

University of Alberta

**Born in the Text: The Bayrouk of Southern Morocco
A Study in History and Identity**

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**A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in
partial fulfillment of the**

Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

In

History

Department of History and Classics

**Edmonton, Alberta
Fall 2004**



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis got to where it is now courtesy of sacrifices made by an inexhaustible number of 'creditors'. I would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Andrew Gow and Dr. Guy Thompson for their tactful guidance and insightful comments. Dr. Thompson shared his insights on modes of identification in a different corner of the globe we call Africa. Dr. Gow regaled me with examples of the role of textuality in the production of "imaginary peoples" and their location beyond the gaze of the author. Drs. Ann McDougall, David Hall, Francis Swyripa (History and Classics) and Sourayan Mookerjea (Sociology) offered helpful comments on an earlier draft of this thesis. The Department of History and Classics, in the person of its former chair, Dr. Robert Smith, and directors of the Graduate Program, Dr. David Johnson and Dr. J.P. Himka trusted me enough to allow me to teach an exceptionally high number of courses. The secretary of the Graduate Program, Lydia Dugbahah, 'covered up' my ineptitude when it comes to electronic registration! My colleagues Sheila Finnie, Mohamed Nouhi and George Colpitts regaled me with tales about the joys and pains of graduate research.

In Rabat (Morocco) I would like to express my gratitude to the archivists at *al-khizana al-a'ma*, Bibliothèque Général et Archives, and its erudite director at the time Dr. Ahmed Toufiq. I was warmly welcomed by Dr. Fatima Harak, Mustafa Naimi and Mujahid of the Institute of African Studies/ University Muhammad V. Dr. Naimi graciously invited me to his home (in Casablanca), 'briefed' me on research in southern Morocco and made copies of the Bayrouk commercial registers and correspondence available to me.

In Agadir I was 'adopted' by the family of my Moroccan colleague and friend Mohamed Nouhi. I would like to thank his gracious brothers Abdullah and Yusuf, his sister Selka and her affable husband Hasan. I also benefited from the wisdom of the academic staff of the Department of History, University of Ibn Zohr. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Shafiq Arfaq and his encyclopedic father. In Gulimeme, I would like to thank the Nouhi friend, Hasan al-Arabi, for his hospitality. I am ever indebted to my generous host for two months, Mohammad Ma al-a'ynayn for insisting that I set 'camp' in the spacious *zawiya* of his grandfather.

Since my arrival in Canada Doris and Dr. Peter Bietenholz have been inexhaustible sources of support. My Sudanese-Canadian friends Dr. Mohamed Shoush and Bakri Osman were always 'there' when I needed them. Last but not least, I am indebted to my wife Amna for taking very good care of me and for leading our sons Foda and Yaseen to 'understand' why I had to miss most of their birthdays! To all of these people and those I have left out, this is the fruit of your goodness.

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CHRONOLOGY: KEY EVENTS AND TEXTS

ERA OF ARAB CONQUEST

661-750: The Umayyad
750-1258: The Abbasids

750s-900s: The Kharijites (Tahert and Sijilmasa)
900s-1040: The Fatimids
988: Ibn Hawqal, *Surat al-ard*
1050s: Hilal/ Sulaym Migration to the Maghrib

BERBER EMPIRES

1030s-1120s: The Almoravids
1130s-1260s: The Almohads
1062: Foundation of Marrakech
1150s: Hilal arrival in Morocco

1250s-1510s: The Marinids
Ibn Battuta (1304-1368), *tuhfat al-nuzar*
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), *al-Ibar*

SHURAFI PERIOD

1510-1650s: The Sa'dians
Mawlai Ahmed al-Masour (r. 1578-1603)
Al-Hassani, *diwan qabail Sus*
1650s-2000s: The Alawites
Mawlai Ismael (r. 1672-1727)
Mawlai Sulayman (r. 1792-1822)
Buhilas Rebellion (1792)
Mawlai Abdul-Rahman (r. 1822-1859)
Bayrouk (r. 1825-1858)
1860: Spanish-Moroccan War
Mawlai al-Hasan (1873-1892)
1912: Morocco become a French protectorate
1930: The *Zaheer Berbere*
Al-Susi's research for *al-Masul* (1936-1944)

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

For transliteration from Arabic (and Berber) to English, I adopted the system of the main publication of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, the University of Muhammad V: *Hesperis Tamuda*. In so far as names of dynasties and places are concerned, however, I retained the transliterations current in Anglophone historiography of the Maghrib: i.e. Marinids, Sa'dians, Marrakech etc. Arabic terms and what they signify in Morocco are explained either on the spot, between brackets and footnotes or in the glossary.

a	آ
b	ب
t	ت
th	ث
j	ج
h	ح
kh	خ
d	د
dh	ذ
r	ر
z	ز
s	س
sh	ش
s	ص
d	ض
t	ط
z	ظ
'	ع
gh	غ
f	ف
q	ق
k	ك
l	ل
m	م
n	ن
h	ه
w	و
y	ي

INTRODUCTION

THE BAYROUK WORLD: SPACE, HISTORY AND IDENTITIES

This dissertation is study of the identity and history of a Southern Moroccan family known as the Bayrouk that became famous in the nineteenth century. The family derives its name from the figure, Bayrouk (r.1825-1858), who epitomized the consolidation of its fame as a commercial and political powerhouse in the Southwestern Moroccan town of Gulimeme. The area surrounding Gulimeme is called Wadi Nun and the people who inhabit it are called the Takna. Gulimeme itself became known because of its transformation by the Bayrouk into an important northern terminus of the fabled Trans-Saharan Trade network, a network that linked northern (al-Maghrib) and sub-Saharan (al-Sudan) Africa. Bayrouk and 'his' town, Gulimeme, became famous in Western Europe via the accounts of survivors of shipwreck awaiting repatriation and then through travelers attracted by the fame of its caravan trade. From an official Moroccan perspective, Gulimeme and the Bayrouk became the center of attention because of the specter of a European hijack of the caravan trade or infringement of Morocco's territorial integrity. Suspicion of the Bayrouk connivance in European trespassing inspired the reigning Moroccan sultan, *Mawlai* al-Hasan (r.1873-1894), to lead two expeditions to Southern Morocco in 1882 and 1886.¹

As a result of the expedition of 1886, Gulimeme was converted into a garrison town and an administrative headquarters for Wadi Nun and its Takna occupants.² Gulimeme's new status was further entrenched during French colonial rule (1912-1956) and after Morocco's independence. The Moroccan reclamation of the Western Sahara from Spain in 1975 and subsequent conflict with the *Polesario* led to the official appellation of Gulimeme as *bawabat al-sahra* (the gateway of the Sahara).³ But notwithstanding the appropriation of their town, the Bayrouk continued to be the leading commercial and political force in Wadi Nun and indeed, have become part of Gulimeme's landscape. They are still the main representatives of the Takna and Wadi Nun at both the provincial and national levels. It was mainly on account of their ability to attract the attention of Moroccan officials and European travelers that the Bayrouk and Gulimeme were also able to carve out for themselves a corner in northwestern African studies, a corner angling between history and social anthropology.⁴

¹*Mawlai* and *Sidi* (Arabic), literally 'my Lord': terms of endearment used to address *shurafa* and *sufi* dignitaries.

²On Mawlai al-Hasan's expeditions to al-Sus see, Ahmed Ibn Khalid al-Nasiri, *kitab al-Istiqsa bi akhbar duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqsa* v.3 (Casablanca: al-mutba' al-malakiya, 1956), 174-182; Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Susi, *Illigh qadiman wa hadithan* (Rabat: al-matba'a al-malakiya, 1966), 277-278; Daniel Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in Southwestern Morocco, 1844-1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1988), 167-195.

³*Polesario*: an acronym for the Popular Front for the Liberation of al-Saqiya al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente Polular Para La Liberacion de aquia el Hamra Y Rio de Oro); see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans: Background to Conflict* (Totwa NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980), 135-142, 247-268.

⁴For examples of references to the Bayrouk in academic treatises see, Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 187-195; Mustafa Naimi, *Le Sahara a travers le pays Takna: histoire des relations commerciales et politiques* (Rabat: Akaz Press, 1988), 177-183; Mustafa Naimi, "The Evolution of the Takna confederation caught between coastal commerce and Trans-Saharan trade," in *Tribe and State: Essays in*

To date, the family name is regularly invoked in academic discourses on the Trans-Saharan Trade, the Moroccan dynastic realm and the terms of their respective interaction with both the localized unit of identification, the *qabila*, and the symbol of religiosity, the *zawiya* (religious lodge).⁵ To synthesize such fractured references to the Bayrouk and Gulimeme or how they mesh with the family's conception of self, its involvement in the Trans-Saharan Trade and its relations with the Moroccan court, requires four things: firstly, we must demarcate the main parameters of the thesis and its contribution to northwestern African studies. Secondly, it is imperative to identify the geographical space that envelops Gulimeme, Wadi Nun, and the community that shares this space with the Bayrouk, the Takna. This is important because it is futile to think of a Bayrouk sense of identity and history without reference to the space the family calls home, Wadi Nun, and the people it calls community, the Takna. Thirdly, to contextualize the thesis itself, I will follow the location of the Bayrouk and the Takna in space and time with a review of the anthropological and historiographical perspectives that inform writing about northwestern Africa and how they mesh with or differ from conventional ethnographic wisdoms and current postmodern/postcolonial theorization of origin and identity. Here, I seek to excavate the textual roots of current academic discourse on Moroccan modes of social existence, and to test their utility to a thesis on the history and identity of the Bayrouk and, by implication, their homeland, Wadi Nun, and community, the Takna. Lastly, I will introduce the sources I intend to use to test the utility of received academic ideas to the project of reporting on and analyzing of the Bayrouk and Takna conceptions of self, and the historical experience and textual traditions underpinning such conceptions. These sections will be capped with a statement on what each chapter in this thesis seeks to establish and what materials I will use for that purpose.

I-Casualties of Translation: Thesis Statement and Contribution

But... kabila has neither the semantic narrowness, nor the negativeness ... of the English term "tribe".
Mazrui and Shariff⁶

Chronologically, the main focus of the thesis is on the nineteenth century. In the course of my discussion of intractable issues such as origin and identity, however, I will

Honour of David Montgomery Hart, ed. E.G. Joffe and C.R. Pennell, (Cambridgeshire: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1991): 213-238, 232-237; Ali al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama' fi al-maghrib: Ait Umran namuzajjan* (Casablanca: matba'at Tugbal, 1989), 107-112; Omar Najih, "Les tribus de Takna: le cas Ait El jamal," in *Les Oasis de Wad Noun, Porte du Sahara marocain: Actes du Colloque* (Agadir: Université Ibn Zohr, 1999): 117-133, 124-126.

⁵*Qabila* (Arabic), (pl. *qabail*): a unit of social and political organization frequently translated as tribe. In current literature tribe is placed between quotation marks: 'tribe'. The qualification is indicative of the concerns surrounding its usage, concerns which I share. To conserve space, however, I will use the term without qualification. *Zawiya*, (plural *zawaya*): site of religious education/ meditation and a matrix for political, social and economic activities. The term is often translated as religious lodge, a translation that also implies a separation between the sacred and secular domains. In Moroccan usage, there is no such distinction. On this 'problem' of translation, see Abdellah Hammoudi, "The reinvention of Dar Al-mulk: The Moroccan Political System and its Legitimation," in *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco*, ed. Susan G. Miller and Rahma Bourqia (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129-175.

⁶Alamin M. Mazrui and Ibrahim N. Shariff, *The Swahili: Idiom and Identity of an African People* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc, 1994), 6.

venture beyond the nineteenth century because that is the most fruitful way to confront the existing authorial explanations of where the Takna and the Bayrouk came from. Topically, my discussion revolves around the major historical agents that frequently invade the Takna and the Bayrouk narratives, and are indeed the staples of current academic discourses on northwestern African history: the transnational dynasty and the caravan, and the localized *qabila* and *zawiya*. Firstly, the dynasty is the mega-establishment that claimed rights in the physical space which envelops the area the Bayrouk and the Takna call their homeland, Morocco as a whole and Wadi Nun in particular.⁷ Among other things, we can use dynastic succession to test the validity of the extant authorial conceptions of the relation between being Takna and infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. Secondly, I use the caravan as a metaphor for the Trans-Saharan Trade system, a system that serviced the space successive Moroccan dynasties sought to control. The quest for access to the caravan occupies center stage in academic explanations of the Bayrouk career, their place amongst the Takna and why they began to attract the attention of European traders and, by default, Moroccan authorities. Thirdly, *qabila* is the Arabic unit of identification used by the Bayrouk to enunciate the congruity of living in Wadi Nun with being 'authentic' Takna. An understanding of the subtlety of *qabila* identity is indispensable for a consideration of the Bayrouk role in the caravan trade and the terms of their relation to the Takna and interaction with the Moroccan court. Finally, the *zawiya* was the self-proclaimed exemplifier of spirituality and sanctified power in Wadi Nun, and in that capacity it was in a position to influence the status of the *qabila* on the spot and the terms of its interaction with the dynasty and the caravan.

Whether as the tangible agencies of northwestern African historical experience or the main discursive matrices of the current academic representations of that experience, neither the trans-national dynasty and the caravan nor the localized *qabila* and the *zawiya* were born in the nineteenth century. Metaphorically, their genesis can be traced back to the Arab conquest of North Africa in the Seventh century. The nineteenth century, however, witnessed significant global changes that influenced the role of these agencies in northwestern African life. It is worth recalling that the nineteenth century was the moment of the Industrial and Liberal Revolutions in Europe, the revolutions whose genesis can be traced back to the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Whereas industrialization spawned notable shifts in the balance of power and terms of trade between Europe and Africa, the Liberal Revolutions radicalized the simultaneous rupture in European conceptions of origin and history and, hence, their relation to and terms of interaction with, to borrow from Eric Wolf, "the people without history."⁸ Needless to say that European sense of positional superiority *vis-a-vis* "the people without history" also inspired the production of an ethnological history that turns this contingent disparity into a fulfillment of a pre-ordained order of things. Suffice it to

⁷"Compared to other Maghribi (Muslim North African) and Middle Eastern states," Miller and Bourquia recently wrote, "the Moroccan political system has preserved a remarkable constancy over time. Since the early ninth century, Morocco has been more or less continuously ruled by a sultan-king who has monopolized the levers of government." Susan G. Miller and R. Bourquia, "An Introduction to the Discussion," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, ed. Miller and Bourquia, 1-14, 1-2.

⁸Eric Robert Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)

note how the 'burial' of what Martin Bernal has called the "old model" of the European conception of the genesis of (western) civilization and, hence, "the fabrication of ancient Greece", intersected with what Edward Said and V.Y. Mudimbe dubbed the 'orientalization' of the "Orient" and the "invention of Africa" respectively.⁹ Seen as signifiers of the congruity of what Michel Foucault aptly called "power and knowledge," the Industrial and Liberal Revolutions can also be credited with the spawning of nationalism and imperialism. Imperialism, in turn, inspired what came to be known as "the scramble for Africa."¹⁰ In so far as colonial propagandists were concerned, "the scramble for Africa" was intended to eradicate slave trading, infidelity and, in the process, to confer on the 'benighted' African the benefits of "legitimate trade." "Legitimate trade" became a metaphor for the European quest for fodder for their factories: raw materials.¹¹

Firstly, in so far as northwestern Africa is concerned, the "scramble for Africa" was heralded by the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 and subsequent defeat of Morocco in 1844. These two setbacks were further compounded by the Moroccan military and territorial losses to Spain in 1860.¹² Secondly, as demonstrations of the weakness of the Moroccan dynastic realm, these defeats were reinforced by a shift in European perceptions of the caravan trade that sustained it. The classical idealization of the caravan as a medium of what Edward Bovill nostalgically called "the golden trade of the Moors" gave way to its depiction by abolitionists as a Trojan horse for traffic in slaves across the Sahara.¹³ Thirdly, Morocco's failure to fend off European pressure in the north, the Mediterranean basin, and seeming inability to stop the so-called "caravans of slaves" in the south, the Sahara, led to a shift in European perceptions of the southernmost limits of the Moroccan dynastic realm. Fervent explorers and abolitionists like the British John Davidson (1835) and James Richardson (1844), and agents of imperial expansion such as the French governor of Senegal, Colonel Louis Faidherbe (1854), represented southern Morocco as a den of "free" tribes and "saints". Befittingly, they situated the Bayrouk community, the Takna, outside the jurisdiction of the

⁹Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization*, v.1 *The Fabrication of Ancient Greece* (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); V.J. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994)

¹⁰On the relation between power and knowledge see, Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*, (New York: Pantheon, 1973); Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, trans. ed. Colin Gordon et al, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

¹¹On the "scramble for Africa" see, *The Scramble for Africa: Causes and Dimensions of Empire*, ed. Raymond Betts, (Lexington: Heath, 1972); Thomas Packenham, *The Scramble for Africa* (New York: Random House, 1991); on the transition from slave to "legitimate" trade, see *From Slave Trade to "Legitimate" Commerce: The Commercial Transition in Nineteenth-Century West Africa*, ed. Robin Law, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

¹²See, Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 248-272, 297-314

¹³Edward William Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995). This text was originally published as *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933).

Moroccan court.¹⁴ The simultaneous reinvention of the object of the caravan and the location of the domain of the *qabila*, as tribe, and the *zawiya*, as "saint," outside the Moroccan dynastic realm were duly adopted by erudite French colonial ethnographers such as Robert Montagne and, indeed, continue to reverberate in post-colonial anthropological and historiographical discourses on northwestern Africa.¹⁵

To date academics usually imagine the Bayrouk place in history in terms of their role in the caravan trade and their political status, as tribal chiefs, *vis-a-vis* an enfeebled Moroccan dynastic realm. "Until the end of the nineteenth century", historian Daniel Schroeter recently (1992) wrote,

the supply of slaves in Morocco was maintained by the trans-Saharan caravan ... The routes the caravans took from the southern entrepôts depended on the political powers in the Sous (southwestern Morocco). In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the large caravans passed through Guolimeme, controlled by Shaykh Bayrouk, the powerful chief who dominated Oued Noun ... By this time, Guolimeme had become an important collection point for the southern Moroccan caravans ... Davidson reported in 1836 that four caravans, each carrying between 300 and 1,000 slaves, left Goulmime annually. This suggests that about 2,000 slaves passed through Goulmime each year, but if all routes were included the total number could have been twice as high.¹⁶

In contrast, historians Tony Hodges (w.1982) and C.R. Pennell (w.2000) suggested a direct relation between the inability of the central Moroccan government, the *Makhzan*, to curb European encroachment in the north and its failure to rein local powerhouses in the south such as the Bayrouk.¹⁷ By weakening the economic matrix of Morocco's political independence, pressure by industrial Europe also contributed to the emergence of autonomous tribal entities in the southern part of the country. Here too, European travelers and consuls are called in as witnesses of the Bayrouk independence. "A much more immediate threat to the Makhzan's trade monopoly," Pennell noted,

¹⁴John Davidson arrived in Gulimeme late in 1835 with the hope of enlisting Bayrouk's help to get to Timbuctu. James Richardson was the envoy of the abolitionist "Society of English Gentlemen" to Morocco in 1844. He tried to travel to Gulimeme but was, ostensibly, discouraged by the British Consulate in Essaouira. Colonel Louis Faidherbe was appointed governor of the French Colony of Senegal in 1854. He did not visit Gulimeme either. But he was still able to report on the Bayrouk and Takna status in relation to the Moroccan dynastic realm. John Davidson, *Notes Taken During Travels in Africa* (London: J.L. Cox and Sons, 1839); James Richardson, *Travels in Morocco, two volumes* (London: Charles Skeet Publishers, 1860); Loius Faidherbe, "Renseignements géographiques sur les parties du Sahara comprise entre l'Oued Noun et le soudan," *Novelles Annales des Voyages*, Tome 3, (1859): 129-156.

¹⁵Robert Montagne, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le sud Maroc* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1930); Robert Montagne, *The Berbers: Their Political and Social life*, trans. David Seddon, (London: Frank Cass, 1973).

¹⁶Daniel J. Schroeter, "Slave Markets and slavery in Moroccan Urban Society," in *The Human Commodity: Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade*, ed. Elizabeth Savage, (London: Frank Cass, 1992): 185-213, 187-89.

¹⁷*Makhzan* (Arabic): literally, 'store' or 'warehouse'. *Balad* (Arabic): land, domain: The term *Makhzan* is a metaphor for the Moroccan central government and the space it controls; on the history behind the term, see Ibrahim Harakat, "al-ajhiza al-siyasiya al-markaziya lada al-makhzan al-Sa'di," *majalat kuli al-adab*, 11, (1985): 7-30.

came from the fringes of Morocco. In the far south, Shaykh Bayruk at Guelmin... started trading with Europeans through intermediaries, often Jewish. Bayruk contracted first the British traveler John Davidson and then the French Consul Jacques Delaporte, both of whom hoped to see their countries trading with Timbuctu. ... European merchants found that Bayrouk was a kindred spirit whose thoughts on trade and government ... had strong utilitarian ring. The sultan disliked uncontrolled trading because it undercut the Makhzan's commercial operations and undermined his power ... He said it was an innovation and therefore a heresy, but he was unable to rein Bayrouk himself.¹⁸

In travel accounts and current academic treatises, the existence of the Tekna as a "free" tribal entity often comes across as a pre-condition for the emergence of the Bayrouk as an autonomous slave cartel or political powerhouse.

The nineteenth century, then, was not merely a moment of major ruptures that must be taken into consideration in a study of the career of a Moroccan family like the Bayrouk. Rather, the nineteenth century is also the cradle of the abolitionist humanism and, to borrow from Mudimbe, the "sagas of exploration" lurking beneath the robust textual tradition that continues to influence writing about Africa in general and northwestern Africa in particular. "More than any thing else, perhaps" the Comaroffs (w.1992) wrote,

abolitionism subsumed the great debates and discourses of the age. For it raised all the crucial issues involved in the contested relationship between European and Other, savagery and civilization, free labour and servitude, man and commodity; the ideological stuff, that is, from which a liberal hegemony was being made.¹⁹

The textual tradition this "liberal hegemony" has spawned is at the root of some of the problems of conception and translation I seek to critique; and in so doing I also hope to establish the contribution of this thesis to African history. My overall contention is that the existing ethnographic and historiographical presentations of the Bayrouk and their large, Northwest African and small, Takna communities, tend to blur the role of some deeply-entrenched (European and Moroccan) traditions of signification in the fostering of not only what we know about the history of the space they call home, Wadi Nun, but also in the postulation of the origins and identities of its past and present occupants.²⁰ What is more, the Bayrouk and the Takna narratives reveal an awareness of the written and, contrary to the conventional ethnographic wisdom, tend to use this textual

¹⁸C.R. Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830, A history* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 45-46; Tony Hodges, *Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara* (Metuchen, N.J and London: Scarecrow Press, 1982), 61-62.

¹⁹Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, v.1 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87.

²⁰Following Geertz, I conflate ethnography with (social) anthropology. "In anthropology, or any way social anthropology," he noted, "what practioners do is ethnography." Clifford Geertz, "Thick Descriptions: Towards an Interpretative Theory of Culture," In Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 3-30, 5.

knowledge to stake a claim to the space they inhabit and the history that seems to make this claim stick.

Thematically, the thesis focuses on what I take as the three main problems of conception and translation that continue to influence academic discourses on northwestern Africa. The first problem stems from the Africanist theorization of the central object of the caravan in the nineteenth century and, by implication, postulations of the career of southern Moroccan powerhouses like the Bayrouk. Africanists posited slaves as the main cargo of the caravan, a proposition rooted in abolitionist humanism. The second problem is the glaring gap that separates the Moroccan and Africanist conceptions of the relation between the dynastic realm, the center, and the domain of the southern Moroccan *qabila* and *zawiya*, the margin. Africanists adopted the notion of tribal autonomy conceived by travelers and upheld by colonial ethnographers. The third problem revolves around the question of identification in general and, more specifically, the utility of the invidious translation of the Arabic term *qabila* into the English tribe or the French *tribu*, the translation that further shores up the notion of the autonomous tribe. My working assumption is that a resolution of these problems of conception and translation will also help us to rectify the discrepancy between the Africanist conversion of the Bayrouk community, the Takna, into autonomous tribes and their simultaneous location in the same space frequented by the caravan and coveted by the dynasty. As we will see, these were the kind of 'civilizing' agents which anthropologists traditionally posit as scourges of the primitive, tribal, condition.

Firstly, the abolitionists' association of the caravan with slave trading remains the bedrock of the current Africanist conception of what southern Moroccan traders like the Bayrouk were up to. I argue that fixation on the centrality of slaves to caravan trading is the main thread that binds both the proposition of a decline in its volume advocated by post-colonial historians such as Adu Boahen in the 1960s and the recent return to the abolitionist model by historians like Ralph Austin (w.1992) and, in so far as the Bayrouk are concerned, Daniel Schroeter.²¹ My main contention is that by secularizing the abolitionist projection of the cargo of the caravan, the academic proponents of this model also ignored the role of ideology in the production of numbers. It was precisely because of his invocation of wallowing in slave trading to chastise his *Moorish* (Muslim) other that the *Nazarene* (Christian) abolitionist was also able to circumvent the glaring discrepancy between the sizeable numbers of 'African' bodies the caravans had allegedly dumped on Gulimeme and the absorptive capacity of their host society. In this regard, the thesis provides recognizable human faces to a commercial system which is, as we will see, invariably imagined in terms of inanimate structures and quantifiable commodities: trade routes, means of transportation, caravanserai, exotic merchandize and their value or volume. The Bayrouk case suggests that the caravan survived mainly because of its ability to cater to the same modern European demands underlying the notion of "legitimate trade"—quest for raw materials.

²¹Adu Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan: 1788-1861* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 103-131; Ralph A. Austin, "The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade: A Tentative Census," in *The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade*, ed. H. Gemery and J. Hogendorn, (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 23-76; Ralph Austin, "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade: A Tentative Census in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage, 214-248; Schroeter, "Slave Markets and Slavery in Moroccan Urban Society," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage, 185-213.

Secondly, the location of the *qabila* and the *zawiya* beyond the dynastic realm popularized by colonial ethnographers and endorsed by post-colonial anthropologists and historians tends to blur the role of travel accounts in the propagation of this mythology. It also underestimates the significance Moroccan sultans had attached to the Trans-Saharan Trade and, in effect, blurs the secular and sacred leverages they used to control the environs of caravanserais like Gulimeme. By demoting the *qabila* to a primitive tribe and the guardian of the *zawiya* to a "saint," post-colonial anthropologists and historians were also able to endow them with romantic notions of "independence," autarky and egalitarianism and, in the process, overlooked their hankering after wealth and involvement in 'high-politics': namely long-distance (caravan) trading and collusion or collision with the court. The Bayrouk case provides us with a concrete example of how involvement in the caravan trade also spawned dependency on markets and suppliers that were either under the control of the court or could not have been accessed without its permission.

Finally, in the realm of identification, I seek to highlight the conceptual imprecision of the term tribe and to consider whether it belongs in the primordialist conception of identification as a reflex of "natural givens" of social existence advanced by thinkers like Clifford Geertz or in the postmodern critique of this vision and adumbration of the conditionality of social attachment championed by theorists such as Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall.²² I argue that colonial ethnographers like the British Evans-Pritchard and his French counterpart, Robert Montagne, used the African tribe as a metaphor for the primitive other and, as such, tribalism became meaningful precisely because it validated their advertisement of Europe as the bastion of civilization.²³ It is precisely because of this "controversial" past that the meaning of tribe continued to elude post-colonial anthropologists who sought to redefine the term and redeem the discipline it ostensibly, spawned, anthropology.²⁴ "Controversial though the matter is" Aidan Southhall wrote back in 1970,

the most generally acceptable characteristics of a tribal society are perhaps that it is a whole society, with a high degree of self-sufficiency at a near subsistence level, based on a relatively simple technology without writing or literature, politically autonomous and with its own distinctive language, culture and sense

²² Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," In Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*: 255-310; Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994); Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs Identity," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, (London: Sage Publications, 1997): 1-17.

²³ See Montagne, *The Berbers*, 21-25; Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 5-6.

²⁴ According to Geertz, anthropology is "a science born in Indian tribes, Pacific Islands and African lineages and subsequently seized with grander ambitions." "For anthropologists," Aidan Southhall noted, "this (dispensation with tribe) involves a poignant dilemma. Their whole discipline has been reared upon the discovery and study of forms of culture and society which held up a contrasting mirror to their own." Clifford Geertz, "Thick Descriptions," in *Readings for A History of Anthropological Theory*, ed. Paul Erickson and L. Murphy, (Lancashire: Broadview Press, 2001):, 332-356, 347; Aidan W. Southhall, "The Illusion of Tribe," in *Perspectives on Africa, A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation*, ed. Roy R. Grinker and Christopher B. Steiner, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000 Reprint): 38-51, 49. The full text of this article was first published in *The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa*, ed. Peter Gutkind, (Leiden: Brill, 1970): 28-50.

of identity, tribal religion being also coterminous with tribal society. Some would insist on further differentiation of the tribal level of social and cultural organization, on the one hand, from the very small-scale band level characteristic of hunting and gathering peoples without agriculture, and on the other, from state or state-like organizations found at the upper limit of scale and complexity within the range of non-literate societies.²⁵

If we take this summation of conventional anthropological wisdom as our point of reference, it becomes imperative to wonder how living with the caravan, the dynasty and the *zawiya* in Morocco can be reconciled with notions like "self-sufficiency," political autonomy, "tribal religion," "distinctive culture" and being "without writing or literature"?

I suggest that entrapment in what is essentially a textual tradition goes a long way towards an explanation of the Africanist inclination to equate the Moroccan *qabila* with the "non-literate" tribe and, by default, to locate it in binary opposition to the dynastic realm (the 'den' of universal religion and the destination of the caravan). Here, the contribution of the thesis centers on my invocation of pre-modern Moroccan history to demonstrate how a set of identity designations was suggested for extinct *qabila* occupants of the same space now inhabited by the Bayrouk's community, the Takna. Using classical Arabic texts, I will seek to clarify when and under what historical circumstances the term Takna became a portable identity for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun and whether it was possible for either its carriers or their predecessors for that matter to elude the dynasties and caravans that invaded their space or the *zawaya* that shared this space with them. Herein I will first locate the Takna and the Bayrouk, the *qabila*, in space and sketch the place of the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan in their own visions of origin and history. I will then show how deference to received traditions of signification shaped both Moroccan and Africanist conceptions of the place of the dynasty, the caravan and the *qabila* (tribe) in northwestern African historical experience. This expose will give us a preview of the potential epistemological mismatch between what, in the light of variables like geographical location alone, is historically conceivable for groups like the Takna and for the concepts anthropologists and historians currently use to grade their social institutions and practices.

II-Rights of Domicile, Rites of Origin: Space and its Occupants

I have already noted how Mawlai al-Hasan's designation of Gulimeme as a garrison town in 1886 has also set the stage for the mapping out of its hinterland, Wadi Nun, into a bounded administrative unit, *muhafaza* (province). The conversion of Wadi Nun to a name of a bounded province, however, tends to blur a much older use of the same term as a signifier for a seasonal stream that originates beyond the eastern confines of the current province and then negotiates its way to the Atlantic shore in the west at the town of Asaka. As an antique site of domicile, Wadi Nun, or what was historically known as *al-Sus*

²⁵Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," in *Perspectives on Africa*, 38; Jack Goody used "lack of writing or literature" to locate tribe outside the "national state". "It would be impossible," he noted, "to imagine ... a purely oral tribal population within a national state." Jack Goody, *The Power of the Written Tradition* (London-Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 134.

al-Aqsa (the Far Sus), can best be located in terms of difference from and similarity to its beyond. From the north and south, Wadi Nun intersects with the Anti-Atlas Mountain and the Western Sahara, namely, al-Saqiya al-Hamra. From the east and west, Wadi Nun is hemmed between the Tamanart desert and the Atlantic Ocean—see map 1. As an ecological zone, Wadi Nun is haunted by a rather erratic climate, a climate that reflects its entrapment by the arid Sahara from the south and east, the Anti-Atlas Mountain in the north and the Atlantic Ocean in the west. While it has an autumn, the duration and output of its rainy season are subject to sharp fluctuations and, indeed, frequently give way to prolonged bouts of drought. These climatic fluctuations also account for Wadi Nun's propensity to host both agrarian and pastoral modes of social existence. In the nineteenth century, its landscape was dotted with agrarian settlements, *qusur*, hemmed around sources of water called *wahat* (oases).²⁶ These *wahat* were, in turn, interspersed with arid backyards which were often utilized as seasonal pasture. The disadvantage of proximity to the arid Sahara was, however, ameliorated by the windfalls of mediation in the Trans-Saharan Trade. Access to the caravan trade also turned Wadi Nun into an attractive site of domicile. These differences in modes of social existence left their imprint on Takna patterns of domicile and, in effect, their conception of the relation between history, spatiality and identity.

In the nineteenth century, the Takna occupied a rather extensive space straddling Wadi Nun in the north and the Western Sahara in the south. The Takna subscribed to the use of the Arabic term *qabila* or its Berber derivative, *taqbilt*, as an intelligible unit of self-identification, the terms currently translated into the French *tribu* and the English *tribe*. The invocation of *qabila* as a meaningful boundary-marker enabled the proponents of *Takna-ness* and academics to endow its carriers with an ancient, albeit stunted history. Discursively, this history also seems to validate the mapping out of Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra as *trab Takna* (Taknaland). The Takna sense of historicity and spatiality, however, tends to betray their prolonged encounters with the two historical agencies that also claimed rights in the space they occupy, the dynasty and the *zawiya*. According to the French colonial ethnographer Vincent Monteil (w.1948) and the post-colonial Moroccan sociologist Mustafa Naimi (w.1988), for example, the Takna "by blood" are the descendants of a purported deputy of the Almoravid dynasty (1030s-1120s) called Osman Ibn (son of) Menda. "Les Tekna de sang," Monteil wrote,

Ce sont les Tekna par définition: la descendance (au moins symbolique) de l'ancestre eponyme Atman Ben Menda, khalifa almoravide d' Abdullah Ben Yasin (xle siecle.) ils se divisent en deux groupes, dont l'origine remonte aux fils d' Atman : lahsen, Bella, et Lgazi.²⁷

²⁶ *Qusur* (Arabic), plural of *qasr*: literally, palace. In Northwest African parlance the term *qasr* denotes an agrarian settlement centered around a reliable source of water called *waha*, metaphorically, oasis.

²⁷ Vincent Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna* (Paris: Editions Larose, 1948), 10; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 78. The idea was borrowed from the French ethnographer Frederic De La Chapelle. Neither De La Chapelle nor Monteil and Naimi, however, revealed the identity of their informants or the text that mentions an Almoravid deputy called Ibn Menda. Frédéric C. De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain, étude géographique, historique et sociologique," *Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique française et du Maroc* (B.C.A.F.M.), (1930): 21-35, 33.

This postulation of an originary identity is, however, contradicted by subaltern Takna narratives that explain the social birth of their major constituencies in terms of "service" (*khidma*) to named *Shurafa* sultans, the dynasty, or *sufi* savants, the *zawiya*.

In contrast to the purported affinity to the 'ancient' Almoravids, the dynasts frequently mentioned in the Takna narratives are mostly from the two rather 'modern' *Shurafa* dynasties, the Sa'dians (1510s-1650s) and the Alawites (1650s-2000s). In comparison, the *sufi* figures incarcerated in the Takna historical memory are also the named founders of the famous *zawaya* centers and *mausems* (annual markets) of Wadi Nun and its environs. The *zawaya* centers in question include the families of Sidi Muhammad Ibn Amr in Asrir (13th century), Sidi Yazi (1248-1326) in Asa, Sidi Muhammad *al-Tamanarti* (1465-1563) in Tamanart and Sidi Ahmed Ibn Musa *al-Simlali* (1440s-1563) in the Anti-Atlas, Illigh—see map 1.²⁸ These *zawaya* families were well known for their involvement in the caravan trade as well as the frequency of their interventions in the relations between the people of Wadi Nun and the sultans of their times. None of the extant narratives of these *zawaya* families, however, seconds the idea of descent from or contemporaneity to the Almoravid deputy Monteil and Naimi have alluded to. Nevertheless, the advertisement of an endogenous descent for the Takna enabled French colonial ethnographers such as Frederic de la Chapelle (w.1930) and Monteil as well as post-colonial Moroccan sociologists like Mustafa Naimi and Ali Najib (w.1985) to locate all of the major constituents of the Takna in terms of their subscription to one of two *qabila* constellations called *Leffs* (alignments): the *Ait Osman*, Bella, and the *Ait Jamal*, al-Ghazi.²⁹ The constituents of the *Ait Osman* were concentrated in the eastern and relatively verdant part of *trab Takna*. In contrast, members of the *Ait Jamal* constellation veered towards the western, and relatively arid, part of *trab Takna* that also runs parallel to the Atlantic coast from Wadi Nun in the north to al-Saqiya al-Hamra in the south. The Bayrouk identified with an *Ait Jamal qabila* called the Ait Musa U'Ali and interacted with the guardians of the aforementioned *zawaya*, specially the families of Sidi Ibn Amr (Asrir), Sidi Ibn Musa *al-Simlali* (Illigh) and Sidi Ibn Ibrahim (Tamanart).

The family conception of self as Ait Musa Takna seems to complement the existing authorial attribution of its fame to Bayrouk's commercial and political conquests in the course of the nineteenth century. Like the subaltern Takna narratives, however, the Bayrouk vision of 'the beginning' tends to discourage any attempt to infer an infinite linkage with either the Takna or the *sufi* founders of their *mausems*. The Bayrouk sense of identity, for example, is enshrined in an individuated family

²⁸On Sidi Ahmed Ibn Musa (Illigh) and the *zawaya* of Tamanart see, al-Susi, *Illigh*, 17-27; on Sidi Ibn Amr of Asrir see, Ahmad Joumani, "Les Saints et le sacré dans la vallée d'Assrir: contribution à l'histoire sociale de Oued Noun," In *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 321-342; on Sidi Yazi and the *zawiya* of Asa see, Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.10, (Casablanca: al-Mutba'a al-Malakiya, 1960), 166-214; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 5.

²⁹Ait: the *Shilha* (Berber) equivalent of the Arabic terms *Banu*, *awlad*-- progeny or people of. For tabulations of the constituents of the two Takna *Leffs* see, F. De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain," *Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique française et du Maroc* (B.C.A.F.M.), (1930): 21-35; Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 6-8; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 134-138, 147-149; Ali Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna Society* (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 1985). 19-25.

genealogy (*nasab*), affiliation with the Ait Musa Takna and domicile in Wadi Nun. These are the main tenets of what is called *nisba* (or *nasab*) in Arabic.³⁰ The family narrative locates the first named ancestor, Sulayman Ibn Ali, outside Wadi Nun and, indeed, beyond the immediate vicinity of *trab Takna* as a whole—i.e. Wadi Nun and the Western Sahara. According to the Bayrouk narrative, Sulayman Ibn Ali lived in the sixteenth century in the well-known group of *wahat* (oases) called Tuwat. Tuwat is located in what is now southwestern Algeria. In the late sixteenth century and, implicitly, during the reign of the famous *Sa'dian* dynast Mawlai Ahmad al-Mansur (r.1578-1603), his only named grandson, Yusuf Ibn Abdullah (Ibn Sulayman), left Tuwat for Wadi Nun. The genealogy (*nisba*) that enshrines this discrepancy between migration from Tuwat and identification with the Takna of Wadi Nun includes twelve named ancestors. But the Bayrouk history revolves around the careers of three of Yusuf's named descendants, *Shaykh* Muhammad Ibn Saud, Ubaydallah Ibn Salem and Bayrouk himself.³¹

Shaykh Ibn Saud is the immediate grandson of Yusuf and, purportedly, a contemporary of the well-known Alawite sultan Mawlai Ismael (r. 1672-1727). In the Bayrouk narrative, Ibn Saud comes across as a pious man and his fame is invoked to establish an eighteenth-century genesis for the family career in the nineteenth century. Through the discovery of water where none had supposedly existed before, Ibn Saud reportedly rescued "a government army" from death by thirst in the Western Sahara and, in the process, also put the family name on the map. Ubaydallah was the fourth descendent of Ibn Saud. In comparison to his pious ancestor, however, he comes across as the wily politician and caravan trader who engineered the ascendancy of Gulimeme in the early nineteenth century. In 1792, Wadi Nun was engulfed in a revolt that also overlapped with the succession dispute leading to the coronation of Ubaydallah's royal contemporary, the Alawite sultan Mawlai Sulayman (r.1792-1822): the *Buhilas* rebellion.³² Ubaydallah reportedly contested a decision made by the reigning leader of the Ait Musa, who was also his brother in law, Ahmed al-Hiri, to side with the rebel called *Buhilas* against Mawlai Sulayman's local partisans. In the face of initial successes by *Buhilas*'s partisans, Ubaydallah reportedly fled to "*al-Sudan*" (the Niger-Senegal basin) and did not return to Wadi Nun until the suppression of that revolt. Upon his return, he assumed the leadership of both the Ait Musa *qabila* and the Ait Jamal Leff, and forthwith staged the 'structural adjustments' leading to the elevation of Gulimeme from an obscure hamlet to the main destination of caravans in southwestern Morocco. In that sense, it was the spiritual and temporal achievements ascribed to Ibn

³⁰*Nisba* also *nasab*, (Arabic, pl. *ansab*): genealogy or pedigree. *Nisba* is usually the list of paternal ancestors, their sites of domicile or *qabila* affiliates beginning with the most recent and leading backwards to the last known ancestor. On *nisba* see, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. Dirweech al-Juwaydi, (Beirut: al-matba'a al-a'sryia, 1995), 122-124; Ali Sidqi, "al-nasab wa Ibn Khaldun," *majalat kuli al-adab*, 11, (1985): 47-83; Abas Ibn Ibrahim al-Marrakechi, *al-i'alam bi-man hala Marrakech wa Aghmat min al-a'lam* (Fez: al-matba'a al-jadida, 1936), 149-151.

³¹Al-Susi, *al-masul*: v.19, 273-283; Muhammad al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra wa Wadi al-Dhahab* (Casablanca: dar al-kitab, n.d), 176-185.

³²On Mawlai Sulayman see, Mohammed El-Mansour, *Morocco in the Reign of Mawlai Sulayman* (Wisbech: Middle Eastern and North African Studies Press, 1990)

Saud and Ubaydallah that paved the way for the Bayrouk success in the nineteenth century.

Here, even if we ignore the distant demographic history of Wadi Nun, the frequent invocation of encounters with sultans, journeying to "al-Sudan" and piety forces us to wonder how the Takna conception of self can be reconciled with the ethnographic notion of the "non-literate" and autonomous tribe? Firstly, the idea of migration from Tuwat subverts the prospect of infinite nativity to Wadi Nun and frustrates the proposition of being Takna as an inevitable identity for the Bayrouk. Conversely, the claim of an originary identity for the Takna, the notion of descent from Osman Ibn Menda, is undermined by narratives of origin that, like the Bayrouk one, tend to dwell on displacement and, as such, suggest what Stuart Hall aptly called "suturing and articulation" as the twin methods behind the structuring of the Takna as a bounded *qabila* ensemble.³³ I use "suturing" to emphasize the deliberation underlying the stitching of separate parts into a composite whole. Conceptually, I posit "suturing and articulation" as the constitutive other of the idea of "segmentation" deployed by colonial and post-colonial ethnographers like Evans-Pritchard and Ernest Gellner to convert tribe to a den of ineffable social attachment.³⁴ The constituents of the Takna ensemble are devoid of a "distinct culture" that sets them apart from their neighbors. Indeed, the idea that the Takna *qabila* ensemble is a manifestation of how originary identities operate in real life tends to blur the process of "articulation" undertaken by the same agencies that claimed rights in the space they call home and as a result, came to occupy center-stage in the Takna conception of origin and history: the dynasty and the *zawiya*. The Takna are, for instance, bereft of a unitary *nisba* (genealogy), "a distinctive language," a "tribal religion" or a uniform pigmentation that could warrant their investiture with a common origin. Like most southern Moroccan *qabila* formations, the Takna adhered to (*Sunni*) Islam, spoke Arabic or *Shilha* (Berber) and deferred to *zawaya* families whose histories often predate those of their *qabila* hosts. In the same way that their site of domicile, Wadi Nun, is hemmed by spaces that share its ecological characteristics, the Takna were 'besieged' by *qabila* constellations that, figuratively, contested their speech, and *zawaya* centers and *mausems* (markets). These *qabila* constellations include the *Herbil* in the east, Tamanart, the *Ait Umran* in the west, the Atlantic coast, the *Majat* in the north, the Anti Atlas, and the Saharan *Rgaybat* and *Tajakant* in the south—see map II.

Secondly, the Bayrouk vision of the relation between history and identity tends to correspond to that of their Takna brethren. It also highlights the importance of the notions of piety, encounter with (*Shurafa*) sultans, and caravan trading, to the location of the family ancestors in space and time. It is, for example, inconceivable that Ibn Saud, Ubaydallah or Bayrouk himself could have earned spot in history if it were not for their purported service to the dynasty or involvement in what Moroccan literati nostalgically refer to as "*tijarat al-Sudan*" (the *sudan* trade): the Trans-Saharan Trade. What underline the Bayrouk and the Takna conceptions of self as a coherent *qabila*,

³³Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs Identity", in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Hall and Du Gay, 1-17.

³⁴Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institution of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940); Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967).

then, are not so much the notions of common origin, autonomy or autarky. Rather, it is the fact of domicile in the same space coveted by the dynasty and the *zawiya*, and frequented by the caravan that made the Takna who they are. In the realm of discourse, for example, it is the entwinement of being Ait Musa or Takna, with 'living in Gulimeme or Wadi Nun that occupies center-stage in the Bayrouk conception of self as well as their portrayal by nineteenth century European travelers, Saharan pilgrims and Moroccan literati, and more recently professional academics.

The main thread that binds the Bayrouk sense of self and their perception by others, therefore, is the idea of belonging to a bounded *qabila* that shared its space with *zawaya* families and was entrapped between the dynasty from the north and the caravan from the south. This obviation of the family origin, the past, in favor of the sense of belonging to an extant *qabila*, the present, is the most salient feature in Bayrouk's own presentation of self: Bayrouk Ibn Ubaydallah Ibn Salem the *Gulimemi* (of Gulimeme) and *Musalawi* (from the Ait Musa) or the *Wadnuni* (of Wadi Nun) and *Takni* (from the Takna). Yet, the introduction of the Bayrouk as part of a bounded community (the Ait Musa of Gulimeme or the Takna of Wadi Nun) was usually made in the context of interaction with the Moroccan court and mediation in the caravan trade. The seemingly *inherent* or stable in the Bayrouk identity, the *nisba*, then is intertwined with the temporal activities that generated the family fame and, hence, brought them to our attention in the first place like caravan trading, leadership of *qabila* and encounters with Shurafa dynasts. To schematize the kind of identity possible for the Bayrouk, therefore, it is imperative to sketch how the three main pillars of their notion of self, the dynasty, the caravan and the *qabila*, have to date been presented in the historiography of Northwest Africa.

III-Pillars of Identification: Dynasty, Caravan and *Qabila*

History is perhaps the conservative discipline par excellence. Hayden White³⁵

It is not a novelty to posit the trio of the dynasty, the caravan and the *qabila* as the most enduring subjects of authorial discourses on northwest Africa: the Maghrib (Algeria and Morocco) in the north and *Bilad al-Sudan* (the Land of the Blacks) in the south. To date, Africanists have not contested Michael Brett's thirty-years-old advertisement of the importance of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) "to the argument of historians and sociologists alike."³⁶ In the *muqadimmah* (introduction) to the text that

³⁵Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse, Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 28.

³⁶Michael Brett, "Problems in the interpretation of the history of the Maghrib in the light of some recent publications: review article," *Journal of African History*, XIII, 3, (1972): 489-506, 493; Ernest Gellner elevated Ibn Khaldun to a "grand Mufti of the anthropologists." Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 61. For similar tributes to Ibn Khaldun see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 16-17; Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc, 1997) 116-118; for examples of Moroccan invocation of Ibn Khaldun, see Ahmed Taoufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi fi-l-qarn al-tas'ashr: Inultan* (Rabat: manshurat kuliat al-adab, jami'at Muhammad al-Khamis, 1983); Mohamed Kably, *Société, pouvoir et religion au Maroc 'a la fin du Moyen age* (Paris: Larose, 1986); Mohamed Kably, "Legitimacy of state power and socioreligious Variations in Medieval Morocco," *In The Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco*, ed. Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 17-29.

made him famous, *kitab al-Ibar*, Ibn Khaldun advanced three propositions that captivated the so-called *Shurafa* historians who came after him, and are still at the center of academic discourse.³⁷ Firstly, he synchronized the rise and fall of dynasties with the social birth and mutation of the *qabila* identities of their founders. Accordingly, he posited dynastic succession as a chronological device to periodize the political history of the Maghrib in terms of the devolution of authority from Arab to Berber elites. Secondly, Ibn Khaldun did not invent, but he certainly lent an intellectual credence to, the popular predication of affluence in the Maghrib on access to the Trans-Saharan, caravan, Trade.³⁸ Thirdly, he used productive capacity as a frame of reference to divide the space coveted by successive Maghribian dynasties and traversed by caravans into a verdant urban core in the north, the Mediterranean basin, and an austere margin in the south, the Sahara. These were the two domains he dubbed the *hadar* (urban center) and the *badiya* (countryside) or *qafir* (wasteland) respectively.

According to Ibn Khaldun, domicile in the urban core, the *hadar*, was the "ultimate objective" (*ghaya*) of the 'hungry' *qabila* constellations, the *badou* (Bedouins), that populated its periphery, the *badiya*.³⁹ Through a deft process of elimination, he concluded that the *badou's* yearning for urbanity was the driving force behind the

³⁷Shurafa historians (*muarikhi al-shurafa*): a referent to the "organic intellectuals" of the two dynasties that succeeded Ibn Khaldun's royal patrons, the Marinids (1260s-1510s), the *Sa'dians* (1510-1670s) and the *Alawites* (1650s-1910s). The best example of such historians is the Alawite devotee Ahmed Ibn Khalid al-Nasiri, the author of *al-Istiqa*. Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunis in 1332 and died in Cairo in 1406. His conception of *nasab* and *asabiya* are dispersed in the "introduction", the *muqaddimah*, to his voluminous history: *al-Ibar wa diwan al-mubtada wa al-khabar fi ayyam al-arab wa al-a'jam wa al-barbar wa man asarahum min dhawi al-sultan al-akbar*. The *muqaddimah* has since been detached from *al-Ibar* and currently dwells in a separate volume and its numerous translations. For the *muqaddimah* I used Dirweech al-Juwaydi's more recent Arabic edition, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, and Rosenthal's much earlier (abridged) English translation. For *kitab al-Ibar*, I relied on the edition of dar al-kitab al-lubnani: *tarikh al-alama Ibn Khaldun*. For brevity, however, I will henceforth refer to this edition by the original abbreviated title—*al-Ibar*. Whenever possible, I quoted from the extracts of classical Arabic texts, including Ibn Khaldun, translated by J.F. Hopkins and N. Levtzion, and published in *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West Africa*. Franz Rosenthal, ed. trans. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958); *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West Africa*, trans. ed. J. F. Hopkins and N. Levtzion, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2002).

³⁸"The merchants", he noted, "who dare to enter the Sudan country are the most prosperous and wealthy of all people." Ibn Khaldun, *Mokadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 368. At the same time, he conceptualised the state as "the market of the world to which the products of scholarship and craftsmanship ... are delivered." Ibid.30.

³⁹This juxtaposition of *hadar*, urban center, with *badiya*, countryside, is the antecedent of the current academic imagination of the same relationship in terms of interaction between "nomad" and "sedentary" or the "desert and the sown." Ibn Khaldun used distance from urban centers and difference in material means of social existence as frames of reference to identify the *badou* as those who "live by tilling the earth, tending to livestock or both." This 'functionalist' conception of the *badou* is more porous than the current use of its English derivative, Bedouin, as a referent to (Arab) "nomadic tribes." For Ibn Khaldun's conception of the *badou* see, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 114. For a revival of the notion of *badiya* (plural: *bawadij*) see, Abderrahmane El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya fi al-qarn al-tasa' ashr* (Rabat: munshurat kuliya al-adab, 1995). For an example of the conflation of *badou* with "nomads" see, Talal Asad, "The Bedouin as a Military Force: Notes on Some Aspects of Power Relations Between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective," in *The Desert and the Sown*, ed. Cynthia Nelson, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): 61-73.

deployment of group solidarity (*asabiya*) and, hence, the constitution of powerful *qabila* ensembles. Deference to leadership occupies center stage in Ibn Khaldun's conception of *qabila* to the extent that he made acknowledgement of its historicity contingent on its possession of a famous *shaykh* or encounter with named dynasts.⁴⁰ Ibn Khaldun converted this conclusion into a premise for his main thesis: that political aggrandizement, or what he called *mulk* (kingship), is the main goal of the cultivation of group-solidarity (*asabiya*). Befittingly, he dismissed *nasab* as an "illusionary matter" and considered its survival for more than "four generations" a marker of its utility rather than veracity-- what he aptly called its "*thamara*" (fruit). The demotion of *nasab* (genealogy) to a mundane tool of empowerment sanctions his conversion of the *qabila* domain, the *badiya*, into a cradle for all the dynasties that ruled the Maghrib in the wake of the Arab conquest.⁴¹

Ibn Khaldun's conception of *nasab* as a tool of empowerment and emphasis on the dynasty, the caravan and the *qabila* are still the main bedrocks of the anthropology and historiography of the Maghrib. Anthropologists such as Ernest Gellner tended to combine homage to his conception of the relation between *nasab* and *asabiya* with the deployment of the notion of lineal segmentation to credit Berber tribes with durable social structure. Conversely, Moroccan academics such as historian Ahmed Taoufiq and sociologist Abdellah Hammoudi called in Ibn Khaldun as a witness to debunk the notion of segmentation and 'chase' the segmentary tribes from the same habitat Gellner assigned to them.⁴² Ibn Khaldun, therefore, belongs in this thesis not simply as a potential bridge of this academic solitude, but also because of the centrality of his history, *al-Ibar*, to my critique of the ethnographic proposition of the congruity of being Takna with infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. Herein, I will provide a synoptic review of academic conceptions of the three major pillars of Northwest African history and use it as a backdrop to introduce the main theories of identification.

⁴⁰Ibn Khaldun did not invent the predication of *qabila* historicity on deference to a leader who 'speaks' for it. This literary device can also be traced back the era of the Arab Conquest "The Berbers of the Maghrib," Ibn Hawqal (w. 988 a.d.) wrote, "are divided into tribes... They have kings ... whom they obey without question: These kings give commands and are not disobeyed ... I heard from Abu Ishaq ... that Tinbautan b. Usfayshar, king of all the Sanhaja, told him that he had been ruling over them for twenty years." Ibn Hawqal, *surat al-ard*, in *Corpus*, ed. Levitzion and Hopkins, 48.

⁴¹Ibn Khaldun stripped the 'obese' urban Man from the redeeming qualities that, ostensibly, inspire his 'hungry' other, the *badawi*, to make the sacrifices necessary for the replacement of a corrupt dynasty with a new one. In contrast to the *hadar*, the *badiya* had to 'vomit' successive dynasties precisely because it reproduces more mouths that it can support. The conversion of *qabila asabiya* into a ticket for a one way trek from arid peripheries to affluent centers enabled him not only to gloss the migration of cosmopolitan elites to the *badiya*, but also their role in the production of esoteric *ansab* (genealogies) for their *qabila* hosts. In so far as he was concerned, the *badiya* attracts only those who could not "afford" the demands of urban life. See *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 120-126; for a reversal of this equation and the investiture of urban man with the 'invention' and use of *qabila* as an auxiliary force, see Asad, 'the Bedouin as a Military Force,' *The Desert and the Sown*: 61-73.

⁴²For Gellner's conception of segmentation see, Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*; for Moroccan critiques of the notion of segmentation in general and Gellner's thesis in particular see, Abdellah Hammoudi, "Segmentarity, Social Stratification, Political Power and Sainthood: Reflections on Gellner's Thesis," *Economy and Society* 9 (1980): 279-303; Hammoudi, "The reinvention of Dar Al-mulk," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, ed. Miller and Bourqia, 129-175; Taoufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi*, 105-139; El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribi*, 79-80.

Matters of Power: The Dynasty

In Morocco, power usually means royal authority. Bourqia and Miller⁴³

Africanists used dynastic succession as a frame of reference to chronicle various historical experiences in the Maghrib and *Bilad al-Sudan*. This strategy informs older texts like Edward Bovill's *Golden Trade*, Julien's *Histoire de L'Afrique du Nord*, Levtzion's *Ancient Ghana and Mali* and Jamil Abun-Nusr's *History of the Maghrib* as well as more recent studies such as Brett and Fentress's *The Berbers*, and the historiographical collection, *The Maghrib in Question*.⁴⁴ A comparable orientation can also be gleaned from the works of Moroccan historians who sought to shift the focus from high politics to "society" (*mujtama'*) or less tractable cultural and intellectual practices. Examples of this orientation include general works like Mohammad Kably's *Société, pouvoir et religion* as well as case studies of southern Moroccan groups like Ahmed Taoufiq's *al-mujtama' al-maghribi*, Abderrahmane El Mouddin's *al-bawadi al-maghribiya* and Ali al-Muhammadi's *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*.⁴⁵ In academic discourses, there is an inclination to posit the Roman era as a cap on antiquity and, hence, to invoke the advent of Islam in the seventh century as the genesis for the historical process that ended with the imposition of French colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The editors of the *Maghrib in Question*, for example, divided its history into three phases: "ancient", "medieval" and "modern." This chronological ordering does not veer from Julien, Brett and Abun-Nasr's much earlier location of the Roman era as antiquity and their use of 'tribal' identity as a frame of reference to divide the pre-colonial history of the Maghrib into three phases: Arab conquest, Berber Empires (interregnum) and *Shurafa* (Arab) dynasties. The proponents of this chronological order recast the Arab Conquest against the first Muslim civil war (657-661) and posit it as a signifier of the Umayyad (661-750) and their Kharijite and Shiite rivals in the Maghrib—namely, *Kharijite* Tahert and Sijilmasa (750s-900s), the *Shiite Idrisids* (780s-900), and their collective scourge, the *Fatimids* (900s-1040s).⁴⁶

⁴³Bourqia and Miller, "Introduction," *The Shadow of the Sultan*, Bourqia and Miller, 1.

⁴⁴Bovill, *The Golden Trade*; Charles-Andre Julien, *History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; from the Arab conquest to 1830*, trans. John Petrie, ed. C.C Stewart, (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1970); Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1973); Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*; *The Maghrib in Question: Essays in History and historiography*, ed. Michel le Gall and Kenneth Perkins, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997).

⁴⁵Taoufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi* (Moroccan society); El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya*; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'* (authority and society).

⁴⁶This civil war (657-661) spawned the division of the Muslim body politics into *Shiites*, *Kharijites* and *Sunnites*. The *Shiites* predicated the right to leadership of the Muslim community on descent from Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima, and her husband and his cousin Ali Ibn Abi Talib: the main tenets of being a *shareef* (pl. *shurafa*). In contrast, the *Kharijites* advocated the absolute equality of all believers and predicated leadership on merit rather than heredity—a conception that contrasts sharply with the fact that they started as *Shiites*. Sunnite authors dwelled on the lack of a binding legal formula. The Umayyad conquests opened the Maghrib to the *Kharijite* and *Shiite* refugees and their conflicting ideologies.

The conquest era is also the genesis for the classical mapping out of modern Algeria and Morocco as *al-Maghrib al-Adna* (the Near West) and *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa* (the Far West) respectively, and the identification of their Berber inhabitants in terms of descent from two siblings, *Butr* and *Baranis*. The *Butr* Berbers included major *qabila* constellations such as the Zanata of the *Near Maghrib*, Algeria and the central Sahara. In contrast, the most famous *Baranis* Berbers were the Masmuda and Sanhaja of the *Far Maghrib*, Morocco and the Western Sahara. Julien, Brett and Levtzion attributed the Berber conversion to Islam to either their recruitment by the Umayyad or to the championship of their grievances by the Kharijites. In contrast, Bovill and Abun-Nasr subscribed to Ibn Khaldun's suggestion of a Fatimid complicity in the migration of the Arabian *qabila* formations called the *Banu Hilal*, *Banu Sulaym* and, arguably, the *Ma'qil*. This migration is often seen as the main catalyst of the *Arabization* of the Maghrib.⁴⁷ On both counts, the conquest era becomes a metaphor for Arab invasion and the cultivation of their religion, Islam, and language, Arabic, in the Maghrib. Befittingly, the proponents of this model invoke conflict between (Berber) natives and (Arab) outsiders during the era of the Arab conquest as a frame of reference to convert the Berber empires into metaphors for what historian Muhammad Talbi called the "Independence of the Maghrib".⁴⁸

The (Berber) empires frequently cited as metaphors of the "Independence of the Maghreb" include the Almoravids (1030s-1140s), the Almohads (1130s-1260s) and, in so far as the *Far Maghrib* (Morocco) is concerned, the Marinids (1250s-1510s). Africanist historians like Levtzion used the notion of Berber tribalism to explain the emergence of the Almoravids in terms of a Sanhaja resentment of the commercial imperialism of the Zanata--Sijilmasa. By the same token, they attributed the rise of the Almohads and Marinids to a Masmuda repudiation of Sanhaja, the Almoravids, control for the former and a Zanata conquest of Masmuda for the latter. In keeping with this textual tradition, Abun-Nasr and Brett converted what they called the "exhaustion" and "dissolution" of Berber tribalism into a genesis for the collapse of the Marinid regime in the 1510s and the restitution of political hegemony to the Shurafa, Arabs, in *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa* (Morocco) and Ottoman Turks in *al-Maghrib al-Adna* (Algeria).⁴⁹ In so far as Morocco is concerned, the transfer of political authority from the (Berber) Marinids to Arabs is imagined in terms of the rise of the two *Shurafa* dynasties, the Sa'dians (1510s-1650s) and the Alawites (1650s-2000s), and the conquest of the Sahara by their *Ma'qil* brethren.⁵⁰ For example, Brett, Levtzion and Abun-Nasr tacitly grafted the

⁴⁷Ibn Khaldun equated the Banu Hilal and Sulaym descent on the Maghrib with that of "locust," a view that became a dogma for Shurafa historians and was, later, endorsed by Bovill, Julien, Abun-Nasr and, more recently, Brett and Fentress. Bovill, *The Golden Trade*, 5; Julien, *History of North Africa*, 72; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 69; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 132-138.

⁴⁸Mohamed Talbi, "the Independence of the Maghrib," in *The General History of Africa, III: Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*, ed. M El Fasi and I. I. Hrbek, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 246-275.

⁴⁹Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 164; Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," in *The Cambridge History of Africa*: v.3, ed. Ronald Oliver, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977): 331-462, 338, 356; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 206.

⁵⁰According to Ibn Khaldun the origins of the *Ma'qil* "are obscure and unknown". "They," he wrote, "claim that their link to *ahl al-bayt* (the family of Prophet Muhammad) is through (his cousin) Ja'far Ibn Abi Talib (d.629) but this is untrue because the *Talibis* ... were not *ahl badiya* (*bedou*)"-- herders. Instead,

Shurafa inheritance of Morocco and the dispersion of the Arabian *Ma'qil* in the Sahara into a sequel in the same process of *Arabization* set in motion by the arrival of the Banu Hilal and Sulaym at the end of the conquest era, the Fatimid period. At the same time, they turned the 'descent' to *sufism* leading to the emergence of the grand *zawaya* of southern Morocco, al-Sus, to a savior of Berber particularity, a particularity Africanists often attribute to the persistence of Berber tribal structures.⁵¹ As a result, there is a tacit tendency to conflate being Berber with being tribal. The conception of dynastic succession in terms of either an Arab-Berber dichotomy or as "a sequel" in a feud between *Butr* (Zanata) and *Baranis* (Sanhaja and Masmuda) Berbers implies a correlation between shifts in the identities of the ruling elite and ideological orientations. In this genre, postulations of change over time tend to come across as regression from the grand *Sunnite*, *Kharijite* and *Shiite* orthodoxies of the conquest era to legalistic scriptualism under the (Berber) Almoravids followed by a 'descent' into *sufi* mysticism under Almohad and Marinid auspices (1250s-1800s).⁵² In contrast, the onset of the *Shurafa* period is tacitly converted into a genesis for the conflation of Arab and orthodoxy with the dynasty, and Berber and *zawiya* with tribe, a conflation that, as we will presently see, also spawned the ethnographic division of space into *bled el-Makhzan*, dynastic realm, and *bled es siba*, domain of anarchical tribes.

Matters of Trade: The Caravan

The merchants who dare to enter Bilad al-Sudan are the most prosperous of all people.

Ibn Khaldun⁵³

The use of the Arab conquest as a genesis for dynastic succession in the Maghrib seems to correspond to its invocation as an origin for what Brett and Fentress called "the economic revolution" that harnessed Northwest Africa as a whole to the

he located the *Ma'qil* in time and space in terms of their "constant fear" of Banu Sulaym and vicarious existence as "protectorates" of the Banu Hilal. The obscurity of the *Ma'qil* origin is often charted via comparison to the seeming clarity of that of the Banu Hilal and Sulaym. Yet, Hilal and Sulaym were the identities 'assigned' to participants in an unsuccessful *Shiite*, Qaramta, revolt against the Abasids in 869 A. D., the revolt that also presaged their ostensible exile (*taghriba*) to Syria. It was in Syria that the Banu Hilal and Sulaym encountered the (Shiite) Fatimids who, according to Ibn Khaldun, "invited" them to Egypt. This invitation also set the stage for the explanation of the Hilal arrival in the Maghrib in terms their deployment by the Fatimids in 1051 to 'get back' at their recalcitrant (Berber) deputies, the Zarids (r. 971-1062). Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.6 (11), 121; Abu-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 67-77; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 95-105, 131-139.

⁵¹Because of "the cult of the saints, ... this new type of Berber Islam," Levtzion wrote, "the religious message reached the remotest Berber tribes of the mountains, who had little to do with the more formal aspects of Islam in past centuries." Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," 362; for a similar association of "Arab" with state and "formal" Islam, and the *zawaya* or "saints" with Berber tribe see, Abu-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 144-247; Michael Brett, "Morocco and the Ottomans: the sixteenth century in North Africa," *The Journal of African History*, 25, (1984): 331-41.

⁵²Levtzion imagined the conflict between (Kharijite) Sijilmasa and the (Sunnite) Almoravids "as a sequel to the long struggle in the Maghrib between Sanhaja and Zanata." Brett and Fentress defined the Marinids as "nomadic Zanata in origin, tribal warriors without the inspiration of religion." Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," 331; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 114.

⁵³Ibn Khaldun, *Mokadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 368.

commercial network spanning the old world: the Trans-Saharan system. "The economic revolution effected by the Arab conquests," they noted,

... incorporated the declining economy of late Classical North Africa, as well as the cycles of trade between the desert and the savannah of tropical Africa, into a vast commercial network from the Atlantic to China and from the Equator almost to the Arctic.⁵⁴

Access to the Trans-Saharan Trade occupies center-stage in the explanation of northwestern African patterns of mobility. According to Levtzion, for example, "the Sudan became something like the New World to which people traveled to become rich."⁵⁵ Indeed, Julien, Levtzion and Abun-Nasr imply a chronological simultaneity between the journey from the era of the Arab conquest to French colonialism on the one hand, and the rise and decline of the Trans-Saharan system on the other. According to Levtzion and Abun-Nasr, for instance, control of the northern termini of this trade network was the constant in the careers of the Umayyads and their Kharijite and Shiite competitors on one hand, and the Berber empires and their *Shurafa* successors as well as their grand *zawaya* contemporaries on the other. I have already noted that Levtzion attributed the rise of the Almoravid dynasty to Sanhaja resentment of Zanata (Sijilmasa) commercial imperialism. Emphasis on the centrality of the Trans-Saharan Trade to dynastic succession also runs through Bovill and Levtzion's explanations of the rise and fall of Western Sudanic empires like Mali (1230s-1590s) and Songhay (1460s-1590s). Conversely, Abun-Nasr identified the dream of "the riches of the western Sudan" as the main driving force behind the Sa'dian conquest of the empire of Songhay in 1591.⁵⁶ The fact that the caravan was the main linkage between the two 'shores' of the Sahara expedited its investiture with the transfer of Islam and Arabic to the Sahara and Bilad al-Sudan.⁵⁷

The academic consensus on the importance of the caravan trade to the historical experience of Bilad al-Sudan also anticipated the broad agreement on the constancy of its main exports to the Maghrib: gold and slaves. It is worth reiterating that the current Africanist vision of the caravan straddles the yearning for gold enshrined in classical Arabic texts and its modern association with slaves pioneered by abolitionists in the nineteenth century. According to Bovill, for instance, "slaves and gold, gold and slaves, provided the life-blood of the trade of the Maghrib with the Sudan."⁵⁸ More recently, the quantitative contributions to Elizabeth Savage's *The Human Commodity*, by

⁵⁴Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 89-90.

⁵⁵Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali*, 137.

⁵⁶Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 216, 221-232; "The presence of merchants from Afriqiya in Awdoghust, as part of the spreading network of the Ibadiyya (*Kharijites*)," Levtzion suggested, "introduced Zanata elements into a trade system which should have been exclusively in the hands of the Sanhaja of the south-Western Sahara." Levtzion, "The Sahara and the Sudan from the Arab Conquest of the Maghrib to the Rise of the Almoravids," in *The Cambridge History of Africa*: v.2 ed. J.D. Fage, (Cambridge University Press, 1978): 637-684, 637; for an identical proposition, see Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 175.

⁵⁷Bovill, *The Golden Trade*, 67-98; Michael Brett, "Islam and Trade in the Bilad al-Sudan, tenth-eleventh century AD," *Journal of African History*, 24,(1983): 431-440.

⁵⁸Bovill, *The Golden Trade*, 22.

historians John Hunwick, Daniel Schroeter and Ralph Austin endorse Bovill's proposition of slaves as the main quarry of the "Moorish" caravan and, indeed, tend to fulfil Humphrey Fisher's much earlier prophecy with regard to the gender and volume of its cargo. "It is arguable," Fisher wrote in 1977,

that a considerable majority of the slaves crossing the Sahara were destined to become concubines ... And it may be this, in turn, which helps to explain why a flow of slaves possibly greater in total than that across the Atlantic has not led to any comparably dramatic racial confusion in North Africa society.⁵⁹

As we will see in chapter three, comparison with the Trans-Atlantic ship has become a permanent fixture in Africanists' discourse on the nineteenth-century Trans-Saharan caravan. Bovill's conception of the caravan as the "golden thread" that linked the Maghrib, the Sahara and Bilad al-Sudan, also inspired the earlier Africanist emphasis on the interface between state formation and control of trade routes or caravanserais as well as the current interest in the traders' objects of desire, their modes of procurement and distribution, and discourses on when and why this system began to decline.⁶⁰ The ultimate point of convergence for these academic paths is the centrality of the caravan of "gold and slaves" to the historical experiences of the Maghrib, the Sahara and Bilad al-Sudan. Yet the viability of this trade system and, in effect, the health of the Maghribian and Sudanic dynastic realms hinged on the caravans' ability to navigate their Saharan backyards, the same backyards Africanists frequently assign to tribes.

Matters of Identity: Social Anthropology in the Past Tense?

History must choose between social anthropology or being nothing. Evans-Pritchard⁶¹

Together, dynastic succession and caravan trading provided contextual frameworks for the classical and current authorial location of the *qabila* or tribe in time and space. It is worth recalling how fixation on dynastic succession led Ibn Khaldun to use (ecological) difference and (spatial) distance between the arid Sahara, the *qaf*, and the verdant Mediterranean basin as a dual frame of reference to locate the ideal *qabila* in the former, the *badiya*, and to imagine the terms of its interaction with the latter, the *hadar*. I have already noted how the Arabic term *qabila* and its Berber derivative,

⁵⁹Humphrey Fisher, "The Eastern Maghrib and the Central Sudan," In *Cambridge History of Africa*: v.3, ed. Oliver: 232-330, 270; John Hunwick, "Black Africans in the Mediterranean World: Introduction to A neglected Aspect of the African Diaspora," In *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage, 1-38; Schroeter, "Slave Markets and Slavery in Moroccan Urban Society," In *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 185-213; Austin, "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade," In *The Human Commodity*: 214-248. Salt, gold and slaves remain the bedrocks of academic discourse on the Trans-Saharan Trade. On Gold and salt, see Bovill, *The Golden Trade*, 79-132; Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali*, 137.

⁶⁰On trade routes see, Levtzion, "The Sahara and the Sudan," 643-654; Jean Devisse, "Routes de commerce et échanges en Afrique occidentale en relation avec la Méditerranée," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 50 (1972): 357-397; for caravanserais made famous by this trade see, Jacques-Meunie, *Le Maroc saharien: Des origines à 1670* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1982); Elias Saad, *A social History of Timbuktu* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Mustafa Naimi, "Nul Lamta, Tableaux Edifiants," *Hespres Tamuda*, v XXXIII, (1995): 83-115.

⁶¹Evans-Pritchard, *Social Anthropology and Other Essays*, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 64

taqbilt, are translated into the French *tribu* and the English *tribe*. The main casualty of this translation, however, is the difference between the Moroccan use of *qabila* as a signifier of self and the ethnographic deployment of tribe as a designation for the primitive other. The discursive gap separating these two textual traditions is enshrined in the current Moroccan and Africanist location of *qabila* and tribe in relation to the dynastic realm. Moroccan historians like Taoufiq, Kably, El Mouddin and al-Muhammadi, for example, subscribed to Ibn Khaldun's diagnosis of *nasab* (genealogy) and *asabiya* (group-solidarity) as perishable creatures of human need. According to Ibn Khaldun, once we strip *nasab* of its utilitarian function, its "fruit" (*thamara*), the 'science' of genealogy itself degenerates into "a useless knowledge and a harmless ignorance."⁶² This adage has become a permanent fixture in the discourses of *Shurafa* historians like al-Marrakeshi and, indeed, still echoes in the works of Moroccan sociologists and historians. For instance, sociologist Paul Pascon identified the Arab conquest itself as the chief culprit behind the mutation of the major Berber *qabila* ensembles that once dominated southern Morocco: the Masmuda. In contrast, Taoufiq and Kably used Ibn Khaldun's history, *al-Ibar*, to question the ethnographic inclination to trace the origin of extant Berber *qabila* ensembles back to "antiquity": the Roman era. To these two historians, the genesis of the current major southern Moroccan *qabila* ensembles cannot be traced beyond the Marinid era (1260s-1500s).⁶³ In his study of the Takna neighbors from the west, the Ait Umran, for instance, al-Muhammadi was able to uncover a clear mismatch between the sense of originary identity that being Ait Umran often suggested to outsiders including *Shurafa* officials and the range of notions of origin claimed by its current carriers. Ait Umran, he concluded, might have been the name of an extinct *qabila* formation that once occupied this space but has long been replaced by heterogeneous groups with various myths of origin.⁶⁴ In that sense, the Ait Umran are kinsmen not because they share a common origin but rather because they occupy the same space—i.e. it is spatial rather than portable identity. In these treatises, the historical *qabila* comes across as an opposite of rather than an equivalent of the ethnographic tribe and, as such, is devoid of atavisms like "distinct culture," autonomy and "self-sufficiency."

In comparison to their Moroccan counterparts, Africanist historians initially used tribe as a substitute for the term *qabila* without dwelling on the problem of translation. Such a combination of the use of the term tribe with silence on its meaning can be seen

⁶²Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 122; al-Marrakechi, *al-i'alam*, 149; Sidqi "al-nasab wa al-tarikh," *majalat kuliyyat al-adab*, 51; Ibn Khaldun subscribed to a general juridical opinion that pride in genealogy stems from the same type of "ignorance" (*jahlia*), Islam has discouraged. He revoked Ibn Hazm's much earlier suggestion that the study of genealogies is imperative because without verification, it will be difficult to establish rights of inheritance. In spite of his qualification of what can be studied, however, Ibn Hazm still 'lost' this argument. Ibn Hazm, *jamharat ansab al-arab* ed. Muhammad Harun (Cairo: Bulaq, 1977), 2-5. For reiterations of such juridical opinions, see al-Nasiri, *al-istiqa*, v. 5, 55; al-Marrakechi, *al-i'alam* v. I: 149-151.

⁶³Paul Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakesh* (Rabat: 1977), 5-32; Taoufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi*, 35-54; Mohamed Kably, "musahama fi tarikh al-tamheed li-zihur dawlat al-Sa'dyeen," *majalat kuliyyat al-adab*, v.3-4, (1978): 7-59; Taoufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi*, 105-139; El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya*, 79-80; Also see, Abdellah Hammoudi, "Segmentarity, Social Stratification, Political Power and Sainthood: Reflections on Gellner's Thesis," *Economy and Society*, 9 (1980): 279-303;

⁶⁴Al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 7-32.

from the earlier works of Brett, Levzion and Abun-Nasr. When they dwelled on the question of meaning, historians like Julien, Abun-Nasr and Brett simply borrowed the propositions advanced by the French ethnographer and colonial administrator Robert Montagne, and his British peer Evans-Pritchard. Montagne's conception of tribe and *Leff* (alignment) in southern Morocco was in turn rooted in a textual tradition born in the bosom of the French encounter with the Berbers in Algeria, the encounter that spawned what Patricia Lorcin recently called the "*Kabyle Myth*."⁶⁵ In contrast, Evans-Pritchard's vision was, ostensibly, inspired by field research amongst the Nuer of the Sudan. Evans-Pritchard's conception of tribe was duly transplanted to Morocco and applied to its Berbers by post-colonial Anglophone anthropologists like David Hart and Ernest Gellner.⁶⁶

Montagne and Evans-Pritchard utilized Emile Durkheim's theory of equilibrium to imagine tribe as a signifier of primitive modes of social existence. A part from Durkheim's distinction between "organic" and "mechanical" solidarity, the pejorative connotations of the primitive served the notion of tribe so well that it did not seem to require further definition.⁶⁷ In colonial ethnography, tribe denudes primeval forms of social existence and organization wherein kinship ties act as guarantors of social harmony, autarky and autonomy, the main pillars of the elusive notions of subsistence and egalitarianism. Fittingly, tribe was uniformly located outside trade networks and in binary opposition to the hegemonic state—i.e. endeavors that spawn unequal distribution of roles and rewards. Montagne, for instance, used modernity as a frame of reference to cast the Berber tribe and its domain, the *bled es Siba* (domain of anarchy), as the

⁶⁵Brett and Fentress anointed Montagne's *Les Berbères et le Makhzen* as the "Bible" of French colonial discourses on Berber tribes. Montagne, however, was the beneficiary from the rich ethnographic tradition the French conquest of Algeria has spawned. For Montagne's vision, see Montagne, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen*; Montagne, *The Berbers* trans. Sedon. *Kabyle* is a French corruption of *qabail* (pl. of *qabila*)—tribes. On the place of Algeria in the French dream of a second Roman Empire in north Africa and the constitution of the Berbers as tribes, see Patricia Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1995), 97-167; Abdulmajid Hannoum, "Myth and Mythmaking in French Historiography of North Africa: Writing the Episode of the Kahina," *Hesperis Tamuda*, v. XXXIV, (1996): 131-158; Abdulmajid Hannoum, *Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2001), 29-69.

⁶⁶Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 190. Abun-Nasr credited Gellner with the provision of "conceptual categories for the analysis of the Maghrib's society." Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, xii; for Evans-Pritchard's conception of segmentation, see his text *The Nuer*.

⁶⁷In spite of the frequent distinction between French and British anthropological paths, the ostensible co-founder of the latter, Radcliff-Brown, traced his own intellectual genealogy back to the "French academy" in general and Durkheim in particular. Radcliff-Brown was Evans-Pritchard's academic mentor. The predication of tribalism on the notion of the primitive remains the main feature of the 'British' school. "Not very long ago," Marshall Sahlins nostalgically noted, "there was a primitive world and a civilized world." This vision also informs the definition of tribe in *The Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, (1991): "Tribe n. group of (esp. primitive) families ... claiming common ancestor." Emile Durkheim, *The Division of labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson, (New York: Free Press, 1940), 173-200; Emile Durkheim and M. Maus, *Primitive Classification*, trans. Rodney Needham (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Radcliff-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (London: Cohen and West, 1952), 14; Marshall Sahlins, *Tribesmen* (Prentice-Hall, 1968), 21. On the intellectual genealogy and 'career' of the notion of the primitive, see Adam Kuper, *The Invention of primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion* (London-New York: Routledge, 1988); Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, v.1, xiii.

primitive opposite of a "barbarian" dynastic realm, the *bled el Makhzan*. This projection sanctioned his inversion of Morocco to a distant past for Europe. "If we," he wrote,

really wish to pursue the game of historical comparison however, it is not to our own Middle Ages that we should turn our attention ... For Morocco remained ... very similar to much earlier forms of (Western) society ... the *bled el Makhzan*... reminds one of the barbarian empires of the west after the fall of Rome ... As for Berber society ... in *Bled es Siba*, it is more reminiscent of the Western world one or two thousand years before the present than of any thing else. It makes it possible for us to rediscover the most humble aspects of our own civilization as it was in its cradle.⁶⁸

In Montagne's vision, the tribal condition belongs in the primitive past and tribes thrived in geographies that, until the recent encounter with Europe, were spared the vagaries of hegemonic power and the 'wheels of commerce'. Montagne, however, also seems to be conscious of the threat Morocco's proximity to Europe and the antiquity and frequency of encounters across the Mediterranean posed to his imagination of the Berber as primitive tribes, the encounters that sanctioned the use of *Moor* as a generic identity for Maghribians. The oscillation between awareness of and disavowal of history can be deduced from his frequent invocation of classical texts such as Ibn Khaldun's *al-Ibar* to locate the Berber tribe in space and time, and simultaneous silence on changes in Moroccan modes of identification after "the fall of Rome."⁶⁹

In contrast, the notion of the primitive is central to Evans-Pritchard's conception of tribe in terms of the fanning out of the descendants of a single (real or putative)

⁶⁸According to Montagne, the Berber "tribes" survived "by the grace of a primitive and feeble economy" in conditions of "virtual isolation", an isolation that seemingly explains the persistence of their "heritage of language, of thought and of primitive art." Montagne, *The Berbers*, 22-24. Montagne, however, did not invent this rhetorical strategy: the oscillation between the location of tribe outside Europe and its appropriation as a distant past for the modern European nation-state. The strategy is rooted in a robust textual tradition that can also be traced back to the nineteenth century and, more precisely, to one of the 'fathers' of anthropology: Lewis Morgan. "The remote ancestors of the Aryan nations," Morgan wrote, "... passed through an experience similar to that of existing barbarous and savage tribes. Though the experience of these nations embodies all the information necessary to illustrate the periods of civilization ... their anterior experience must be deduced in the main, from the traceable connections between the elements still preserved in those of savage and barbarous tribes." Morgan appears as a 'witness' in Charles Darwin's imagination of "the descent of Man" as well as Karl Marx's conception of the "tribes of the ancient states." Darwin posited the "astonishment" generated by first encounter with "savage" tribe as a reminder of 'in the beginning.' "The astonishment," he noted, "which I felt on first seeing a party of Fuegians ... will never be forgotten by me. For the first reflection at once rushed into my mind ... they had no government, and were merciless to every one not of their own small tribe. ... I would as soon be descended from that heroic monkey ... as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies ..." Lewis Morgan, "Ethnical periods," in *History of Anthropological Theory*, ed. Erickson and Murphy: 43-55, 46; Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species and the Descent of Man* (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 488; Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 76.

⁶⁹Invocation of conquest by the Romans as the 'last' Berber encounter with civilization and, by default, the abrogation of the history that preceded French colonialism is one of the most salient features of colonial ethnography. Discursively, it eases the advertisement of colonialism as a "civilizing mission". On the genesis and proliferation of this rhetorical strategy, see Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 21-28; Abdulmajid Hannoum, "Myth and mythmaking in French Historiography of North Africa," *Hesperis Tamuda*, v. XXXIV: 141-143.

ancestor-- what he called "segmentation."⁷⁰ In his model, segmentation breeds "balance" amongst the agnatic lineages forming a single tribe and guarantees instinctive "opposition" to attempts at the concentration of power—i.e. state formation. "The tribal system typical of segmentary structures elsewhere," he wrote,

is a system of balanced opposition ... There cannot therefore, be any single authority in a tribe. Authority is distributed at every point of the tribal structure and political leadership is limited to situations in which a tribe or segment acts corporately.⁷¹

Yet, Evans-Pritchard's vision is comparable to that advanced by Montagne in the sense that they both used the notions of the primitive and "mechanical solidarity" to discover similar tribes without agonizing over the spatial distance or cultural differences separating the Maghribian Berber from the "Nilotic" Nuer. It is futile to attempt to account for the striking similarities exhibited by such tribes without thinking of the difference that also sets them apart from the ethnographer or the textual tradition that made the discovery of tribes possible in the first place.⁷² Yet, according to Gellner and Hart, the principles of "segmentation" and "balance and opposition" Evans-Pritchard has "discovered" amongst the "Nilotic" Nuer and later applied to the clients of the Sanusiya *sufi tariqa* (order) in Libya are also the same matrices of Berber social structures in post-colonial Morocco. On this occasion too, neither spatial distance nor differences in religious ethos and historical experiences seem to hamper the *belief* in the sameness of tribes, the sameness, one might add, that cannot be accounted for without recourse to their difference from the author. According to Gellner, for instance,

The internal mechanics of Nuer and Berber politics are very similar. In fact, I believe that the principles discovered at work among the Nuer apply with greater purity to the Berbers than they do to the Nuer themselves. The various Nilotic tribes whom he (Evans-Pritchard) studied ... lived beyond the pale of the Muslim Arab civilization ... The Berbers of the Atlas, on the other hand, combined dissident and turbulent independence with wholehearted ... internalization of Islam.⁷³

⁷⁰"If you wish to live among the Nuer," Evans-Pritchard recommended, "you must treat them as a kind of kinsmen." Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 5

⁷¹Edward Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 59.

⁷²Notwithstanding geographical, historical and cultural barriers, the tribal characteristics ostensibly exhibited by Montagne's Berbers and Evans-Pritchard's Nuer are identical to those claimed for the Tallensi (Ghana) and the Tiv (Nigeria) by Meyer Fortes and Bohannan respectively. Meyer Fortes, *The Dynamics of Clanship Among the Tallensi* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945); Paul Bohannan and L. Bohannan, *The Tiv of Central Nigeria* (London: International African Institute, 1969)

⁷³Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 188. In his chapter, "Cohesion and Identity: The Maghrib from Ibn Khaldun to Emile Durkheim," Gellner sought to merge Ibn Khaldun's vision of *asabiya* with Durkheim's conception of solidarity. For examples of the systematic expansion of the domain of segmentation, see Ernest Gellner, "Introduction," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles Macaud, (London: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972): 11-21; Gellner, "Tribalism and State in the Middle East," in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, ed. Philip Khoury and J. Kostiner, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 109-126.

In a similar manner, David Hart considered the Berber tribe "a masterpiece" of the segmentary system.⁷⁴ According to Gellner and Hart, it is of no consequence whether the genealogies that underpin Berber "segmentary structures" are authentic or putative. What matters is that they confer an aura of sanctity on the segmentary system and thereby 'naturalize' the sense of solidarity that welds the tribe and, in effect, ensures its "turbulent independence." This inversion of the Berbers from *Moors* to tribes, however, owes more to the sense of difference underlying the deft juxtaposition of (primitive) tribe with (civilized) state than it does to the notion of endogenous descent that, ostensibly, underpin the "segmentary structure."

The influence of the notion of the primitive can be deduced from Gellner's investiture of the French colonial enterprise with "the resolution of the old stalemate between the central government and tribalism" in Morocco.⁷⁵ Yet, if we exclude the "Nilotic tribes" that, ostensibly, inspired Evans-Pritchard's theory of segmentation, it also becomes clear that adherence to a universal religion like Islam and deference to the *zawiya* are the main threads that bind the "Sanusi of Cyranica" observed by Evans-Pritchard and the "dissident" Berber tribes studied by Montagne, Gellner and Hart. It is worth noting that while the introduction of a universal religion and, by implication, "writing and literature," did not abrogate the centrality of difference to the ethnographic conception of tribe, it certainly violates "the most generally acceptable characteristics of a tribal society" tabulated by anthropologists like Southall. Contrary to Southall's projection, however, anthropologists of Morocco turned sanctified difference into the main substitute for the notion of the primitive that enabled colonial ethnographers to discover similar tribal conditions in separate geographical and cultural settings.⁷⁶ Without emphasis on the centrality of difference to the conception of tribe, it would be difficult to comprehend how "living beyond the pale of the Muslim Arab civilization" and the "internalization of Islam" could inspire such striking similarities between the Nuer and the Berbers? Like Montagne, Gellner and Hart merged the "turbulent" Berber tribe, the *qabila*, with its peaceable "saint," the *zawiya*, and, then, located them in binary opposition to urban centers, the dynastic realm. "The town," Gellner wrote, "constitutes a society which needs and produces a doctor, whilst the tribe needs and

⁷⁴David Hart, "Segmentary models in Morocco," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, v.2, (1996): 721-722, 721. "Segmentation", Hart argued much earlier, "is the most important single principle underlying not only Berber tribal social structure in general, but that of the Ait Atta in Particular." David Hart, *Dadda Atta and his Forty Grandsons* (Cambridge: Middle Eastern and North African Studies Press, 1981), 19; for this systematic defence of segmentation, see David Hart, "Segmentary systems and the role of the 'five Fifths' in tribal Morocco," *Revue de L'occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 12, (1967): 35-95; David Hart, "Rejoinder to Henry Munson Jr: on the Irrelevance of the Segmentary Lineage Model in the Moroccan Rif," *American Anthropologist*, 91, (1989): 766-9.

⁷⁵Gellner, "Introduction," in *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Gellner and Maceud, 20. "The deep territorial and tribal divisions that once separated the bled al-makhzan (lands under government control) from the bled es-siba (dissident tribal land)," Entelis reiterated in 1989, "have been effectively overcome in the modern period, creating among contemporary Moroccans a strong sense of nationalist identity." John P. Entelis, *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics* (San Francisco-London: Westview Press, 1989), 28

⁷⁶According to Gellner, "Muslim tribesmen in the largely arid zone stretching roughly from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic and the Niger Bend are generally segmentary." Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 189.

produces the saint."⁷⁷ The idealization of the *zawiya* enshrined in its translation as "saints" obscures its middling in power politics and fails to acknowledge the impact of its frequent collusion with the court on its *qabila* hosts.⁷⁸ By inverting Arab and Berber to mutually exclusive identities for the dynasty and the *qabila*, Anglophone anthropologists also elevated the "*bled el-Makhzan-bled es-Siba*" dichotomy invoked by French colonial ethnographers to a dogma that fuels what historian Pennell recently dubbed an "unfortunate ... controversy."⁷⁹ This "controversy" is indeed "unfortunate" because it also spawned the current split between Moroccanist and Africanist discourses on *qabila* and its place vis-à-vis the dynastic realm.

I have already noted how historians who dwell on the meaning of tribe subscribed to the same ethnographic tradition and, by implication, took tribalism as a signifier of endogenous descent, egalitarianism and binary opposition to the dynasty. In a manner reminiscent of Montagne and Gellner, these historians also tend to oscillate between fidelity to the ethnographic notion of the autonomous tribe and deference to Ibn Khaldun's postulation of *qabila* solidarity as the genesis for the dynasty. One result of this oscillation is that tribe comes across both as an agnatic lineage and a contingent political formation and, hence, is located in binary opposition to the dynasty and as a participant in its production. Like the colonial ethnographer, the Africanist historian also tends to merge tribe and *zawiya* and, by default, ignores the hybridizing impact adherence to a universal religion or subjectivity to the dynasties it inspired was bound to have on the so-called "segmentary lineage system."⁸⁰

⁷⁷Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 6-8; Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 41; for an identical conception, see Clifford Geertz, *Islam observed, Religious Development in Morocco and Algeria*, (New haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 15-16, 49-50. This vision echoes Evans-Pritchard's much earlier statement that "the tribal system and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated in it through their lodges." Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, 71. For a critique of this modality, see Vincent J. Cornell, "The Logic of Analogy and the Role of the Sufi Shaykh in Post-Marīnid Morocco," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 15, (1983): 67-93, 67-68.

⁷⁸Hammoudi invoked Foucault's conception of the relation between power and knowledge to question the notion of segmentation and the idea of the 'non-involved' "saint". He tended to posit the *zawiya* as a metaphor for the kinds of 'tyranny' that subvert the notion of the autonomous tribe. 'Each time a centre appears,' he wrote, "terror appears with it ... In such a system of governance ... terror meets the sacred in the figure of the prince as saint and executioner. At this level there is no distinction between sainthood and violence, in contrast to what advocates of the theory of segmentation would claim... The contrast between *ilm* and gnosis (doctor and saint), as Gellner and others put it, is not relevant. On the contrary, the effort to create new forms reconciling the two is what characterizes the era (the Marīnid period onwards). This is also the case with another supposed opposition, that of saint and chief, that some believe to be exclusive." Hammoudi, "The Reinvention of Dar Al-Mulk," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*: 129-175, 139-140. For a full expose of this thesis see, Abdellah Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundation of Moroccan Authoritarianism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁷⁹R.C. Pennell, "Makhzan and Siba in Morocco: An Examination of Early Modern Attitudes," in *Tribe and State*, ed: Pennell and Joffe: 159-181, 159. Gellner and Micaud's *Arabs and Berbers*, epitomizes the conflation of Berber with tribe and Arab with dynasty. Of the 23 case studies in this text not a single one deals with an 'Arab tribe'. The genesis of this 'bias' can also be traced back to the French encounter with Algeria. See Lorcín, *Imperial Identities*, 16-20.

⁸⁰Deference to the notion of segmentation can be seen from the work of an otherwise astute critic of colonial ethnography such as Burke III. "The prevalence of feuding and mutual jealousies and suspicions between tribes," he wrote, "made social intercourse beyond the limits of the kin bond difficult even in the best of times ... If rural Moroccan society was internally structured and sub-divided along tribal lines,

Reliance on Montagne, for example, led Julien to identify tribe in terms of common "blood, speech and way of life." In his text, however, the Berber tribe comes across both as a redoubtable opponent to political centralization and a participant in dynastic squabbles.⁸¹ In contrast, Abun-Nasr and Brett subscribed to the generality of Gellner's conception of the segmented tribe. Borrowing from Gellner, for instance, informs Abun-Nasr's more recent concession of the possibility of "descent from an eponymous" rather than an authentic ancestor. In his history, however, Abun-Nasr posited "tribalism" as the binary opposite of the "centralized state."⁸² In comparison, Brett and Fentress invoked the anthropological conception of the Berber tribe as "agnatic, patriarchal and segmentary" and, then, turned what was an observable 'present' for colonial and post-colonial ethnographers into a sequel in a "long historical development" they dutifully traced back to the Roman era. As a result, the origin of the Takna, as Berber tribes, was pushed back to "antiquity." "A second element of disruption," Brett and Fentress wrote,

is visible in those (Berber) tribes, such as the Gaetulians, who refused to pay tribute to the kings. This is another Berber theme: Both Montagne and Gellner speak of the Makhzan tribes of Morocco as the inner circle who extracted taxes as opposed to ... the outer circle, in *bilad al-siba*, or uncontrolled lands, who refused to allow taxes to be extracted from them ... Berber society is at least, nominally, egalitarian, indeed what often unites Berber groups is a common resistance to the imposition of centralized authority ... Indeed ... there is good evidence that the egalitarian structures of settled Berber society are the process of a long historical development in which the effect of the Arab conquest and Islamization are extremely important.⁸³

this tribal mass existed within the framework of a bureaucratic Muslim state organized along lines roughly a kin to the great Islamic empires of the Middle East." Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 10-11.

⁸¹According to Julien, for example, the founder of the Almohad dynasty, Muhammad Ibn Tumart (1080-1130), "had to manage as best he could with a patchwork of tribes... whose social structure and political tendencies must have very closely resembled those described by Montagne in his book *Les Berbères et le Makhzen*"; Julien, *History of North Africa*, 101, 330; for examples of historiographical emulations of this ethnographic wisdom see Henri Terrasse, *Histoire du Maroc* (Casablanca: Editions Atlantide, 1950); John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite, A study in Segmented Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)

⁸²"The history of the Maghrib," Abun-Nasr wrote, "has been dominated ... by constant competition between ... tribalism ... and the centralized state." Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 11.

⁸³Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 48, 232. Borrowing from Gellner also explains the combination of writing about Berber Empires with emphasis on their 'inability' to transcend kinship bonds or segmentary structures and, hence, the location of colonialism as "the first time the Berbers had been brought within the cycle of ... regular administration." Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 190. This oscillation between the 'timid' disavowal of tribe and the invocation of the notion of segmentation became the whole mark of academic discourse. "Moroccan rural society," Burke wrote, "was organized in tribes, based on descent from a common ancestor... Some Moroccan tribes are clearly described well by classical segmentary theory ... In general, the Berber tribes of the Rif, central, and middle Atlas, and the pre-Saharan steppe zone tend to conform to the theory better than the Arab tribes of the central plains ... The concept of tribe is a weak reed upon which to lean. Segmentation is therefore a model, not a description. Many (Arab) tribes in the central plains regions were literally the creation of the government." Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance 1860-1912* (Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 7-10. For an identical vision see Abun-Nasr *History of the Maghrib*, 12. For other examples of the application of segmentation to history, see Ross Dunn, *Resistance in the*

It goes without saying that emphasis on the state-tribe, Arab-Berber, dichotomy also neutralizes the demographic impact of the processes of "Islamization" and displacement the Arab conquest had set in motion. For instance, fixation on the tribal rather than the ideological dispositions of Maghribian political elites remains the bedrock of the Africanist conception of dynastic succession. The presentation of the Umayyad deputies in the urban core, the *hadar*, as Arabs, sanctions Julien, Brett and Abun-Nasr's location of their *Kharijite* and *Shiite* competition in the arid margins, the *badiya*, as composite Berber tribes, (*Butr*) Zanata for *Kharijite* Sijilmasa and (*Baranis*) Kutama for the *Shiite* Fatimids. This orientation is further demonstrated by the use of the *Butr-Baranis* or *Zanata-Sanhaja* dichotomy to explain the rise and fall of the Almoravid, Almohad and Marinid dynasties in terms of tribal rather than ideological fusion and fission.⁸⁴ On these occasions, Berber tribes took part in a quest for empires that also negates their advertised animosity to the centralization of authority. At the same time, the conflation of the (*Shurafa*) dynasty, as *Makhzan*, with orthodoxy and *Arabness* led to its juxtaposition with the Berber "saint" or "marabout" and 'his' tribe, as *siba*. "The Berbers," Brett and Fentress wrote,

were still a substantial majority ... But their divine simplicity, extolled by the Kharijites, admired by Ibn Khaldun and touched by the preaching of the Fatimids, the Almoravids and the Almohads, was in the hands of the marabout rather than the *murabit* ... The great Berber marabouts of the Moroccan Atlas, whom the Sa'dis had vigorously repressed ... had mobilized their tribal followers ... The triumph of the Shurafa put an end to any prospect of a maraboutic revolution leading to a Berber empire in the manner of the past.⁸⁵

Desert 1881-1912 (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Charles Stuart, *Islam and Social Order in Mauritania* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973)

⁸⁴"The history of the Maghrib," Levtzion wrote, "may be related in terms of the succession to hegemony of rival Berber confederations. The Sanhaja of the Sahara (the Almoravids) had been replaced by the Masmuda of the High Atlas Mountains (the Almohads), who in their turn were overthrown by the Zanata of the sub-Saharan steppes (the Banu Marin)" Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," 359. Abun-Nasr and Brett endorsed this emphasis on tribal rather than ideological cleavages. "In each of the states which appeared in the Maghrib during this period—the Almoravids, Almohads, Hafisid, Marinids and Zayyanids," Abun-Nasr wrote, "power was held by a Berber dynasty whose authority was identified with a distinct Berber tribal group ... the rulers felt compelled to seek Islamic religious legitimation for their authority." Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 18; "Beneath the political surface of the unification of North Africa by the new religion," Brett and Fentress wrote, "lurks a different kind of history, in which the tribalism which gave rise to the great Berber dynasties was instrumental in the retreat of their native tongue." Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers* 121.

⁸⁵Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 74-75, 170. This suggestion echoes a similar one made by Geertz at a much earlier stage. "The establishment of the Arabized, Islamic reformist Sharifian dynasty," Geertz wrote, "... and the subsequent royal efforts to reduce the field of Berber customary law ... to repress saint worship and cultic practices and to purify Islamic belief of local pagan accretions, reinforced the distinction between *bled al makhzan*—the land of government—and *bled es Siba*—the land of insolence." Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in *The Interpretation of Cultures*: 255-310, 298. "Marabout" is a (French) corruption of the Arabic term *Murabit*—it is used as a signifier of the "priest-like figure" Brett has situated among Berber tribes. See footnote below.

The Berber tribe, then, has become the ward of a "marabout" who to all intent and purposes, was barred from aspiring to its binary opposite, the empire, by the very fact of his domicile in space under the control of a repressive, Sa'dian, dynasty. In this genre, interest in religion is driven mainly by the quest for what Julien has earlier called "Berber nationalism under the impetus of the Shaikhs of the Zawiyas."⁸⁶ The secularization of sacred idioms and, hence, the *tribalization* of politics glosses their ability to transcend "segmentary" cleavages and to spawn alternative grids of social attachment.

By turning history and universal religion into incubators of segmentation, therefore, historians also perpetuated the problems of conception and translation I have traced back to the nineteenth century. As we will see in the next chapter, French colonial ethnographers who grappled with the question of Takna origin, such as Frederic de la Chapelle, de la Ruelle and Vincent Monteil, endorsed Montagne's use of encounter with the Romans to situate the Berbers in time and space. These ethnographers also eschewed the Takna invocations of birth in the bosom of the dynasty and the *zawiya*, and, indeed, explained their origin and sense of territoriality in terms of descent from "Gétules" contemporaries of the Romans. Here, it is enough to note that *Getules* is an alternative (French) designation for the same "Gaetulians" of "antiquity" mentioned by Brett and Fentress.⁸⁷ Post-colonial Moroccan ethnographers like Naimi and Ali Najib and Anglophone historians such as Hodge endorsed both the postulation of an ancient origin for the Takna and the concomitant prolongation of their domicile in Wadi Nun. The only difference between the conception of Takna origin advanced by Naimi, Najib and Hodges, and the one propagated by French colonial ethnographers is the substitution of descent from the "Gétules" (Gaetulians) with descent from one of their Berber contemporaries called the Lamta. In fact, de La Chapelle preceded Naimi, Najib and Hodges in proposing the Lamta as the most likely ancestors of the Takna. And according to Najib, Takna modes of social organization resemble the segmentary structure Gellner has prescribed for the Berbers as a whole.⁸⁸ In contrast, Tony Hodges used the Takna and Bayrouk to historicize the ethnographic location of (Berber) tribe in binary opposition to the (Arab) dynastic realm: the *Siba-Makhzan* dichotomy. In the process, he, albeit unwittingly, credited the Takna and their neighbors with the kind of "theme" Brett and Fentress recently claimed for the extinct "Gaetulians (Getules)" and their extant Berber 'descendants.' "A typical example of *bilad es-siba*," he noted,

⁸⁶ Julien, *History of North Africa*, 209. According to Levtzion, "Maraboutism ... thrived on the debris of the state." Brett and Abun-Nasr adopted Gellner's oscillation between belief in the centrality of the *zawiya* to the conception of the Berber as tribes and emphasis on the political neutrality of its guardians. They defined the "saint" as, to borrow from Brett, "a priest-like figure who approved rather than abhorred the life of the people." Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," 397; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 143; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 12, 18; for an implicit 'return' to this vision see Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*. For the ethnographic roots of this perception, see Gellner *Saints of the Atlas*, 226.

⁸⁷ De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain," *B. C.A.F. M.* (octobre 1933): 587-98; C. De la Ruelle, "Contribution a l'étude de l'Histoire de la Coutume et du Folklore des Populations du Versant S.O de L'Anti Atlas, les Takna Berbérophones du Haut Oued Sayed, Les Id Brhim et leurs tributaires." *C.H.E.A.M.*, 457, (1941): 139-172; Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 6-8.

⁸⁸ Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 89-100; Najib, *The Transformation of Takna Society*, 19-25; Frédéric De la Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une Histoire du Sahara Occidental," *Hesperis Temoda*, XI, (1930): 35-96.

was the region of the Anti-Atlas and the Oued Noun ... during most of the three centuries preceding Morocco's colonialism. A virtually independent statelet was established at Tazeroualt in the Anti-Atlas early in the 17th century and, though it was brought under Alawite control by Moulay Rachid (r.1666-1672) and Moulay Ismail, (1672-1727) it was reborn in the 1760s, when small state was also set up in Goulimine by a largely sedentary Tekna tribe, the Ait Moussa ou Ali. Under the rule of the Beyrouk family, Goulimine's degree of independence was such that the Beyrouks negotiated with several French, Spanish and English representatives during the 19th century.⁸⁹

In that sense, the received academic wisdom on the Takna history and identities I critique is more in tune with the ethnographic notion of the primitive tribe than it is with the conception of *qabila* identity proposed by Ibn Khaldun and refined by historians such as Taoufiq and al-Muhammadi. What needs to be clarified here is whether and how the modern ethnographic conception of tribalism and the classical notion of *qabila* fit into the current theorizations of identification: the premordialist-postmodernist debate.

V-Realms of Theory: Primordial and Conditional Identities

When I enter... what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other.
David Hume⁹⁰

In the realms of theory, identities are imagined either as reflexes of heritage or as expedient social charters. This polarity still echoes in the ongoing debate between the advocates of primordial amity and their postmodern critics, the constructionist. "In the common sense language," Stuart Hall noted,

identification is constructed on the back of recognition of some common origin or shared-characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the 'naturalism' of this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed—always 'in progress' ... Though not without its determinate conditions of existence ... identification is in the end conditional, lodged in contingency. Once secured, it does not obliterate difference.⁹¹

⁸⁹Hodges, *Historical Dictionary*, 61.

⁹⁰David Appelbaum (ed.), *The Vision of Hume* (Brisbane: Element Books, 1996), 126.

⁹¹Stuart Hall, "Introduction," In *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Hall and Du Gay, 2; "In a wide variety of disciplines," Christopher Miller wrote, "inquiries are finding more and more ways to confirm the theory that identities are 'negotiated' rather than natural; contingent, constructed and imagined rather than unmediated ... Some have suggested that identity is not only a construction but actually an 'identitarian' prison, from which we might or must escape." Christopher L. Miller, *Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture* (Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 171-172.

Proponents of the "common sense" approach, the primordialists, deploy the notion of common origin to turn identification into a reflex of cultural heritage and blame what is done in its name on the mechanical compliance with pathological impulses. In this model, the sinews of the notion of originary identity such as genealogy, kinship and speech are credited with an ineffable significance in and off themselves. Because origins ostensibly predate and outlive their mortal claimants, the identities they underpin are seen as vestiges of inheritance rather than expediency. When seemingly originary identities turn out to be temporal devices, advocates of primordialism invoke their capacity to evoke mechanical solidarity to endow them with the same effect usually reserved for the so-called "natural givens" of social existence.

The notion of primordialism was originally deployed by the British sociologist Edward Shils (w.1957) to trace observable amities among family members back to what he called "the ineffable significance attributed to the tie of blood." It is precisely because kinship attachments are reflexes "of the tie of blood," Shils argued, that their emotive power supersedes calculable self-interest.⁹² More recently, however, it was Clifford Geertz, who schematised an intellectual credibility to the notion of primordialism. Geertz invoked Max Weber's imagination of Man as an animal imprisoned in a cage of 'his' own creation to refine the notion of primordialism and to broaden its scope. In his vision, culture is the "web of significance" Man has spun but then became its prisoner. The fusion of culture and nature enabled Geertz to elevate what he called "the assumed 'givens' of social existence" like "speech and customs" to the same status Shils had reserved for "the tie of blood," the "natural givens" of social existence. In his model, it makes no difference that the "assumed givens of social existence" are not exactly manifestations of a natural, infinite, order of things. What is significant is the fact that their human prisoners believe that identities are inherited rather than constructed and act on such conviction. In a manner reminiscent of Gellner's conception of segmentation, Geertz argued that the belief in the permanency of identities also cancels the putative nature of the notions of origin used to schematise their 'naturalism'. "By a primordial attachment," he wrote in 1974,

is meant one that stems from the "givens" or, more precisely, the assumed "givens" of social existence ... These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and off themselves ... For virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, has some attachments that seem to flow more from a sense of natural ... affinity than from social interaction.⁹³

In its crudest and most popular guise, however, primordialism is a synonym of the ineffable attachments that can result only from "natural affinity" and in that capacity, is frequently associated with ethnic identities. Its proponents tend to ignore Geertz's nuanced retreats from the conventional anthropological certitudes about "civilization" that sanctioned the conflation of "natural" attachment with tribal, primitive, conditions

⁹²Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, 8, (1957): 130-45, 142

⁹³Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," In Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 255-310, 259-260.

of social existence.⁹⁴ Instead they tend to dwell on virulent ethnic solidarities that seem to be immutable either because their advocates insist that they are pathologies or because they evoke emotive displays which defy "rational" explanations. "Primordialism," George Scott suggested in 1990,

has to be retained in any model that attempts completely to explain ethnic solidarity, because without it, we would have people acting without emotion, going about the business of asserting their ethnicity totally without passion, in a wholly sober, rational manner.⁹⁵

Postmodern critics of primordialism like Stuart Hall tended to exploit Geertz's concession of Man's propensity to worship his own creation and, indeed, to implicate nature or providence in the enunciation of cultural deities. At the empirical level, critics of primordialism defy the notion of "natural affinity" by parading examples of the timely invention and mutation of ethnic or national identities. They argue that the assumed "naturalism" of identities does not rest on the existence of self-evident essences that warrant the proposition of a primordial amity. Rather, the belief in primordial attachment is itself the fruit of the axiomatic assumption that emotive displays of amity *must* be reflexes of pathological impulses. At the conceptual level, critics of primordialism take the fact that notions of self are invariably demarcated in terms of difference as evidence of the essentially conditional and malleable nature of identification. For example, Edward Said defined identities as "contrapuntal ensembles" that cannot be sustained "without an array of opposites, negatives, opposition."⁹⁶ James Clifford seconded this proposition and added that not only does every conception of self lives vicariously by the grace of its constructed other, but "every version of another ... is also a construction of a self."⁹⁷

In an article published in 1995, Gayatri Spivak demoted identities to "commodities ... something made for exchange." Spivak tended to reverse Geertz's conception of identity as a sign of entrapment in cultural heritage. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun's predication of the survival of *nasab* (genealogy) on its capacity to deliver tangible benefits, *thamara* (fruit), Spivak imagined identification as one of the "grounding mistakes" that enable "us to make sense of our lives." Spivak, however, also agrees that identities thrive courtesy of notions of origin that hark back to a distant past. But in this vision, neither origin nor what is done in its name has anything to do with pathology. On the contrary, notions of origin are themselves creatures of the

⁹⁴Geertz's 'retreat' from primordialism was spawned by a discovery "that our ideas about the 'primitive' have grown less primitive and our sureties about 'civilization' less sure." Clifford Geertz, *After the Fact: Two countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995), 42-63, 65. For further refinements of this retreat, see Clifford Geertz, *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 42-68.

⁹⁵George M. Scott, "A resynthesis of the Primordial and Circumstantial Approaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13, (April 1990): 147-171.

⁹⁶Edward Said, "Secular Interpretation: The Geographical Element and the Methodology of Imperialism," In *After Colonialism*, ed. Gyan Prakash, (Princeton University Press, 1995): 21-39, 29.

⁹⁷James Clifford, "Introduction: Partial Truths," In *Writing Culture: The Poetic and Politics of Ethnography*, ed. James Clifford, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986):1-26, 23.

same "institutions and inscriptions" that strive to orient human thought and behaviour. "A most tenacious name," she noted,

as well as the strongest account of the agency or mechanics of the staging of experience-in-identity is "origin": "I perform my life this way because my origin stages me so." National origin, ethnic origin. And more pernicious: "You cannot help acting this way because your origin stages you so." The notion of origin is as broad and robust and full of effect as it is imprecise ... History slouches in it, ready to comfort and kill. Yet, to feel one is from an origin is not a pathology, it belongs to that group of grounding mistakes that enable us to make sense of our lives. But the only way to argue for origins is to look for institutions, inscriptions and then to surmise the mechanics by which such institutions and inscriptions can stage such a particular style of performance⁹⁸

Homi Bhaba and Stuart Hall seconded the centrality of "staged" origins to the production of identities. Bhaba and Hall, however, tend to emphasize the centrality of the sense of difference lurking beneath the juxtaposition of "my origin" with "your origin" to the conception of self i.e. what Said has called the "array of opposites."

In his anti-Cartesian and, one might add, pro-Human intervention, Bhabha upheld the impossibility of a meaningful revelation about self that is also not haunted by hallucinations about its constitutive Other. "To exist," he wrote,

is to be called into being in relation to an otherness, its looks or locus. It is a demand that reaches outward to an external object ... The question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy... It is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image... (It) is always the return of an image of identity that bears the mark of splitting in the Other place from which it comes⁹⁹

In a similar vein, Stuart Hall suggested that there is no such a thing as a self-fulfilling and stable identity. In his vision, identification is a project always "in progress." Because of their lack of stable "core," identities are malleable creatures that not only encourage, but also live off the cultivation of difference. The impossibility of sustainable identities generates both the "invention of tradition" and the authorship of the cultural attire that renders them beyond the reach of their constitutive other. "Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked," he noted,

identities are constructed through not outside difference... It is only through the relation to the other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its *constitutive outside* that the 'positive' meaning of any term and thus its 'identity' can be constructed. Throughout their career,

⁹⁸Gayatri Spivak, "Acting Bits/ Identity Talk," In *Identities*, ed. Kwame Appiah and Henry Gates, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): 147-180, 158.

⁹⁹Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 44-45.

identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render outside, abjected.¹⁰⁰

In the postmodern model, then, it is precisely because of the exclusionist intent behind the process of enunciation that it is imperative to locate "who needs" identities and in what geo-political context, before arguing over their distant origins or current mechanics of display. In that sense, the search for self is doomed to languish in the realm of the incomplete pending the mapping out of the constitutive other that makes what is essentially an exercise in self-validation worthwhile.

Applied to this thesis, it becomes imperative to bring the Takna and, by implication, the Bayrouk conception of self and their presentation by ethnographers under the canopy of either the primordialist or postmodern theorization of identity. Subscription to the primordialist predication of identity on "natural affinity" entails an endorsement of the proposition of the extinct Gétules or Lamta as named ancestors of the Takna. It goes without saying that such an extrapolation also subverts the subaltern Takna narratives of origin and blurs the demographic history which we can use to examine the congruity of being Takna with infinite nativity to Wadi Nun (al-Sus). In contrast, an invocation of the postmodern perspective on identification does not augur well for the notion of endogenous origin much less uninterrupted domicile in Wadi Nun. At the same time, however, the postmodern emphasis on the malleable nature of identification meshes well with the tacit refusal of the subaltern Takna narratives to acknowledge the existence of the Gétules, the Lamta or even the Almoravids, and simultaneous invocations of the more modern founders of *zawaya* centers or famous Shurafa sultans. In comparison to the postmodern perspective, moreover, the primordialist predication of social attachment on what Geertz has called the "congruities of blood, speech (and) custom" is yoked to the ethnographic conception of tribal identity in terms of lineal segmentation. From this vantage point, it is tempting to merge the proposition of segmentation as the essence of Berber tribalism advanced by Gellner and endorsed by historians like Brett with Geertz's conception of identity as a reflex of the "natural" or "assumed" givens of social existence. Conversely, the postmodernist emphasis on the "discursive" nature of identity echoes Ibn Khaldun's association of the deployment of *nasab* as a glue of *qabila* solidarity (*asabiya*) with the quest for power, *mulk*. Herein, I argue that there is a suggestive congruity between the onset of post-colonial critique of the primitive tribe Southall alluded to and the debut of the notions of primordial amity and ethnic group. I seek to locate a textual origin for the notion of segmentation and, then, I will argue for the utility of merging the postmodern emphasis on the discursive nature of identification with Ibn Khaldun's election of power as the "ultimate objective" of group solidarity to the study of the Bayrouk identity and history.

Born in the Text: Modern Tribe, Postmodern *Qabila*

*In the case of identity ... the catchword of modernity was creation, the catchword of postmodernity is recycling. Z. Bauman*¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰Stuart Hall, "Introduction," *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Hall and Du Gay, 4-5; Stuart Hall, "Response to Sabu Mahmoud," *Culture Studies*, 10, (1996): 12-15.

Given their mutual invocation of proximity to the natural order of things as the basis for the conflation of ethnic group with ineffable affinity, it is reasonable to see the primordialist vision as a "recycling" of the much older ethnographic conception of tribalism as a reflex of lineal descent and segmentation. Firstly, by considering the "natural givens" as the matrix of identification, the proponents of primordial amity actually credit ethnic groups with the *same* type of ineffable attachment the fathers of ethnography assigned to "savage tribes." Indeed, the idea that ethnic solidarity overrides self-interest or defies "rational" explanation echoes the ethnographic assumption of the incongruity of tribalism with the concentration of resources and power, the assumption that also sanctioned the conversion of entrapment in kinship into a matrix of political egalitarianism and economic autarky. Like ethnic solidarity, for example, tribalism also seemed to defy "logic" namely because it was deemed to be a reflex of pathological impulses rather than temporal exigencies.¹⁰² Secondly, the concepts of primordialism and ethnic group made their debut at precisely the same time that the notion of the primitive tribe came under attack in the wake of de-colonization. Post-colonial challenges to the intellectual probity of the primitive tribe and emphasis on the symbiotic relation between ethnographic knowledge and colonial power structures can be seen from the earlier works of Jacques Berque, Ronald Cohen, Talal Asad, Maurice Godelier, John Lonsdale and more recently, Joseph Ki-Zirbo and Carola Lenz.¹⁰³ The common thread that binds these texts is that they were composed in the wake of the Second World War and the subsequent European "scramble" out of Africa—decolonization.

It was under these post-colonial circumstances that the notion of "mechanical solidarity" colonial ethnographers reserved for primitive tribes was revamped and reassigned to composite ethnic groups. Roland Cohen, for example, suggested a direct connection between the debut of the ethnographic notion of tribe and the emergence of "clear-cut racist stereotypes concerning Africa." In contrast, Godelier recommended that, given its imprecision and racist connotations, tribe should be banished from academic discourse on Africa. Southall proposed a similar fate for the notion of the primitive and called for the renaming of the ethnographic tribe as "ethnic group".¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Zygmunt Bauman, "From Pilgrim to Tourist- or a Short History of Identity," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Hall and Du Gay: 18-35, 18.

¹⁰² "Within Berber society," Montagne wrote, "there exist forms of alliance between groups in order to understand fully their nature and their significance we must once again lay aside those concepts that are familiar to us and refuse to call upon 'logic', 'utility' or 'common sense' to explain the facts." Montagne, *The Berbers*, 36.

¹⁰³ Jacques Berque, "Qu'est-ce qu'une 'Tribu' Nord africaine," In *Eventail de l'Histoire vivante: Hommage à Lucien Febvre*: v.1 (Paris: 1953): 260-271; Roland Cohen, "Introduction," in *From Tribe to Nation in Africa: Study in Incorporation Processes*, ed. Roland Cohen and John Middleton, (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970); Talal Asad ed. *Anthropology and the Colonial encounter*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1973); Maurice Godelier, "Le Concept de Tribu," *Diogenes*, 81, (1973): 3-28; John Lonsdale, "When Did the Gussi (or any other group) Become a Tribe?" *Kenya Historical Review*, 5 (1977): 123-133; Joseph Ki-Zirbo, "Introduction," *General History of Africa*: v.1, ed. Joseph Ki-Zirbo, (London: Heinemann, 1981): 10-25; Carola Lenz, "Tribalism and Ethnicity in Africa," *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines*, 31 (1995): 303-328.

¹⁰⁴ Roland Cohen, "Introduction," *From Tribe to Nation in Africa*, 1-2; Godelier, "Le Concept de Tribus," *Diogenes*, 81: 3-28, 17; Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," in *The Passing of Tribal Man*, 28- 50.

More recently, Ki-Zirbo reiterated Godelier's much earlier call for the banishment of tribe from academic discourses on Africa. In 1985, Southall noted that Africanists have yet to abandon the "atavisms" that haunted colonial ethnography. As late as 1995, Carola Lenz added that anthropologists of Africa still use tribe and "ethnic group" interchangeably, thereby implying an intrinsic similarity between their discursive imports.¹⁰⁵

In fact, current critiques of the notion of tribe tend to feed off the postmodern debunking of the primordialist conception of identification. In the works of post-colonial anthropologists, for example, the erstwhile conviction of Africans with wallowing in tribalism is seen as a value judgment espoused by the same colonial literati who connived in the mapping out of space and the parceling of its occupants, the colonial administrator/ethnographer. This consensus informs the two overlapping theoretical perspectives currently used to dismiss tribe as a creature of colonial expediency and authorial lore, the dismissal that legitimizes its restraint with inverted coma: 'tribe'.

The first perspective 'is reality-based' and tends to charge the colonial state with complicity in the demarcation of tribal entities. Asad, Lonsdale and Wright, for example, argued that the term "tribe" acquired the status of a social reality courtesy of its systematic imposition by colonial bureaucrats on African space and body types.¹⁰⁶ Conversely, Africans learned to live with tribal identities either because of coercion or as an adjustment to conditions of displacement resulting from the imposition of colonialism.¹⁰⁷ The second perspective is textual in orientation. It tends to recommend

¹⁰⁵"In recent decades," Southall noted, "many anthropologists and most Africanists have dropped 'tribe' in favour of 'ethnicity' to mask a radical change of heart, although many atavisms remain." Southall, "The Ethnic Heart of Anthropology," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 100,XXV-4: 567-572, 568. Ki-Zirbo, "Introduction," *General History of Africa*: v.1: 10-25; Lenz, "Tribalism and Ethnicity," *Cahiers des Sciences Humaines*, 31: 303-328. The 'flight' from the term tribe can also be gleaned from the simultaneous introduction of idioms like "oral societies," "non-literate society," and "societies without writing" as referents to groups previously identified as "tribes." See Goody, *Power of the Written*, 27-29, 35-41; Jack Goody, "The Impact of Islamic writing on the Oral Cultures of West Africa," *Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines*, v.11, (1971): 455-466.

¹⁰⁶This postulation rests on the tendency of colonial ethnographers to combine official service in with the inclination to recommend their texts as manuals for, 'native' administration. Evans-Pritchard, for example, conceived *the Samusi* after he was "posted as Political Officer to the (third) British Military Administration of Cyrenaica." "The policy of indirect rule," the editors of *African Political Systems*, Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes, wrote, "is now generally accepted in British Africa. We would suggest that it can only prove advantageous in the long run if the principles of the African political systems, such as this book deals with, are understood." Evans-Pritchard, *The Samusi*, preface; Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes, "Introduction," *African Political Systems*, ed. Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940): 2-23, 2; for the 'interface' between anthropology and colonial power structures, see *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. Asad; Lonsdale, "When did the Gussi ... Become a Tribe?" *Kenya Historical Review*, 5: 123-133; Ed Van Hoven, "Representing Social Hierarchy, Administrators-Ethnographers in French Sudan: Delafosse, Monteil and Labovret," *Cahiers D'études Africaines*, 30, (1990): 179-198.

¹⁰⁷"So at some time in the first half of the twentieth century," Wright concluded, "Africans did indeed become 'tribal'. They read the European studies and ... discovered their ethnic identities. But it seems that these ethnic identities were more an alien creation... something that fit the European notion of how things ought to be rather than the African notion of how things were." Donald R. Wright, "What do you

the culture of imperialism as the adequate referent for an understanding of the timely invention of tribe as well as its location in the colonies. In this model, 'tribalism' was used by colonial ethnographers to strip their African subjects of the ability to conceive the same institutions frequently invoked to validate European conception of self as civilized beings like market, church, (nation) state and "writing."¹⁰⁸ And as the disciplines that mapped out non-Europe as a primitive space and pioneered its cultivation with, to borrow from David Hume, "wholly different" people, travelogue and ethnography rather than African cultures are the proper archives for an excavation of the origin of tribe.¹⁰⁹

The proponents of the second perspective tend to build on Edmond Leach's early implication of ethnographers in the invention of tribes.¹¹⁰ In the 1980s, however, they began to deploy the notion of "epistemological archeology" advanced by Michel

mean there were no tribes in Africa? Thoughts on boundaries and related matters in pre-colonial Africa", *History in Africa*, 26 (1999): 409-521.

¹⁰⁸"They (the Berbers)," Montagne cynically noted, "imagine that we also, the French and other Europeans, live in tribes divided into leffs, and our constant wars in which Germany opposes France and England tend to confirm them in this belief." Montagne, *The Berbers*, 38. "The fundamental principles of tribal structure," Evans-Pritchard noted, "is opposition between its segments, and in such segmentary systems there is no state and no government as we understand these institutions." Evans-Pritchard, *The Samusi*, 59-60. "A tribe," Sahlins wrote, "is specifically unlike the nation state in that ... (it is) not united under a sovereign governing authority, nor are the boundaries of the whole thus clearly and politically determined." Sahlins, *Tribesmen*: vii-viii. "In ruler-less society," Gellner wrote, "it is no use appealing to the police, or the government to protect you ... there is no police and no government." Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 44. "Modernity," Gellner later wrote, "means first of all, effective centralization and so the end or decline of tribalism." Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 56; "Tribalism," he elaborated, "never prospers, for when it does, every one will respect it as a true nationalism, and no one will dare call it tribalism"; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 87.

¹⁰⁹"Should a traveler returning from a far country," David Hume recommended, "bring us an account of men wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted ... we should immediately ... detect the falsehood and proven him a liar." in *The Essential works of David Hume*, ed. Ralph Cohen, (New York: Mantam Books), 105. For examples of the tacit return to Hume's vision of travelogue, see Mary L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992); Abdul-Nabi Dhakir, *al-waga'i wa al-mutakhayal fi al-rihla al-aurubya lil maghrib --the realistic and imaginative about the European journey to Morocco--* (Casablanca: manshurat kawthar, 1996); On the tendency of colonial ethnographers in Africa to 'borrow' from travel literature, see Mary Pratt, "Field work in Common Places," In *Writing Culture*, ed. James Clifford, 27-50; Robert Thornton, "Narrative Ethnography in Africa, 1850-1920: The Creation and Capture of an Appropriate Domain for Anthropology," *MAN*, 18,(1983): 502-520. Maria Grosz-Ngate "Power and Knowledge: The Representation of the Mande World in the Works of Park, Caillie, Monteil and Delafosse," *Cahiers d'etudes africaines*, XXXVIII (1988), 485-511.

¹¹⁰"It is," Leach wrote, "largely an academic fiction to suppose that ... one ordinarily finds distinct 'tribes' ... My own view is that the ethnographer has often only managed to discern the existence of a tribe because he took it as axiomatic that this kind of cultural entity must exist." Edmond Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 74. As late as 1985 Southall felt it necessary to 'warn' ethnographers working in Africa of the pitfalls of the ethnographic present that consumed their colonial predecessors: "The fundamental error of anthropologists," he wrote, "has been to go out with admirable intention of studying the lives of people as they are, but doing so late in the colonial period and not only assuming that they could find integrated societies, which each could call his own, but that what they saw in the mid-20th. Century was a primeval state of affair—the ethnographic present." Aidan Southall, "The ethnic heart of anthropology," *Cahier d'etudes africaines*, 100,XXV-4 (1985): 567-572, 567.

Foucault and refined by postcolonial theorists like Mudimbe to excavate textual genealogies for the rhetorical strategies informing the ethnographic text. Mudimbe, for instance, tended to lump colonial ethnography with travelogue and to endow them with an intellectual genealogy that stretches all the way back to what Foucault called the "last rupture" in Western epistemology, the Enlightenment.¹¹¹ As a metaphor of otherness, tribe comes across as one of the aliases of the generic "outsiders" pre-modern European literati conjured up to render Europe self-sufficient. "The west's self-representation," Mudimbe noted in 1994,

have always included images of peoples situated outside of its cultural and imaginary frontiers. The paradox is that if indeed, these outsiders were understood as localized and far away geographically, they were nonetheless imagined and rejected as the intimate and other side of the European thinking subject, on the analogical model of the tension between the being In-Itself and the being For-Itself.¹¹²

From this vantage point, the historically adequate referent for tribe is not a real primitive. Rather, tribe was a product of the same boundary-constructing process critics of what Hall called "the common sense language" trace back to modernity. I have noted that this was the process that in the case of Morocco also spawned the location of the (Berber) *qabila* and *zawiya* beyond the (Arab) dynastic realm, the *Siba-Makhzan* modality.

The idea of birth in the bosom of the text has become a common wisdom in post-colonial academic discourses on sub-Saharan Africa. But emphasis on the interface between the re-discovery of tribe and the "scramble for Africa" has yet to infiltrate Africanist discourses on Maghribian identities. As a result, the conventional use of the segmented and autonomous tribe as an adequate unit of historical analysis still resigns supreme. I have already noted how Gellner's introduction of Evans-Pritchard's conception of segmentation to Morocco and its subsequent adoption by historians like Abun-Nasr and Brett coincided with the drive by post-colonial anthropologists to evict the primitive tribe from sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, there is an ironic congruity between the outright dispensation with tribe or its replacement with "ethnic group" in sub-Saharan Africa, and the repatriation of the segmented tribe first to Morocco and then, the Middle East.¹¹³ In that sense, tribe has returned to the cradle of the same civilizing trends that, ostensibly, plotted its demise elsewhere: universal religion, "writing" and centralized authority. It is worth recalling how the articulation of tribe in terms of what Europeans were not enabled even post-colonial critics of colonial ethnography like Southall to locate the tribal condition outside the realm of universal religion, commerce,

¹¹¹"Travelers in the eighteenth century," Mudimbe noted, "as well as those of the nineteenth century and their successors in the twentieth century (colonial pro-consuls, anthropologists, and colonizers) spoke using the same type of signs and symbols and acted upon them." Mudimbe, *the Invention of Africa*, 22; On the notion of "epistemological archeology," see, Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 376-378.

¹¹²V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 19.

¹¹³For examples of the 'repatriation' of the segmented tribe to the Middle East, see Dale Eickelman, *The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach* (Prentice-Hall, 1988), 87-90; Richard Tapper, *The Conflict between Tribe and State in the Middle East*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); *Tribes and State Formation*, ed. Khoury and Kostiner.

the state and "writing." Yet it was the looming presence of Islam that also enabled Gellner to situate the segmented tribe in an area extending "from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic and the Niger bend."¹¹⁴ Field research in Morocco and the "observation" of Islam was also central to Geertz's refinement of the notion of primordialism. As the titles of their respective texts suggest, Geertz's *Islam Observed* and Gellner's *Muslim Society*, it was the universal, and sacred, ideal rather than the localized, and secular, practice that enabled these post-colonial ethnographers to endow Berber tribalism with a coherence that would have otherwise been difficult to articulate.¹¹⁵

As I have already noted, it is next to impossible to imagine a Berber tribal particularity without also thinking of the difference that sets them apart from their outside observers. After all, if the "internalization" of Islam is capable of turning the Berber tribe in the Maghrib into a double for social formations in the "Hindu Kush," is it difficult to imagine how the same religion could have failed to erase its difference from the present (Arab) dynastic realm? In this sense, the difference Anglophone anthropologists like Gellner, and historians such as Abu-Nasr used to demarcate the Berber tribe harks back to the same pre-modern location of the *Moor*, Muslim, in juxtaposition to his *Nazarene*, Christian, other. This is also the 'primordial' difference lurking beneath abolitionist discourse on Morocco in the nineteenth century. Whether as a signifier of sanctified difference from Euro-Christendom or as a metaphor for the literary heritage that produced authors such as Ibn Khaldun, Islam is also the incubator for, to borrow from Spivak, the "institutions and inscriptions" that inspired notions of origination in an epical point and subsequent dispersion: the idea of segmentation. It is precisely because of their tendency to promise lofty histories that such textual notions of origin were also able to enchant even redoubtable critics of the ethnographic tribe like Ki-Zirbo. Ki-Zirbo, for example, denied sub-Saharan Africa to tribe. But at the same time he seconded, albeit tacitly, Gellner's repatriation of its segmented twin to "literate" North Africa. "So far as possible," Ki-Zirbo wrote,

the word 'tribe' will be banished from this book *except in the case of certain regions in north Africa* ... The Arabic term *Khabbyla* designates a group of persons linked genealogically to a common ancestor and living within specific territory. *Since genealogical filiation is of great importance among Semitic peoples (Arabs, Berbers and so on) the Khabbyla (the English equivalent of which would be tribe) has played and some times still plays a part not to be disregarded (emphasis added).*¹¹⁶

It is tempting to posit deference to sanctified textual tropes as the main reason behind the striking similarity between Ki-Zirbo's invocation of the "Semitic" entrapment in "genealogical filiation" and Gellner's nomination of the Muslim Berbers rather than the

¹¹⁴Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 36; also see, Ernest Gellner, "Tribalism and State in the Middle East," *Tribes and State Formation*, ed. Khoury and Kostiner, 109-126.

¹¹⁵According to Gellner, the Berber tribe "has a great need for arbitrators and mediators... (who) can only function well if they are in it but not of it." In his vision the "saints" (*zawaya*) fulfill this tribal need for "arbitrators." Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 41. In contrast, Geertz identified the (Moroccan) city as a site of "aggressive fundamentalism" and tribe as the domain of "aggressive piety"; Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 15.

¹¹⁶Ki-Zerbo, "Introduction," *General History of Africa: v.1*, ed. Ki-Zerbo, 22.

"Nilotic" Nuer, as the ideal exemplifiers of the "segmentary tribe." I have already noted that the inventor of the secular notion of segmentation, Evans-Pritchard, himself had no difficulty transporting his diagnosis of the social practices of the "non-literate" Nuer to the clients of the "orthodox" Sanusi "order of Sufis" in Cyrenaica (Libya).¹¹⁷

What Gellner did not acknowledge, however, is the fact that Evans-Pritchard himself borrowed the idea of segmentation from the one time chair of the "Hebrew and Old Testament interpretation in the Free Church College" and author of *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, William Robertson Smith.¹¹⁸ It goes without saying that Smith's conception of segmentation was culled from sacred texts, the "Hebrew and Old Testament," and was tried on adherents to a similar notion of *in the beginning*, the inhabitants of "early Arabia." In as much as Smith's conception of segmentation is rooted in the notion of *in the beginning* encoded in Jewish literature, it belongs in what Edward Said aptly called the secularization of religious knowledge, the secularization that, according to Mudimbe, also "guarantees our scientificness."¹¹⁹ The segmented tribe, therefore, was born in the text and, as such, tells us more about the lore of its modern and post-modern advocates than the "non-literate" societies they described. Like Morgan and Montagne, for instance, Smith too found it imperative to deploy modern non-Europeans, the Australian aborigines, to simulate how segmentation ostensibly worked in "early Arabia."¹²⁰ In as much as tribe is a creature of textuality, its inversion into what Montagne called an "ethnographic museum" for Europe cannot be understood without reference to the colonial "institutions and inscriptions" that made this sort of knowledge possible in the first place. Even if we take Gellner's presentation of the Berber at its face value, it will still be hard to comprehend the transformation of segmentation from a revelation to an observable reality without thinking of the agencies that brought this modeling of mundane social practices after sacred ideals within the realm of the possible: namely, the dynasty and the *zawiya*.

The forgoing discussion further detracts from the utility of the notions of segmentation and ineffable attachment to the study of the identity and history of a family like the Bayrouk. My working assumption is that neither the generality of the history of the Maghrib nor the specificities of the Takna and Bayrouk conception of origin bode well for the notion of the segmented and autonomous tribe. Rather, when

¹¹⁷On the deference of "Bedouin tribes" to the Sanusi "order," see Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, 1, 71.

¹¹⁸William Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1903); Instead of the 'clerical' Smith, Gellner traced Evans-Pritchard's intellectual genealogy back to the 'secular' Emile Durkheim and the anti-"religionist" David Hume. Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 39.

¹¹⁹Said, *Orientalism*, 113-123; "Having confused secularization with de-Christianization," Mudimbe noted, "we assume that we are functioning within a culture that no longer owes anything to Christianity but its past, which has been assumed and surpassed ... For along time the secularity that guaranteed our 'scientificness' prevented us from understanding the Christian basis of twentieth-century African literate thought." V.Y. Mudimbe, "African Memories and Contemporary History of Africa," In *History Making in Africa*, ed. Mudimbe and B. Jewsiewicki, (Middletown: Wesleyan University, 1993): 1-11, 6-8.

¹²⁰According to Cohen, the use of the ethnographic present to 'simulate' the past and vice versa is a common denominator of French writing about pre-modern Amerindians and modern Africans. "As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," he noted, "Frenchmen, when observing Indians or Caribs, had ascribed to them characteristics that they claimed remind them of ancient Greece or Rome." William Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Responses to Blacks, 1530-1880* (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1980), 77.

taken in the context of Maghribian history, the Takna and the Bayrouk notions of origin can best be understood in the light of the Khaldunian and postmodern emphasis on the utilitarian propensities of identification. Firstly, segmentation and ineffable attachment are coterminous with originary identities. It is, however, difficult to argue for an originary identity in the absence of (authentic or fictive) genealogies that shore up the belief in a common origin. A fruitful utilization of Gellner's conception of segmentation or Geertz's elevation of "natural affinity" over "social interaction," for example, hinges on the location of the genealogies that warrant the investiture of the Takna with a common origin. Even if we take the ethnographic postulation of a Getule, Lamta or an Almoravid heritage at its face value, the absence of genealogies that lead back to such distant moments frustrates any attempt to negotiate a common origin for the Takna and, then, to surmise their modes of segmentation. As I have already noted, such a quest does not conform to either the Takna refusal to acknowledge the Getules, Lamta and Almoravids, nor the discordant myths of origin enshrined in their subaltern narratives. The location of the origin of the Bayrouk's first named ancestor, Sulayman Ibn Ali, in sixteenth-century Tuwat rather than al-Sus is an early warning of the heterogeneity of the Takna *qabila* ensemble. Besides, the proposition of descent from the Getule or Lamta "of antiquity," or the Almoravids can work only if one also ignores the historical chasm that separates their disappearance from the rather recent articulation of Takna as an identity for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun.

As we will see in the next chapter, the proposition of the Takna as the rightful heirs of the Getules or Lamta of antiquity eschews Wadi Nun's demographic history as well as the tendency of the anonymous authors of the subaltern Takna narratives to implicate the dynasty and the *zawiya* in the making of their *qabila* ensemble. The disparity between the ethnographic yearning for primeval origins and the Takna fixation on birth in the bosom of recent dynasties and *zawaya* is further augmented by the fact that tribe itself was located in binary opposition to the concentration of power and resources. I have noted that the Bayrouk place in history is itself a byproduct of their privileged position amongst the Takna, a position that also violates the main tenets of the ethnographic notion of tribe: subsistence, autonomy and egalitarianism. One can blame this mismatch between the Bayrouk as affluent traders and powerful potentates and the anthropological notion of the egalitarian tribe on the same problems of translation and conception I have already identified. To circumvent this structural contradiction, I will back my repudiation of segmentation in favor of "suturing" with the restitution of *qabila*, and subscription to the Khaldunian and postmodern conceptions of the wiles of origin and identification. This substitution enables us to escape the evaluative connotations of tribe as well the current oscillation between the disavowal and reification of this term, the oscillation underlying its restraint by inverted comas. In spite of its porosity, *qabila* is at least spared the troubled career and negative connotations of tribe. *Qabila* is also the term the Bayrouk and the Takna used to locate both self and other in time and space.

Secondly, I have also noted the disparity between the Africanists' tendency to invoke Ibn Khaldun's conception of *nisba* (genealogy) and their inclination to obviate his emphasis on its "illusionary" nature. Emphasis on utility also sanctions his nomination of power as the "ultimate objective" of the sense of *asabiya* (solidarity)

nisba is geared to kindle.¹²¹ Advocates of segmentation, for instance, tend to invoke his declaration of "authentic" *nasab* coterminous with domicile in desolate terrains, *qafir*, and, hence, its exile to a distant time and place-- pre-Islamic Arabiya.¹²² Ibn Khaldun's inability to find "authentic" *ansab* in the Maghrib further underlines the axiomatic nature of his proposition of pre-Islamic Arabia as its natal home. In his history, *al-Ibar*, Ibn Khaldun deployed what he called the "mixing" (*ikhtilat*) of the peoples of the Maghrib and the "corruption" (*fasad*) of their *ansab* (genealogies) to dismiss claims of authentic (Arab or Berber) origin as studious fabrications. This proposition enabled him to posit the Arab conquest of the Maghrib as the genesis for the patterns of displacement (*hijra*) and "mixing" (*ikhtilat*) lurking beneath the social birth and mutation of the *qabila* ensembles that 'made it' to the text. I have also noted how his materialist conception of *asabiya* predated Spivak's demotion of (postmodern) notions of origin and identity to "commodities."¹²³ In fact, Ibn Khaldun's deployment of the Arab conquest as the catalyst for displacement and hybridism in the Maghrib tends to anticipate Hall's conversion of the migrations unleashed by modernity and "globalization" into scourge of "relatively settled" pre-colonial cultures. "We need," Hall recommended,

To situate the debate about identity within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively 'settled' character of many populations and cultures, above all in relation to the processes of globalization which I would argue are coterminous with modernity and the processes of forced and 'free' migration which have become a global phenomenon of the so-called 'post-colonial world'.¹²⁴

I would argue that very much like Ibn Khaldun's location of "authentic" genealogies in a distant place and time, Hall's predication of "forced and free migration" on modernity is unwarranted partly because it rests on an axiomatic assumption that once upon a time there were settled cultures. This suggestion tends albeit inadvertently, to resurrect the

¹²¹ Ibn Khaldun's refusal to divest *qabila* of a constituted authority or to distance it from the state is tied to his conception of Man as "slave of his needs." In his opinion, 'natural' Man is rarely driven by altruistic motives and, as a result, even authentic kinship ties have to justify why they should be honored. Man the "aggressive animal" is at once cursed with the impossibility of surviving on 'his' own and blessed with the aptitude to weave social safety nets that cater to the individual's need for sustenance and protection from equally aggressive peers. To fulfill these goals, however, s/he not only has to belong to a group, but also submit to the authority that manages its conflict with competitors and keeps its members off each other's throat. This seemingly secular theory 'preaches', albeit clandestinely, a religious ideal to the effect that in the absence of revelation and constituted authority 'men' will regress to the status of *Jahilia* (ignorance) that preceded the advent of Islam. See *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 46-47, 99-124, 130-132, 141-145; for a reiteration of this vision, see al-Marrakechi, *al-i'alam* v.1, 149-151.

¹²² Ibn Khaldun made the prospect of "pure" (*sareeh*) *nasab* (genealogy) contingent on conditions of "isolation" which are almost impossible. As a result, he was also forced to forsake the Maghribian 'present' (14th century) and to reach out to a distant past and geography: he elected an arid part (*qafir*) of pre-Islamic Arabia, Najd, as the terrain where "pure" Arab *ansab* (genealogies) once thrived. *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 122-123.

¹²³ Ibn Khaldun's vision lurks beneath the 'Francophone academy' informing Spivak's conception of identity--see her footnotes.

¹²⁴ Hall, "Introduction," in *Questions of cultural Identity*, 4.

predication of the end of the (primitive) tribal condition on encounter with Europe, the idea actively propagated by colonial and post-colonial ethnographers.¹²⁵ Given its proximity to and interaction with the cradle of the "Semitic" heritage (Western Asia), the birth-site of modernity (Western Europe) and the destination of the caravans of "gold and slaves" (West Africa), the Maghrib is one area where displacement rather than nativity occupies center-stage in the conception of identity and history. My review of the literature on dynastic succession and the Trans-Saharan (caravan) Trade promises two pedantic deductions that tend to underline the centrality of displacement to the postulation of what I have called the identities possible for the Takna Bayrouk.

Firstly, the literature review suggests that the conquest of space, its division into centers and margins, the delegation of prerogatives to clients and the dislocation of opponents, are staples in the historiography of the dynasties that established rights in the space enveloping the Takna and the Bayrouk ancestry, Wadi Nun and Tuwat. By generating boundary-constructing processes capable of impacting the demographic map of the Maghrib, dynastic squabbles also rendered claims to cultural atavism or infinite nativity impossible to verify. As I have already noted, what gives meaning to the identities touted by *qabila* ensembles like the Takna is the fact of domicile in a shared space, spatiality, and the terms of interaction with the dynasties or *zawaya* that claimed rights in it. Secondly, the quest for access to the caravan trade led Maghribian dynasties and *zawaya* to turn select locales like the sites of ancient Sijilmasa or modern Asa and Illigh into attractive centers of power. The Trans-Saharan Trade system also spawned patterns of displacement and relocation which, while less tractable than the *en masse* transfer of clients to the center, *hadar*, or the exile of opponents to the margin, the *qafr*, frequently credited to Maghribian dynasties, left their imprint on the demographic map of cross-roads of trade routes like Wadi Nun.

On the strength of these two deductions, it is imperative to wonder whether and how either extinct *qabila* formations like the Lamta and *Getules* or extant groups such as the Takna could have enjoyed the uninterrupted patterns of domicile or the tranquility of social existence conducive to segmentary "structures" and "natural affinity"? An application of these two deductions to the known about the history of the 'ancient' al-Sus and modern Wadi Nun will enable us to surmise the contingent emergence and mutation of identities as well as the role of "writing and literature" in the enunciation of the Bayrouk conception of origin. To this end I will first provide a synoptic overview of the sources of the thesis and, then, an outline of the chapters in which I used this material to deconstruct the notions of origin claimed for or by the Takna and Bayrouk, and to sketch the place of the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan in their histories.

¹²⁵There is no denying that modernity did set the stage for spectacular patterns of "forced and free migration." Modernity, however, also spawned signifiers of origin that tend to fossilize identity: family name, "security" number, certificate of nationality, passport etc. Modernity, of course, is also responsible for the technological revolution that produced mechanical devices that cancel distance or preserve cultural practices and, in that sense, enhance the sense of being grounded in some place or culture-- plane, telephone, cassette, video-camera etc. By donating such agents of 'stability', modernity also tended to ameliorate the impact of the "forced and voluntary migrations" it has set in motion. None of these amenities were available to the pre-modern immigrant, out of sight really equaled out of mind!

VI-Sources and Methodology

The main sources for this thesis consist of material generated by the Bayrouk and material in which the family was represented by outsiders. The sources are in Arabic, French and English. They can be divided into four main categories: archival records, orally based material, travelogue, and *Shurafa* biographies and colonial ethnography. Collectively, these sources cover the three main pillars of the Bayrouk identity and history: the dynasty, the caravan and *qabila*. I used this ensemble of sources to address the history of the family and how this history was deployed by family members to construct a Bayrouk identity, and the ways academics have hitherto dealt with this construct. Below I will introduce the main sources and the ways in which they contribute to my treatment of the Bayrouk history and identity.

Archival Material

The archival materials consist mainly of the Bayrouk commercial ledgers and correspondence with Europeans and the Alawite court. The commercial ledgers consist of 269 folios containing 254 entries: records of sales. The bulk of this material covers the period between 1840s and 1860s and consists of transactions between the Bayrouk and their customers: buying, selling and credit. The registers specify the goods in circulation, their prices, terms of sale and payment and the identities of their pursuers. I used the registers in my treatment of the commercial activities of the family and what they entail for the Bayrouk conception of identity and history. The registers are helpful in identifying shifts in the family patterns of procurement and distribution, the identity of the goods they were dealing in and whether and how trade influenced the Bayrouk choice of customers on the spot and attitude towards the Alawite court and European traders.

In contrast, the main focus of the correspondence is the family relations with European traders, the Alawite court and some of the Bayrouk's localized peers—namely, the Simlali of Illigh. The correspondence with Europeans consists of twelve folios covering inconclusive negotiations between Bayrouk and French officials in the early 1840s. I utilized this material for my discussion of the Bayrouk commercial and political activities in general and their search for access to European markets in particular. The correspondence between the court and the Bayrouk or a third party, like the Simlali, concerning the Bayrouk consists of 61 folios. Even though the main focus of this correspondence is on the Bayrouk quest for European customers, I used it mainly in my discussion of their politics in general and relation with the Alawite court in particular. Because of its intermittent nature, the correspondence leaves gaps that can be filled by recourse to other sources like travel accounts and *Shurafa* biographies.

Orally Based Material

This material is mainly drawn from Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Susi's compendious text, *al-masul*. The material for the 20 volumes constituting this text was collected in the 1930s and is mostly biographical translations for famous southern Moroccan families. In scope, al-Susi tended to focus on the very designations and activities colonial ethnographers considered irreconcilable with tribalism such as

encounter with dynasts, long distance trade and "writing and literature." In his translation for the Bayrouk, al-Susi identified his contemporary, Dahman Ibn Abdin (Ibn Dāhman Ibn Bayrouk), as the "man of the family" and, by implication, the main authority on the family history. I identified this material as orally based rather than "oral" sources because *al-masul* is not a verbatim transcription of the exact words of al-Susi's informants. Rather, it is written in the same elegant language of classical texts such as Ibn Khaldun's *al-Ibar* and Shurafa biographies like al-Nasiri's *al-Istiqsa*, al-Marrakechi's *al-i'alam*.¹²⁶ The bulk of the Bayrouk biography is in volume 19 of *al-masul*. But there are also intermittent references to the family in volumes 5 and 20 as well as the supplementary works that branched out from al-Susi's research for *al-masul*: *min afwah al-rijal*, and *khilal Jazula*.¹²⁷ This biographical translation not only predated, but also informed later presentations of the Bayrouk narrative by Moroccan authors who might have consulted contemporary members of the family. The works of Mustafa Naimi and Muhammad al-Gharbi are the most obvious examples. I used al-Susi's version as the grand narrative and the basis for my discussion of the Bayrouk conception of the family origin and career in Wad Nun. I will use postmodern insights to highlight the role of textuality in both the narrator and al-Susi's conception of history and identity. Textuality, I suggest, played a central role in both the Bayrouk conception of self as well as their presentation by outsiders.

Travel Literature

Apart from a few Arabic texts, the travel accounts used in this thesis are mostly written by American and European survivors of shipwreck and explorers. Examples of survivors of shipwreck include the Americans Robert Adams (1812) and James Riley (1815), and the French Charles Cochelet (1819).¹²⁸ While they all passed through Wadi Nun, only Adams and Cochelet reported direct encounters with members of the Bayrouk family. In contrast, the explorers include the French Rene Caille (1828), the British James Jackson, John Davidson and James Richardson, the Senegalese Leopold Panet and Bou Mogdad (1850s), and the Spanish Joachim Gatell (1860s).¹²⁹ Davidson, Panet, Bou

¹²⁶The distancing of tribe from "writing" led post-colonial anthropologists to take sub-Saharan Africa as the main domain of "oral tradition" and "oral culture". On "oral" tradition and culture, see Joseph Miller, *The African Past Speaks: Essays on Oral Tradition* (Folkestone: Dawson/ Archon Books, 1980); Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History* (London: James Currey, 1985); David Henige, *The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for a Chimera* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); Elizabeth Tonkin "Implications of Oracy: An Anthropological View," *Oral History*, III, (1975), 41-49. Tonkin, "Investigating Oral Tradition," *Journal Of African History*, 27, (1986): 203-213.

¹²⁷Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Susi, *kitab min afwah al-rijal* (Tetuan: matba'at al-Mahdyia, 1962); al-Susi, *khilal Jazula* (Tetuan: n.d)

¹²⁸Robert Adams, *the Narrative of Robert Adams* (London: John Murry, 1816); James Riley, *An Authentic Narrative of the Loss of the American Brig Commerce* (London: Richard Philip, 1822). In the U.S.A, Riley's account was published under the enticing title: *Sufferings in Africa: Captain Riley's Narrative*, ed. Gordon Evans, (New York: Clarkson N. Potters, Inc Publishers, 1965); Charles Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, (London: Richard Philip, 1822); for earlier examples of this genre, see *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental 1784-1786*, ed. Maurice Barbier, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1984).

¹²⁹Rene Caillié, *Travels Through Central Africa to Timbuctoo and Across the Great Desert to Morocco performed in the Years 1824-1828*, 2 vols. (London: 1830); Davidson, *Notes*, Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*; Léopold Panet, *Première exploration du Sahara occidental: Relations d'un voyage du Senegal*

Mogdad and Gatell visited Gulimeme and lodged with the Bayrouk. In terms of content, both narratives of shipwreck and exploration are riveted on the crossing of the Sahara and encounter with some of its occupants. These narratives could be used to gauge the cargo of the trans-Saharan caravan as well as the identities of its Saharan and southern Moroccan benefactors. I used this material in my discussion of the Takna identity and the Bayrouk commercial and political careers. Information on the family commercial activities and modes of procurement and distribution is cross-checked with the commercial registers and correspondence with Europeans. My use of this material, however, is circumscribed by postmodern critiques of the travelers' fixation on and intolerance of cultural difference: discourses on savage speech and physique or irrational beliefs and indecent attire. I invoked postmodern insights to gauge the role of textuality in the production of nineteenth-century travelogue. Regardless of the exact experience of any given traveler, these texts tend to conform to European textual traditions that predated the travelers' encounter with and reportage on the named Moroccan objects of his observation. In that sense, the element of sameness oozing from such accounts does not necessarily mean that the traveler was merely reporting an observable experience. On the contrary, given the combination of modern European fixation on the exotic with the frequency and facility of translation and publication, travelers tended to have a priori knowledge of the geographical settings and peoples incarcerated in their texts. The frequent predication of encounter with southern Moroccans like the Bayrouk on enslavement is, for example, rooted in a tradition of writing about the "Moors" and "Barbary" that can be traced back to the Enlightenment and beyond. Postmodern insights enabled me to sketch intellectual genealogies for the Bayrouk image in modern travel accounts.

Shurafa Biographies and Colonial Ethnography

The above sources are supplemented by biographical translations for *Shurafa*, *Alawite*, dynasts by contemporaries to Bayrouk and his father Ubaydallah such as al-Nasiri and al-Da'eef al-Rabati (of Rabat).¹³⁰ These *Shurafa* historians make occasional references to al-Sus (Wadi Nun) and the Takna, and the Bayrouk or their town, Gulimeme. But like the nineteenth-century travel accounts, *Shurafa* biographies were also informed by textual traditions that lead back to classical Arabic texts on the Maghrib. There is also a body of ethnographic commentaries on the peoples of southern Morocco, al-Sus, and its Saharan backyards. This literature is produced by French colonial officials turned authors and, as such, highlights the relation between power and knowledge. Its main focus is on the notion of tribe and its ostensible career in the Maghrib. Examples of the ethnographers/ colonial administrators who wrote about the Takna or some of their constituencies include Paul Marty (1914), Robert Montagne (1930), Frederick de la Chapelle, De La Ruelle (1941)

au Maroc (Paris: Reprint 1968); Bou Moghdad, "Voyage de Si Bou Moghdad de Saint-Louis (Senegal) a Mogador (Maroc)", *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages, de la Géographie, de L'Histoire et de L'Archéologie*, v. 2, (Paris: Artus Bertrand, 1861): 257-70; Joachim Gatell, "L'Oud-Noun et le Tekna," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 18, (octobre 1869): 257-287.

¹³⁰ Muhammad al-Da'eef al-Rabati, *tarikh al-Da'eef al-Rabati*, ed. Muhammad al-Buzaydi, (Casablanca: Dar al-Thaqafa, 1985)

and Vincent Monteil (1948).¹³¹ In scope, the information in these cartographic surveys include profiles of the main constituents of the Takna *qabila* ensemble, their patterns of domicile and social existences, and the relation between their speech and political affiliations. This information was later used by ethnographers like Monteil to deduce causal relations between economic or cultural practices such as farming and language on one hand and the ethnic (Berber or Arab) origins of the main constituents of the Takna *qabila* ensemble. Another popular theme is the nature of the relation between the Takna, as (Arab or Berber) tribes and the Moroccan state, the *Makhzen*. Here the Takna, as tribes, become a signifier for living in *siba* (anarchy) and, as such, they were located beyond the jurisdiction of the pre-colonial Moroccan states. While these texts were published some time after the imposition of French colonialism on North Africa, some of the material used to construct the tribes they describe can be traced back to nineteenth-century travel literature. To highlight the role of textuality in the inversion of southern Moroccan *qabila* formations to tribes, my use of this material is informed by the current insights on the symbiosis between ethnography (knowledge) and colonialism (power), and the role of travelogue in the production of the ethnographic text.¹³² To this end, I will also juxtapose the ethnographic and Takna conceptions of *qabila* origin and relation to the pre-colonial Moroccan state.

VI-Outline of Chapters

The differences in modes of reporting informing this ensemble of sources suggest that the Bayrouk meant different things to different people at different points in time. Despite such differences, these sources dwell on the same pillars of the Bayrouk conception of self I have already identified: the bounded *qabila*, the *zawiya*, the caravan and the dynasty. To match the main pillars of the Bayrouk vision of identity and history with the set of sources that speak to them, I have divided the thesis into four chapters and a conclusion. Chapters one and two address the notions of origin claimed for the Takna and the Bayrouk and whether and how they relate to the histories of Wadi Nun (al-Sus) and Tuwat. Together, these two chapters constitute the part of the thesis that deals with the question of origin and identification and, as such, forms the background for my discussion of the family commercial and political careers in chapters three and four respectively. These chapters are intended to underline how the Bayrouk approach to matters of trade and politics influenced their terms of engagement with their Takna brethren and outsiders.

The focus of chapter one is on the discrepancy between the ethnographic explanations of the Takna origin and what their own narratives seem to suggest. I sought to relate these two visions to the set of (European and Moroccan) textual traditions and the

¹³¹Paul Marty, "Les tribus de la haute Mauritanie: Les Takna (Oued Noun)," *Bulletin du Comité de L'Afrique française*, n. 5, (August 1915): 136-146.

¹³²"Ethnography", Ki-Zirbo wrote, "was deputed to serve as a sort of ministry of European curiosity vis-à-vis the native." Ki-Zirbo, "Introduction", *General History of Africa*: v.3, 13. On the interface between ethnographic knowledge and colonial power, see Edmond Burke III, "The Image of the Moroccan state in French ethnographical literature: A new Look at the Origin of Lyauty's Berber Policy", in *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Gellner and Micaud, 175-199; Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*; Van Hoven, "Representing Social Hierarchy", *Cahiers d'études Africaines* 30: 179-198.

sources that made them possible in the first place. The sources in question include ethnographic texts and travel accounts for the ethnographic vision and *Shurafa* biographies and subaltern narratives for the Takna conception of history. By crosschecking the two types of sources with classical texts, like Ibn Khaldun's *al-Ibar*, that speak to the demographic history of Wadi Nun (al-Sus), I sought to establish why the Takna identity should be imagined in terms of *suturing* rather than *segmentation*. Here an understanding of the circumstances surrounding the tabulation and mutation of the Geutle (Gaetulians) or Jazula and Lamta makes it possible to tell whether the Takna could be credited with a common origin or natural right to Wadi Nun. And by examining the role of named dynasts and Sufi grandees in the making of the Takna, I also seek to discount the ethnographic inclination to distance *qabila* from the dynasty or to exonerate the "saint" from meddling in its affairs. The overall objective of the chapter is to demonstrate the rather modern origin and hybrid nature of the Takna and, in effect, their propensity not only to take in outsiders like the Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf, but also to allow his descendants to concentrate wealth and power. The Takna, I argue, took in the Bayrouk ancestor because that was how their *qabila* ensemble 'reproduced' itself. This conclusion sets the stage for my discussion of the Bayrouk vision of who their ancestors were and how they made it in Wadi Nun: chapter two.

In chapter two, I sought to apply the same investigative strategy I used in chapter one to the Bayrouk conception of Tuwat as an origin and to postulate how the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya* might have eased the journey of their ancestor to Wadi Nun as well as merger into the Takna. The main source for this chapter is the Bayrouk recollection of the journey from Tuwat to Wadi Nun as it is presented in al-Susi's *al-ma'sul*. Here too, I adduced what is known about the history of Tuwat from classical and contemporary sources to surmise the historically conceivable about the Bayrouk narrative. My main objective is to underline the impact of the dynasty and the caravan on Tuwat's demographic map and to establish how its *history* does not lend itself to an imagination of the Bayrouk affiliation with the Takna of Wadi Nun in terms of common descent. I sought to cement this argument by presenting the identities that were possible to the Bayrouk ancestry in Tuwat itself and to highlight the chasm separating them from those available to their contemporaries in Wadi Nun. I underlined how al-Susi's informants used textual knowledge to illuminate the Bayrouk conception of history. This conclusion serves as the background for my discussion of how a combination of spiritual and temporal credentials assigned to named ancestors like Ibn Saud, and parleying with *Shurafa* dynasts and *zawaya* families, could have paved the way for settlement in Wadi Nun and affiliation with one of its *qabila* units: the Ait Musa. This discussion serves as a premise for my postulation of how the social networks spun by this ancestry, could have been used to maximize the Bayrouk commercial and political fortunes in Wadi Nun: the subjects of chapter three and four.

Chapter three deals with the Bayrouk commercial career in the nineteenth-century and whether it corresponds to the existing authorial conceptions of the Trans-Saharan caravan. It begins with a delineation of the centrality of trade to the family vision of history and the ways it influenced the Bayrouk conduct on the spot, Wadi Nun, as well as the reviews it generated from the Moroccan court and European observers. For this purpose, I used the family narrative, commercial registers and travel accounts to

confront the received academic wisdom on the object of the caravan trade and the identity of the merchandise the Bayrouk were chasing. This material is also used to dispose of the erstwhile ethnographic conception of the congruity between kinship and economic and political behavior in 'tribal' settings: the notions of subsistence and egalitarianism. My main finding here is that rather than letting attachment to the Takna determine their choice of customers or the eligibility to credit, the Bayrouk used commercial credentials to re-define being Ait Musa and to stuff their site of domicile, Gulimeme, with like-minded outsiders—namely, Jewish and Saharan traders. But the main finding of this chapter is that neither the family commercial registers nor the Bayrouk expectations lend credence to the Africanists' fixation on the exotic: gold and maidens. The main focus of the Bayrouk was the collection and marketing of raw materials only industrial Europe wanted. This quest became the driving force behind the family's political behavior discussed in chapter four.

Chapter four deals with the Bayrouk political career and the ways its course was charted by the quest for suppliers of and markets for, perishable commodities. Here, I used the Bayrouk narrative, travel accounts and Alawite correspondence to explain the impact of commercial priorities on the family relations with Europeans, its localized, Susian, peers and the Moroccan, Alawite, court. I put special emphasis on how preoccupation with trade impinged on the Bayrouk choice of 'friends and foes' on the spot and terms of interaction with the Alawite court. My argument is that the simultaneity between the Bayrouk quest for markets and the contingent nature of their transactions with local and distant centers of power does not lend credence to the ethnographic predication of the relation between the Takna, as tribe, and the court, the state, on the *bled es-siba-bled el-makhzan* dichotomy. On this occasion, the Bayrouk did not question the Alawite prerogatives in Wadi Nun but rather the restrictions they imposed on trade with Europeans.

The conclusion is a recapitulation of what the main findings of these four chapters say about the construction and use of identity in this part of North-west Africa. Identities, I suggest, are creatures of expediency. They cannot be understood without reference to the historical contingencies surrounding their appearance and mutation in a given geographical setting or the centrality of textuality in the authorship of the origins that underpin them. The translation of Arabic idioms of identification to their (Latin) English 'equivalents' may explain the current split between the Bayrouk/Takna conceptions of the main pillars of their identities and history, and their images in Africanist, Anglophone, literature.

CHAPTER I

ANTIQUE SPACE, MODERN *QABILA*: TAKNA ORIGINS

In this chapter, I intend to address a set of questions pertaining to the main bedrock of the Bayrouk conception of self as members of abounded southern Moroccan *qabila* called the Takna. It is difficult to gauge the nature of the Bayrouk relation to the Takna without dwelling on the question of whom the Takna were: the problem of origin. The most convenient way to address this problem is to acknowledge the existing theories and to identify their main sources. To amplify the similarities or differences between such theorizations of the Takna origin, I have structured the chapter around three main themes, themes which in turn revolve around three types of evidence: contemporary Takna narratives and ethnographic texts, modern European travelogue and Shurafa biographies and finally, classical Arabic materials. Firstly, I seek to sketch how the Takna imagine their history and what role, if any, did they assign to the main agents of Moroccan history: the dynasty and the *zawiya*. We can utilize the Takna conception of self as a frame of reference to reflect on the notion of descent from antique Berbers proposed by French colonial ethnographers during the first half of the twentieth century and subsequently endorsed by sociologists and historians such as Najib and Hodge. The main sources for this section are the subaltern Takna narratives tabulated by post-colonial Moroccan sociologists such as Mustafa Naimi and the ethnographic texts produced by French colonial officials like Robert Montagne, de la Chapelle and Vincent Monteil.¹

From Naimi's accounts, it is difficult to tell the exact authors of the Takna myths of origin. The narratives, however, are laden with historical metaphors. We can take such metaphors as indications of intervention by the kind of elders the Takna might consider as the experts on the origin of their *qabila* ensemble: the *nasaba* (genealogists). Together the subaltern Takna narratives and ethnographic texts provide us with insights into the way the contemporary Takna wanted to present themselves and how they were represented by, to borrow from Rosaldo, "participant" observers: ethnographers.² As we will see, a juxtaposition of these contemporary sources also reveal a notable disparity between the rather short history the Takna *nasaba* (genealogists) claimed for their *qabila* ensemble and the antiquity ethnographers thought the Takna were entitled to.

Secondly, the split between the Takna and ethnographic visions begs a legitimate question: how could Takna *nasaba* (genealogists) and French colonial officials who lived in the same space, Morocco, and during the same time period, the

¹For the Takna narratives see, Mustafa Naimi, "Azwaft," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*, (1989): 364-367; Naimi, "Ait Asa," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 377-378; Naimi, "Asrir," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome D2*, (1989): 409-412; Mustafa Naimi, "Azraqayn," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 339-340; Naimi, "Teqaoust," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome B 6*, (1992): 2084-2089. For the ethnographic conception of Takna origins see, Montagne, *The Berbers*, 7-8; De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain," *B.C.A.F.M.*, (octobre 1933): 587-598; De la Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une Histoire du Sahara Occidental," *Hesperis*, XI, 82; Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 16-17.

²The idea of "participant" observer underlines the role of ethnographers in the production of the exotic phenomena they claim to have merely observed and recorded. See Renato Rosaldo, "From The Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and the Inquisitor" in Clifford and George ed. *Writing Culture*: 77-97.

twentieth century, differ so profoundly in their conception of the origin of the same *qabila*? In addition, what kind of alternative sources could we use to either reconcile or explain such differences? It is tempting to blame the difference between the (Moroccan) Takna and (French) ethnographic conceptions of origin on translation: the substitution of the term familiar to the Takna *nasaba* (genealogist), *qabila*, with the one used by colonial ethnographers like Montagne and endorsed by post-colonial anthropologists and historians such as Gellner, Brett and Abu-Nasr: *tribu* or tribe. It is also tempting to take the subaltern Takna narratives and the ethnographic texts as spontaneous productions of tangible social realities and, then, blame their discrepancies on faulty translation. Yet, the linguistic differences between the describer and described are also symptoms of the epistemological gap separating the traditions of signification that underpin both the Takna and ethnographic conception of origin. Since we are dealing with "literate societies," it is imperative to ponder the role textuality might have played in the construction of both the Takna narratives and the ethnographic text both in terms of their content and mechanics of composition. From this vantage point, the question of whether and why there is a difference between the Takna and ethnographic visions can hardly be answered without recourse to the most modern European and Moroccan texts that might have either served as intellectual role models for the subaltern narratives and colonial ethnography or can be used to correct them. These texts include nineteenth-century European travelogue and Shurafa biographies.³

Like the Takna *nasaba* and the French ethnographers of the twentieth century, nineteenth-century European travelers and Shurafa biographers were also impelled to report on Takna 'realities'. As we will see, however, neither the European accounts nor the Shurafa biographies actually resolve the discrepancy between the Takna and ethnographic conception of origin. Indeed, these sources tend to perpetuate the question of how far back in history can we actually trace the current conflation of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun. It will become apparent that early nineteenth-century European travelers, survivors of shipwreck, were not aware of the existence of a distinct Susian *qabila* formation called the Takna. In contrast, travel accounts produced during the second half of the nineteenth century, the era of exploration, not only attest to the existence of the Takna as a bounded tribe, but also emphasize their autonomy from the Alawite court. In comparison to European travel accounts, Shurafa biographies tend to locate the Takna 'in' the Moroccan dynastic realm and to commend their deference to the Alawite court and localized *zawaya* centers. That said neither the observations of European travelers nor the testimonies of Shurafa biographers seem to warrant the conflation of being Takna with infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. On the contrary, these testimonies lead the reader to wonder whether the present congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun could be traced beyond the Shurafa period. And if so, is there a point in time when there were no Takna in what is now *trab* Takna (*Taknaland*)?

³For examples of these sources see, Adams, *Narrative of Robert Adams*; Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*; Saugnier, "Récit du Naufrage et de la captivité de Saugnier," in *Trios Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 157, 159, 166-167; Gatell, "L'Oud-Noun et le Tekna," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 18: 257-287. For examples of contemporaneous Moroccan and Saharan texts see, al Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.1, 57; Idem., v.2, 68-71; al-Marrakechi, *al-i'lam*, v.1, 169; Muhammad Yahya al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijaziya*, Muhammad Hajji ed., (Bierut: dar al-gharb al-islami, 1990), 87-88.

Lastly, the fact that both European accounts and Shurafa biographies tend to cast doubts on the antiquity of the Takna identity raises the possibility of a separation between the history of Wadi Nun as an antique space and the history of its current occupants. And if the conflation of the Takna with Wadi Nun is not as ancient as the Takna *nasaba* and colonial ethnographers thought, is there anything about Maghribian experience in general or the demographic history of Wadi Nun in particular that we can use to explain the emergence of the Takna *qabila* ensemble in terms of either segmentation or "suturing"? Once we address these kinds of questions, it becomes feasible to imagine how and why it was possible for confessed outsiders like the Bayrouk ancestry to become Takna and what kind of identity we should assign to a group that allows this kind of imposture to take place. The sources I used to address these questions are mostly classical Arabic texts that speak to the demographic history of the Maghrib from the Arab conquest to the Marinid period (1260s-1510s).⁴ As we will see, these sources not only enable us to surmise why the Takna *qabila* ensemble should be taken as a rather modern creation, but can also be used to discount the possibility of authenticity for any occupants of the space they currently occupy: Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards.

The overall focus of the chapter is on the problems of conception and translation underlying the discrepancy between the Takna conception of origin and the infinite nativity to Wadi Nun ethnographers thought they were entitled to. It is geared to achieve two main theoretical and empirical objectives. At the empirical level, I seek to establish both the rather recent invention of Takna as an identity designation for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun and the hybridism of its carriers. We could credit the Takna with signifiers of originary identity like endogenous descent only if we also ignore the demographic history of Wadi Nun in the period extending from the Arab conquest to the era of the Shurafa dynasties-i.e. from the eighth century to the proposed time of the arrival of the first ancestor of the Bayrouk, the sixteenth century. As I noted in the introduction, colonial ethnographers tended to credit the Takna with descent from Berber contemporaries of the Romans called the Geutle and Lamta. Yet, the classical Arabic sources that cover the period extending from the Arab conquest of the Maghrib to the sixteenth century do not support the investiture of the Takna with a common origin nor warrant the implicit insulation of *qabila* from the main agents of Maghribian history: the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*. On the contrary, the Takna seem to have come together courtesy of the prolonged vulnerability of the space they occupy to the interventions of the same dynasties and *zawaya* families cited in their own subaltern narratives.

At the theoretical level, my main contention is that very much like the idea of segmentation advocated by Gellner and adopted by Africanist historians; the ethnographic conception of the Takna as autonomous tribes was born in the text rather than field research. The Takna of the ethnographer provide a good example of how textuality often enables the author to construct and historicize an ethnographic present that could hardly withstand scrutiny. In many ways, the main tenet of the ethnographic

⁴The best example of these texts is Ibn Khaldun's *kitab al-Ibar* which is also, as I noted in the introduction, the main source used by *Shurafa* historians like al-Nasiri to reconstruct the history of Morocco before the Shurafa period (before 1500).

Takna, the notion of the autonomous tribe, is a distillation of their image in nineteenth-century European travel accounts. The construction of the ethnographic Takna can best be understood in the light of the inversion of the Moroccan dynastic realm into what Montagne has called a "barbarian empire." It is worth recalling that this inversion also enabled him to turn the Berber into an ethnographic museum for Europe. The conflation of (Berber) tribe with autonomy, I suggest, goes back to the shift in European perceptions of the southernmost limits of what travelers often called "the empire of Fez and Morocco (Marrakech)."⁵ It is worth recalling that this epistemological rupture was in turn, inspired by the shift in the balance of power between agrarian Morocco and industrialized Europe leading to the "scramble for Africa." In that sense, the main impetus behind the demotion of the Takna to tribes and, in effect, their investiture with an antique origin was not the discovery of social realities on the ground. Rather, it was a manifestation of the drive to impart to (Berber) *qabila* the kind of resume that seemed to befit its new status as the primitive tribal other of a civilized colonial state: France. I have already noted how colonial ethnographers like Montagne tended to represent the Roman conquest of North Africa as the last occasion for the Berber breach with civilization and, in the process, posited the *bled-makhzan-bled es-siba* modality to suspend the period from the Arab conquest to French colonialism.

Herein, I will first sketch the disparity between the Takna and ethnographic approaches to this suspended history and then seek to establish whether the available evidence, beginning with the most recent European travel accounts and Shurafa biographies, warrant the inversion of the Takna into residues of authentic Berbers or Arabs. I will then use classical Arabic texts to identify the extinct occupants of the space the Takna now claim as their homeland during the period extending from the Arab conquest to the time when Takna became an identity designation for a Susian *qabila*: the late Marinid and early Sa'dian period. Collectively, these sources suggest that at the proposed time of the migration of the Bayrouk ancestor, Yusuf Ibn Abdullah, from Tuwat to Wadi Nun, the sixteenth century, Takna identity was still in the making. Its carriers were prone to grow by the incorporation of outsiders. Below I will show how the Takna narratives of origin accommodate the main agents of displacement in pre-colonial Morocco, the *zawiya* and the dynasty, and in the process, graft *qabila* in the main stream of Maghribian history.

1-In the Womb of the Dynastic Realm: Takna for the Takna

In the introduction, I emphasized the centrality of the notion of the bounded *qabila* to the Bayrouk conception of self. The Bayrouk, I added, posit being Ait Musa and living in Gulimeme or being Takna and domicile in Wadi Nun as the main pillars of their sense of history. I also cited some of the tangible factors that militate against both the postulation of a common origin for the Takna and their investiture with the kind of

⁵In European travel accounts covering the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, what we now know as Morocco tends to 'shrink' from a sprawling *Moorish* empire to a western Barbary and then to a mire kingdom of "Fez and Morocco (Marrakech)." See Roland Lebel, *Les Voyageurs Français Du Maroc: L'exotisme Marocain dans la Littérature de Voyages* (Paris: Larose, 1936); Roland Lebel, *Le Maroc chez les Auteurs Anglais Du XVIe Au XIXe Siècle* (Paris: Laros, 1939) 85-144.

atavisms anthropologists like Southall and Gellner has prescribed for tribes, autonomy and segmentary structures. These factors range from Wadi Nun's geopolitical location as a crossroad between the Sahara and the Mediterranean basin, to the religious and linguistic ties that bind its occupants, the Takna, to other Maghribian and Saharan *qabila* formations. More importantly, the Takna themselves profess different myths of origin and conceive *in the beginning* in terms of birth in the bosom of named Moroccan *zawaya* and dynasties.

It is worth noting that the division of the Takna body politics into two *leffs* (alignments), the *Ait Osman* and the *Ait Jamal*, also corresponds to the differences in their patterns of domicile. These differences are enshrined in the discursive distinction between *ahl al-dakhil* (people of the interior) and *ahl al-sahil* (people of the coast). In what one can take as a reminder of the centrality of spatiality to the Takna conception of identity, being *ahl dakhil* corresponds to being *Ait Osman* in much the same way that being *ahl sahil* is synonymous with being *Ait Jamal*. On the eve of colonialism, the main constituents of the *Ait Osman* constellation, the *ahl al-dakhil*, were the Azwafit in the north, Asrir, the Ait Brahim and Id Ahmad to the east, Taghjijt and Tamanart, and the Ait Ausa (Asa) in the south, Asa and the eastern part of al-Saqiya al-Hamra. In contrast, the major constituents of the *Ait Jamal Leff*, the *ahl al-sahil*, were the Ait Musa in the north, Gulimeme, the Ait al-Hasan to the west, al-Qasabi, and the Azraqayn in the south, the western (Atlantic) part of al-Saqiya al-Hamra—see maps I and II.

The anonymous authors of the subaltern narratives of the *Ait Osman* Takna tend to reverse Gellner's conception of an ontological relation between the (Berber) *zawiya* and *qabila*: the idea that the tribe "produces" the "saint" rather than the other way round. The *Ait Osman* (Azwafit, Ait Usa and Id Ahmed) narratives predicate the social birth of the *qabila* on service to the founders of the three main *zawaya* centers in Wadi Nun: Sidi Ibn Amr *al-Asriri* (of Asrir), Sidi Yazi *al-Asawi* (of Asa) and Sidi Ibn Ibrahim *al-Tamanarti* (of Tamanart).⁶ Here it suffices to note that while Sidi Ibn Amr was a contemporary of the Almohad dynasty (1120s-1260s), Sidi Yazi and Sidi Ibn Ibrahim lived during the Marinid (1260s-1510s) and Sa'dian (1510s-1660s) periods respectively. In the *Ait Osman* narratives, the social birth of the *qabila* is contingent on the ability of the *sufi* savant to discover or ration the thing that made otherwise arid spaces inhabitable: water. Alternatively, the *sufi* savant comes across as the deputy of a named dynasty and in that capacity was authorized to take a share of the labor and produce of his hosts.⁷ The space, *zawiya* or *museum* (market), the *sufi* savant was able to carve on his own or to receive as a donation from his royal benefactors also becomes the centre of the web of social relations binding the *qabila*. The *zawiya* is not only much

⁶For the subaltern Takna narratives see, Mustafa Naimi, "Azwafit," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*, (1989): 364-367; Naimi, "Ait Asa," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 377-378; Naimi, "Asrir," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome D2*, (1989): 409-412; Naimi, "Asa," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome D2* (1989): 412-414; Mustafa Naimi, "Azraqayn," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 339-340; Naimi, "Teqaoust," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome B 6*, (1992): 2084-2089; Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna*, 19-25, 52-58, 31-35; Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna*, 19-25, 52-58, 31-35.

⁷For the Azwafit and Ait Ausa narratives see, Naimi, "Azwafit," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*, (1989): 364-367; Naimi, "Asrir," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome D2*, (1989): 409-412; Naimi, "Ait Asa," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 377-378; Naimi, "Asa," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome D2* (1989): 412-414.

older than the *qabila*, but the *qabila* sense of cohesion (*asabya*) lives vicariously by the 'blessings' of the *museum* (market) it patronizes.

In comparison to the *Ait Osman* fixation on birth in the bosom of the *zawiya*, *Ait Jamal* Takna (the Ait Musa, Azraqayn and Ait al-Hasan) predicate their social birth on service (*khidma*) to imperious Shurafa dynasts like the Sa'dian sultan Mawlai Ahmad al-Mansur (1578-1603) and his Alawite peer Mawlai Ismael (1672-1727).⁸ Like their *Ait Osman* brethren, however, the *Ait Jamal* Takna do not see themselves as survivors of the conditions of displacement engendered by the successive dynastic squabbles over the space they occupy. Instead, they often position themselves as auxiliaries of the victors in such dynastic squabbles and, by default, the beneficiaries from their ability to control space and to distribute its resources. Befittingly, the founding father comes across as a resourceful lieutenant, *qaid*, of the famous dynast incarcerated in the historical memory of the *qabila*.⁹ In addition, unlike the *Ait Osman* narratives, the *Ait Jamal* notions of origin do not specify the sites where the *qabila* identity was first born. Instead, the *qabila* begins its career as a regiment that, pending the retirement of its leader, *qaid*, was amenable to be posted where its services were needed.

Overall, the subaltern narratives do not trace the Takna origin back to a common biological or even symbolic father like Ibn Menda or limit the birth of the whole *qabila* ensemble to a single historical juncture such as the Marinid or Shurafa period. Rather, these narratives tend to emphasize the multiplicity of both the moments and sites of social birth and explain the career of the *qabila* in terms of its patronage by either a pious or an imperious outsider: a *sufi* savant or a dynast. In that sense, it is impossible to extricate the history of a *qabila* like the (*Ait Osman*) Azwafit or the (*Ait Jamal*) Ait Musa from the histories of the *zawaya* and dynasties that dominated the space they occupy. The rather recent and different moments of social birth enshrined in these narratives also tend to anticipate the discrepancy between the idea of descent from Berbers of "antiquity" and the tacit refusal of the Takna *nasaba* (genealogist) to acknowledge the existence of such ancient ancestors. Because of their tendency to spouse different notions of social birth, the subaltern narratives also inhibit any attempt to credit the Takna with a segmentary lineage system or a sense of ineffable attachment.

French colonial ethnographers and post-colonial Moroccan sociologists tended to combine the cursory allusion to such discordant myths of origin with an inclination to see the Takna as a residue of some ancient Berbers. I have already indicated that neither the nineteenth-century European travelogue nor the Shurafa biographies can be used to bridge the chasm separating the Takna and ethnographic conception of origin. Yet, the subaltern Takna narratives are comparable to Shurafa biographies in the sense that their conception of origin in terms birth in the womb of the *zawiya* or the dynasty makes them susceptible to what Jack Goody has aptly called "the interface between the written

⁸For the Azraqayn and Ait al-Hasan myths of origin see, Mustafa Naimi, "Azraqayn," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 339-340; Naimi, "Teqaoust," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome B 6*, (1992): 2084-2089.

⁹This is the bench mark of the Ait Musa and Azraqayn myths of origin, See Naimi, "Azraqayn," in *Encyclopédie Du Maroc, Tome CI*: 339-340; Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1934-39, 34.

and the oral."¹⁰ For instance, there are striking parallelisms between what both colonial ethnographers and post-colonial sociologists tended to classify as tribal mythologies and the presentations of Wadi Nun's history in Shurafa biographies. We can hardly explain such similarities without skewing the ethnographic tendency to separate tribe from "writing and literature." Like the Shurafa biographers, the Takna *nasaba* were able to write the *qabila* into history precisely by 'raiding' the same texts that glorify the pious *sufis* and imperious sultans incarcerated in the subaltern narratives. Here, it behooves us to ponder how translation could obscure the role of textuality in the authorship of the subaltern narratives and, hence, facilitate the investiture of the Takna with the kind of atavisms ethnographers prescribed for tribes.

In contrast, the ethnographic presentation of the Takna as autonomous tribes tends to mimic their profile in nineteenth-century European travel accounts. On this occasion, the problem is not whether colonial ethnographers had a priori knowledge of Wadi Nun or the Takna. They did. The question is to what extent did borrowing from the text shape what colonial ethnographers have presented as transcriptions of Takna realities captured in the course of field research? That said, both these contemporary European and Arabic sources implicitly agree on the utility of deploying encounter with the dynasty or the *zawiya* as a frame of reference to locate the Takna, as tribe or *qabila*, in time and space. The same sources, however, also tend to differ in their conception of the role these agents of the Moroccan historical experience might have played in the demographic history of Wadi Nun. As we will presently see, colonial ethnographers were, very much like nineteenth-century travelers, able to perpetuate the myth of tribal autonomy by locating the Takna outside the Moroccan dynastic realm. In contrast, Shurafa biographies tend to anticipate the subaltern Takna narratives precisely because of their refusal to concede the possibility of social birth outside the dynastic realm. It is tempting to grade the similarity of the Takna subaltern narratives to Shurafa biographies or their mutual differences from ethnographic treatises and travel accounts in pedantic terms of true and false. To avoid such temptation, however, I will posit the difference between Moroccan and European traditions of signification as a frame of reference to contextualize such discrepancies. This precaution could help us elucidate the role of textuality in the current conceptions of Takna origin and history. Herein, I will first introduce the ethnographic vision of the Takna before tracing its main feature, the notion of the autonomous tribe, back to nineteenth-century European travelogue.

II-Rites of Antiquity: The Ethnographic Takna

But a theory may have heuristic value without being sound. Evans-Pritchard.¹¹

In this section, I will examine the construction of an ethnographic profile for the Takna, a construction that took place in the course of the first half of the twentieth century. My focus is on how French colonial ethnographers such as de la Chapelle imagined the Takna origin and, in effect, historicised the observable congruity of being

¹⁰"While writing and the book," Goody noted, "can supplement the oral, they may also lead to a change in its role, and to disempowering those who depend solely upon it." Jack Goody, *the Interface between the Written and the Oral* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 156

¹¹Evans-Pritchard, *Essays in Social Anthropology*, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 19. Descartes, in Cohen, *the French Encounter with Africans*, 77

Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun. I will show how post-colonial sociologists and historians who wrote in the 1980s responded to the ethnographic conception of origin and whether they were successful in bridging the gap between the Takna tribe enshrined in ethnographic texts and the Takna *qabila*, we came to know through the subaltern narratives. I have already noted how post-colonial anthropologists and historians of Morocco oscillated between subscription to the ethnographic conception of tribe and allusions to pre-colonial historical experiences that tend to subvert this conception. Colonial and post-colonial treatises on the Takna seek, albeit inconclusively, to reconcile the ethnographic theorization of tribe with the demographic history of Wadi Nun. This attempt to reconcile ethnography with history, however, remains inconclusive largely because it represses the fact that the Takna and ethnographic visions were sanctioned by different traditions of signification. These traditions also inform the modern and classical texts that we could have otherwise used to demonstrate the relevance of either of these postulations: European travel accounts, Shurafa biographies and classical Arabic sources.

In the introduction, I noted how post-colonial critiques of colonial ethnography tend to conceptualize the ethnographic tribe as a creature of modernity, the conception that seems to authorize its current entrapment in inverted coma: 'tribe'. I added that these critiques range from the treatment of tribe as a creature of colonial expediency to emphasis on the textual tradition and discursive devices that facilitated its authorship. Anthropologists, such as Cohen and Asad, who wrote in the morrows of the European "scramble" out of Africa, 1960s-1970s, tended to dwell on the relation between ethnographic knowledge and colonial power structures, the relation epitomized by the congruity of being an author with being a colonial administrator.¹² In this literature, ethnography comes across as the applied science that expedited control of space and its occupants. In contrast, advocates of the discursive approach to ethnography invoke the postmodern/postcolonial conceptions of identification inspired by Foucault's notion of epistemological archeology and his rendition of the relation between power and knowledge. In general, these theorists emphasize the role of textuality in the production of ethnographic knowledge and the constitution of tribe as its proper domain. As I noted in the introduction, such treatises do not dispute the utilitarian nature of ethnographic field research nor question the centrality of "the colonizing situation" to the production of ethnographic knowledge. In contrast to their predecessors, however, postmodern theorists tend to diagnose ethnographic discourses on tribalism as reincarnations of European misgivings about "other cultures," misgivings that predate the "scramble" for Africa.¹³ To Mudimbe and Grosz-Ngate, for example, the nomination of twentieth-

¹²Cohen, "Introduction," in *From Tribe to Nation in Africa* ed. Cohen and Middleton, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. Talal Asad, Godelier, "Le Concept de Tribu," *Diogenes*, 81, (1973): 3-28; Southall, "The Illusion of tribe," in *The Passing of Tribal Man*, ed. Gutkind, 28-50. Also see, Lonsdale's, "When Did the Gussi ... Become a Tribe?" *Kenya Historical Review*, 5 (1977): 123-133.

¹³"Ethnology," Foucault wrote, "has its roots, in fact, in a possibility that properly belongs to the history of the European culture... Obviously this does not mean that the colonizing situation is indispensable to ethnology... but as the latter can be deployed only in the calm violence of a particular relationship and the transference it produces, so ethnology can assume its proper dimensions only within the historical sovereignty-- always restrained, but always present-- of European thought and the relation that can bring it face to face with all other cultures as well as with itself." Foucault, *the Order of Things*, 377. Mudimbe

century field research as the "foundation" of ethnographic knowledge tends to make the ethnographic text more creative than it is in reality. Nineteenth-century travelogue, they add, is replete with the kind of romantic and repulsive images that later adorned the ethnographic presentation of tribe. Such images range from primitive democracy or communism to unbridled savagery or anarchy.¹⁴ Indeed, in terms of both content and mechanics of composition, travelogue and the ethnographic texts it informed seem to follow a path prescribed by traditions that lead back to what Foucault called "the last archaeological rupture in Western epistemology," the Enlightenment.

One can posit these overlapping perspectives to capture the utilitarian nature of the ethnographic text and trace what it advertises as a transcription of Takna social realities back to its most recent textual roots, nineteenth-century travelogue. As far as the question of utility is concerned, it is enough to note that the ethnographic texts under review were composed by adjutants of the same French colonial regime that not only perpetuated what Burke has called "the division of Moroccan society into *Makhzan* and *siba*," but also turned this polarity into a basis for its policies.¹⁵ Chronologically, these texts tend to mark a shift in French priorities from the era of "la pacification" which commenced with the declaration of Morocco as a "protectorate" in 1912 to the scientification of administration symbolized by the issuance of the so-called "*Zaheer Bebere*" (*Berber Decree*) in 1930. To post-colonial authors, the *Zaheer Berbere* signifies the French decision to turn the *Makhzan-siba* dichotomy to a mirror of essential differences between "Arabs and Berbers."¹⁶

Ethnographic texts from the era of "pacification" tend to posit the ostensible autonomy of pre-colonial Moroccan (Berber) tribes as a preamble for the body of knowledge, which could have also eased their transformation into subjects of a hegemonic colonial regime. Such monographs do not dwell on the question of Takna origin or the secret behind their bilingualism. For example, Paul Marty combined silence on the Takna history with the meticulous tabulation of their observable realities. He identified the constituent "fractions" of the Takna tribes, their sites, the number of

invoked this proposition to impute a longer history for ethnography: "The development of anthropology, which up to the very end of the eighteenth century was sought within travelers' narratives, now takes a radical turn. From now (colonialism) on it will develop into a clearly visible power-knowledge political system." Mudimbe, *the Invention of Africa*, 15.

¹⁴Mudimbe, *the Invention of Africa*, 12-13, 22, 44-83; Maria Grosz-Ngate, "Power and Knowledge: The Representation of the Mande World in the Works of Park, Caillie, Monteil and Delafosse," *Cahiers d'études Africaines*, XXXVIII, (1988): 485-511.

¹⁵"In the hands of French apologists of colonial domination," Burke (1976) noted, "the division of Moroccan society into *Makhzan* and *siba* tended to become an article of faith. When the French government went on to erect a policy founded upon this supposed difference, the stage was set for the perpetuation of a stereotype." Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 12.

¹⁶This *Zaheer* (decree) not only feeds off, but also enriches the distinction between Arab (*Makhzan*/ state) and Berber (*siba*/ tribe). Colonial officials advertised the *Zaheer* as a sign of the French resolve to rescue the Berbers' customary (tribal) laws from the 'Arab' legal code: the *Sharia*. In contrast, the Moroccan intelligentsia saw the same *zaheer* as an insidious attempt at proselytism. Arguably, the crisis sparked by this *Zaheer* was also the genesis of the Moroccan struggle for independence. For the text of the *Zaheer Berbere*, see Montagne, *Les Berbères et le Makhzen*, 183; For the politics behind this *Zaheer* and the crisis it sparked, see Burke, "The Image of the Moroccan State in French Ethnological literature," In *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Gellner and Micaud, 175-199; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 383-393; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 186-192.

households in each "fraction," the names of their "chefs" and tallies of their livestock—in short the kind of information no one will read unless s/he had to!¹⁷ In contrast, ethnographers who composed in the era of the *Zaheer Bebere* such as de la Chapelle, de la Ruelle and Monteil used the *Makhzan-Siba* modulation to impute the distant origins of the Takna. Ethnographers posited these origins to explain the bilingualism of the Takna as well as its relation to their division into two alignments (*Leffs*), the *Ait Osman* and *Ait Jamal*. The conflation of being Takna with infinite nativity to Wadi Nun becomes the basis for their classification as tribes, a classification which, in turn, sanctions their distancing from the dynasty.

It is worth recalling how the notion of tribal "anarchy" theorized by Montagne and Evans-Pritchard have influenced post-colonial conceptions of *qabila* identity as well as its location *vis-à-vis* the *zawiya* and the dynasty. I have already noted how subscription to the ethnographic notion of tribe led historians like Julien, Abun-Nasr and Brett to posit autonomy and segmentation as the essences of *qabila* modes of social existence. Like the colonial pundits they frequently cite, these historians took the ostensible dichotomy between the dynastic realm, *Bled el Makhzan*, and the domain of *qabila*, *Bled es Siba*, as a reflex of differences between Arabs (state), and Berbers (tribe). Colonial ethnographers who wrote about Wadi Nun not only operated within the parameters of the *Makhzan-Siba* dichotomy, but also took the Roman conquest of North Africa as a point of departure for the location of the ostensible ancestry of the Takna in time and space.

In keeping with his racialization of the *Makhzan-Siba* modality, Montagne put the total number of Moroccans of "genuine Arab origin" at fifteen percent. He then grafted the rest of their compatriots into either "Arabized Berbers" or "Berber tribes within which Arab elements constitute only a tiny minority." In accordance with this classification, Montagne counted the Takna among the "Arabized Berbers."¹⁸ The Arab-Berber modality underpinning this classification became the bedrock of the ethnographic presentation of the Takna as tribes with the Bayrouk as one of their "chefs." Montagne's deployment of Arab as a metaphor for the state and, in effect, the binary opposite of tribe, may have also inspired the codification of the Berber as an appropriate domain of ethnographic field research. Otherwise, it would be difficult to comprehend the notable lack of interest in "Arabized" Takna and corresponding fascination with their *shilha*-speaking (Berber) brethren.¹⁹

¹⁷Paul Marty, "les Tribus de la haute Mauritanie," *B.C.A.F.*, 5 (1915): 136-146. In the wake of a trek to Algeria in 1847, de Tocqueville posited, albeit unintentionally, a causal relation between the imposition of colonial rule and the production of 'utilitarian' knowledge. "Although the coast of Africa is only some sixty sea miles from France ... it is nevertheless hard to imagine the profound ignorance in France, only seven years ago, regarding things Algerian: there was no clear idea of the different races occupying the territory, nor of their customs, nothing was known of the language spoken by these people." A. de Tocqueville, *Lettre sur L'Algerie*, in *Writing French Algeria*, Peter Dunwoodie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 38.

¹⁸Montagne, *The Berbers*, 7-8.

¹⁹This preference out-lived the era of colonialism and, as I noted in the introduction, figures prominently in Anglophone anthropology of Morocco. I have already noted that notwithstanding its promising title, there is not a single study of an Arab *qabila* in Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud's *Arabs and Berbers*—a sign of the survival of the use of Arab as an identity for the *Makhzan*.

In the introduction, I noted that de La Chapelle tended to oscillate between the location of the Takna origin in terms of descent from either "the *getules* of antiquity" or their Lamta contemporaries.²⁰ De La Chapelle, however, was also conscious of the threat the Takna bilingualism poses to their identification as "Arabized Berbers." At the pedantic level, it would be ironic to think of "Arabization" without agonizing over the possibility of autonomy from the main agents of acculturation in the Maghrib, the dynasty, caravan and *zawiya*. To explain the Takna bilingualism without jeopardising the location of tribe in binary opposition to the dynasty, he blamed the existence of "Arabized" Takna on an encounter between their Berber, Lamta, ancestors and *Ma'qil* Arabs. "Dans le sud-ouest du Maroc," he wrote,

les Lamta n'eurent pas a se révolter contre les Ma'qil: ils formèrent avec eux une confédération stable, celle des Tekna, qui aujourd'hui encore nomadise entre la Sgiet el Hamra et le Noun²¹

This oscillation between the investiture of the Takna with an originary identity and allusion to demographic ruptures that tend to abrogate claims to authenticity became the mainstay of colonial and post-colonial discourses on the Takna. Colonial ethnographers who composed after de La Chapelle, such as de la Ruelle and Monteil, subscribed to the ethnographic conception of tribe and reified his predication of domicile in Wadi Nun on descent from 'native' Berbers or Arab conquerors. As a result, these ethnographers also credited the Takna with a sense of historicity and degree of authenticity that negates what their subaltern narratives as well as the rest of the available sources tend to suggest.

The search for a distant origin for the Takna led De la Ruelle to historicize the "coutume et du folklore" of the Ait Brahim constituents of the *Ait Osman* Leff. He sought to explain the seeming incongruity of the *shilha* (Berber) speech of the Ait Brahim with their affiliation with Arabophone Takna like the (*Ait Jamal*) Ait Musa and Azraqayn. To resolve this seeming mismatch between *shilha* speech and association with Arabs like the Bayrouk, he invoked the distinction between *Ait Osman* and *Ait Jamal* to qualify Montagne's classification of all the Takna as "Arabized Berbers." Instead, de la Ruelle took the bilingualism of the Takna as a sign of the duality of their origin, a result of an incomplete merger between "ethnic" Berbers and Arabs. As it stands, this proposition does not militate against the possibility of either endogenous descent or the location of the social birth of tribe in a distant, pre-Islamic, moment. In fact, the conversion of the Ait Brahim (*shilha*) speech into a reflex of a Berber heritage enabled de la Ruelle to trace their origin and, indeed, that of all their *Ait Osman* allies, (including the "Arabized" Ait AUSA) back to an ancient Berber group called the "Gezzula." At the same time, he took the prevalence of Arabic speech among the *Ait Jamal* affiliates of the Bayrouk as indication of descent from or interaction with *Ma'qil* Arabs. Besides the obvious tendency to racialize language, this postulation also stands

²⁰De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain," *B.C.A.F.M.*, (octobre 1933): 587-598; *Idem*, (novembre 1933): 633-45; *Idem*, (décembre 1933): 791-99, *Idem*, (janvier 1934): 42-52; De la Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une Histoire du Sahara Occidental," *Hesperis*, XI, 82.

²¹De La Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une Histoire du Sahara Occidental," *Hesperis*, XI, 88.

in stark juxtaposition to de la Ruelle's simultaneous reportage of an Ait Brahim legend that predicates the social birth of their *qabila* identity on intermittent migrations from the Western Sahara some time in the fifteenth century: late in the Marinid period.²² Notwithstanding his substitution of the *Geutles* mentioned in Latin texts with the "Gezzula" (Jazula) enshrined in classical Arabic sources, de La Ruelle's proposition is essentially a rehash of de La Chapelle's much earlier attempt to bridge the gap that separates the mutation of the *Geutles* and Lamta identities from the emergence of the Takna as a bounded Susian *qabila*. Despite the eminent threat the Takna narratives and the classical Arabic sources pose to, or ought to have posed to, the prospect of an originary identity, de la Ruelle was still able to retain the idea that the Takna were the descendants, rather than mere spatial heirs of named Berbers and Arabs.

De la Ruelle's postulation of a distant Berber origin for the *Ait Osman* Takna anticipated Vincent Monteil's inclusive study of the Takna. In his study, Monteil confirmed the theorization of a pre-Islamic origin for the Takna almost at the same time that he reported discordant narratives of social birth that seem to undermine it.²³ Indeed, Monteil not only endorsed de la Ruelle's projection of an ancient origin for the Takna, but also seconded de la Chapelle's earlier conception of Takna social birth in terms of descent from the "Getules of antiquity."²⁴ In his text, the "Gezzula" de la Ruelle has mentioned and the "Getules" de la Chapelle has invoked come across as different names for the same Berber group. In other words, the "Gezzula" of the Arab author were the "Getules" of his Latin predecessor. In fact, Monteil also sought to merge the investiture of the Takna with a *Getule* origin with the notion of direct descent from an ostensible Almoravid deputy: Osman Ibn Menda. I have already noted, in the introduction, how he posited this myth to, albeit gingerly, predicate the distinction between the *Ait Jamal*, "les chameliers," and the *Ait Osman* in terms of descent from named sons of this (Berber) deputy: *Bella* and *Ghazi* respectively. Monteil attributed the bilingualism of the Takna to the infiltration of the "berbères gezzula" (*Getules*) by Ma'qil conquerors. Metaphorically, encounter with Ma'qil tribes seems to extenuate what was, in the beginning, a distinction between descendents of two Berber siblings. "Les Tekna," he noted,

constituent donne une Confédération ... de tribus reparties en deux leffs. C'est, suivant le mot de la Chapelle, le groupe de deux systèmes d'alliance traditionnellement opposes': Ait Ejmel, ou leff de l'Ouest; Ait 'Atman, ou leff de l'Est. Pour la Ruelle, ce sont peut-être les héritiers de deux groupements ethniques, l'un *berbère* (Ait 'Atman), l'autre *arabe ma'qil* (Ait Ejmel). En tout cas, les chameliers sont bien plus arabises que les Ait 'Atman. Ils correspondraient, en somme, aux éléments constitutifs des Takna: berbères gezzula et conquérants ma'qil Dwi-Hassan (invasion vers 1252).²⁵

²²C. De la Ruelle, "Contribution à l'étude de L'Histoire de la Coutume et du Folklore des Populations du Versant S.O de L'Anti Atlas, les Takna Berbérophones," *H.E.A.L.M.*: 139-147

²³Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 16-17.

²⁴De la Ruelle, "Contribution", *H.E.A.L.M.*, 141

²⁵Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 10-14; On the association of *Gétule* with *Gezzula* (Jazula), see de La Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une histoire du Sahara Occidental", *Hesperis*, XI, 50, 55, 65.

The conversion of *Shilha* and Arabic speeches into signifiers of the authenticity of the Berberphone *Ait Osman* and the hybridism of the Arabphone *Ait Jamal* lurks beneath the asymmetrical division of the Takna into two major 'grades': Takna by "blood" (de sang) and Takna by "name" (de nom).²⁶

The idea that the modern Takna were the product of encounters between their Berber, *Gezzula* (*Getules*) or Lamta, ancestors and Ma'qil invaders, raises questions about the impact of dynastic squabbles and caravan trading on the demographic makeup of Wadi Nun and, in effect, the kind of identities possible for its occupants. Suspension of the historical process that expedited the encounter between the ostensible ancestors of the Takna, the *Getules* and the *Ma'qil*, goes along way towards explaining the ethnographer's ability to make a case for the autonomous tribe. After all, as a tribal horde, the *Ma'qil* had, seemingly, arrived at Wadi Nun on their own. Colonial ethnographers were interested in history only to the extent that it seemed to establish a precedent for the French encounter with the Takna. As far as the colonial ethnographer (and administrator) was concerned, France was the first power since the "fall of Rome" to put an effective end to tribal autonomy in Morocco. It was also on the verge of conferring on groups like the Takna what the Romans had bestowed on their *Getules* or Lamta ancestry: civilisation.

In contrast to colonial ethnography, post-colonial scholarship seems to be driven by two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, post-colonial academics were repulsed by the (racist) excesses of the ethnographic text and frequently criticize the seductive binaries underpinning the notion of static Berber tribe: civilized and primitive, *Makhzan* and *Siba*, Arab and Berber etc. At the same time, however, they were beguiled by the prospect of a distant origin for the Takna. Overall, this literature combines subscription to the ethnographic conception of Takna origin with references to demographic shifts that tend to render such conception untenable. I have already noted that post-colonial academics like Najib, Naimi and Hodges picked up from where de la Chapelle and Monteil have left off and reproduced the same discrepancies between the Takna and the ethnographic conceptions of origin. For instance, they also took the Berber encounter with Rome as a point of departure for the recovery of Takna history and, as a result, traced their origin back to one of the same Berber groups nominated by colonial ethnographers: the Lamta. These academics also tended to predicate bilingualism on an encounter between the ostensible Berber ancestry of the Takna and *Ma'qil* Arabians.²⁷ Here, the colonial ethnographer comes across as a witness rather than a captive or custodian of a textual tradition. It is not difficult to imagine how fixation on descent from Berbers of antiquity may have also foreclosed a nuanced reflection on the notion of birth in the bosom of the *zawiya* or the dynasty. In post-colonial scholarship, the

²⁶Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 9. Monteil points to the existence of a third strata: Takna by "practice" (de fait). He then provided examples of the discrepancies between these discursive distinctions and social realities almost at the same time that he endorsed the proposition of the "Gezzula" (*Getules*) as the ancestors of the original Takna. In his classification, major constituents of the *Ait Osman* Leff such as the Berberphone Azwafit tend to have a disproportionately high number of "Takna by Blood".

²⁷Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna*, 19-25, 52-58, 31-35; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 20-34, 39-54, 77-79, 82-88; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 121-122.

subaltern Takna narratives are either "mythologies" or reminiscences about more recent experiences.

Najib and Naimi made room for the discordant subaltern Takna narratives of origin but did not dwell on their subversive implications for the idea of a pre-Islamic social existence or uninterrupted domicile in Wadi Nun.²⁸ At the same time, consultation of classical Arabic texts led them to discount de la Ruelle and Monteil's proposition of the "*Getules (gezzula)* of antiquity" as the veritable Berber ancestry of the Takna. Instead, they opted for their Lamta contemporaries. It is perhaps worth recalling that these were essentially the two possibilities recommended by de la Chapelle. And in what seems like an attempt to reconcile the idea of social birth in the bosom of the Almoravid dynasty with the notion of descent from the Lamta, Najib and Naimi credited the ostensible ancestor of "the Takna by blood," Osman Ibn Menda, with a Lamta origin. To bypass the failure of the subaltern Takna narratives to recall either the Lamta or their Almoravid patrons, Najib fell back on the ethnographic conflation of the tribal condition with "oral culture" and, in effect, its location beyond the realm of "writing and literature." This strategy enabled him to confine the subaltern Takna narratives to "the realm of mythology" and, indeed, to strip their anonymous authors, the *nasaba*, of the ability to recall distant histories. He did not dwell on the similarities between the Takna narratives and the Arabic sources that alert us to the existence of groups called Jazula, Lamta and Ma'qil. "The early history of the Tekna prior to the invasion of the Arab Maaqil," he noted,

... is virtually unknown. Speculations regarding the origin and early history of the Tekna must be uncertain, since we have to depend on a few scant references in the writings of certain Arab historians and on the Tekna's own legendary and mythological accounts of their origin... We must remain sensitive to the fact that the Tekna's own conception of their origins and early ancestry are only orally transmitted histories, emerging in the realm of mythology, and inevitably are subject to the distortions and manipulations that were made to validate and justify their socio-political order.²⁹

The prospect of endogenous descent the ethnographic Takna seemed to promise enabled Najib to posit the notion of segmentation as the bedrock of the ordering of the *Ait Osman* and *Ait Jamal* leffs. This attempt to reconcile the Takna and the ethnographic conception of origin also led to the translation of *qabila* into tribe and, by default, its stuffing with the atavisms ethnographers prescribed for the tribal condition: segmentation, autonomy, egalitarianism. "All available literature on the Takna confederation and contemporary Tekna informants," Najib casually wrote,

²⁸Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna*, 19-24; Naimi, "Nomades Sédentaires dans l'évolution historique de l'ensemble confédéral Tekna," *Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc*, 4 (1986):139-154; Naimi, "Asrir," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome D2: 409-412; Naimi, "Azraqayn," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome C1: 339-340; Naimi, "Azwafit," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome C1: 364-367; Naimi, "Teqaoust," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome B VI: 2084-2089.

²⁹Najib, *The Transformation of the Takna*, 19, 24. For an example of the distancing of tribe from "permanent records" and "writing," see Southhall, "the Illusion of Tribe," in *The Passing of Tribal Man*, ed. Gutkind, 28-50.

describe the Tekna politics towards the end of the nineteenth Century in terms which resemble the famous tribal political system of the Nuer of the Sudan and the Bedouin of Cyrenaica... A similar view of such an anarchist and egalitarian tribal political system has given rise to the definition of the Takna as 'le groupe de deux systèmes d'alliance traditionnellement opposés. Les chefs sont généralement des sédentaires ou des nomades a petit Royan, et que ce n'est pas sans difficulté qu'ils exercent sur les grands nomades anarchique une autorité qui n'est pas toujours reconnue par les derniers'. Thus among Tekna traditional society, as elsewhere in the Arab world, it was common to find alliances and oppositions within one society.³⁰

It is worth recalling how Gellner credited the (Muslim) Berber tribe with the atavisms Evans-Pritchard has assigned to the (Non-Muslim) Nuer. In a similar manner, Najib did not dwell on the role of the sacred or its temporal custodians, the dynasty and the *zawiya*, in either the cancellation of the (spatial) distance and (cultural) difference between the Takna of Wadi Nun and the "Arab world" or their failure to set them apart from the Nuer. Indeed, in what seems like an attempt to insulate the Takna, as segmentary tribes, from the influence of the third pillar of Maghribian history, the caravan, Najib also exonerated their constituencies from trade with outsiders.³¹ While it may cement the notion of originary identity, the *tribalization* of *qabila* does not sit well with either the Takna conception of origin nor befit the demographic history of Wadi Nun. On this occasion, subscription to the textual theorization of tribe not only blurs the Takna historical experience, but also credits them with a kind of particularity, which is too porous to be ascribed to specific group. After all, what distinguishes the "traditional" Takna is precisely that which is supposed to have made them an "Arab world" in miniature.

In comparison to Najib, Naimi, the sociologist, and Hodge, the historian, did not dwell on either the discrepancy between the ethnographic and Takna conception of origin nor did they question the relevance of the notion of segmentation to the Takna social structures and political culture. Instead, the reader is left with the impression that *qabila* and tribe (tribu) are the same. Indeed, silence on the casualties of translation also corresponds to the conflation of the history of space, Wadi Nun, with the history of its current occupants, the Takna. As descendants of the first named occupants of this antique space, the Lamta, the Takna must have a longer history than the rather modern dynasts and the *zawaya* mentioned in their subaltern narratives. For example, Naimi turned the Lamta into an ancestry for the main pillar of the *Ait Osman* Leff, the Azwafit, as well as the founder of their oldest *zawiya*, Sidi Ibn Amr al-Asriri (of Asrir). In the introduction, I noted how colonial ethnographers like Montagne and post-colonial anthropologists such as Gellner conflated tribe and "saint," *zawiya*, with Berber. Naimi tended to conflate being a "Takna by blood" with being Azwafit (Berber) and deference to Sidi Ibn Amr's family. He credited this family with Lamta origin and then turned its 'survival' to evidence of Azwafit descent from the same group.

³⁰Najib, *The transformation of the Takna*, 30. The citation in French is from De La Chapelle's "Les Tekna du sud marocain," *B.C.A.F.M.*, (décembre 1933): 791-799, 796.

³¹Najib, *The transformation of the Takna*, 29.

In addition, like Montagne, Naimi tended to treat the Arabic speech of an *Ait Jamal qabila* such as the Ait al-Hasan as a crust that masks a Lamta (Berber) essence. In a manner reminiscent of de la Ruelle's treatment of the Ait Brahim narrative, Naimi used the idea of descent from the Lamta to qualify the Ait al-Hasan conception of the birth of their *qabila* identity in terms of migration from the Western Sahara in the course of the eighteenth century. Here, migration from the Western Sahara is inverted to a "return" to an ancestral homeland: Wadi Nun.³² In much the same way that he used descent from the Lamta to overcome the lack of reference to the Takna in early Arabic texts, Naimi tends to use the subaltern narratives and authorial references to the Takna encounters with famous sultans or *sufi shaykhs* to bypass the ethnographic fixation on the *Makhzan-Siba* modality. As witnesses to the historicity of the Takna, the imperious sultan, the caravan and the learned *sufi shaykh* occupy a diametrical position to the one conceived by colonial ethnographers. In short, they are not signifiers of the constitutive other of *qabila*, as tribe, civilization. This strategy enabled Naimi to credit the Takna with a robust history, a history rooted in "antiquity" and evidenced by the frequent allusions to Wadi Nun or its *zawaya* centers in the annals of successive dynasties.³³

Like Naimi, Hodge also sought to turn the ethnographic and Takna conceptions of *qabila* origin and history into components of a linear historical process. He adopted the ethnographic conception of the Takna origin in terms of descent from the Lamta and then used their reported encounters with Shurafa dynasts like Mawlai Ismael to fill in the gap that separates the mutation of the Lamta from the emergence of the Takna. Hodge tended to invert what was a moment of *qabila* social birth for the Takna *nasaba* to an interregnum in a much longer historical saga. Here, bilingualism becomes a signifier of the Lamta adjustment to *Ma'qil* invasion and, as such, does not impede the tracing of Takna origins back to "antiquity." The change in name, from Lamta to Takna, becomes a testament to the survival of Lamta bodies as well as their adjustment to foreign intrusions. "The Tekna people," Hodges stated,

lived primarily in southern Morocco ... They are thought to have their origins in a fusion between Lamta Berbers and Maqil Arab Bedouins. The Lamta had lived in the Oued Noun region, the center of what was to become Tekna territory, for many centuries before the arrival of the first groups of Maqil in 1218. According to de la Chapelle, 'the two fractions of the Lamta, who were called the Zogyuen and Lakhs, incorporated themselves into a group of the Maqil tribe of Bani Hassan, and it was perhaps then, or rather one or two centuries later, that the whole group took the name Tekna... During the reign of the powerful Saadian sultan Ahmed el-Mansur (1578-1603) the Takna appear to have played a role as guish tribes... that is, they were furnished with land

³²For examples of the use of Lamta as a dual origin for the *qabila* and 'its' *Zawiya* see, Naimi, "Azwafit," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome CI : 364-367; Naimi, "Asrir," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome D2 : 409-412. For examples of the use of descent from Lamta (and nativity to Wadi Nun) to override the role of displacement in the creation of the Ait al-Hassan and Azraqayn identities see, Naimi, "Teqaoust," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome B VI : 2084-2089; Naimi, "Azraqayn," In *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome CI : 339-340.

³³For the idea of a continuous Takna history see, Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 4-160; Naimi, "Nomades Sédentaires dans l'évolution historique de l'ensemble confédéral Tekna," *Bulletin Economique et Social du Maroc*, 4 (1986):139-154.

and dispensed from taxation in return for providing military contingents for the defense of the dynasty... The most powerful Alawite sultan, Moulay Ismail (1672-1727), once again used the Tekna as guish tribes sending the Azerguien, under Hammou Said... to what is now Mauritania to help the emir of Trarza, Ali Chandura (1703-1737) re-establish his authority.³⁴

In the introduction, I noted how Hodges' subscription to the ethnographic conception of tribe also led him to present the space the Takna call home, "the Oued Noun," as "a typical example of *bilad es siba*." On this occasion, however, the Takna tribe, as *qabila*, embarks in the kind of career that amounts to an inversion of what anthropologists like Gellner have envisioned for the segmented tribe. It comes across as an ancillary of its constitutive other, the dynasty. It is, for instance, difficult to imagine how the "powerful sultan" could have turned the Takna into "guish tribes," posted them in distant locales without also adding to or subtracting from their constituents? Yet, the problem with the notion of originary identity is not limited to the fact that the early ancestry it proposes predates what the Takna remember or want to remember about the demographic history of Wadi Nun. Rather, the veracity of this postulation itself hinges on whether it can be reconciled with changes in Wadi Nun's demographic map from the era of the Arab conquest to the much-later periods proposed by the subaltern Takna narratives. Like Najib and Naimi, Hodges posited, albeit gingerly, the conventional ethnographic conception of Takna origin as a point of departure for his description of developments that hardly support their investiture with an originary identity much less uninterrupted domicile in Wadi Nun.

We could take Hodges' description of the Takna experience with the Shurafa as a reminder of the fact that the ethnographers and historians who believed in the possibility of an autonomous (Berber) tribe, were unable to conceptualize its origin or locate it in time without also thinking of the successive empires that dominated the Maghrib. The autonomous tribe tends to thrive in precisely those areas deemed to be beyond the dynastic realm, *bled es siba*. As the notions of decent from *Getules* or *Lamta* of "antiquity" indicate, it is difficult to imagine how colonial ethnographers and post-colonial academics could have discovered the ostensible ancestry of the Takna without recourse to classical (Latin or Arabic) texts. On the basis of this premise, it is reasonable to wonder whether the notion of autonomy that made tribe glitter was the product of field research in twentieth-century Morocco as colonial ethnographers and post-colonial anthropologists seemed to believe or whether it was also born in the text as postmodern critiques of this tradition tend to suggest. Because of their modernity and, one might add, much-debated interface with colonial ethnography, European travel accounts provide the kind of evidence one can use to test the frequent conflation of being Takna with infinite nativity to Wadi Nun and to locate a textual origin for the notion of tribal autonomy.

³⁴Hodges, *Historical Dictionary*, 332-33, 334.

III-From Moor to Tribe: Takna for Travellers

Travelling is nearly the same thing as talking with men of past centuries. Rene Descartes³⁵

In the following pages, I seek to establish an intellectual genealogy for the idea of tribal autonomy underlying the ethnographic division of space into two spheres, *Makhzan* and *Siba*. As far as Morocco is concerned, we can trace the notion of the autonomous tribe back to nineteenth-century European travel accounts. I have divided these accounts into two groups: narratives of shipwreck and narratives of exploration. Overall, shipwreck was the main mode of European arrival in Wadi Nun in the period that preceded the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, the invasion I have posited as a genesis for the "scramble" for Northwest Africa. In contrast, exploration tended to overlap with the drive towards abolition and in that sense, anticipated the onset of the European "scramble" for sub-Saharan Africa.

I have already noted that survivors of shipwreck were not interested in secular identities and, as a result, they did not dwell on the existence of the Takna as a differentiated tribe. Instead, survivors of shipwreck tend to credit their Saharan and Susian (southern Moroccan) captors and hosts with a generic *Moorish* identity and, then, to locate them in the outskirts of a decaying Moroccan dynastic realm. In comparison, the accounts produced during the era of exploration tend to secularize identities and, as a result, conceive the Takna as "free" tribes. In that sense, we are not witnessing the birth of novel European ideas about Morocco or its inhabitants. This is a case of repackaging rather than discovery. The construction of the Takna as autonomous tribes was inspired by the secularization of religious idioms, the secularization that seemingly guarantees what Mudimbe has called "our scientificness."³⁶ In other words, there seems to be a link between the demotion of *qabila* to a secular tribe and the effacement of generic terms like *Moor*, terms that enabled the pre-modern European to think of himself as a rational being. Yet, the same way that secularization enabled ethnographers like Montagne to invert the Berber tribe into an ethnographic museum for Europe the *Moor* began to serve as an ironic reminder of a Biblical past. We could consider this shift from sacred to secularized idioms as the first step in the repatriation of tribe to Morocco.

We can best understand the appearance of Wadi Nun and then, the Takna in travel accounts in the context of the European journey to and reportage on Northwest Africa as a whole. In the introduction, I alluded to the precautions we need to take when dealing with the European journey to and observations about, Morocco. Generally, the value of the testimonies of survivors of shipwreck and explorers is circumscribed by classical and current skepticisms regarding the traveler's infatuation with the exotic. This lore also inspired the production of what Hume has called "wholly different people" and expedited their location beyond the immediate gaze of his intended audience. Firstly, linguistic differences circumscribed the travelers' ability to transcend visual observation. Reported speech is the rhetorical strategy that transforms what was essentially a monologue to a purported dialogue. In travel accounts, linguistic

³⁵Quoted by William B. Cohen, *The French Encounter With Africans: White Responses to Blacks, 1530-1880*. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1980), 77

³⁶Mudimbe, "African Memories," in *History Making in Africa*, Mudimbe and Jewsiwicki, ed. 1-11, 6-8

incompetence tends to enhance visual observation. Travelers often compensate their inability to "talk with men" by descriptions of fearful landscapes and, the strange attire and physique of their barbarian occupants. On this occasion, the *Moor* becomes "wholly different" precisely because of his approximation of the stylized image of the "savage," already incarcerated in the text.³⁷ It was because of the abnormality of the world they presented to their audiences that travelers also became the celebrities of their time.³⁸

Secondly, one should not take the element of sameness oozing from the presentations of different people in different geo-political and cultural settings, and at different times, as confirmations of the perseverance of particular social norms. Rather, given the facilities of publication and translation that were the whole mark of modernity, it became possible for travelers not only to know, but also to choose the exotic terrain and "savage tribes" incarcerated in their texts. In addition, in much the same way that they were to inform the ethnographic text, modern travel accounts also conform to well trodden, textual, paths in European discourse on otherness. "At any rate," Mudimbe wrote,

the explorer's text is not epistemologically inventive. It follows a path prescribed by tradition ... In what the explorer's text does reveal, it brings nothing new besides visible and recent reasons to validate a discipline already remarkably defined by the Enlightenment. The Novelty resides in the fact that the discourse on "savages" is, for the first time, a discourse in which an explicit political power presumes the authority of a scientific knowledge and vice-versa.³⁹

Regardless of the exact qualifications and experiences of the survivors of shipwreck and explorers cited in this thesis, their accounts often reflect conformity to established textual traditions on writing about the Africans pre-modern Europeans referred to as the *Moors* and the space they called *Barbary*. In that tradition, *Barbary* and its *Moors*, Muslims, served as metaphors for otherness, the otherness that illuminated the European conception of home as Christendom.⁴⁰

³⁷Riley and Cochelet's reports of first encounter with Saharans are replete with these kinds of images. "We saw," Riley wrote, "a human figure approach our stuff ... It was a Man! He began plundering our clothing ... He appeared to be ... of a complexion between the American Indian and Negro. He had about him to cover his nakedness, a piece of course woolen cloth that reached from below his breast nearly to his knee. His hair was long and bushy ... His face resembled that of an Ourang-outang more than a human being; his eyes were red and fiery, his mouth ... stretched nearly from ear to ear, well lined with sound teeth ... I could not but imagine that those well set teeth were sharpened for the purpose of devouring human flesh!!" Riley, *Sufferings*, 18.

³⁸"Riley," Gordon Evans noted, "became one of the best known men in the United States at the time. His description of foreign places and barbarism caught the public's imagination." Riley, *Sufferings*, ed. Gordon Evans, vi.

³⁹Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*, 13, 15-16.

⁴⁰Adherence to sanctified traditions of signification oozes from Riley's surprise when he discovered that the "Moor" was not devoid of compassion. "To hear such sentiments," he recoiled, "from the mouth of a Moor, whose nation I had been taught to consider the worst of barbarians, I confess, filled my mind with awe... and I looked up to him as a kind of superior being when he added, 'we are all children of the same heavenly father, who watches over all our actions, whether we be Moor or Christian or Pagan or any other religion.'" Riley, *Loss of the American Brig Commerce*, 278.

Sanctified Identities: Moor and Barbary

Every vice that is disgraceful and degrading to human nature, is to be found amongst them. Jackson ⁴¹

Whether because of its proximity to Europe or the antiquity and frequency of contact across the Mediterranean, it is tempting to assume that Morocco, as "western Barbary," was not exactly new to Western Europeans. However, the European encounter with southern Moroccans and Saharans like the Takna was the byproduct of the opening of the Atlantic Ocean to navigation in the fifteenth Century. In fact, we can hardly understand the simultaneous constitution of Morocco as a Shurafa dynastic realm in the 1510s without reference to the Sa'dian conflict with the Portuguese along the Atlantic coast of southern Morocco: al-Sus. Recognition of the significance of the Atlantic system led the successors of the Sa'dians, the Alawites, to open Casablanca in 1760 and Essaouira (Mogador) in 1765 to cater to trade with Europe. The Alawites not only designated Essaouira as the southernmost legitimate port of trade with Europe, but also strove to turn it to a linchpin between the Trans-Saharan and the Atlantic commercial systems, the caravan and the caravel.⁴² To enhance its commercial status, the Alawite court discouraged the European traders Essaouira had begun to attract from trespassing in its southern backyards, al-Sus and the Western Sahara.

By the nineteenth century, the historic links across the Mediterranean and the modern encounters via the Atlantic Ocean ought to have rendered Morocco, as "western Barbary," sufficiently familiar to Europeans. As late as 1809, however, the British literati and long-time resident of Essaouira, James Gray Jackson, could still concur with the lamentation of the British Consul that, "there are more books written on Barbary than on any other country, and yet there is no country with which we are so little acquainted." Jackson blamed the dearth of credible information about Morocco and the prevalence of European "misconception and misrepresentation" of Moroccans on "servile" copying from Leo Africanus (w.1526) and the lack of "accurate and practical knowledge of their language."⁴³ By blaming "misrepresentation" on language, however, Jackson also blurred the role of sanctified differences in the constitution of being Moor (Muslim) and being Nazarene (Christian) as self-evident identities for Maghribians and

⁴¹James Grey Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco and the Districts of Suse and Tafelt*, 3ed ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 53.

⁴²The Alawite drive to turn Essaouira into a sole outlet for southern Morocco led to the simultaneous closure of Agadir and the transfer of its inhabitants to Essaouira. On the impact of the opening of Essaouira on al-Sus see, al-Nasri, *al-istiqa* v. 3 (8), 20-21; Mohammed Ennaji et Paul Pascon, *Le Makhzen et Le Souss al-Aqsa, la Correspondance Politique de la Maison d'Iligh (1821-1894)*, (Paris-Casablanca: C.N.R.S et Toubkal, 1988), 12-17, 19-23; Umar Afa, *masalat al-nuqud, fi-tarikh al-maghrib fi al-qarn al-tasa'ashr: Sus, 1822-1906*, (Agadir: Manshurat Kuliat al-Adab, Jama't al-Qadi Ayad, 1988), 96-100; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 85-108, 117-132; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 170-173.

⁴³Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, v-vii; Leo Africanus is the 'Latin' name of the Moroccan author of the much translated text *Description de l'Afrique*: al-Hasan Ibn Muhammad al-Wazan (1488-1550). In 1520 al-Wazan, was taken captive by Italian corsairs who sent him as a gift, slave, to Pope Leo X. He was baptized as Giovanni Leone but came to be known as Leo Africanus (the African). Before his 'defection,' to the Sa'dians, al-Wazan was a protege of the Marinid (Watisid) court. For a classical English translation- of this text, see Leo Africanus, *The History and Description of Africa*, trans. John Pory, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1896). For a recent Arabic edition see, *wasf afriqiyya lil al-Hasan al-Wazan al-ma'ruf bi Leon al-afriqi*, two vols, ed. and trans. Muhammad Hajji and Muhammad al-Akhdar, (Rabat: al-sharika al-maghribiya li-dur al-nashr, 1980).

Europeans respectively. In the same way that it paved the way for encounters with Susians and Saharans, the opening of the Atlantic also sanctioned their presentation as 'copies' of the same "fanatic" *Moor* conceived in the womb of the perennial conflict across the Mediterranean. Direct encounter with southern Moroccan elites and proficiency in Arabic also enabled him to decry the essentialization of Maghribian identities. According to Jackson, *Moor* was the secular identity of the inhabitants of the "cities" and, as such, it does not correspond to the term that denotes adherence to Islam: "Mooselmin." The confinement of the *Moors* to Morocco's urban core enabled Jackson to discover three other "classes" in its backyards: "*Berebbers*" to the north of "the city of Morocco" (Marrakech) "*Shelluhs*" in the Anti-Atlas and "Arabs" in the Sahara.

It is tempting to take Jackson's fixation on linguistic differences as a sign of a serious attempt to secularize Moroccan identities. Emphasis on the problem of translation, however, did not impede his prompt return to and positing of religion as the *thing* that made Moroccans "differ in every respect" from their European counterparts.⁴⁴ There is, however, no doubt that pride in his own proficiency in Arabic and ability to converse with Moroccan literati was also responsible for Jackson's implicit invocation of the classical, textual, use of the dynastic realm, the caravan and the *zawiya* as adequate referents for the location of the Susian "Shelluh" and the Saharan "Arab" in space. Conformity to Maghribian traditions of signification also led to the substitution of *qabila* realities in the early nineteenth century with textual images that predated the birth of Shurafa Morocco in the sixteenth century, the same images he blamed on "servile" recycling of classical texts. It is for instance, hard to make sense of Jackson's conception of Wadi Nun's relation with the Shurafa dynastic realm without reference to his representation of *Moorish* political culture. To Jackson, the *Moors* (Moroccans) were at once "equal by birth" and "subjects of an arbitrary despot." This premise enabled him to imagine the political status of the occupants of Wadi Nun in terms of oscillation between yearning for "independence" from and intermittent subjectivity to an "arbitrary despot."

According to Jackson, the provincialism of the inhabitants of Wadi Nun, "the Wedinoonees," was circumscribed by their temporal and spiritual dispositions. Firstly, Wadi Nun was itself "a kind of an intermediate depot for merchandize on its way to Soudan, and for the produce of Soudan going to Mogador (Essaouira)." In that sense, Wadi Nun needed the dynastic realm because it was the ultimate market for its imports from and a source of supplies for its trade with, "Soudan": the Niger and Senegal basins. Secondly, the inhabitants of southern Morocco were "more superstitious" than those who lived "in the northern provinces" and, as such, more amenable to manipulation by "fanatic saints": the *zawaya*. Lastly, because of its enviable

⁴⁴"The pride and arrogance of the Moors", Jackson wrote, "is unparalleled; for though they live in the most deplorable state of ignorance, slavery, and barbarism, yet they consider themselves the first people in the world... Their sensuality knows no bounds: by the laws of the Koran they are allowed four wives and as many concubines as they are able to support, but such is their wretched depravity that they indulge in the most unnatural and abominable propensities; in short, every vice that is disgraceful and degrading to human nature, is to be found amongst them." Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 53. Jackson's affirmation of the *Moors'* depravity contrasts sharply with his simultaneous use of the same "Koran" to refute "misconceptions" advanced by those "anxious to acquire ecclesiastical fame." Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 196-208.

geopolitical location Wadi Nun also attracted "Saharawns" who roamed its southern backyards and frequently plundered its caravans.⁴⁵ Appreciation for Wadi Nun's entrapment between the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan, led Jackson to deny it to "free" tribes. Instead, he imagined the identities of its people, "the Wedinoonees," in terms of domicile in a "depot for merchandize," intermittent autonomy from the Alawite court and deference to "fanatic saints": i.e. in relation to the caravan, the dynasty and the *zawiya*. Befittingly, he considered the classification of the Takna as "free" tribes more in tone with roaming the Sahara and the plundering of caravans than it was with domicile in a hub of trade like Wadi Nun. "Besides these grand accumulated caravans," he wrote,

There are others, which cross the Desert ... without a stata or guard of soldiers: but this is a perilous expedition, and they are too often plundered near the northern confines of the desert by two notorious tribes called Dikna (Takna) and Emjot (Majat). These ferocious hordes are most cruel and sanguinary, poor and miserable, ignorant of their situation, but unsubdued and free.⁴⁶

In Jackson's account, moreover, the "free" Takna come across as authentic "Arabs" whose "original stuck" was in the Sahara and, as such, they were not only outside Wadi Nun, but also beyond the reach of the Alawite court and Susian *zawaya*.

It is tempting to ponder how the "ignorant," albeit "free," Takna anticipate the anarchical but republican tribes ethnographers like Montagne were later to discover in the same space. But Jackson's representation of Wadi Nun also harks back to its description by Leo Africanus almost three centuries earlier. In that sense, his presentation of Wadi Nun was fraught with the same "servile" copying from texts he lamented. In any case, Jackson did not travel to Wadi Nun much less meet with the "free" Takna. In anticipation of Jackson's conception of the Takna as a "free" tribe, Leo Africanus lamented the lack of "government" in Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards. Leo Africanus, however, was also impressed by the deference of Wadi Nun's "warring" factions to an anonymous *sufi* savant. The Moroccan editors of his account, Hajji and al-Akhdar, identified this *sufi* savant as Sidi Muhammad Ibn al-Mubarak al-Aqawi (of Aqa).⁴⁷ As we will later see, al-Aqawi (d.1518) and his disciples, Sidi Ibn Musa and al-Tamanrti, were the acclaimed spiritual mentors of the Sa'dian dynasty. The Wadi Nun Leo Africanus described was also a theatre of the Moroccan-Portuguese conflict of the early sixteenth Century, the conflict leading to the demise of the Marind regime and the emergence of the Sa'dian dynasty.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 55-56, 143, 276

⁴⁶ Ibid. 287. Stata (ztata) is an arrangement whereby merchants could count on the guarantee of safe passage for their caravans by the *qabila* potentate or *zawiya* grandee in charge of the space they had to cross. The guarantor bears responsibility for losses resulting from malicious acts like plunder. On the legal aspects of this arrangement, see Abdelahad Sebt, "Ztata et sécurité du voyage: un thème de pratique judiciaire Marocaine," *Hesperis-Tamuda*, XXX, 2, (1992): 37-52; Afa, *masalat al-muqad*, 404.

⁴⁷ Leo Africanus, *wasf Afriqiyya*, v.1, ed Hajji and al-Akhdar, 95-96, 114-115. The editors identified Sidi al-Aqawi (d.1518) as the dean of the *Jazulia sufi* order in al-Sus. The Spanish adventurer, Louis de Marmol, also located Wadi Nun beyond the (Sa'dian) dynastic realm, and commented on the deference of its inhabitants to an anonymous "saint"—i.e. he recycled Leo's description of the area. See Marmol, *afrikiyya li Marmol*, ed. trans. Ahmed Taoufiq et al, (Rabat: matba't al-ma'rif al-jadida, 1989), 143-144.

In contrast to Leo Africanus, Jackson arrived in Morocco in the wake of the 1792 rebellion that overlapped with the coronation of Mawlai Sulayman and the "return" of Bayrouk's father, Ubaydallah Ibn Salem, from his exile in "al-Sudan," the Buhilas rebellion. "The district of Wedinoon," he noted,

is nominally in the Emperor (Mawlai Sulayman) of Morocco's dominions, but lately no army having been sent farther south than Terodant... *This place being thus only nominally in his dominion, is another impediment to the redemption of the mariners who happen to be shipwrecked about Wedinoon, for if the Emperor had the same authority over this district, that he has over the provinces north of the river Suse, measures might be adopted ... for their delivery, without pecuniary disbursement* (emphasis added).⁴⁸

Here again, there is striking resemblance between Jackson's conception of the political status of "the Wedinoonees," and the later ethnographic and historiographical representation of the relation between the Moroccan court and Susian *qabila* formations, the depiction underlying the *Makhzan-siba* modality.

Even if we discount the possibility of borrowing from the text, it is still difficult to ignore Jackson's predication of al-Sus's political status on the frequency of its visitation by an army or more importantly, the redemption of shipwrecked Europeans "without pecuniary disbursement." That said; there are suggestive links between the distancing of the Takna from "the Wedinoonees," their location outside the Moroccan dynastic realm and the conception of their social existence in terms of either deference-indifference to "fanatic saints" or the plundering-escort of caravans. In either case, he made concession of Moroccan sovereignty over Wadi Nun contingent on the Alawite capacity to accommodate European expectations of free passage across the same space the Alawite court had declared off limit to *Nazarene* trespassers: Essaouira's backyards. The elevation of impediment of European movement to a sign of Wadi Nun's autonomy became stable in narratives of shipwreck and exploration and later, the main pillar of the ethnographic vision of the autonomous tribe.⁴⁹

Like Jackson's account, narratives of shipwreck tend to locate its sites beyond the Moroccan dynastic realm but imagine the deliverance of survivors in terms of the transfer of rights in their bodies to traders from Wadi Nun such as the Bayrouk. Unlike Jackson, however, survivors of shipwreck had no "practical knowledge" of their captors' language and, indeed, were hardly conscious of or interested in secular identities.⁵⁰ To them differences between the "wandering Arabs" of the Sahara, the (Berber) *Shilluh* of the Anti-Atlas and the urbane *Moors* of the Mediterranean basin pale beside the simple fact that they were not Christians. The presentation of the Saharan as a "dark" Arab and *his* stripping of decent attire were sanctioned by the classical introduction of the *Moor* as an infidel other and, as such, it does not reflect an

⁴⁸ Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 287.

⁴⁹ In the early 1880s, Pennell wrote, "Charles de Foucauld traveled through Morocco disguised as a Jew and distinguished between submitted and unsubmitted tribes simply by whether he could travel freely through their territories." Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 92.

⁵⁰ According to Riley, for instance, his (Muslim) captors also "wanted to know ... if we had seen any of the natives whom they called Moselimin (Muslims)." Riley, *Suffering*, 65.

interest in his skin pigmentation per se.⁵¹ In this genre, Saharans and Susians were "barbarians" not because they were "non-literate" tribesmen. Rather, they tend to be insidiously "dark" precisely because of their approximations of the "fanatic" *Moor* Europeans had long known. In fact, the term tribe itself occurs very sparingly and, one might add, in the *biblical* sense of the word. It is not a phonetic shadow of the notion of the primitive or a synonym of "non-literate society."⁵² Yet, even at this level, this Biblical tribe was invoked precisely because it demotes the (romanticized) *Moor* to a reminder of a distant Christian past. Here, the sacred tribe was deployed in the same way that its secular double was later used by colonial ethnographers like Motagne to conjure up primitive beginnings for European civilization. "I will," the French traveler Eugene Fromentin nostalgically noted,

tell you something about the tribe migrating ... it is a wonderful sight which renews here ... on Europe's doorstep, the migrations of Israel ... Is there not a lesson to be learned from this people which, I now see, often makes one think involuntarily of the Bible? Is there not something in it, which revives the soul?⁵³

In contrast, narratives of exploration retained the belief in an immutable difference between Europeans and Moroccans but veered towards the secularization of its tenets. In this modern genre the *Moors* become Africanized and in that capacity, their difference from Europeans is often couched in biological terms like race and color.⁵⁴ As we will presently see, it was this secularization of the negative and romantic attributes long affixed to the *Moor* that also paved the way for the conversion of al-Sus and the Western Saharan into dens of "savage" and "free" tribes.

Narratives of shipwreck posit landing in the "barbarous coast of Africa" as the inadvertent prelude to the arrival of their authors in Wadi Nun and, hence, to their encounter with the Bayrouk. In these accounts, religion is the common denominator between Saharan and Susian *qabila* ensembles and, in effect, the sinew of their identity designations. One can glean this consensus on the centrality of religion to the

⁵¹For an example of the parallelism between European conceptions of the Mediterranean *Moor* and his Susian and Saharan counterparts, see Francis Brooks, *Barbarian Cruelty* (London: Salusbury and Newman, 1693); Thomas Pellow, *History of the Long Captivity and Adventures of Thomas Pellow in South Barbary* (London: Brower, 1890). Eldred D. Jones, *The Elizabethan Image of Africa* (The University Press of Virginia, 1971). On the pitfalls of a "celebratory" reading of travelogue see, Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, 1-107; for the Moroccan image in European travel accounts see, Dhakir, *al-waga' wa al-mutakhayal*, 189-214.

⁵²Riley's vision of "tribe" is very different from the ethnographic conception of its secular (primitive) counterpart. "They all," he wrote, "learn to read and write: in every family or division of a tribe, they have one man who acts as teacher to the children... When a family of wandering Arabs pitch their tents they set a part a place for school ... They enumerate with the nine figures now in use among all Europeans ... and were extremely astonished to find that I could make them." Riley, *Loss of the American Brig*, 309.

⁵³Eugene Fromentin, *Un ete dans le Sahara*, in *Writing French Algeria*, Dunwoodie, 54.

⁵⁴"And so," Theophile Gautier wrote, "within a few hours, we were going to find ourselves in another corner of the globe, in this mysterious Africa, actually only two days from France, among those dark and black races so different from us ... as much as day differs from night." Theophile Gautier, *Voyage en Algerie*, in *Writing French Algeria*, Dunwoodie, 44.

imagination of Saharan and Moroccan identities from the accounts of two American mariners, Robert Adams and James Riley, and their three French counterparts, Follie, Saugnier and Charles Cochelet. In these texts, shipwreck in the Western Saharan and capture by "dark" Arabs or *Moors* are part of the same sequence leading to arrival at Wadi Nun and encounter with the Bayrouk.⁵⁵ The sanctification of perceived cultural aberrances often enables the traveler to blur differences in the speech patterns and identity designations of his Saharan captors and Susian hosts. Survivors of shipwreck tend to imagine the journey from the Saharan site of shipwreck to Europe as a crossing from an abode of infidelity to the bastion of Christendom. Conversely, being Saharan or Susian becomes a signifier of domicile in cursed margins, lack of redeeming qualities and distance from civilization.

In what seems like an attempt to convince their audiences that the people they met were not the relatively familiar *Moors* of the Mediterranean basin, Adams, Riley, Saugnier and Cochelet identified the Bayrouk compatriots as "Musslimin" and "Monselimene"—i.e. Muslims. The condensation of religious credentials seems to justify Adams' implicit refusal to present his audience with a secular identity for the Ait Musa whom he credited with his transportation from the Western Sahara to Gulimeme. Adams' seeming lack of interest in secular identities, contrasts sharply with his familiarity with the kind of motifs that enabled pre-modern European literati to make sense of the *Moors*. He converted the term Ait Musa to a name for an "encampment." He, for example, identified the human carriers of this name, Ait Musa, as "Musslimin" *Moors* (Muslim Muslims). Fixation on the sacred may also explain James Riley's silence on the *qabila* identities of his Saharan "masters" and his Susian escort to Essaouira. His "wandering Arabs" were literate, had schools and texts and more importantly, nothing worldly could "divert them from the strict observance of their religious ceremonies."⁵⁶ In short, they tend to violate the kind of atavisms ethnographers have prescribed for the tribal condition: lack of "writing and literature" and "tribal religion."

Emphasis on Saharan and Susian religiosity equally pervades the accounts of the three French mariners, Follie, Saugnier and Cochelet. Cochelet endorsed Saugnier and Follie's almost identical descriptions of Wadi Nun as well as their identification of the Bayrouk community, the Takna and their neighbors, simply as "Monselemine." The synchronization of domicile in Wadi Noun and its Saharan backyards with being *Monselemine* enabled these French mariners to identify them largely in terms of their religious difference from the Mediterranean *Moors* in the north and the Saharan "Arabs" in the south. According to Saugnier, Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards were home to,

un peuple connu le nom général de *Monselemine*. Il diffère, dans sa religion et dans ses coutumes, des Maures ses voisins, et des Mongearts habitants du

⁵⁵Follie, "Mémoire d'un Français qui sort à L'esclavage," in *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 69, 81-83; Saugnier, "Récit du Naufrage et de la captivité de Saugnier," in *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 69, 81-83, 113, 119, 122, 197; Adams, *Narrative of Robert Adams*, 53-72; Riley, *Loss of the American Brig* 34-348; Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 6-78.

⁵⁶Riley, *Loss of the American Brig*, 304-309.

désert ... Quoi qu'il en soit en soit, ce pays est habité par les Monselemine, qui sont un assemblage d'Arabes véritables, descendus des anciens Arabes, et de Maures fugitifs de l'empire de Maroc. Le gouvernement est républicain; ... Ces peuples ont un chef général de la religion. Le respect qu'ils lui portent approche de l'adoration. On le nomme sidi Mohammed Moussa; sa demeure ordinaire est à quinze lieues environ du Cap de Nun, près de la ville nommée Illeric ... Différent dans ses principales et sa conduite de l'empereur de Maroc.⁵⁷

The allure of the sacred led Saignier to consider the *Monselemine* "veritable Arabs" and, hence, to trace their origin back to an ostensible "companion of the grand prophet," Muhammad, called "Moseilama," hence, *Monselemine*. More importantly, however, Saignier was very candid with respect to the location of *qabila* in terms of opposition to the state and deference to the *zawiya* or its investiture with "republican" dispositions. If it was not for his overt conflation of religiosity with authentic Arab descent and simultaneous silence on the Takna, we could easily posit this presentation as a textual genesis for the later ethnographic conceptions of the autonomous tribe. Saignier's vision is also similar to that of Jackson in the sense that he, albeit tacitly, considered Wadi Nun, with its markets, caravans and *zawaya*, too hybrid to be assigned to a primitive tribe. He presented its occupants as "un peuple" rather than "une tribu." In that sense, the inversion of Wadi Nun to a den of anarchical tribes required a dispensation with the *Muslimin/ Monselemine* or the effacement of their name and the secularization of their ethos. In any case, this was precisely the kind of strategy that enabled Jackson to find the "free" Takna and to distance them from the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan.

The discursive assassination of the *Monselemine* and, hence, the recovery of the ethnographic Takna was undertaken by explorers and consuls who not only read, but also sought to correct narratives of shipwreck. Unlike survivors of shipwreck, explorers tended to think of themselves as the vanguard of a European mission to regenerate Africa. The regeneration of Africa was imagined in terms of the establishment of order, "legitimate" trade and Christian morality—i.e. the ideological stuff that justifies conquest by the sword or "the maxim gun." Given the redemptive tone of the explorers' discourse, it is not surprising that their texts should also berate the primitive conditions that seemed to need reform: anarchy, slaving and infidelity. In the context of the shift in the balance of power in favour of Europe, it becomes possible to impute a casual relation between the explorers' tendency to *tribalize* Susian identities and Morocco's descent towards colonialism, the descent marked by its losses to France and Spain, and its conquest by British "free trade".

⁵⁷Saignier, "Récit du Naufrage et de la captivité de Saignier," in *Trios Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 157, 159, 166-167; for a similar location of being Susian in terms of living beyond the jurisdiction of the Alawites, "republicanism" and deference to "saints", see Fullie, "Mémoire d'un Français qui sort à L'esclavage," in *Trios Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 84, 131.

Secularized Identities: the Tribalisation of the Takna

*Far from bringing us answers to our questions, the travelers have increased our enigmas by many an addition. Frobenius*⁵⁸

We can draw the signs of the descent from sacred identities to the ethnographic notion of tribe from the presentations of Wadi Nun by the British explorer John Davidson, the governor of the French colony of Senegal, Colonel Faidherbe, and the Spanish cartographer Joachim Gatell.⁵⁹ Yet, we can understand the accounts of these explorers only in the context of the shift in the balance of power between the two shores of the Mediterranean in favor of Europe, the same shift that anticipated the "scramble for Africa." I have already noted that this shift was contiguous with the French occupation of Algiers in 1830 and the Spanish defeat of Morocco in 1860. Of course, these political developments overlapped with the general shift towards secular modes of identification in Europe that began with the Enlightenment but reached its peak during the nineteenth century: the era of nationalism and imperialism. There is, in fact, a suggestive simultaneity between the change in European modes of arrival at and writing about al-Sus and the Western Sahara, and the articulation of (primitive) tribe on the one hand, and the onset of nationalism in Europe and the descent to colonialism on the other.

One result of secularization was the dispensation with sanctified motifs like *Monselemine* and their replacement with the notion of autonomous tribe. Despite differences in their modes of arrival in Wadi Nun, for example, European explorers tended to reverse the classical use of deference to the "saint," the *zawiya*, to locate *qabila* in time and space. In the new model, for instance, *qabila*, as an autonomous tribe, acquires an omnipresence that not only signifies its wholeness, but also blurs the political role Jackson, Riley and Saugnier had assigned to the "saint," the *zawaya*. "These are," Bayrouk's British guest, John Davidson (w.1836), wrote,

without exception the most savage people ... They are without government, laws or honour ... any man may ... shoot another out of mere caprice. The only persons not exposed to the dread of this fate, are the Marabuts and saints.⁶⁰

Davidson's emphasis on anarchy and impressions of the political status of the "saints" is strikingly similar to Montagne and Gellner's conception of (Berber) tribe, the conception duly endorsed by Anglophone historians like Michael Brett and Abu-Nasr. It is worth noting how the exoneration of the "saints" from this anarchy also enabled Davidson to locate the Takna tribes in the same area Saugnier has ceded to the *Monselemine* and their "chef général de la religion." This strategy also enabled Davidson to recover the secular names and identities of Takna neighbors like the Susian Ait Umran and, the Saharan Tajakant and Rgaybat.

⁵⁸H. Frobenius, "The Origin of African Civilization," *Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 637.

⁵⁹Davidson, *Notes*, 104-106; Faidherbe "Renseignements géographiques," *Novelles Annales des Voyages*, 3, 129-156; Joachim Gatell, "L'Ouad Noun et le Tekna a la cote occidentale du Maroc," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 18 : 257-287.

⁶⁰Davidson, *Notes*, 105

Faidherbe and Gatell tended to pick up from where Davidson had left off and strove to tally the Takna constituencies and to amplify their autonomy from the Alawite court. There is, however, a suggestive contrast between Faidherbe's invocation of tribe as a substitute for the *Monselemine* and Gatell's preoccupation with Takna constituencies and secular mores. Faidherbe (w.1859) strove to fill what he called the "empty space" separating the Senegal basin in the south from Wadi Nun in the north with independent tribes. He began by questioning the utility of *Monselemine* as an identity designation for the inhabitants of al-Sus and its Saharan backyard. In the process, he also revoked Jackson's situation of the "free" Takna beyond Wadi Nun. Unlike Jackson and Saugnier, Faidherbe credited the Bayrouk community with a Berber rather than Arab identity and blamed the obfuscation of the secular names of their tribes on an ostensible encounter between shipwrecked Christians and anonymous *Moors*. This ostensible encounter between 'Cross and Crescent' also allowed the potential Takna to disavow their secular identity and to introduce themselves simply as "*nous sommes des Messelmin*" (we are the Muslims):

On trouve sur les anciennes carte une tribu de Monselmines : il n'y a pas de tribu de ce nom. Des maures interrogés par des naufrages ou des pêcheurs canariens auront répondu : nous sommes des Messelmin, c'est-à-dire des musulmans, et on a fait de cela le nom d'une tribu.⁶¹

In one stroke, Faidherbe changed "un peuple" to "une tribu". And by positing language as the repository of identity, Faidherbe was also able to turn *Shilha* speech into a signifier of the infinite nativity of the Berbers to Wadi Nun and; hence, to convert Arabic into an insignia of alterity. This strategy further enabled him to declare living in Wadi Nun congruent with homage to "un petit état berbère, séparé, au sud Maroc" and, thereby, to retain the location of the Takna, as Berber tribes, beyond the Moroccan dynastic realm—in what he dubbed "the empty space between the Senegal and Wadi Nun." One can easily note how similar this vision was to the ethnographic, colonial and post-colonial, inversion of Berber, as tribe, to a metaphor for autonomy from the dynastic realm, the *Siba-Makhzan* dichotomy.

It would be naive to credit Faidherbe alone with the subversion of the classical use of religiosity as an adequate identity designation. In any case, his intervention on behalf of the secular (Berber) tribe and attempt to correct narratives of shipwreck came after a similar venture by the British vice-consul in Essaouira, Joseph Dupuis, to revise Adams's presentation of the Bayrouk community as "Muslimin" *Moors* rather than as a constituency of a "distinct" Berber or Arab "race of people."⁶² That said, Faidherbe's

⁶¹ Faidherbe, "Renseignements géographiques," *Novelles Annales des Voyages*, 3129-156.

⁶² "While the Arabs and Berbers," Dupuis noted, "are in every respect distinct races of people, and are each again sub-divided into various tribes ... the third (*Moor*) are chiefly composed of the other two classes, or of their descendants ... mixed with the European or Negro races ... (They) are the inhabitants of the cities and towns." Adams, *The Narrative of Robert Adams*, appendix, 211. With the exception of the addition of "distinct races," the statement is strikingly similar to Jackson's confinement of the *Moors* to the cities, location of the "shelluh" (Berber) in the Atlas and the "Arabs" in the Sahara; Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 141. On the pioneering role of travelogue in the descent towards racial/ ethnic classifications, see Ann Thompson, "La classification raciale de l'Afrique du Nord au début

intervention on behalf of tribe seems to have paved the way for Gatell's concentration on the secular modes of organization amongst the Takna and, indeed, was the cue for later French ethnographers like Robert Montagne and Vincent Monteil.

Gatell arrived in Wadi Nun in the wake of the Spanish defeat of Morocco in 1860. He took the congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun as a given and sought to provide his audience with a meticulous tabulation of their various constituencies and "customs." In a suggestive break from the erstwhile location of all Susians under the spell of "fanatic saints," for example, Gatell advertised "tolerance" and "independence" as the main traits of the inhabitants of Wadi Nun, the Takna:

Le caractère des habitants (de l'ouad Noun)" he wrote, "est un peu différent de celui des habitants du Sous. Ceux-la ont un sentiment plus vif d'indépendance, et ils ne sont pas aussi intolérants en matière de religion."⁶³

Of course, dispensation with "intolerance" is imperative if tribe were to be located beyond a religious-oriented dynastic realm or to be credited with "customs." In his attempt to amplify the differences between Wadi Nun and the rest of al-Sus, Gatell posited the "feudal" Moroccan dynastic realm and its "fanatic" protégés as the binary opposites of "tolerant" and "independent" Susians like the Takna. "Les habitants du nord," he noted,

sont plus intolérants... ; la seule raison en est qu'ils sont encore sous le joug de la féodalité, tandis que la souveraineté directe du Maroc cesse au-delà de ces limites... Dans le reste du pays,... on ne connaît ni rangs, ni distinctions; Il y règne une parfaite république dans toute l'acception du mot; chacun, maître absolu de ses actions, n'en doit compte qu'à l'opinion publique, et pourtant ce peuple sans gouvernement et livre à lui-même est meilleur que ses voisins placés sous le joug de maîtres et de gouverneurs. ... Les Sousiens du sud ont l'orgueil de leur ... indépendance.⁶⁴

Despite of his postulation of the dynasty and *qabila* as the opposite ends of the Moroccan political spectrum, Gatell's vision of Wadi Nun differs from that of Saugnier precisely because of the contrast in what religion meant to their respective subjects, the Takna and *Monselemine*. Conversely, Gatell's emphasis on the Takna "independence" and "republican" traditions tends to merge Faïdherbe's imagination of Wadi Nun as a "separate," albeit small, Berber state to Jackson's depiction of the Takna as a "free" tribe. Discursively, the transformation of Wadi Nun to a homeland for Gatell's "independent" Takna seems to be contingent on the fact that it was no longer the "depot

de XIXe Siècles," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, xxxiii (1993): 19-36; François Pouillon, "Simplification ethnique en Afrique du Nord: Maures, Arabes, Berbères," *Cahiers d'études africaines*, xxxiii (1993): 37-49.

⁶³Gatell, "L'Oud-Noun et le Tekna," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* 18: 257-287; Saugnier, "Récit du Naufrage et de la captivité de Saugnier," in *Trios Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier: 183-86, 183.

⁶⁴Gatell "L'Oud-Noun et le Takna," *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, 18:183; Haha is a name for both the space adjacent to Essaouira and the *qabila* constellation that occupies it. The proximity of the Haha to Essaouira may explain the Alawite tendency to patronize their elite in the nineteenth century.

of Merchandize" or "separate state" described by Jackson and Faidherbe respectively. Despite the differences in their modes of arrival or reporting, however, one can still argue that survivors of shipwreck and explorers were unable to locate either the *Monselemine* or the Takna in space without thinking, albeit in negative terms, of the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*.

By cross-referencing narratives of shipwreck and exploration with colonial ethnography, we can draw two conclusions that have direct bearings for the current conceptions of Takna origin and provenance in Wadi Nun. Firstly, the location of Wadi Nun and the Takna either beyond or in binary opposition to the dynastic realm predated the conversion of Morocco to a French "protectorate" and the field research that, seemingly, alerted the ethnographers to the existence of autonomous tribes. On this occasion, field research seems to be the rhetorical strategy ethnographers used to turn a textual tradition we can trace back to modern authors like Jackson into an unremitting social reality. In that sense, the conception of the Takna as autonomous tribes was born in the text. Secondly, there is nothing in such travel accounts that we can use to credit the Takna with an infinite nativity to Wadi Nun or to ascertain their alleged descent from Berbers, *Getules* or Lamta, of "antiquity." For almost the half century that separated Faidherbe from Jackson, European observers were oblivious to the secular, *qabila*, identity of the inhabitants of Wadi Nun and, indeed, the whereabouts of the Takna per se. Besides Saugnier's imputation of an Arab genesis for his *Monselemine* and Faidherbe's quest for their, Berber tribal double, travelers were not particularly interested in the distant origin of the people Jackson identified as "Wedinoonees." In an ironic way, Saugnier's attempt to credit his *Monselemine* with descent from a companion of the "grand Prophet," seems to complement the tacit refusal of the Takna *nasaba* to invoke notions of descent from Berbers of "antiquity" and infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. After all, none of the extant Takna narratives traces their origin to either the Roman period or the era of the Arab conquest. The only available sources that one can call to testify for or against the ethnographic notion of descent from *Getules* (*Gezzula*) or Lamta of "antiquity," are the nineteenth-century Saharan and Moroccan accounts, and classical Arabic texts. I have already elected these texts as the most probable intellectual role models for such accounts. Herein, I seek to verify whether the nineteenth century Saharan and Moroccan sources confirm the presence of a bounded *qabila* formation called the Takna in Wadi Nun and how, if at all, did they explain its origin.

IV- Of Caravan and Sultan: Takna for Pilgrims and Biographers

I behold a sharif (sultan) on your way. From him you will see bounty and kindness!

Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah⁶⁵

Nineteenth-century Saharan and Moroccan sources tend to anticipate the historiographical invocation of the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya* to locate *qabila* in time and space. Because they were composed during the same period, the nineteenth

⁶⁵ Ahmad Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah, *The Pilgrimage of Ahmad, son of the Little Bird of Paradise: An Account of a Nineteenth-Century Pilgrimage from Mauritania*, trans. and ed. H.T. Norris, (Warminster: Aris and Philips, 1977), 9.

century, these sources are comparable to and, in effect, can be cross-referenced with European travel literature. Unlike European travel accounts, however, we cannot posit these sources as a possible textual genealogy for colonial ethnography. These Moroccan and Saharan texts feed off a different tradition of signification and were written in a language that was alien to colonial ethnographers, classical Arabic. I have already noted how the subaltern Takna narratives exhibit striking resemblance to nineteenth-century Shurafa biographies. I added that one could hardly explain such similarities without reference to the common textual heritage that seems to inform both the Takna narratives and the Shurafa biographies. In that sense, what binds colonial ethnography to nineteenth-century travelogue is also the thing that sets them apart from the Takna narratives and the Saharan and Shurafa accounts: textuality. These differences may also explain why Moroccan and Saharan sources tend to subvert the location of the Takna *qabila vis-à-vis* what European travelers and ethnographers took as its constitutive other: the dynasty.

The most famous Saharan authors to pass through nineteenth-century Wadi Nun were the pilgrims Ahmed Ibn Tuwayr al-Janah (1834) and Muhammad al-Walati (1894).⁶⁶ These narratives confirm both the Takna presence in Wadi Nun and their deference to leading families like the Bayrouk. Because our informants were also pilgrims, however, they tended to interpret the Takna capacity to guarantee safe passage for the caravan and hospitality to travelers as signifiers of their religiosity and deference to the ultimate guarantor of 'order' in an Islamic setting: the court or sultan. As far as Ibn Tuwayr al-Janah and al-Walati were concerned, the Alawite court was not a mere symbol of a sanctified political ideal. The Alawite sultans were also providers of lodging, means of transportation and fiscal support. Indeed, for these two pilgrims, the journey to and back from Mecca was easy mainly because they were also bearers of letters of recommendation from the Alawite court. In these accounts, encounter with the Takna and lodging with leading families such as the Bayrouk comes across as stages in a process that ultimately takes the pilgrim to the Alawite court. The *qabila* enters the pilgrim's narrative courtesy of its capacity to protect the caravan or to hasten the encounter with the sultan.

In their narratives, Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah and al-Walati routinely locate *qabila* in terms of either its deference to or deviation from their vision of the Islamic norm, the norm that also legitimizes the authority of their hosts: the Alawites and their devotees. The indictment of *qabila* with deviancy from the Islamic norm and, hence, its secularization, often stems from its withholding of provisions from the caravan of the pilgrim. Quite often, such indictment sanctions a return to the classical identification of inhospitable *qabila* ensembles by the demeaning inversions of Arab and Berber, *a'rab* and *brabir* respectively. It suffices to note that this discursive inversion also strips the *qabila* of redeeming qualities and, hence, eliminates the gap that separates it from the "savage tribe."⁶⁷ In comparison to Jackson, however, neither Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah nor al-Walati

⁶⁶ Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah, *The Pilgrimage of Ahmad*, trans. and ed. Norris; Muhammad Yahya al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijaziya*, ed. Muhammad Hajji, (Beirut: dar al-gharb al-islami, 1990)

⁶⁷ The inversion of Berber into *brabir* was modeled after the inversion of Arab into *'arab* (wayward Arab). Despite its seemingly 'secular' connotations, the image of the *'arab* (sing. *'arabi*) is carved out of their accusation in the Quran with wallowing in "*kufi*" (infidelity) and "*nifaq*" (hypocrisy). This image has its (sanctified) roots in the early conflict between the urbanized Muslim community in Medina and its

was willing to demote the Takna and their neighbors to "sanguine" tribes—i.e. *a'rab* or *brabir*. For instance, Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah located the Takna in Wadi Nun and commended the Azwafit (Ait Bella) "generosity" to travelers. "The people of Wadi Nun, the Tikna," he wrote,

(and)... the [Saharan] Awlad Dulaym and... Rgaybat, began to be amazed at the behavior of the sultan with us and the way he followed our wishes... The Tikna... more particularly, the Ait Bella [Zwafit]... may God grant them good in abundance, gave us many camels and thirty six grain sacks in one evening ... Then we journeyed to the Awlad Dulaym... to renew old-time love and affection between us ... we obtained some thirty camels.⁶⁸

In contrast, al-Walati presented his Ait Musa hosts, the Bayrouk, as "*ahl al-hal wa al-aqd*" (those who make and unmake decisions)—i.e. the accredited leadership of the community.⁶⁹ Al-Walati's legitimization of the Bayrouk's positional superiority reflects his awareness that his host, Dahman Ibn Bayrouk, was an accredited Alawite *qaid*. Like European narratives of shipwreck, however, Saharan accounts match dwelling on the religious and temporal credentials of their Takna hosts, with silence on the origin of this *qabila* ensemble. Neither Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah nor al-Walati was interested in the distant ancestry of the Takna or the length of their domicile in Wadi Nun.

The notation of the Takna occupancy of Wadi Nun in the nineteenth century by Saharan pilgrims was seconded by contemporaneous "Shurafa historians" like al-Da'eef al-Rabati, al-Nasiri and later, al-Marrakechi.⁷⁰ I have already indicated that these biographers were the "organic intellectuals" of the Alawite court and, as a result, their histories tend to celebrate the achievements of the sultans and their devotees. In that sense, what they tell us about *qabila* constellations such as the Takna also mirrors the level of the Alawite satisfaction with the "service" (*khidma*) or dispositions of the Takna elite at any given time. In comparison to the pilgrims' fixation on the Takna "generosity" to the caravan of the pilgrim, Shurafa biographers were mainly interested in the Takna "service" (*khidma*) to named dynasts or their deputies. Here too, *qabila* identity matters precisely because of its utility as a means to higher callings. Al-Rabati, al-Nasiri and al-Marrakechi, for instance, confirmed both the Takna occupancy of Wadi Nun and involvement in the

pastoral surroundings: the *a'rab*. Urbane scholar made being a good Muslim contingent on domicile in urban centers, the *hadar*, and deference to authority. In contrast, the *bedou*, the *a'rab*, were routinely associated with deviance from the Islamic norm. The juxtaposition of the 'modern' *a'rab* with their pre-Islamic counterparts also rationalizes their stripping of redeeming qualities and hence, their discursive conviction with living in *siba* (anarchy). This is the sanctified origin of the notion of 'siba'. The notion of *siba* was, however, articulated by "organic intellectuals" of the Shurafa courts. As such, its popularization is a salutary reminder of the ability of the 'establishment' to de-legitimize those who fail to live up to its expectations. For an indictment of the *a'rab*, see *The Quran*, chapter X, Sura IX, Verse 97. For a nuanced postulation of the perils of living in the *badiya*, see Ibn Khaldun, *Mukaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 117-118; for an example of its deployment in the nineteenth-century to distance 'wayward' (pastoral) Hassan from 'pious' (sedentary) *zawaya*, see Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, *al-wasit fi trajim udaba Shinqit* (Casablanca-Cairo: al-wuhda al-Arabiya and al-Khanji, 1958) 475-506.

⁶⁸ Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah, *The Pilgrimage of Ahmad*, trans. and ed. Norris, 132

⁶⁹ Al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijaziya*, ed. Hajji, 87-88.

⁷⁰ Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*; al-Rabati, *tariikh al-Da'eef*; al-Marrakechi, *al-ia'lam*

caravan trade in the nineteenth-century. Most often, however, these Shurafa biographers present the Takna either as diligent adjutants of the Alawite court or devotees of *zawaya*. Because of the historical scope of their work, however, the *Shurafa* biographers also tend to mix concession of the congruity of being Takna and living in Wadi Nun in the nineteenth century with suggestive silences on or tacit denials of the antiquity of this phenomenon. More often than not, the tacit denial of the historicity of the Takna presence in Wadi Nun occurs when the biographer ventures further beyond the Shurafa period, the sixteenth century, and, hence, seeks to identify the *qabila* auxiliaries of ancient dynasties such as the (Arab) Umayyads and Fatimids or the (Berber) Almoravids and Almohads. In that sense, we cannot posit the *Shurafa* biographies as an intellectual genealogy for the ethnographic conception of the Takna origin.

In the introduction, I noted that *Shurafa* historians tend to emulate Ibn Khaldun and, in effect, to update his voluminous history, *al-Ibar*. In these texts, Ibn Khaldun also comes across as the main authority on al-Sus's demographic history before the Shurafa period—i.e. from the Arab conquest to the Marinid era. Al-Nasiri and al-Marrakechi, for instance, took the Arab conquest as the genesis for the historical process leading to the demise of Ibn Khaldun's royal patrons, the Marinids (1260s-1510s), and the constitution of Morocco as a Shurafa dynastic realm. I have noted how Julian, Abun-Nasr and Brett posited the collapse of the Marinid regime as the end of the Berber Empires: the Almoravids, Almohad and Marinids. I added that in this genre, the end of these Empires anticipated the regression of the Berbers to tribes and, in that sense, seems to sanction the demotion of their *qabila* formations to wards of, to borrow from Brett, "the marabouts," the *zawaya*. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun, these *Shurafa* biographers also used dynastic succession as a periodizing device. They presented al-Sus's demographic history in terms of its domination by the (Sahhaja) Lamta and Jazula from the time of the Arab conquest to the Almohad era and then the (Ma'qil) *Shabanat* and *Hassan* during the Marinid period (1140s-1510s).⁷¹ In other words, the current congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun does not extend to the Marinid period, let alone the era of the Arab conquest. In that sense, Shurafa biographies tend to credit the Takna *qabila* ensemble with a much shorter history than what both the Takna *nasaba* and survivors of shipwreck like Saugnier were willing to concede. As far as the biographer is concerned, the Takna historicity is contingent on their appearance as auxiliaries, *khudam* (servitors), of the dynasties and *zawaya* that ushered in the Shurafa period. At the pedantic level, the answer to the question of when did Wadi Nun become *Taknaland* hinges on how one conceptualizes the period that separates the mutation of the Lamta (and Jazula) identities from the appearance of the Takna—i.e. the period when being from Wadi Nun also seems to denote being *Shabanat* or *Hassan*. As we will see, the demographic shifts that took place from the era of the Arab conquest to the Marinid period do not auger well for the existing academic explanations of the main pillars of Takna origin: the notions of descent from *Getules* (Jazula) or Lamta of "antiquity" and infinite nativity to Wadi Nun.

⁷¹For references to the Lamta, Jazula, *Shabanat* and *Hassan* domicile in Wadi Nun and tacit denials of the historicity of the Takna, see al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, v.1 57; Idem., v.2, 68-71; al-Marrakechi, *al-i'alam*, v.1, 169.

V. "Taught by the Pen": Arab Conquest, Berber Exile

*Read in the name of thy Lord... who taught by the pen, taught Man that he knew not
Quran, XCVI*

In this section, I intend to test the limits of the ethnographic conception of the Takna origin in terms of descent from the Lamta and infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. My discussion is geared to amplify the two theoretical and empirical conclusions I have identified at the beginning of the chapter. At the theoretical level, I want to highlight the role of textuality in the classical conceptions of Berber origins and, hence, postulations of the Lamta and Jazula modes of identification. It will become clear that the classical, Muslim, author was able to endow the Lamta and Jazula, as Berbers, with a common origin precisely because of his own advocacy of a sacred order of things. In that sense, the idea that the Berbers were segmentary was born in the text. At the empirical level, I intend to illustrate the demographic ruptures that inhibit, or ought to have discouraged, any attempt to credit the Takna with an ordinary Berber or Arab identity or uninterrupted domicile in Wadi Nun. From the Arabic texts that cover the period from the Arab conquest to the Marinid era, it is impossible to think of a Berber, *Getules* (Jazula) or Lamta, and Ma'qil, Shabanat or Hassan *qabila*, let alone verify its presence in al-Sus without reference to the agents of displacement and acculturation in the (Far) Maghrib-- the dynasty and the caravan. At the same time, these texts underline the gap that separates the mutation of the Jazula or Lamta from the appearance of the Takna without offering credible evidence as to why we should predicate *qabila* identity on endogenous descent. To expedite this goal, I have divided this section into three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I will identify the role of textuality in the authorship of Berber origin and the codification of Lamta or Jazula as portable identities for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards. In the second part, I will use dynastic succession as a frame of reference to sketch the main demographic ruptures that spawned the mutation of the Lamta and the constitution of Shabanat and Hassan as identities for their successors in Wadi Nun. In the final sub-section, I posit this survey as a backdrop for my own postulation of when Takna became an identity for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun and why we should posit the dynasty and the *zawiya* as the main culprits behind the "suturing" of the Takna *qabila* ensemble.

Displaced Philistines, 'Lost' Arabs: Berber Origin

In the introduction, I noted that, historiographically, the significance of the Arab conquest lies in its frequent invocation as a genesis for the dynastic successions and trans-Saharan commercial networks that shaped the internal history of the Maghrib as well as its external relations with the rest of the world. I have noted that the dynasty and the caravan are at the center of existing explanations of the Islamization, Arabization and, hence, hybridization of the Maghrib. I have also noted how the Africanists' emphasis on the Arab-Berber, *Makhzan-siba* dichotomy, and concomitant essentialization of identity designations tends to blur the cumulative impact of this historical process. This orientation is evident from Michael Brett and Abdelmajid Hanoum's recent secularization and *racialization* of the classical predication of Berber

origin on exodus from *holy Land*, Palestine, and prophetic heritage, descent from *Noah*. Brett, for example, considered the predication of the division of the Berbers into *Butr* and *Baranis* on descent from "*Canaan*" (Ibn Noah) or exodus from the orient (*Mashriq*) "an odd form of treason to the concept of a Berber race."⁷² In contrast, Hannoum reduced the theorization of Berber origin by classical "Arab" *nasaba* (genealogists) and modern French ethnographers to a symptom of the search for racial superiority *per se*. "Only later, because of their numerous revolts," he argued,

was attention drawn to their (Berber) presence and the problem of their origin raised. The inevitable solution was immediately found. It was this same [classical] solution that, in modern times, the French were to propound in North Africa ... Nothing seems easier than to integrate the new population ... by maintaining that (it) ... was originally at the dawn of time, from among us. This solution is very convenient because it also solves another serious problem... the conquerors (whether Arabs or Europeans) want by all means to keep their privileged situation as the noble, superior race.⁷³

It would be naive to dispute the role of temporal expediencies in the classical imagination of the *Butr* Zanata origin in terms of exodus from Palestine or affinity with *Goliath* much less the simultaneous promotion of the *Baranis* Sanhaja to Arab *lost tribes*. Yet, what Hannoum called "the inevitable solution" has more to do with the sacred notion of *in the beginning* than it was with a secular quest for positional or racial superiority. In any case, the idea that the Berbers were, once upon a time, "from among us" was not born in the bosom of the encounter with Arab or French invaders. The classical Muslim authors borrowed the idea of Berber origin from an erudite Yemenite literati and Jewish convert to Islam called Wahab Ibn Munabbih (d.728-9). "Wahab b. Munabbih," historian Muslim Ibn Qutayba (d.889) casually wrote,

said that Ham Ibn Nuh [Noah] was a white man ... But Allah ... changed his colour and the colour of his descendants ... Ham went off, followed by his children. Ham begot Kush b. Ham, Kan'an b. Ham and Fut b. Ham. Fut traveled and settled in the land of Hind and Sind (India), and the people there are his descendants. The descendants of Kush and Kan'an are the races of the Sudan, the Nuba (Nubians) ... the Qibt (Copts) and the Barbar.⁷⁴

⁷²Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 131

⁷³Hannoum, *Colonial Histories*, 8-9

⁷⁴Ibn Qutayba, *kitab al-ma'rif*, in *Corpus of Early Arabic Sources*, ed. Levtzion and Hopkins 14-15. "Ham," al-Masudi later (wr. 947) wrote, "went his own way towards the Maghrib until he arrived at al-Sus al-Aqsa"—Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards. Ali al-Masudi, *muruj al-dhahab*, *Corpus*, ed. Levtzion and Hopkins, 33-37, 34. By Ibn Khaldun's time, the Marinid period, this belief was so deeply entrenched that it no longer required an invocation of Wahab b. Munabbih's 'authority'. Classical proponents of the notion of exodus from 'holy land' invoked the *Goliath-David* duel to explain why the Berbers, as *Philistines*, were exiled to 'Africa' and, by implication, when and how their Jewish and Arab 'cousins' rejoined them. See *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 34-35, 165, 170. For a recent articulation of the notion of descent from Arab 'lost tribes', see Muhammad al-Arabari, *al-barbar arab qudamma* (Rabat: al-majlis al-qawmi lil-thaqafa al-a'rabiya, 1993).

It is also a classical truism that Ibn Munabbih's division of the Berbers into displaced *Philistines* and *lost Yemenites*, Arabs, coincided with the rivalry between the (Sunnite) Umayyad dynasty and its *Shiite* (and *Kharijite*) detractors, the rivalry that branched out of the first Muslim civil war (657-661).⁷⁵ In that sense, the author's choice of which Berber *qabila* was entitled to what origin can be understood only in the context of the Umayyad, Kharijite and Shiite competitions over space or scrambles for the support of its (Berber) occupants. For example, it is difficult to account for Ali Ibn Hazm's searing critique of the promotion of the (Berber) Sanhaja to *lost Arabs* by a "Yemenite historian" such as Ibn Munabbih without reference to the Almoravid conquest of his homeland, *Andalusia* (Spain). This resentment was fueled by Ibn Hazm's allegiance to the Umayyad (Adnan) elite they displaced.⁷⁶ That said, it is hard to find a more compelling reason for subscription to Ibn Munabbih's conception of *in the beginning* and, hence, the institutionalization of the idea of segmentation oozing from it than the belief in, to borrow from Geertz, "the overpowering coerciveness" of revelation when it comes to the question of who we are.

Ibn Khaldun duly endorsed Ibn Hazm's much-quoted ridicule of the "lies of the Yemenite historians" and, as a result, tended to credit the Berber with a separate, albeit still sacred, origin.⁷⁷ The conception of Berber origin in terms of exodus from the *Mashriq* (east) rather than infinite nativity to the *Maghrib* (west) was adopted by Shurafa historians like al-Nasiri and, indeed, commanded tremendous respect even among some French and Moroccan historians. In other words, it outlived both the Arab and French attempts to establish themselves as the "superior race" in the Maghrib.⁷⁸ The fact that the Yemenite Ibn Munabbih was also a Shiite devotee, and the 'Persian' Ibn Hazm was an Umayyad sympathizer goes along way towards explaining the disparity between their approaches to the question of Berber origin. Yet ethnographers and historians who dwelled on the Arab-Berber divide seem to operate under the impression that the proponents of the notion of prophetic descent or exodus from the *Mashriq*, Palestine or Yemen, were both "Arab" and "organic intellectuals" of either the Umayyad regime or its Kharijite and Shiite opponents. The conception of origin in terms of prophetic descent (Noah) or exodus from *holy land*, Palestine, was, for what it

⁷⁵The two-tiered division of the Berbers, into *Butr* and *Baranis*, corresponds to the seemingly secular explanation of Arab origin in terms of descent from two siblings: *Adnan* (*Mudar*) and *Qahtan* (*Yemen*). While the former were the clients of the Umayyad dynasty, the latter became 'hosts' for its Kharijite and Shiite opponents.

⁷⁶Ali Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri was reportedly a descendant of a Persian client of those Umayyad *emirs* who fled to the Iberian Peninsula (Andalusia) in the wake of their defeat by the Abbasids in 750 A.D, hence, his reported dislike for the (Berber) Almoravids who supplanted his Umayyad patrons.

⁷⁷Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*, v.1, 191-92.

⁷⁸Ali Ibn Hazm, *Jamharat Ansab al-'arab* ed. Levi-Provençal (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'rif, 1948), 460-62. Ibn Khaldun used Ibn Hazm's testimony to revise the dualism underlying the predication of Berber presence in the Maghrib in terms of *Butr* (Zanata) exodus from Palestine and *Baranis* (Sanhaja) migration from Yemen. He leaned towards the idea of Berber descent from *Philistines*. Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*, v.1, 191-92; Idem. v. 6, (11): 125, 176-192, 206; Idem. v.7, (13), 7-18. For examples of the endorsements of the notion of exodus from the *Mashriq* by Shurafa historians, see al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.1, 35-63; al-Marrakechi *al-i'alam*, 153-197. For an academic embracement of the notion of exodus from Palestine, see Jacques-Meunier, *Le Maroc Saharien des origines a 1670* (Paris: 1982). For an example of the academic conception of the Berbers as 'lost Arabs', see al-Arabari, *al-barbar arab qudamma*, 119-296

is worth, applied to spaces that did not become part of the Umayyad dynastic realm like "Bilad al-Sudan" or the "land of Hind and Sind." Since it served as bedrock for the cartographic and demographic production of the Maghrib and its Berber, Jewish and *sudan* (black) occupants, the cultural arsenal of the Arab conquest belongs in any attempt to dispense with the ethnographic explanation of Takna origin and domicile in Wadi Nun in terms descent from Lamta or Jazula (*Geutles*) of antiquity.

Officially, the Arab conquest was predicated on an ultraistic mission to introduce Islam to the Maghrib. The introduction of this religion, however, also imparted the *belief* in one of its sacred tenets, namely, the conception of human origin in terms of single creation and dispersal from an apical point-- paradise, Noah's ark, *holy land* etc. Here, even if we overlook the much older Jewish and Christian versions of this motif, the fact that Islam itself originated in the *Mashriq* was bound to presage the explanation of domicile in the rest of the world in terms of migration rather than infinite domesticity. As a requirement of being a Muslim, belief in single creation and the location of the cradle of Man in the *Mashriq* was therefore capable of transcending the temporal agendas of its "Arab" carriers. Fidelity to this sanctified motif sanctioned the imagination of Northwest Africa as the *Maghrib* (occident), the tracing of the origin of its occupants to its sacred opposite, the *Mashriq* (orient) and, hence, the "inevitable" classification of the Berbers as displaced *Philistines* or Arab *lost tribes*.

I have noted in the introduction that deference to the notion of single creation also hatched the quest for grand genealogies and, indeed, spawned the current conception of tribal identities in terms of segmentation. The idea of segmentation commanded such respect precisely because both classical authors like Ibn Munabbih and Ibn Qutayba, and contemporary academics such as Gellner and Abu-Nasr took the *belief* in human dispersion from an apical point as the natural order of things. In the Maghrib itself, literacy and textual knowledge made it possible for the often-learned *qabila* genealogists, the *nasaba*, to conjure up notions of origin and the esoteric genealogies they deemed most likely to withstand any scrutiny. Since the textual origins assigned to Berber groups like the *Branis* Lamta or the *Butr* Zanata feed off the *belief* in migration from the *Mashriq*, they can best be understood in light of what this *Mashriq* came to signify in classical *Maghribian* discourses on identification. As we will presently see, the classical conception of the Lamta and Jazula origin was similar to the ethnographic postulation of the Takna origin in the sense that it was born in the text rather than field research. The Lamta and Jazula ancestry had to be either *Philistines* or *lost Arabs*. Unlike the colonial ethnographer, however, the classical author did not believe in infinite nativity nor did he posit language as a repository of some distant origin. As a result, he took displacement as the norm and, in effect, predicated the birth of new identity designations on historical or historicized contingencies. Africans were, once upon a time, *Philistines* or Arabs but in the course of their exile they had also 'gone native'—i.e. became Berbers and *sudan* (blacks).

Arabs 'Gone Native': Lamta and Jazula

The reverence of the *Mashriq* as the cradle of Man and revelation, the resting place of self-negating prophets and the site of blessed sanctuaries, led to its elevation to a

sacred centre and a point of reference for the mapping out of the rest of the world as its pagan peripheries. Distance and difference from this sanctified *Mashriq* were used as signifiers of the positional inferiority of its 'secular' other: the Maghrib. "The Maghreb," the anonymous author of *Mafakhir al-Barber* (w. 1312) stated,

was mentioned once in the presence of the Commander of the Faithful. One of those present said, 'we have been told that the world has been likened to a bird. The Orient is its head, the Yemen is one of its wings and Syria is the other. Iraq is its chest and the Maghreb is its tail.' Now in the assembled gathering there was a man from the Maghreb ... He said to them, 'you have spoken the truth. The bird is a peacock'!⁷⁹

The wit of the "man from the Maghreb" hardly obviates the burden of origination in the "tail" of "the world" and, hence, the inclination to use exodus from the *Mashriq* to dodge its marginalizing connotations. Subscription to the notion of descent from the cradle of Islam, advertisement of affinity to its propagators, Muhammad and his *Sahaba* (companions), and proficiency in its language, Arabic, became the scourge of idea of infinite nativity to the 'pagan' Maghrib.

The sense of displacement from a blessed site sanctioning the conflation of the "Far" *Maghrib* with modern Morocco was responsible for the location of Wadi Nun in terms of its proximity and similarity to the austere Western Sahara, and distance and difference from the verdant Mediterranean basin.⁸⁰ I have already noted that until the nineteenth century the area straddling the Atlas Mountains and the Western Sahara was called al-Sus. In another display of the sense of distance from the blessed center of the universe, the *Mashriq*, classical authors divided al-Sus into two parts: al-Sus *al-Adna* (Near Sus) in the north and *al-Sus al-Aqsa* (Far Sus) in the south. According to this mental map, Wadi Nun was the epicenter of *al-Sus al-Aqsa*. In contrast, the two-tiered division of the Berbers into *Butr* and *Baranis* and their location in terms of domicile in the Near (*Adna*) and Far (*Aqsa*) *Maghrib* was used to make sense of al-Sus's demographic map in the wake of the Arab conquest.

It is worth recalling that the classical division of the Berber into *Butr*, in *al-Maghrib al-Adna*, and *Baranis*, in *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa*, was modeled after the conception of Arab origin in terms of descent from two siblings: *Adnan* (Mudar) and *Qahtan* (Yemen). I have noted that contemporary academics tend to subscribe to the classical postulation of *Baranis* into a named ancestor for the bulk of the Berbers of the *Maghrib al-Aqsa*, Morocco and its Saharan backyards. This strategy enabled classical authors like al-Mas'udi (wr. 947) to turn similarities amongst the Masmuda of the *Near Sus* (the Anti-Atlas), the Lamta and Jazula of the *Far Sus*, Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra, and the Sanhaja (Lamtuna and Judala) of the Western Sahara into signifiers of common origin. In contrast to the agrarian Masmuda, however, the partially pastoral Lamta and Jazula were classified as Sanhaja who differed from their Saharan brethren only in terms of their domicile in al-Sus. About three centuries after the Arab conquest,

⁷⁹Trans. and quoted by H.T. Norris, *The Berbers in Arabic Literature*, (London and New York: International Book Center, 1982), 2.

⁸⁰This perception still survives in Morocco: people in southern Morocco, al-Sus, still refer to this area, the north, as *al-gharb* (the west).

for example, Ibn Hawqal (wr. 988) declared the Lamta and Jazula of al-Sus as "pure Sanhaja." By the time of the Almohads, al-Idrisi (wr.1154) promoted "Lamt and Sanhaj" to sibling ancestors of the Susian Lamta and Saharan Sanhaja and blamed their domicile in arid spaces on their mutual exile by "other Berbers." About a century later, Ibn al-Athir (d.1233) used the notion of *Arab lost tribes* to credit the Susian Lamta and the Saharan Lamtuna, as Sanhaja, with a Yemenite, Arab, origin and, indeed, to promote them to full participants in the Arab conquest of the Maghrib. "They (the Lamtuna and Lamta)," he wrote,

first came out of the Yemen in the days of [Khalifa] Abu Baker (r.632-634)... he sent them to Syria, then they moved to Egypt and entered the Maghrib with Musa b. Nusayr and went with Tariq to Tanja. Then they desired to be alone so they went into the desert and made their home up to this time.⁸¹

These discrepant accounts may have led the Maghribian Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) to doubt the Lamta relation to the Saharan Sanhaja and to dispute the proposed time and mode of their arrival in al-Sus. According to the Berber *nasaba* he purportedly consulted, the Lamta and Jazula shared "a common mother" with the Saharan Sanhaja but their "father was unknown".⁸² Here, even if one were to take Ibn Khaldun's bastardization of the Jazula and Lamta at face value, it will still be presumptuous to credit them with the kind of homogeneity that warrants their conversion into a composite tribal ancestry for the Takna.

Uncertainty about the exact "father" of the Lamta and Jazula contrasts sharply with the unanimous pairing of identity with territoriality to locate them in terms of domicile astride al-Sus and the Western Sahara. On this occasion, however, the Lamta and Jazula identities become intelligible courtesy of the centrality of their space to the Trans-Saharan Trade system and, in effect, susceptibility to invasion by successive dynasties. Infatuation with the caravan trade, for example, informed one of the earliest identifications of "al-Sus and the country of the Sudan" as the dual destination of the first Arab expeditions to venture beyond the Mediterranean basin. In the course of such successful military *treks*, Umayyad commanders also discovered a traffic in gold that later mushroomed into the fabled Trans-Saharan Trade. According to Ibn Abd al-Hakam (803-871) the commander of one such expedition, Habib al-Fihri, "attained success of which the like has never been seen and got as much gold as he wanted."⁸³ This association of control of al-Sus with access to gold set the stage for its cartographic and ethnographic

⁸¹Of these four authors, only Ibn Hawqal (Egypt) actually visited the Maghrib. Al-Masudi (Iraq), *akhbar al-zaman*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 34; Ibn Hawqal, *surat al-ard*, in *Corpus*, ed. Levzion and Hopkins, 50; al-Sharif al-Idrisi (Sicily), *nuzhat al-mushtaq*, in *Corpus*, ed. Levzion and Hopkins, 127; Ibn al-Athir, (Iraq) *al-kamil fi al-tarikh*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 158.

⁸²Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar* v. six (11), 419-420.

⁸³Ibn Abd al-Hakam, *Muajam al-Buldan*, in Hopkins and Levzion *Corpus*, 13. The first recorded Arab treks across al-Sus and into the Sahara are credited to a legendary Umayyad deputy called Uqba Ibn Nafa' (d.683). Apart from attention to security, Umayyad deputies also dug wells to provide reliable water sources for the caravans. In Saharan and Sudan narratives of origin Uqba is often claimed as a founding father. See al-Mukhtar al-Kunti, *al-taraif wa al-tala'id* ed. Shafiq Arfaq (Rabat: M.A. Thesis, Mohammed V University, 1992), 13; Muhammad Belo, *Infraq al-maysur fi tarikh bilad al-takrur*, ed. Bahija Chadi (Rabat: Institute of African Studies, 1996), 159.

production in terms of the utility of its *qabila* formations to the caravan trade. From a *Far Maghribian* (Moroccan) perspective, al-Sus was the natural gateway to the Western Sahara and the crossroad for routes linking the Mediterranean ports of trade with their sub-Saharan African counterparts. A set of routes tied the Mediterranean shore with a plethora of trade centers in and around al-Sus: Tarudant in the Anti-Atlas, Nul Lamta in (Wadi Nun) the *Far Sus*, and Sijilmasa in Tafilalt. In the fringes of the *Far Sus*, these routes converged into a single trail that traversed the Western Sahara parallel to the Atlantic coast before it branched out into two main routes, one leading to the Senegal valley, via Awdaghust, and the other to the Niger basin, via Walata. It was because of its geopolitical location that al-Sus became a major destination for caravans and an object of desire for successive dynasties.

The quest for gold and access to its source, *Bilad al-Sudan*, became a permanent fixture in *Maghribian* political culture and, indeed, a major driving force behind conquests of, migrations to and writing about, al-Sus and its inhabitants. To Ibn al-Fiqih (w. 903), for instance, al-Sus was the Idrisid (780s-900s) "possession" adjacent to Kharijite Sijilmasa. Befittingly, he located "its inhabitants and the Lamta" in time largely in terms of what they did for a living- i.e. service to caravans and the production and marketing of "unique lamtiyya shields." In the wake of the Fatimid conquest of the Kharijite and Idrisid dominions in the tenth century, Ibn Hawqal located "the territories of Lamta" astride the "shortest side of a triangle" linking al-Sus with Awdaghust and Sijilmasa, a triangle that was also reputable as the "source of lamti Shields". In contrast, al-Bakri (d.1094) identified al-Sus as a crossroad of trade routes leading to al-Sudan. Al-Bakri, however, located its Lamta and Jazula occupants in terms of predation on the caravans that congregated at "a watering place" where "all the roads leading to the Sudan meet." To al-Idrisi (w.1154), in contrast, the Lamta were not brigands but rather, the proprietors of the caravanserai of Azuqqi in the Western Sahara and the "well populated" town of Nul Lamta in al-Sus, the town where "the Lamti shields" were made.⁸⁴ These cursory presentations were duly used by (the Syrian) geographer Yakut al-Hamawi (d.1229) to sketch what he thought was a composite profile for the Lamta, a profile that, however, also sums up the disparity between authorial concession of their presence in al-Sus and confusion over the matrix of their identity. "Lamta [is]," he wrote in his *mu'ajam al-buldan* (dictionary of places),

... a place belonging to a Berber *qabila* in the Maghrib al-Aqsa (Far West) ... both the place and the people are called Lamta ... The Lamti shields are named after them ... Nul Lamta... is a town in the south of the Maghrib. It is the capital of the Lamta (emphasis added).⁸⁵

Like his predecessors, Yakut seems to blame the obscurity of the Lamta identity on the fact that the term *Lamta* was a designation for an animal, *lamt*, its processed hide, *Lamti shields*, and a suffix in the name of a trade center, *Nul Lamta*.⁸⁶ Classical *nasaba* and

⁸⁴Hopkins and Levitzion, *Corpus*, 13, 26-27, 46-47, 64, 127.

⁸⁵Yakut al-Hamawi, *mu'ajam al-buldan*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levitzion 124.

⁸⁶Al-Idrisi, *nuzhat al-mushtaq*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levitzion, 127; Ibn Hawqal, *surat al-ard*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levitzion 50; Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*. v. 6 [11], 419, 420, 462.

historians did not dwell on whether the congruity of the name of the locale with that of its occupants was a case of naming people after animals and space or vice versa. Instead, interest in what the (*Branis*) Lamta and Jazula sites of domicile meant to the caravan led to the invocation of contingent political dispositions to shore up their perceived similarity to the Saharan Sanhaja and difference from the (*Butr*) Zanata proprietors of Sijilmasa.

Classical authors routinely use encounter with the dynasty as a frame of reference to locate the Lamta and Jazula in time and space. During the era of the Arab conquest, for example, the Lamta and Jazula identities become evident courtesy of the Umayyad conquest of their homeland, al-Sus, and its subsequent loss to the Kharijites of Sijilmasa. Towards the end of this era, al-Sus became a "possession" of the Shiites Idrisids and, then, their Fatimid cousins. During the era of the Berber empires, the Lamta and Jazula entered the text courtesy of their recruitment by the (Sunnite) Almoravids and subsequent dispersion by the (*sufi*) Almohads. It is worth noting that the common denominator in these classical accounts is that their authors tended to predicate the origin of the dynasty itself on encounter between displaced redeemers and Berber *qabila* groupings. One important feature of this encounter was that leadership devolved on outsiders who promoted ideology rather than kinship as the commendable foci of attachment.⁸⁷ The use of ideological or doctrinal differences as boundary markers between the *Butr* Zanata and *Branis* Sanhaja makes it impossible to imagine being Lamta or Jazula (Sanhaja) in terms of affiliation with the (Zanata) Kharijites of Sijilmasa and domicile in a Shiite (Idrisid) "possession," Nul Lamta. There is in fact a suggestive simultaneity between the designation of Sijilmasa and Nul as Kharijite and Shiite possessions, and the classification of their respective occupants as (*Butr*) Zanata and (*Branis*) Sanhaja (Lamta and Jazula). None of the extant classical narratives locates the Lamta and Jazula in Sijilmasa or the Zanata in Wadi Nun. In that sense, the Africanist invocation of difference between the Zanata and the Sanhaja as a frame of reference to locate the Lamta or Jazula is but an example of the secularization and *tribalisation* of the ideological chasms that separated *Kharijite* Sijilmasa from its *Shiite* (Idrisids and Fatimid) or *Sunnite* (Umayyads and Almoravids) competition.

It is worth recalling that the Fatimid departure to Egypt in 969 also represents the end of the era of Arab conquest and the beginning of the so-called Berber empires, the Almoravids, Almohads and Marinids. In the annals of the Berber empires, the Lamta and Jazula come across as affiliates of the Susian mentors of the Almoravid movement: Wajaj Ibn Zallu *al-Lamti* (of the Lamta) and Abdullahi Ibn Yasin *al-Jazuli* (of the Jazula).⁸⁸ Levzion and Abun-Nasr posited the assumed commonality of Sanhaja

⁸⁷The foundation of the two major Kharijite principalities, Tahert and Sijilmasa, was credited to a Persian, Ibn Rustum, and a *sudan* (black), Ibn Yazid. The bulk of their followers, however, were deemed to be Zanata. Ibn Idris, of the Idrisids, and Ubaydallah, the Fatimid, claimed descent from Muhammad via his daughter Fatima (hence, Fatimids) and her husband Ali Ibn Abi Talib. In contrast, the founders of the Almoravid and Almohad movements made their names as Muslim reformers rather than Berber 'nationalists' and in that sense, picked up from where the Kharijites, Sijilmasa, and the Shiites, the Fatimids, had left off.

⁸⁸On the careers of Wajaj and Ibn Yasin, see al-Bakri *al-masalik*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levizion, 71-79. H.T.Norris, "New Evidence on the Life of Abdullah b.Yasin and the Origin of the Almoravid Movement," *Journal of African History*, 12 (1971): 255-68; Levizion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali*, 40.

descent as one of the main reasons behind the Almoravids' ability to attract Lamta and Jazula recruits. "Wajaj [Ibn Zallu] himself," Abu-Nasr wrote,

was a Sanhaja belonging to the Lamta tribe and the scholar whom he sent to the Sahara with the chief of the Guddala, Abdulla b. Yasin, was also a Sanhaja from the Jazula tribe... The Dispatch of Ibn Yasin to propagate Islam amongst the Sanhaja of the Sahara was therefore, as much an act of tribal solidarity as it was one of pious commitment to the faith.⁸⁹

Besides the fact that it blurs the Almoravid role in the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula identities, this emphasis on "tribal solidarity" also enabled Levzion and Abun-Nasr to divest being Zanata from its Kharijite connotations and to use it as the signifier of opposition to a purely Sanhaja dynasty.⁹⁰ Neither the ideological predilections of the Almoravids, nor their modes of recruitment, however, seem to warrant the use of "tribal solidarity" as a frame of reference to explain their treatment of the Lamta or Jazula. Fixation on "tribal solidarity" tends to set the (Berber) Almoravid and Almohad projects in contra-distinction to those of all their (Arab) predecessors, the (Sunnite) Umayyads, the Kharijites and Shiites. At the same time, emphasis on tribalism also obscures the symbols of universality that seem to signify the end of kinship and, as such, bring the projects of the (Sunnite) Almoravids and Almohads much closer to those of the vanguards of Arab conquest, the Umayyads, than to those of their Berber opposition, the Kharijites and Shiites. "We note that," Kably aptly noted,

among all the Islamic dynasties of the region (the Maghrib) and the other Islamic dynasties, only the Almoravids and Almohads did not take their names from eponymous ancestors but rather from points of doctrine – *ribat* in one case and *tawhid* in the other- thereby justifying in the eyes of their followers the insertion of their rule into the global historical design of the Islamic revelation.⁹¹

The centrality of "points of doctrine" to the Almoravid ability to transcend *qabila* cleavages can be drawn from the way the Susian Ibn Yasin al-Jazuli (of the Jazula), was introduced to his Saharan Sanhaja hosts. He posed as a religious redeemer rather than as a (Berber) Sanhaja relation. "This," his host reportedly told Ibn Yasin's first audience, "is one who bears the *Sunna* ... He has come to instruct you in the essentials of ... the religion of Islam."⁹² Religion enabled the Almoravids to espouse a

⁸⁹ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 80; Levzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali*, 36; "The Almoravid conquest," Talbi noted, "was a vengeance of the desert Sanhaja on the Zenata." M. Talbi, "The Independence of the Maghrib", in *General History of Africa*, v. 3, 347. See the introduction.

⁹⁰ "(Sanhaja) superiority," Levzion wrote, "dictated the exclusion of other ethnic groups from service in the army and from the privileges attached to it." Levzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," in *Cambridge History of Africa* v.3, Oliver ed. 337.

⁹¹ Mohamed Kably, "Legitimacy of State Power and Socioreligious Variations in Medieval Morocco," In, *The Shadow of the Sultan*, 17-29, 22.

⁹² Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, *al-kamil fi al-tarikh*, In *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 159; According to Ibn 'Idhari moreover, the Almoravids also enlisted "a large group of the shaykhs of the ... Berber tribes

redemptive mission that also legitimized the dispossession and recruitment of wayward kinsmen like the Lamta and Jazula. According to Ibn al-'Idhari (d.1312) for example, it was the combination of redemptive mission with the display of force rather than the "tie of blood" that convinced the Lamta to "join" the Almoravids. "Ibn Yasin," he wrote,

used to go out with the tribes of the Lamtuna to make war on certain (Sanhaja) tribes who had not accepted his authority until they turned against the Lamta and demanded one third of their possessions from them in order to purify the remaining two thirds... The Lamta agreed and joined with them.⁹³

Such classical testimonies make it difficult to reconcile the sense of homogeneity lurking beneath the notion of "tribal solidarity" with the disruptive impact of recruitment by a dynasty whose interests dictated the deployment of *qabila* where its services were needed the most. Even those Lamta and Jazula elements that might have dodged the Almoravid draft system could not have escaped the destabilizing repercussions of the Almoravid treatment of space and its occupants. After all, the Almoravids dumped their 'hungry' Saharan protégés on al-Sus and took special interest in the commercial potential of Nul Lamta and Tarudant. The Almoravid conquest of al-Sus also ensured their control of both the southern, Awdaghust, and northern, Sijilmasa and Nul, termini of the western axis of the Trans-Saharan Trade. The route itself was aptly renamed *tariq Lamtuna* (the Lamtuna, Almoravid, Road). In fact, it was under the Almoravid auspices that Nul Lamta approximated Sijilmasa in commercial fame. No doubt, Nul's fortune was also the product of its proximity to the new seat of the Almoravid government: Marrakech (1062). In its capacity as a garrison city and a commercial hub, Nul became a favorite site of domicile for political elites and a magnet to aspirants for access to the caravan trade. Here, we can predicate the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula identities on the cumulative instances of "forced and voluntary" displacement unleashed by the Umayyad, Idrisid, Fatimid and Almoravid conquests of their space and the commandeering of its resources.

Prelude to Takna: of *Ahl* Wadi Nun and Ma'qil

The Almoravid patronage of Nul was largely responsible for its high ranking in the Almohad list of priorities. In a manner reminiscent of the Almoravid perceptions of Kharijite Sijilmasa, Nul became the epicenter of their subsequent duel with the Almohads. In the course of that duel, the Almohads leveled Nul in 1153 and decapitated the Lamta and Jazula protégés of the Almoravids. According to the Almohad biographer, Abu-Bakr al-Baydaq, the Lamta and Jazula were thoroughly "defeated" to the extent that their "women, camels, cattle and sheep were sold at *Bab* (the gate of) *al-*

of the Masamida (Masmuda) and others." Ibn al-Idhari, *al-bayan*, in *Corpus*, Levtzion and Hopkins ed., 216-32, 226.

⁹³Ibn al-Idhari, *tarikh Ibn al-Idhari*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levitzion, 221; on Wajaj's piety see, Yusuf al-Tadli, *at-tashawwuf ila rijal at-tasawwuf*, ed. Ahmed Taoufiq (Casablanca: al-Najah al-Jadid Press, 1984), 33; al-Tadli, *At-tashawwuf*, in *Corpus*, ed. Levtzion and Hopkins, 155-156.

Shariya in Marrakech."⁹⁴ The demographic impact of this event can be seen from the fact that the only biographical work that alludes to the *Far Sus*, Wadi Nun and its environs, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, al-Tadli's *al-Tashawwuf*, has no entry for either Nul Lamta as a locale or the Lamta as a bounded *qabila*. Instead, al-Tadli (d.1231) named Asrir and Tegauqst as the most attractive sites of domicile in *al-Sus al-Aqsa*. The classical collation of being Lamta with domicile in Nul is superseded by the fame of a *sufi* sage al-Tadli identified as Sidi Muhammad Ibn Amr *al-Asriri* (of Asrir). In anticipation of Leo Africanus and Jackson, al-Tadli identified Sidi Ibn Amr in terms of his *sufi*, pious, credentials and influence amongst groups he simply called "*ahl Wadi Nun*" (the people of Wadi Nun).⁹⁵ It is worth recalling that the Ibn Amr mentioned in al-Tadli's text is the same founder of the *zawiya* that occupies center-stage in the Azwafit conception of origin. I have already indicated that the classical deployment of Lamta and Jazula as portable identities is speculative at best. Even if we take this speculation at its face value, we could still take al-Tadli's emphasis on spatiality as evidence of the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula *qabila* ensembles, a mutation that seems to have preceded the times of the Ma'qil invasion proposed by de la Chapelle and Monteil, 1252, by almost a century. The incompatibility of the mutation of the Lamta identity with the arrival of Ma'qil is further evidenced by the fact that classical narratives tend to credit the (Berber) Almohads with the *Arabization* of the *Far Maghrib*. In these accounts, the Almohads are the main culprits behind the settlement of the Hilal in the verdant core of the *Far Maghrib*, and the exile of upstart *qabila* formations like the (Zanata) Banu Marin and the (Arab) Ma'qil to its arid backyards.

According to Ibn Khaldun, the Almohad exile of the Banu Marin from the verdant, Mediterranean, core of the Maghrib, the *hadar*, to its arid backyards, the *qafir* (Sahara), in 1239 presaged the rise of the Marinid dynasty. The Marinid conquest of the urban core of the Maghrib in turn paved the way for the inheritance its arid backyards, the *qafir*, by their Ma'qil "allies".⁹⁶ By Ibn Khaldun's time, Ma'qil was the generic name for Arabic-speaking groups that occupied the space extending from Tuwat in the east, Algeria, to the Atlantic coast of al-Sus in the west, Morocco. In actuality, however, the Marinids themselves were the product of rather than the cause behind, these demographic ruptures. For example, the named culprit behind the introduction of the Shabanat and Hassan branches of the *Ma'qil* to al-Sus was a recalcitrant deputy of the

⁹⁴ Abubakr Ibn Ali al-Baydaq, *akhbar al-mahdi Ibn Tumart wa bidayat dawlat al-muwahidin* ed. Abdul-Wahab Binmansur, (Rabat: Dar Al-Mansur, 1971), 77. Like his Almoravid predecessors, the leader of the Almohads also tended to 'trust' ideological commitment more than 'tribal' cleavages. According to al-Nasiri, for example, Ibn Tumart chose (the Zanata) Abdul-Mumin as his successor because "he was stranger amongst them (Masmuda)", al-Nasiri, *Istiqsa*, v2, 101.

⁹⁵ Al-Tadli, *al-tashawwuf*, 344; al-Nasiri, *al-Istisqa*, v.4, 163; On the career of Sidi Ibn Amr's family, see al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.12, 189-195; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 7; Naimi, "Asrir," In *Encyclopédie du Maroc* v.2, 409-414; Ahmed Joumani, 'Les Saints et le Sacre dans la vallée du Assrir', in *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 321-352.

⁹⁶ For the Almohad relations with the Zanata (Banu Marin) and the Ma'qil Arabians see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar* v. 6 (11), 209; Idem. v.7 (13): 345, 505, 554-555, 594, 645. The settlement of the Banu Hilal in the Far Maghrib and Spain is credited to the Almohad Sultans Abdul Mumin (1130-1163) and al-Mansur (1184-1199). Their successors relocated some of these elements in *Hawz* (vicinity of) Marrakech where they became reservists at the disposal of the court. Al-Nasri, *al-istiqsa*, v. 2, 178, 254; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 109.

Almohad dynasty called Ali Ibn Yadr. According to Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Yadr "invited" the Shabanat and Hassan to al-Sus and used them to pacify its, ostensibly, Lamta and Jazula occupants.⁹⁷ By bypassing al-Baydaq's celebration of the Almohad decapitation of the Lamta and Jazula, and al-Tadli's silence on their exact whereabouts, Ibn Khaldun was also able to posit native (Berber) encounter with foreign invaders (Arabs) as the benchmark for an unprecedented demographic coup in al-Sus. Notwithstanding his allusion to the role of Ibn Yadr's recruitment strategies in the Shabanat and Hassan inheritance of Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards, the *qafir*, Ibn Khaldun was still able to delay the final mutation of the Lamta and Jazula identities to the end of the Almohad era. As we will see, this premise was inspired by his use of dynastic succession as a benchmark for the identification of upstart *qabila* formations like the Banu Marin as "second generation" Berbers and their shadowy Ma'qil "allies" as "fourth generation Arabs."⁹⁸

Ibn Khaldun's tacit exoneration of the (*Butr*) Almoravids and Almohads from complicity in the mutation of their Lamta and Jazula brethren appealed to French colonial ethnographers and some post-colonial Moroccan academics. Whereas French ethnographers like de la Chapelle and Monteil dwelled on invasion by Ma'qil Arabs, Moroccan academics such as Naimi and Boumzgou often add Iberian maritime incursions to the list of the main culprits behind the 'de-berberization' of al-Sus as a whole.⁹⁹ The end-result in both cases is silence on the demographic impact of the Almoravid and Almohad treatment of space and its occupants, a silence that also validates the deployment of the Arab-Berber modality as a frame of reference for the conception of the Takna origin and career. Discursively, this silence tends to facilitate the commission of Lamta and Jazula identities to a textual life support system and, in effect, sanctions the invocation of their carriers as ancestors for the present Berber-speaking inhabitants of al-Sus and the Sahara. "Les Gezoula et les Lamta," De la Chapelle wrote,

étaient proches parents des Sanhaja et ont longtemps vécu dans leur sillage. On a rapproché le nom des premiers de celui de Gétules de l'antiquité; leurs descendants habitent maintenant des villages de l'Anti-Atlas, après avoir mené la vie des tentes dans le Sous et dans le désert au moins jusqu'au xive siècle. A partir de cette date, ils paraissent s'être fixés au sol, et leur histoire a cessé

⁹⁷According to Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Yadr lured the Shabanat and Hassan to al-Sus with promises of land and a share in tribute. His heirs maintained their fledgling autonomy until the Marinid conquest of al-Sus—arguably, in the wake of their desertion by the Hassan and Shabanat. On the Hassan and Shabanat arrival in al-Sus and the Sahara see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 6 (11): 118-119, 137; Idem. v. 6 (12): 69, 137 572-577; Idem., v. 7 (13): 174, 478, 768; al-Marrakechi, *al-mua'jib fi talkhis akhbar al-maghrib*, 104, 251-253. On the Hassan dispersion in the Western Sahara see, al-Shinqiti, *al-wasit*; H.T. Norris, *The Arab Conquest of the Western Sahara* (Essex: Harlow, 1986).

⁹⁸For the distinction between "first generation" and "second generation" Zanata see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7 (13): 3, 121-122, 345-342. For skeptical treatment of the notions of origin touted by "second generation" Berbers like the Banu Marin and "fourth generation" Arabs such as the Ma'qil see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7 (13), 345, 505, 554.

⁹⁹For examples of the oscillation between Arab (Ma'qil) invasion and Nazarene incursion, see Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 95; Ahmed Boumzgou "Aspects de l'histoire de Tiznit", in *La Ville de Tiznit et sa Campagne: Actes des journées d'étude, 12-14 novembre 1993*, (Agadir: Université Ibn Zohr, 1996), 23-45, 26.

d'intéresser le Sahara. Un groupe de Lamta a peut-être accompagné les Sanhaja dans leur migration vers l'ouest, tandis que d'autres gagnaient directement l'Air et le Soudan, ou ils furent rejoints par les Howwara, ancêtres des Hoggar venus comme eux de Tripolitaine. On en trouve encore un petit groupe dans l'oued Noun, au sud-ouest du Maroc.¹⁰⁰

Ibn Khaldun's election of the interface between the Almohad and Marinid eras as the time of the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula, however, stems from his deployment of dynastic succession as the point of reference for the certification of the social birth or death of *qabila* identities. This textual strategy lurks beneath the disparity between his conflation of the mutation of famous Saharan *qabila* ensembles like the Lamtuna with the Almohads' succession of the Almoravids and simultaneous retention of Lamta and Jazula as identity designations for the occupants of *al-Sus al-Aqsa*.¹⁰¹ In that sense, the Lamta and Jazula identities survived precisely because of their failure to inspire imperial projects that transcend the *qabila* stage.

At the pedantic level, it is difficult to imagine how the Lamta and Jazula identities could have survived the historical ruptures that sketched the mutation of their Sanhaja (Almoravids) patrons and Masmuda (Almohad) conquerors. Conversely, the positing of the Marinid period as the graveyard of the Lamta and Jazula identities corresponds to his presentation of dynastic succession in terms of a Zanata (Marinids) inheritance of the Masmuda (Almohads), the presentation duly endorsed by historians like Levzion, Brett and Abun-Nasr. Here, the classical location of the Lamta and Jazula in terms of similarity to the Susian Masmuda seems to justify the nomination of the (Zanata) Marinid dynasty and its (Arab) Ma'qil "allies" as the chief culprits behind the demise of the last *Butr* or Sanhaja, the Lamta and Jazula. Of course, this premise also expedites the prolongation of the viability of the Lamta and Jazula identities and, in effect, their inversion into direct ancestors for the Takna. The problem with this kind of, to borrow from Pouillon, "Simplification ethnique" is that it deploys the historicity of the Lamta and Jazula to suppress the logic of the historical process that brought them to our attention in the first place. It is impossible, for instance, to argue for a linear connection between extinct Lamta and extant Takna without simplifying the careers of the institutions that seemingly gave meaning to such transformation, the dynasty and *zawiya*. Yet, we can posit the demographic shifts engendered by dynastic succession as a frame of reference to impute probable circumstances for the emergence of heterogeneous *qabila* formations like the Takna as well as the empowerment of the *zawaya* families that dominated their space.

It is worth recalling that in the introduction to his history, *al-'Ibar*, Ibn Khaldun considered origin an "illusionary matter" and made the survival of identity contingent on its utility, *thamara* (fruit). In *al-'Ibar*, he equated the Marinid period, his own time, with the "total corruption of genealogies" and dismissed claims to originary Berber or Arab identities as studious fabrications. This proposition rests on his investiture of the *Butr* (Zanata) and the *Baranis* (Sanhaja) Berber contemporaries of the "Conquest Arabs" (*Arab al-fath*) with relative authenticity. In contrast, he demoted their respective

¹⁰⁰ De la Chapelle, "Esquisse d'une Histoire du Sahara Occidental," *Hesperis*, XI, 50.

¹⁰¹ On the "corruption" of Sanhaja identities see, *Mukaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 144.

heirs to hybrid second and fourth generation Berbers and Arabs.¹⁰² To Ibn Khaldun, the notions of origin advertised by "second generation Zanata" like the Marinids and "fourth generation Arabs" such as the Ma'qil were products of imposture.¹⁰³ He went on to attribute the dearth of claimants of Berber origin and the simultaneous proliferation of 'Arabs' to the fusion of genomes (*ikhtilat*) and the upgrading of the notion of exodus from the *Mashriq* to certificates of direct descent from Muhammad and his companions.¹⁰⁴ I have already noted that in the wake of the Arab conquest, authors such as Ibn Munabih used the notion of exodus from the *Mashriq* to dispose of the idea of infinite nativity to its pagan other, the Maghrib. By the time of the Marinids, the notions of descent from *Philistines*, holy land, and *lost Arabs*, Yemen, seem to have lost their discursive potency and, as a result, were replaced by claims of social birth in the bosom of Islam.

The notion of blending (*ikhtilat*) enabled Ibn Khaldun to attribute the final effacement of the (Sanhaja) Jazula and Lamta to their merger into the Hassan and Shabanat Ma'qil respectively. In his model, crossing from being Lamta or Jazula (Berber) to being Hassan or Shabanat (Ma'qil Arab) was feasible not only because they were all of "unknown" origins, but also because the latter had inherited the space previously inhabited by the former. Discursively, the Hassan and Shabanat inheritance of space seems to justify the explanation of the disappearance of its first named occupants, the Lamta and Jazula, in terms of merger rather than mutation. To Ibn Khaldun, however, the Shabanat and Hassan inheritance of space and, in effect, consumption of its occupants, was expedited by Marinid patronage. The (Zanata) Marinids designated their Ma'qil "allies" as guarantors of the security of the caravans and, in the process, reduced them to "humble" auxiliaries of the dynasty. "The Ma'qil," he wrote,

were the allies of the Zanata (the Marinids and Zayanids) for all their days ... These Arabs used not to desecrate any sanctuary on the fringes of the ... Maghrib, nor do any harm to travelers ... to the land of the Sudan ... In exchange ... they received concessions from the states for which they stretched out humble hands.¹⁰⁵

Like the tabulation of the Lamta and Jazula they had replaced, then, the situation of the Shabanat and Hassan in space and time was inspired by interest in their temporal services to the dynasty and escort of the caravan. It is difficult therefore to conceive

¹⁰²On the distancing of the (fourth generation) Ma'qil from the "conquest Arabs" (*Arab al-fath*), see Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.6, 1, 27-141.

¹⁰³For the distinction between 'authentic' (first generation) and 'hybrid' (second generation) Zanata see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7 (13): 3, 121-122, 345-342. On the Zanata "abjuration" of Berber origin see, Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed al-Juwaydi, 125; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7 (13) 7-9.

¹⁰⁴Ibn Khaldun put the total number of the "original" Ma'qil at less than "two hundred" (families) and attributed their rapid proliferation to their inclusion of Berber "allies" and subsequent division into three main constellations: the Dhawi Ubaydallah (Tuwat), the Mansur (Tafilelt), and the Shabanat and Hassan (al-Sus and the Western Sahara). Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar* v.1, 50; *idem*. v.6 (11), 118-141.

¹⁰⁵Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 324

composite Shabanat or Hassan *qabila* ensembles without also thinking of the terms of their interaction with the Marinid dynasts of their time.

Congruent to his allusion to the Shabanat control of Wadi Nun, Ibn Khaldun also identified a shadowy group called *Zakn* without being able to ascertain its origin. Ibn Khaldun's uncertainty about the *Zakn* origin is enshrined in his proposition of the Lamta and (Haha) Masmuda as their probable ancestors. At the same time, however, he identified the *Zakn* as *a'rab* and predicated their usable identity on allegiance to the Shabanat and (occupational) difference from "*ahl* (the people of) Tegaoust."¹⁰⁶ In the context of his use of *hadar* and *badiya* as a dual frame of reference to locate people in space, Ibn Khaldun's distancing of being *Zakn* from living in *qusur* like Tegaoust implies that the *Zakn* were not sedentary. Using encounter with the dynasty as a means of locating *qabila* in time, he counted the *Zakn* amongst the refractory *a'rab* pacified by the Marinid sultan Ali Ibn Sa'eed (r.1331-1348). According to Ibn Khaldun then, the *Zakn* were, like the extinct Lamta and extant Shabanat, of obscure origin and, as such, they enter the text courtesy of their service to or pacification by the (Marinid) dynasts of their time.¹⁰⁷

In a brief interjection, al-Gharbi endorsed Ibn Khaldun's investiture of the *Zakn* with a possible Haha (Masmuda) origin but computed their history in terms of service to the (Sanhaja) Almoravids rather than the (Masmuda) Almohads. While he did not dwell on the etymological similarities between *Zakn* and Takna, al-Gharbi attributed the sudden disappearance of the former to their eventual merger into the Saharan Hassan.¹⁰⁸ The predication of *Zakn* origin on migration from beyond *al-Sus al-Aqsa* and the explanation of their mode of existence and disappearance in terms of patronage by Shabanat and merger into Hassan correspond to a connotative conception of the Takna origin relayed to al-Susi by his Rgaybat informants. Al-Susi seems to have elicited an explanation for the deference of Takna inhabitants of al-Saqiya al-Hamra like the Azraqayn to the heirs of the purported ancestor of the Rgaybat: Sidi Ahmad al-Rgaybi. The answer he got was that the Takna were, *in the beginning*, Ma'qil *a'rab* who used to roam the area between Fez and Marrakech and to plunder caravans. As a punishment for their tampering with the security of caravans, the Marinid sultan Abu al-Hassan (1330-1348) chased them to the "extremity of al-Sus" wherein the pious ancestor of the Rgaybat, Sidi al-Rgaybi, purchased their guilt from the sultan for a hefty sum of money. According to al-Susi's informants, flight from a Marinid punitive expedition, the dynasty, and redemption by a *sufi* savant, the *zawiya*, was the genesis of the Takna domicile in Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*, v.6 (11), 420, 462. Haha is a name for Shilha speaking groups and the space they occupy: to south of al-Hawz (the vicinity of Marrakech) and to the north of Illigh (the Anti-Atlas)—the hinterland of Essaouira. The Haha are often classified as Masmuda because they live in the space once owned by this group.

¹⁰⁷"Ali Ibn Sa'eed al-Marini," Ibn Khaldun wrote, "invaded and conquered the land of al-Sus and its vicinities and thrashed the *a'rab* of the Dhawi Hassan, the Shabanat and the *Zakn* until they submitted to his authority." Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*, v.7 (13), 505.

¹⁰⁸Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 205

¹⁰⁹Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 12, 88-89. For another version of the same story see, Muhammad Salim, *Les Principales Préoccupation des Rgaybat*, ed. trans. Mustafa Naimi (Rabat: L'Institut Universitaire de la Recherche Scientifique, 1992), 44.

In spite of the demeaning connotations of *a'rab*, the Rgaybat invocation of encounter with the dynasty and the *zawiya* as frames of reference to locate *qabila* in time and space is strikingly similar to the conceptions of origin oozing from the Takna narratives. In fact, the story itself seems to be plagiarized from Ibn Khaldun's presentation of the *Zakn* as one of the refractory *a'rab* the Marinids had to pacify. Abu al-Hasan seems to be the royal nickname, *kunya*, for the same Marinid figure mentioned in Ibn Khaldun's text, Ali Ibn Sa'eed. At the same time, the predication of the Takna rights in space on service (*khidma*) to Sidi al-Rgaybi is strikingly similar to Ibn Khaldun's investiture of Ibn Yadr with the "invitation" of the Shabanat and Hassan to Wadi Nun. And with the exception of the minor etymological differences between *Zakn* and Takna, al-Susi's Rgaybat informant seem to second Ibn Khaldun's invocation of the Marinid period as the watershed between the mutation of "first generation" Berbers like the Lamta and the emergence of upstart *qabila* constellations like the Shabanat and, still later, their *Zakn* clients. At the same time, Ibn Khaldun's proposition of a possible Masmuda (Haha) connection shores up the idea of exodus from the north, the vicinity of Marrakech, proposed by al-Susi's Rgaybat informant. Collectively, belated social birth, the late Marinid period, exile from the north, the Marrakech-Fez axis, and Arabic speech and mobility, *a'rab*, tend to militate against the idea of prolonged domicile in al-Sus and, in effect, Lamta or Jazula heritage.

It is tempting to use the etymological resemblance between the terms *Zakn* and Takna to impute a possible correlation between the carriers of these two identity designations. Firstly, in pre-nineteenth century texts Takna is transcribed without the Arabic equivalent of the last English [a]: *Takn*. In fact, Shurafa biographers such as al-Nasiri in the nineteenth Century, and al-Susi, in the twentieth century, adhered to this classical rendition of the Takna name: *Takn*. Secondly, one can blame the commutation of the Arabic equivalent of the English [t] in *Takn* to the [z] in *Zakn* to the frequent misspelling of *Maghribian* proper names by the (Lebanese) editors of *al-Ibar*. Thirdly, the *Zakn* faded away around the same time that *Takn* became an identity designation for a separate Susian *qabila*, albeit in alliance with the Shabanat. Fourth, the absence of any reference to the *Zakn* until the end of the Almohad era and the listing of the *Takn* among the "Arab" contemporaries of the Sa'dians suggests the second half of the Marinid period as the most plausible time for their appearance in al-Sus.¹¹⁰ For example, Taoufiq and al-Muhammadi's endorsement of Ibn Khaldun's election of the Marinid era as the graveyard for those *qabila* ensembles tabulated in the wake of the Arab conquest also corresponds to its deployment as the cradle of the contemporaries of the Takna. Lastly, this derivation does not violate either al-Tadli's silence on the whereabouts of the Lamta, nor Ibn Khaldun's attestation to the inheritance of their sites of domicile by the Shabanat and Hassan.

Together, al-Tadli and Ibn Khaldun also agreed on the use of deference to a *sufi* savant like Sidi Ibn Amr and service to a dynasty such as the Marinids as intelligible

¹¹⁰The first extant text to acknowledge the use of *Takn* as a portable identity for a distinct *qabila* was the *Diwan qaba'il al-Sus* commissioned by the Sa'dian Sultan Ahmed al-Mansur. For the text of this *Diwan*, see, Ibrahim Ibn Ali a-Hassani, *Diwan Qaba'il al-Sus*, ed. Umar Afa, (Casablanca: Mutba't al-Jazyra, 1989)

frames of reference for the location of the *qabila* occupants of Wadi Nun. The introduction of the inhabitants of the *qusur* as "*ahl Wadi Nun*" and their tacit differentiation from the herders who 'stocked' their arid backyards constitute a notable break from the classical deployment of Lamta as a generic identity designation for both occupational groups. Even if we decline to take this distinction at face value, it is still impossible to ignore the rather lengthy Ma'qil interregnum that separate the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula identities from the articulation of Takna as a collective designation for occupants of Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra. In that sense, the ethnographic investiture of the Takna with descent from the Lamta or Jazula amounts to an obviation of the Ma'qil interlude and the conflation of inheritance of space with the right to its history. Herein, I will elect the main *zawaya* that studded Wadi Nun and the Shurafa dynasties which sought to secure it for the caravan as, to borrow from Spivak, the twin "institutions" that facilitated the emergence of the Takna *qabila* ensemble and sanctioned its capacity to put up with newcomers like the Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf. Contrary to current anthropological and historiographical treatments of the *zawiya* and the dynasty as signifiers of a cultural chasm that separates the "Arabs and Berbers," the emergence of bilingual *qabila* constellations like the Takna was sanctioned by collusion rather than collision between these historical agents. As we will presently see, the Takna tendency to locate the *qabila* social birth in the bosom of the *zawiya* and the dynasty is a reflection of the role of displacement in the constitution of their *qabila* ensemble. At the same time, the startling similarities between the Takna narratives and classical and pre-modern Moroccan texts exhibit a high level of familiarity with "writing and literature." If we are looking for constants in the Takna conception of identity and history, we will find them embedded precisely in things that tend to subvert the ethnographic notion of tribe: displacement and textuality.

VI- Dynasts and Sufis: The "Suturing" of the Takna

O Arabs, O Berbers, O mountain, O plain: obey the sultan Abdullah (al-Ghalib)!

Sidi Ahmed Ibn Musa ¹¹¹

It is worth recalling how the translation of *qabila* into tribe also entails its distancing from the foci of power and knowledge the Takna invoke as founders of their *qabila* ensemble: the dynasty and the *zawiya*. As segmented tribes, for example, the Takna at once become the binary opposite of the dynasty, the *Makhzan*, and a hive for "saints," the *zawaya*. In the introduction, I noted how subscription to Gellner's conflation of "saints" and tribes led Africanists like Abu-Nasr and Brett to reify the simultaneous division of the Moroccan space into a domain of *qabila*, *Bled es Siba*, and a dynastic realm, *Bled el Makhzan*. In Africanist discourses, tribalism is contingent on the *Berberization* of the *zawiya* and the *Arabization* of the dynasty. To demonstrate the theoretical pitfalls and historiographical flaws of the *makhzan-siba* modality, we have to establish a common origin for the dynasty and the *zawiya* and demonstrate how their respective careers tended to feed into each other. Such exercise will also enable us to

¹¹¹For this (much-quoted) 'plea' see, al-Nasiri, *Istiqsa*, v.5, 48; Dahiru Yahya, *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy* (Essex: Longman group, 1981), 28

recover the history that seems to sanction the Takna fixation on social birth in the womb of known dynasties and *zawaya*, and, in effect, may explain the similarities between the biographical translations for *zawaya* and dynasts on one hand, and the Takna narratives on the other. I will posit the debut of *sufism* in Morocco as a point of departure and seek to sketch the role of the dynasts and *zawaya* figures it inspired in the, to borrow from Hall, "suturing and articulation" of Takna identities.

One can trace the congruence of the spread of *sufism* and dynastic succession back to the Almohad period. To sanctify rebellion against fellow Sunnites, the Almoravids, the Almohads presented the leader of their movement, Muhammad Ibn Tumart (1080-1130), as a *mahdi* (divinely guided redeemer) and a disciple of the erudite advocate of the conformity of *sufism* to Sunnite orthodoxy, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d.1111).¹¹² More recently, Levtzion and Abun-Nasr conjugated the same conflict into a collision of what the former has called the Almoravids' "narrow-minded Malikism" with the Almohads' championship of "the emerging trend towards *sufism*."¹¹³ According to El Mansour and Hammoudi, however, the difference between "Malikism" and *sufism* is not as self-evident as the Almoravid-Almohad duel seems to suggest. Contrary to Gellner's distinction between (urban) "doctors" and (tribal) "saints," the final product was, in Hammoudi's words, "the synthesis between *'ilm* (exoteric science) and gnosis, a synthesis that led the *ulema* to mystical awareness and the *Sufis* towards the acquisition of *'ilm*."¹¹⁴ In any case, the tilt toward *Sufism* outlived the Almohad dynasty and under the auspices of their Marinid and Shurafa successors, deference to the *zawaya* and

¹¹²*Mahdi*: Arabic, v. *hada*, lit. to guide. The ideology of *mahdism* is rooted in the Shiite textual tradition but was then grafted into the *sufi* (Sunnite) apocalyptic literature. In political discourse, the *Mahdi*, as a prospective *khalifa*, must be a descendant of Muhammad via his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali. He would appear "before the end of the world," purify the Islamic faith and deliver justice to the meek. According to Ibn al-Arabi (d.1240) for example, the *Mahdi* "will appear after the earth has been filled with tyranny and oppression to fill it with equity and justice." In classical Maghribian narratives, the Almoravids come across as the custodians of the Sunnite (Maliki) orthodoxy the Umayyad (and Abbasids) had imparted to the Maghrib and hence, the scourge of Kharidjite and Shiite 'heresies'. By so doing, the Almoravids also absolved Ibn Tumart of the need to draw a boundary with the Kharidjites or Shiite, namely because they were no longer a potent force. Here, whether Ibn Tumart actually met al-Ghazali is immaterial. His journey (*siyaha*) to the *Mashriq*, however, took place while al-Ghazali was still alive. Ibn Tumart's *Shurafa and Mahdist* credentials, very much like the al-Moravid's alleged "incineration" of al-Ghazali's texts, acquired their significance in the context of a power struggle and as such, were discursive constructs intended to glorify the founder (Ibn Tumart) and to discredit his critics. On the ideology of *mahdism* see, Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-Arabi, *al-futuhat al-makkiyya* (Cairo: 1293 A.H) v. 3, 429; Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 287-305; Muhammad Ahmad al-Hajj, "The Mahdist Tradition in Northern Nigeria," (Kano: PhD thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, 1973): 1-42; On the Almoravid-Almohad ideological differences see, al-Tadli, *At-tashawwuf*, Toufiq, ed. 145.

¹¹³Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," in *Cambridge History of Africa*, v.3, 338; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*: 87-91; for the anthropological genesis of this proposition see, Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 8; Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 16, 46; for critiques of this vision see, B.A. Mojuetan, "Legitimacy in a Power State: Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth-Century," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 13(1981): 347-360; Talal Asad, *Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz*, *Man* 18, (1983): 273-259; Vincent J. Cornell, *Realm of the Saint* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998). 5-7.

¹¹⁴Hammoudi, "The reinvention of Dar Dar Al-Mulk," in *The Shadow of the Sultan*: 129-175, 140; El Mansour, "The Sanctuary (Hurum) in Precolonial Morocco," in *The Shadow of the Sultan*: 49-73.

congregation around their *mausems* became salient features of the Moroccan political landscapes.¹¹⁵

The descent to *sufism* set in motion by the Almohads intersected with the emergence of Morocco, al-Maghrib *al-Aqsa*, as a separate dynastic realm under the Marinid and Shurafa auspices. It also overlapped with the Ma'qil penetration of al-Sus and the Portuguese maritime incursions that, ostensibly, expedited the mutation of, to borrow from Ibn Khaldun, "first generation Berbers" such as the Lamta. Whether because of their organization of Susian resistance to the Portuguese or their vested interest in the security of the caravan trade, the histories of the *zawaya* centers enshrined in Takna narratives are inextricably tied to those of the Marinids and Shurafa dynasties. The annals of the Marinid and Shurafa dynasties also constitute surrogate histories for the *zawaya* families the Takna frequently call as witnesses of their own historicity. One can, for instance, hardly understand either the career of a *sufi* figure of the caliber of Sidi Ibn Amr or the role of his *zawiya* in the structuring of the Azwafit sense of identity and history without reference to the *sufi* dispositions of the Almohad regime. Similarly, we cannot explain the careers of the founders of the *zawaya* mentioned in the Ait Ausa and the Id Ahmad narratives or the dynasts invoked by their Ait Musa and Azraqayn counterparts, without a detour to the Marinid and Shurafa histories. These histories revolve around conflict with Iberians (Spanish and Portuguese) in the north and quest for security for the caravan trade in the south.

Moroccan historians frequently credit the Marinids with the institutionalization of state patronage of *sufi* shaykhs like Sidi Ya'zi of Asa and *qabila* ensembles like the Shabanat of Wadi Nun. Arguably, the Marinids used patronage as a cure for the structural weaknesses that, ostensibly, presaged the eventual demise of their regime: their ideological poverty and narrow political base. According to Kably, for instance, the Marinids were different from the Almoravids and Almohads because they "had no reform project they could truly call their own."¹¹⁶ They sought to make up for their lack of a redemptive ideology by the lavish distribution of gratuities to Shurafa families and the issuance of *zaha'ir tawqir* (decrees of respect) absolving *zawaya* grandees from "duties" to the dynasty: taxes and military service. These measures were of course, designed to drum up support for the regime. Yet, the economic toll of this pattern of distribution also constrained the Marinid ability to repulse Iberian maritime incursions. The combination of belated attempts to curtail the disbursement of gratuities with inability to fend off Iberian incursions eventually alienated the founders of the Susian *sufi* order that later spawned the Sa'dian dynasty: the *Jazulia tariqa*.¹¹⁷ Shurafa

¹¹⁵This shift is also the most likely genesis of the invention of prefixes like *sidi* and *mawlai* as terms of endearment and deference to *Sufi shaykhs* and *Shurafa* dignitaries. Being *shareef* and *sufi shaykh* however, were not mutually exclusive. While the *shurafa* were often members of *Sufi turuq*, the genealogies of *Sufi* savants always lead back to Prophet Muhammad, his family or at least his famous *sahaba* (companions). On this overlap see, Muhamed El Mansour, "Sahrfian Sufism: The religious and social practice of the Wazzani Zawiya" In *Tribe and State*, ed. Joffe and Pennell, 69-83; Kably, "Legitimacy of State Power" in *In The Shadow of the Sultan*, ed. Bourqia and Miller, 17-29; On the pioneers of Maghribian *sufism* see, al-Tadli, *At-tashawwuf*, 20-21; Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*, 3-63.

¹¹⁶Kably, "Legitimacy of State Power," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, 17-29, 23.

¹¹⁷Kably, "Musahama fi tarikh al-tamheed li zuhur dawlat al-Sa'dyeen," *Majalat Kuliat al-Adab*, 3-4: 7-59.

historians such as al-Nasiri credit the rise of the Sa'dian dynasty to the *Jazulia* resistance to *Nazarene*, Portuguese, invaders and explain its collapse and the rise of the Alawites in terms of conflict with the *zawayas* families the *Jazulia* had spawned, the *Simlali* in al-Sus and the *Dila* in Tadla.¹¹⁸ It is not difficult to conceive how the translation of metaphors of piety like *sufi* into "saint" could also blur what Hammoudi, following Foucault, has diagnosed as "the diagram of knowledge and power." *Zawayas* families transformed *qabila* "respect" (*tawqir*) and royal patronage into, to borrow from Pierre Bourdieu, "symbolic capital" and then, converted this "capital" into power.¹¹⁹ The *zawiya* not only served as a conduit of royal authority, but also marketed itself as the legitimate heir of the prerogatives of weak sultans. According to Bourqia and Miller, the dynast and *zawiya* grandee "share a similar kind of spiritual ascendance that makes their relationship one of tension, rivalry, and mutual attraction."¹²⁰ As an agent of sanctified power, then, the *zawiya* is comparable to the court in the sense that it also fleeced what colonial ethnographers and post-colonial anthropologists have tended to conceive as its voluntary host, the *qabila*.

We can use the prospect of contingent cooperation and competition between the court and the *sufi zawiya* to sketch the role of Marinid and Shurafa patronage in the emergence of Takna constituencies like the (Ait Osman) Ait Ausa and the (Ait Jamal) Ait Musa. It is worth recalling that the Ait Usa narrative invokes service to Sidi Ya'zi (1248-1326) of Asa and his heirs to circumvent the stark differences in complexion and modes of social existence among the constituents of their *qabila*.¹²¹ Susian narratives chart Sidi Ya'zi's career in terms of his amicable relations with the Marinid court. Patronage by the Marinids is symbolized by the location of his own birth in the palace of *emir* Abu Yusuf Yacub (d.1286) in Marrakech.¹²² Al-Susi credited Sidi Ya'zi with

¹¹⁸The founder of the *Jazulia Tariqa*, Muhammad Ibn Sulayman al-Jazuli (d.1465), was presented as a *sharif*, and *sufi* savant. His intellectual genealogy is traced back to the architect of the *Shadiliya Tariqa*, Ali al-Shadili (d.1242). In al-Sus, al-Jazuli's legacy spawned the career of his disciple Sidi Muhammad Ibn al-Mubarak al-Aqawi (d.1518). The *Jazulia* is also the genesis of the famous *zawayas* founded by Sidi Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim in *Tamanart*, Sidi Ahmed Ibn Musa al-Simlali in Tazrualt (Illigh) and Sidi Abubakr al-Dilai (d.1612) in Tadla. Ibn al-Mubarak's heir, Abdullah al-Aqawi, was a student and son in law of Sidi Muhammad al-Tamanarti and later on, married into Ibn Musa's family. On al-Jazuli see, Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*, 169-191. On the careers of the *Simlali* and *Tamanarti* families, see al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa* v.5, 7-67; al-Susi *al-ma'sul* v.7, 10-22, 40-43; al-Susi *al-ma'sul*, v. 18, 166-191; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 169-174; Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*, 230-272.

¹¹⁹Hammoudi, "The Reinvention of Dar Al-mulk," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*: 129-175. Bourdieu conceptualized "symbolic capital" as the "prestige and renown attached to a family" and as such, "is readily convertible back into economic capital". It is a feature of what he called "the good-faith" or "archaic" economy of the (Berber) tribe. In keeping with my return to the concept of *qabila*, I use "symbolic capital" as a metaphor for sanctified power and as such, I do not associate it with the kind of atavisms Bourdieu reserved for the Berber tribe. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 171-183.

¹²⁰Bourqia and Miller, "An Introduction to the Discussion," *The Shadow of the Sultan*, Bourqia and Miller ed.: 1-14, 10.

¹²¹Sidi Ya'zi is credited with descent from Muhammad's first companion (*Sahabi*) and *Khalifa* (successor): Abubakr al-Sidiq (d.634). During the Sa'dian period, the fame of the *zawiya* of Asa was tied to that of his descendant, Ibrahim Ibn Abdullah al-Asawi (d.1651); for the place of this *zawiya* in the Ait Ausa vision of history see, Naimi, "Ait Asa", in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, Tome 2, 377.

¹²²Al-Susi, *Illigh*, 5.

the recruitment of *bedou* for the Marinids. Not surprisingly, his *zawiya* in Asa comes across as a linchpin between the court and Saharan *qabila* ensembles. It is worth adding that the *zawiya* of Asa was also a conduit of caravans on their way to or hailing from Bilad al-Sudan. The mediation of this *zawiya* in the caravan trade may explain why the Marinid court sought to cajole its guardians. We can also deduce the mediation of this *zawiya* in the caravan trade from the saga of the dean of the *Jazulia tariqa* in al-Sus, Sidi Ibn al-Mubarak *al-Aqawi* (d. 1518). For example, al-Susi predicated Ibn al-Mubarak's career on the migration of his father from Timbuctu and his temporal lodging with Sidi Ya'zi in Asa. Al-Aqawi (of Aqa), the son of a confessed outsider, turned his knowledge into power and, as a result, he was able to impart to Susian *qabila* ensembles the kind of discipline his Marinid (Watisid) contemporaries had failed to provide.¹²³ It should not come as a surprise that Ibn al-Mubarak is also credited with the deputation of the Sa'dians to organize Susian resistance to the Portuguese.

In contrast, Shurafa historians chronicled the career of the original founder of the *Jazulia tariqa*, Sidi Muhammad Ibn Sulayman al-Jazuli (d.1465), in terms of his strident denunciations of the Marinids' lethargic response to "Nazarene," Portuguese, incursions. Al-Nasiri attributed the improvement in the political fortunes of the Sa'dian to their deputation by al-Jazuli's student, Sidi Ibn al-Mubarak *al-Aqawi*, to lead Susian opposition to the Portuguese and Spanish, and their endorsement by his two, posthumous, disciples, Sidi Muhammad *al-Tamanarti* (1465-1563) and Sidi Ibn Musa *al-Simlali* (d.1563). It is perhaps worth recalling that Ibn al-Mubarak is also the anonymous *sufi* figure, "saint," commended by Leo Africanus. Like their predecessors, Sidi Ya'zi and Ibn al-Mubarak, *al-Tamanarti* and Ibn Musa *al-Simlali* come across as foreign redeemers who were able to make history outside their places of origin, the Anti-Atlas and Simlala respectively.¹²⁴ Al-Tamanarti and Ibn Musa were contemporaries of the patriarchs of the Sa'dian family and their careers are inseparable from those of its famous dynasts.

Al-Nasiri and al-Susi credited Sidi Muhammad *al-Tamanarti* with the delivery of Saharan recruits, including Takna elements, to the first Sa'dian sultan, Ahmed al-A'raj (1512-1539). In recognition of his influence in Wadi Nun, he was elevated to the position of "judge" in 1521, a position he purportedly relinquished out of fear of the "corruptive" temptations of authority. Al-Tamanarti's heirs remained faithful to the Sa'dian court and were counted among the confidants of Mawlai Ahmed al-Mansur (1578-1603). Besides its patronage of Al-Tamanarti, the Sa'dian court also issued "decrees of respect" (*zaha'er tawqir*) to the much older *zawaya* families of Asrir, Sidi

¹²³"During the power vacuum preceding the rise of the Sa'di dynasty," El-Mansour recently wrote, "a saint in the Sous named Muhammad Ibn Mubarak succeeded in imposing peace on the tribes of the region. ... Ibn Mubarak's days became so respected, we are told, that a murderer could meet the son of his victim without fear of revenge. According to a local author, the tribes of the Sous, both Arab and Berber, adhered to the system devised by Ibn Mubarak and respected it." El Mansour, "The Sanctuary (Hurum) in Precolonial Morocco" in, *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, 49-73, 54-- the "local author" is al-Susi. For Susian reminiscence about "Ibn al-Mubarak's days" see, al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 20, 167-68.

¹²⁴Ibn al-Mubarak ostensibly recommended the patriarch of the Sa'dian family Muhammad al-Qayem and his two sons and future sultans--Ahmed al-A'raj (r.1512-1539) and Muhammad al-Shaiykh (r.1539-1556) -- to Susian seekers of leadership for their duel with the Portuguese and Spanish. See, al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.5, 6-18; al-Marrkechi, *al-ia'lam*, v.2, 22-27; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 9.

Ibn Amr, and Asa, Sidi Ya'zi.¹²⁵ In contrast, Ibn Musa became famous for his much-quoted supplication for and his subsequent choice as a spiritual mentor of, the third Sa'dian dynast Abdullah al-Ghalib (1557-1574). Al-Susi credited Sidi Ibn Musa with the introduction of the Majat *qabila* from Hawz (vicinity of) Marrakech and their deployment to expel the occupants of the site of his future *zawiya* in Tazarualt: the *Herbil*.¹²⁶ Ibn Musa's role in the constitution of the Majat as a Susian *qabila* is therefore comparable to Ibn Ibrahim's concentration of Takna recruits in Wadi Nun. No doubt, the prestige of having the court as a disciple also enabled Ibn Musa and Ibn Ibrahim to overcome their own marginality as outsiders and to spawn social networks that shored up the geo-political weight of their Majat and Takna clients.

Sidi Ibn Ibrahim's recruitment of the Takna for the Sa'dian presaged their subsequent appearance as protégés of Mawlai Ahmad al-Mansur. The Sa'dian demand for recruits branched out of their simmering conflict with Portugal, the conflict leading to the Moroccan victory of 1578. This victory paved the way for the coronation of Mawlai Ahmed al-Mansur and was the genesis of his use of al-Sus as a base for the Sa'dian expeditions to and conquest of the Songhay Empire in 1591.¹²⁷ As part of his endeavor to control space and its occupants, al-Mansur also commissioned one of his confidants, Ibrahim al-Hassani, to carry out the now famous census of Susian *qabila* ensembles: *diwan qaba'il Sus* (the Register of the *qaba'il* of Sus).¹²⁸ The *diwan* located each Susian *qabila* in space, tabulated the number of its households (*kanun*) and the taxes it owed to the state. The inscription of the "Takn" in this *diwan* constitutes the first official recognition of their existence as a distinct Susian *qabila*. Interestingly, the author of the *diwan* reified al-Tadli's implicit and Ibn Khaldun's explicit distinction of the sedentary *ahl Wadi Nun* from their pastoral compatriots.

In the *diwan*, the "Takn" were included in the "totality of the Arabs (who were) in the company of the Sultan," Mawlai Ahmed al-Mansur. One result of being in "the company of the sultan" was that the "Takn" were absolved from the payment of "duties," tribute. In contrast, "*ahl Wadi Nun*" come across as a porous designation for taxable bodies who were also obliged to provision Sa'dian expeditions, *haraka*, passing through Wadi Nun or stationed in Tegaoust. In comparison to the Azwafit and Ait Ausa invocation of service to the *zawaya*, the anonymous author of the Ait Musa myth of origin invested the location of "Arab Takn" in "the company of the sultan" to imagine their social birth as a separate *qabila*. The author posited "service" (*khidma*) under one of al-Mansur's deputies to al-Sus, *al-qa'id* Hamu (Muhammad) Baraka, as the genesis

¹²⁵ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 12, 190; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 14, 20-24; On the intersection between politics and religion see, Kably, "Legitimacy of State Power," in *In The Shadow of the Sultan*, ed. Bourqia and Miller: 17-29.

¹²⁶ Al-Susi, *Illigh*, 5.

¹²⁷ On the Sa'dian defeat of Portugal and conquest of the Songhay Empire see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 214-216; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 172-173; Yahya, *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century*, 66-119, 145-167; Michel Abitbol, *Tombouctou et les Arma* (Paris: Larose, 1979).

¹²⁸ Al-Hassani, *Diwan Qaba'il Sus*, ed. Afa, 11-29. For a French translation of this text see, L.C. Justinard, "Le Kennach: Une expédition du Sultan Ahmed El-Mansur dans le Sous (988/1580)," *Archives Marocaines*, 29 (1933): 165-214.

of the constitution of the Ait Musa as a cohere *qabila* under the leadership of the *al-Heri* family, the future in-laws of Bayrouk's father Ubaydallah.¹²⁹

The invocation of service to *sufi* savants or Shurafa dynasts as intelligible boundary markers between occupants of the same space was, at least temporarily, blurred by the Simlali inheritance of the Sa'dian prerogatives in al-Sus. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Yadr's break with his Almohad benefactors, Sidi Ibn Musa's ambitious heir, Ali Abu Hassoun *al-Simlali* (1592-1658), upgraded his *zawiya* to an *emirate* with Illigh as its capital. As a result, the *zawiya* and the dynasty came to mean the same thing. To secure the caravan routes linking Illigh with Bilad al-Sudan, Abu Hassoun utilized the recruitment strategies used by the Sa'dian benefactors of his ancestor, Sidi Ibn Musa, and created an alliance among the *qabila* ensembles the Alawites later dubbed *ahl al-sahil* (the people of the coast). The main constituents of the *ahl al-sahil* were the Ait Umran, the Majat and the Takna. Notable for their absence from this equation are the Shabanat 'benefactors' of the *Zakn* (Takn).

We can blame silence on the whereabouts and political dispositions of the Shabanat on the recruitment strategies adopted by Mawlai al-Mansur's embattled successors. In an attempt to shore up their position, the last Sa'dian sultans reportedly "invited" their Shabanat in-laws to *Hawz Marrakech* in the hope of using them to halt *zawaya* encroachments.¹³⁰ It is reasonable to assume that as the junior partners of the Shabanat, the "Arab Takn" could have stepped in to fill the power vacuum created by the departure of their allies to Marrakech. Conversely, enlistment in the *Simlali* army could have also enhanced the Takna ability not only to lay claim to Wadi Nun, but also to 'sell' their identity to the inhabitants of its *qusur*, those collectively identified as "*ahl* Wadi Nun" or in terms of their domicile in any of its *qusur*, "*ahl* Asrir," "*ahl* Tegaoust" etc. Abu Hassoun, for example, used his Majat and Takna clients to expand southwards.¹³¹ In the course of this expansion, he also patronized an upstart *zawiya* family that, to all intents and purposes, mediated the emergence of the Id Ahmad as a bounded Takna *qabila*, the *al-Qa'id al-Tamanarti* family.

According to al-Susi, Abu Hassoun armed the Andalusian founder of this family, Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim, with the deed to the site of his future *zawiya* and *mausem* in Tamanart.¹³² With the Simlali at his back, Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim began to edge the heirs of the Sa'dian confidant Sidi Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim from their eminent position in Tamanart and, in the process, turned his upstart *zawiya* into a major centre of power in Wadi Nun. The Simlali connivance in the empowerment of a confessed outsider like

¹²⁹ Al-Hassani, *diwan qabail Sus*, 28-29; the Ait Musa myth of origin see, Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, v.5: 1935-36.

¹³⁰ Instead of assisting his Sa'dian nephew, Mawalai Ahmed al-Abas (1654-1659), the Shabanat leader, Karum al-Hijj, assumed control of Marrakech until his defeat by the Alawite sultan Mawlai Rashid in 1688. See Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 219-231.

¹³¹ On the *Simlali* conquest of al-Sus and recruitment of the Takna see, al-Susi, *Illigh*, 58-60, 85; De La Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud marocain", *B.C.A. F.M.*, 45; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 163.

¹³² The origin of the founder of this second Tamanart *zawiya*, Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim, is traced back to Spain. Arguably, the arrival of his ancestor in al-Sus was part of the Muslim flight from Granada in the wake of its conquest by Spain in 1492. For a biographical translation for this family see, al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v.20, 228-240. He should not be confused with Sidi Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim *al-Tamanarti* of the Sa'dian dynasty.

Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim was, ostensibly, the result of their resentment of the refusal of the heirs of Ibn Musa's *Jazulia* peer and friend, Sidi Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim, to sever their allegiance to the Sa'dian court. The Simlali break with their former *Jazulia* peers contrasts sharply with the cordial relations that bound them to the guardians of the *zawiya* of Asa and its Ait Ausa clients.¹³³ Ultimately, the Simlali patronage of Sidi Ahmed did enhance the status of the easternmost constituent of the Ait Osman ensemble, the Id Ahmed.

The Simlali role in the reconfiguration of the demographic map of al-Sus is often blurred by the authorial fixation on the high politics of their duel with and eventual exile by the patriarchs of the Alawite family, namely, Mawlai Rashid (r.1666-1672) and Mawlai Ismael (r.1672-1727). Mawlai Rashid's reported "dislike" for and harassment of, the *ahl al-sahil zawaya* and *qabila* ensembles are 'reciprocated' by the deft excision of his name from the Takna narratives.¹³⁴ In contrast, Mawlai Ismael's shift from obtrusive harassment of the heirs of confidants of the Simlali like Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim, corresponds to the invocations of his career by the two main *Ait Jamal* brethren of the Ait Musa, the Azraqayn and Ait al-Hasan respectively. In what seems like a continuation of Mawlai Rashid's ostensible distrust of the *zawaya* of Wadi Nun, for example, Mawlai Ismael's son and deputy in al-Sus, Muhammad al-Alim, leveled Sidi Ahmed's *zawiya* and deported its guardians to Miknas. Eight years later, in 1706, Mawlai Ismael pardoned the family and through a succession of "decrees of respect" elevated its patriarch, Sidi Ibrahim *al-Tamanarti* (r.1707-1758) to a trustworthy Alawite *qa'id*, hence, the appendage of the honorific title *al-qa'id* as a suffix in the family name, *al-Qa'id al-Tamanarti*.¹³⁵ In contrast, the quest for guarantors of the security of the caravan from brigands and a suspected (European) *Nazarene* conspiracy to hijack this commercial system, led Mawlai Ismael to trade his rights in *qabila* tribute for service in his trans-Saharan expeditions. To expedite this goal, he deputized Susian clients such as the (Takna) Azraqayn to curtail the activities of refractory Saharans like the "thieving" Awlad Dulaym and to prop up the Tararza *emir* Ali Shandura (r.1703-1727).

The anonymous author of the Azraqayn narrative seems to have exploited the known about Mawlai Ismael's Saharan policy to explain their social birth as a *qabila*, provide a context for their settlement in al-Saqiya al-Hamra and, hence, their identification as a constituency of the Ait Jamal Leff. In the narrative, the congruity of being Azraqayn with living in al-Saqiya al-Hamra comes across as an aftermath of their exile from Wadi Nun by the (Ait Osman) Azwafit and service with one of Mawlai Ismael's deputies and the founding father of the leading family in the *qabila*, *al-Qa'id*

¹³³ According to al-Susi, the guardians of the *zawiya* of Asa and their Ait Usa clients, served as a sanctuary for Abu Hassoun's son Muhammad in the wake of his defeat by and flight from Mawlai Rashid. Al-Susi, *Illigh*, 227-228.

¹³⁴ Mustafa Naimi considered Mawlai Rashid's conquest of Wadi Nun the main cause of the "obscurity" of the Takna for the "next sixty years"—i.e. until the end of Mawlai Ismael's reign and, hence, the return of Abu Hassoun's heirs to Illigh in the early 1730s. Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 163. On Mawlai Rashid's treatment of *ahl al-Sahil* see, al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, v. 7, 40-41.

¹³⁵ *Qa'id* (Arabic): literally, leader. In Morocco, the term denotes appointment to or confirmation in a position of authority over a bounded *qabila* or territory. On Ismael's appeasement of the *ahl al-sahil* see, al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, 3 (9), 50-51; for the series of "decrees of respect" that rehabilitated the *al-Qa'id* al-Tamanarti family see, al-Susi, *al-Masul*, v. 20, 237-240.

Hamu Ibn Sa'eed.¹³⁶ If we overlook the place of spatiality in *qabila* notions of origin, then service to the Sa'dian al-Mansour and the Alawite Ismael will be the only boundary marker between the Ait Musa and Azraqayn conceptions of social birth. In fact, the idea of contemporaneity to the Alawite (Shurafa) informing the Azraqayn conception of their social birth also lurks beneath the myth of origin touted by their Ait al-Hasan brethren.

Unlike his Azraqayn counterpart, for example, the anonymous author of the Ait al-Hasan narrative took advantage of Mawlai Ismael's activities in the Western Sahara to locate the return of the bulk of the constituents of this *qabila* from al-Hawd (Mauritania) astride the eighteenth century. The attribution of empowerment to inclusion of Saharan returnees to Wadi Nun led to the explanation of the Ait al-Hasan territoriality in terms of their conquest of Tegaoust and the displacement of its native occupants, the Ait Idris. The (Ait Jamal) Ait al-Hasan narrative is comparable to that of the (Ait Osman) Ait Brahim in the sense that it predicates the origin of *qabila* identity on migration from the Western Sahara. Instead of advertising their nativity to al-Sus, the Ait al-Hasan narrative predicate the inception of al-Qasabi as their capital on the simultaneous evacuation of Tegaoust and the exile of its occupants, the Ait Idris, to the territories of the (coastal) Ait Umrān.¹³⁷ Like the Ait Osman Id Ahmed, the Ait al-Hasan was the latest major branch of the Ait Jamal to take its definitive shape as a cohere *qabila*. In that sense, we can use the relative modernity of their social birth as bounded entities to propose the Shurafa period as the time for the constitution of the Takna *qabila* ensemble. This proposition lends credence to the level of the state intervention in the Takna history sketched by Hodges. Besides it enables us to impute the logical conclusion which he did not seem 'anxious' enough to draw. The Takna did not develop into a bounded *qabila* ensemble because they shared common ancestors or a history that extends back all the way to "antiquity." Rather, the Takna ensemble was put together by the same temporal agencies of Moroccan history enshrined in their own narratives and under circumstances that do not bode well for the notions of segmentation and autonomy.

The overlap between the jurisdictions of the dynasty and *zawiya* makes it unnecessary to locate them in separate domains. Given the fact that the *qabila* often come across as a 'theatre' for their joint or competing activities, it is difficult to imagine how the *zawiya*, as a metaphor for *bled es-Siba*, and the dynasty, as a signifier for *bled el-Makhzan*, could have avoided each other. Here, we are left with two main options: either to take the intersections between the Takna narratives and Shurafa biographies as metaphors of the constancy of *qabila* existence within the confines of a dynastic realm or as signs of exposure to Maghribian textual traditions. In either case, these intersections do not bode well for the common denominator between the ethnographic text and travel account, the notion of the autonomous or "free" tribe. In other words, the foregoing discussion does not supply historical precedents for the kind of autonomous tribes later discovered by travelers and colonial ethnographers. As we will presently see,

¹³⁶For the Azraqayn myth of origin see, Naimi, "Azraqayn", *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome 1: 339-42. The Azraqayn participation in Ismael's attempts to prop up Ali Shandura's authority sanctioned their purported entitlement to an annual "gift" (*hadiya*) from the Trarza.

¹³⁷Monteil, *Notes sur les Tekna*, 17; Naimi, "Tagaoust", *Encyclopédie du Maroc* Tome 6 : 2084-2089.

the *zawaya* and the *qabila* were not only born within the confines of a dynastic realm, but they also seem to have failed to exploit the Alawite weakness in the age of European imperialism to regain their autonomy.

"In the Company of the Sultan": *Zawaya* Devotees, *Qabila* Clients

If you disobey me, you disobey the Messenger, and if you disobey the Messenger, you disobey Allah!
Sidi Muhammad Ibn Nasir¹³⁸

The cross-referencing of the subaltern Takna narratives with the histories of the named *sufi* savants and the dynasts incarcerated in their myths of origin tends to underscore the relative modernity of this *qabila* constellation as well as its propensity to grow by taking in outsiders like the Bayrouk ancestor.¹³⁹ Firstly, it would be an exercise in futility to try to fix the obvious historical chasms separating the Takna conception of *qabila* origin in terms of birth in the bosom of the *zawaya* founded by contemporaries of the Almohads, the Marinids, the Sa'dians and the Simlalis: Sidi Ibn Amr, Sidi Ya'zi, Sidi al-Tamanrti and Sidi Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim respectively. Even if we ignore the disruptive impact of dynastic successions on Wadi Nun's demographic map, it would still be difficult to circumvent the role of universal religion and encounter with the caravan in the authorship of the Azwafit, Ait Ausa and Id Ahmed sense of self or to make a case for authorial dogmas like segmentation or "natural affinity." The *sufi* founders of the *zawaya* mentioned in the subaltern narratives of these three *qabila* groupings were all immigrants and, befittingly, thrived precisely because of their ability to transcend notions of kinship and to attract diverse followers. It was this sense of displacement and heterogeneity that seems to account for the implicit refusal to assign portable identities to their compatriots and the simultaneous use of porous terms like *ahl* (people of) as emblems of identification. The Takna sense of displacement and heterogeneity is even more evident from the notions of origin manufactured for or touted by the three main constituents of the *Ait Jamal*: the Ait Musa, Azraqayn and Ait al-Hasan. It is perhaps worth recalling how ethnographers like Montagne and Monteil used Arabic speech and professions like tending to camels as signifiers of the *Ait Jamal* aberration from ostensible Berber norms and, hence, the explanation of their social birth in terms of descent from or exposure to M'aqil (Arab) invaders. In the light of the *Ait*

¹³⁸In a letter to one of his *qabila* clients in Wadi Dra', the Alawite devotee, Sidi Ibn Nasir, wrote, "You must defer to and obey my deputy (*muqaddam*). He received his instructions from me ... if you do not implement these instructions, then you disobey me. And if you disobey me you disobey the Messenger, and if you disobey the Messenger, then you disobey Allah ... and there is no hope for you!" For this letter see, *al-ajwiba al-nasiriya*, Al-Sanhaji, ed. (Rabat: Bibliothèque Général et Archives, D1111, n.d.). Sidi Muhammad Ibn Nasir (1603-1675) is the founder of the *Nasiriya* (*sufi*) *tariqa* and *zawiya* in Tamkrut (Wadi Dra'), and the great grandfather of the famous Shurafa (Alawite) historian Ahmad Ibn Khalid al-Nasiri-- the author of *al-Istiqa*. Muhammad Ibn Nasir assumed the leadership of the *zawiya* of Tamkrut in 1642. In 1696, Mawlai Ismael summoned the custodians of the *zawiya* to account for their tendency to 'omit' his name from the Friday *khutba* (sermon). Mawlai Ismael eventually pardoned the Nasiri family and through a series of decrees, he turned their *zawiya* into a conduit for Alawite relations with localized *qabila* ensembles. The Nasiri seems to have benefited from this close association with the court and in the course of the nineteenth century, spread their *tariqa* in al-Sus. Qaid Dahman Ibn Bayrouk had a cozy relation with the Nasiri family and, indeed, was counted among their disciples. On the political role of the Susian Nasiris see, chapter IV.

¹³⁹I use modernity here in its literal, chronological, sense and posit it as the 'other' of antiquity.

Jamal invocations of service to dynasts and the monitoring of caravan routes, however, we could credit the garrison with a similar role to the *zawiya* and, hence, take the hybridism of *qabila* as the norm rather than the exception.

Given their intrinsic propensities to thrive on crossing and to devour boundaries, one can hardly entrust the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan with the conservation of conditions conducive to segmentation. It was because of the incompatibility of encounter with the dynasty and the caravan with the sense of homogeneity implied by segmentation that ethnographers and historians of the Maghrib strove to insulate *qabila* from the vagaries of their activities. I have already suggested that this vision was not only born in the text, but in its most modern garb, it could be traced to nineteenth-century travelogue. Like the colonial and post-colonial ethnographers who benefited from their accounts, travelers took the absence of uniformed officials, what Gellner later called "the police", as a signifier of the existence of "free" tribes: the genesis of the *bled al-Makhzan-bled al-siba* modality.¹⁴⁰ The ethnographic promotion of tribe to a metaphor for lost liberties also sanctioned the absolution of the *zawaya*, the "saints," from tampering with its "republican" modes of social existence, the trio of autonomy, subsistence and egalitarianism.

Secondly, the division of nineteenth-century Morocco into *bled el-Makhzen* and *bled es-Siba* and the simultaneous investiture of colonialism with the devouring of *qabila* "independence" blur the level of Alawite intervention in Wadi Nun and collusion with its major *zawaya* centers. One does not have to subscribe to Jackson's location of Wadi Nun and the "free" Takna beyond the dynastic realm to take the succession disputes that followed the death of Mawlai Ismael (1727-1757) as a genesis for the shift in the balance of power in favor of Morocco's European competitors and, hence, its descent towards colonialism. In the course of the nineteenth century, for example, Moroccan territorial losses to France and Spain were augmented by unfavorable terms of trade with Britain.¹⁴¹ Mawlai Ismael's successors had a difficult time trying to fend off European pressure in the north and to exercise their prerogatives in al-Sus and its Saharan backyards. It is not surprising that the exiled heirs of Abu Hassoun al-Simlali should choose this historical moment as the ideal time for their return to Illigh and the rejuvenation of its commercial and political fortunes.¹⁴² Like the nineteenth-century European travelers, colonial ethnographers and post-colonial historians tended to take the reconstitution of the "second Illigh" and the ability of its early proprietor, Hashim al-Simlali (r.1790-1824), to dodge the punitive expeditions mounted by the Haha

¹⁴⁰I am referring to Gellner's statement that "in ... ruler-less society, it is no use appealing to the police ... to protect you ... for ... there is no police and no government." Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 44.

¹⁴¹On the impact of this shift in the balance of power on Morocco see, al-Nasri, *Istiqsa* v. 3 (8-9) 71, 26-32, 45-54, 84-102, 179-182; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 297-314; On its replications in al-Sus see, Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et le Sous al-Aqsa*, 12-17, 19-23; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 85-108, 117-132.

¹⁴²Al-Susi identified the patriarch of the *Simlali* returnees as Abu-Hassoun's grandson Ahmed Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ali (Abu-Hassoun) and took 1730 as the time of his arrival in Illigh: three years after Ismael's death. The noticeable improvement in the family fortunes however, is attributed to Hashim al-Simlali (approx.1790-1824), and his two sons Ali (r. 1824-1842) and al-Husayn (r. 1842-1886); al-Susi, *Illigh*, 228-231, 237, 239-241; On the Simlali commercial and political aggrandizement see, Paul Pascon, *La Mazon d'Illigh et l'histoire sociale de Tazerwalt*. (Rabat : S.M.E.R. 1984)

deputies of Mawlai Sulayman (1792-1821) as a sign of Susian independence, specially those Berbers Brett dubbed "the highlanders of Morocco."¹⁴³

Notwithstanding the constant demand on their resources and attention in the north, however, Mawlai Sulayman and his heirs still considered al-Sus too valuable to be left to *zawaya* power centres or *qabila* ensembles. After all, al-Sus continued to be an indispensable conduit of the caravan trade and, as such, its loss would have been an irreparable blow to Essaouira's commercial health. To secure the caravan routes to Essaouira, the embattled Alawite dynasts reverted to the system of patronage used by their Marinid and Sa'dian predecessors. They embarked on a lavish distribution of "decrees of respect" to the same *zawaya* families their powerful ancestors, Mawlai Rashid and Ismael, tended to distrust. Like their Marinid and Sa'dian predecessors, the Alawites sought to invest the *zawaya* influence over their *qabila* compatriots as a surety for the security of the caravan routes and as a bulwark against *Nazarene* trespassing in Essaouira's backyards. To dispel any illusion that it had given up on al-Sus, the Alawite court matched concessions to loyal *zawaya* families and *qabila* potentates with punitive expeditions, *haraka*, against their refractory compatriots.¹⁴⁴ This oscillation between the carrot and the stick became the main feature of the policies of those Alawite dynasts who presided over Morocco's glide towards colonialism: Mawlai Sulayman (1792-1822), Abdul-Rahman (1822-1859), Muhammad (1859-1873) and al-Hasan. Through this appeasement policy the Alawites were not only able to win the *zawaya* that dominated the Takna homeland, Wadi Nun, but also succeeded in the conversion of the Simlali (Illigh) to royal devotees.

The correspondence between the Alawite sultans Sulayman, Abdul-Rahman and Muhammad on one hand and their Simlali counterparts, Hashim and his sons Ali (r. 1824-1842) and Husayn (1842-1886), on the other hand, does not support the ethnographic explanation of their relations in terms of an unremitting animosity between an Arab *Makhzan* and, Berber tribes and saints. This pattern of patronage presaged Mawlai al-Hasan's appointment of al-Husayn's son and successor, Muhammad, as *qa'id* in 1886.¹⁴⁵ In congruity with the conciliation of the Simlali, the Alawites granted the custodians of Sidi Amr's *zawiya* with a series of "decrees of respect" that, collectively, absolved them from "duties" to the state and shored up their status as hereditary "judges" of Wadi Nun. At the same time, the Alawite court renewed the *zaheer* Mawlai Ismael had conferred on the *al-Qa'id al-Tamanarti* family, expanded

¹⁴³Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 174-178.

¹⁴⁴Yahya Jalal, *al-Maghrib al-Kabir* v.3, (Beirut: Dar al-Nahda, 1981), 453-499; Ibn Zaydan *Ithaf*, v.5, 122-23; al-Susi, *al-masul* v.20, 261-63.

¹⁴⁵For the deployment of the *Simlali* as a signifier of Berber opposition to the Alawite court see, Barbier, *Voyages et Exploration*, 48-50, 103-107; Montagne, *Le berbère et Le Makhzan*, 105-109; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 176-77; for a different conception of the same relationship see, al-Da'eef al-Rabati, *Tarikh*, 459; al-Susi, *al-masul* v.6, 266; al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 17, 226; al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.20, 269; Jacques-Meunie, *Le Maroc saharien*, v.2, 730-732; El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya*, 229-304; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 101-102; Pascon et Ennaji, *Le Makhzan et le Sous al-Aqsa*, 37-88, 102; Bumzugu, "Oued Noun dans les archives de Dar Illigh," *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 57-83, 65.

its jurisdiction and prerogatives and, hence, enhanced the status of the *zawiya* among the Takna.¹⁴⁶

In the light of the frequent collusion between the court and the *zawaya* and the overlap of their jurisdictions and prerogatives, it is difficult to conceive how a major *qabila* ensemble like the Takna could have been left "free." Short of reducing the expectations of the Alawite court and its *zawaya* protégés to a quest for supplications by the former and royal ropes by the latter, we would have to take *qabila* autonomy as the main dowry for and, in effect, the casualty of their collaboration. Since the *zawiya* was in the dynast's payroll, then *qabila* "respect" (*tawqir*) for its guardians was to all intents and purposes, an alternative mode of "service" (*khidma*) to the Alawite court. In fact, patronage by the Alawites often nullified the advantage of spatial distance from their main seats of authority, the distance that incidentally also seems to sanction the ethnographic translation of *qabila* into tribe and its location beyond the dynastic realm. Whether because of their patronage by the dynasty or their own ability to garner "respect" on the spot, the hereditary *shaykhs* of the *zawiya* also became a landed-aristocracy and in that capacity, were in a position to decide which *qabila* group was entitled to what space. It was largely because of this shared capacity to control space and its resources that, together, the *zawiya* and the dynasty also occupied center-stage in the Takna perceptions of themselves as a bounded *qabila* constellation.

I have already noted how in the course of his expansion southwards, for example, Abu Hassoun al-Simlali also utilized the services of the *qabila* formations his Alawite competition dubbed as the *ahl al-sahil* (the people of the coast). Interestingly, the major *qabila* constituents of the *ahl al-sahil*, the Majat, the Takna and Ait Umran, were also the main signatories to a political alignment (*Leff*) that, in the nineteenth century, was known as the *Iqzulin*. In Susian discourse, the boundaries of the *Iqzulin* alignment were mapped out largely in terms of its competition with a rival constellation called the *Tahukat*. In comparison to its rival, the *Iqzulin*, the *Tahukat* constellation included the Majat's chief rivals in the Anti-Atlas, the *Ba'qila* and Awlad Jarar, and the *Herbil* competitors of the Takna in southeastern Wadi Nun, Tamanart.¹⁴⁷ Despite the obscurity of its origin, subscription to the *Iqzulin* became the linchpin that often saved the *Ait Osman* and *Ait Jamal* from drifting apart and, ironically, was more durable than the constituents of either *qabila* constellation were. Indeed, we can say that the *Ait Osman*

¹⁴⁶The first extant renewal of the Alawi *zaheer* (copy in my possession) to Sidi Amr's family goes back to 1739—i.e. it predated Sidi Muhammad's accession to the throne. This *zaheer* was renewed in 1797, 1802, 1826 and 1845. This trend corresponds to the successive renewals of the *zaheer* issued to the *al-qa'id* al-Tamanarti family by Mawlai Ismael: in 1758, 1809 and 1846. Al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 12, 190-191; Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.20, 235-256.

¹⁴⁷Montagne converted the *Tahukat* into a vanguard of Arab (Saharan) invasion and the *Iqzulin* into descendants of 'native' Berbers. In contrast, al-Susi invoked Ibn Khaldun's postulation of an 'inevitable' duel between the 'hungry' *bedou* and urban Man to credit the *Iqzulin* constituents with nativity to the verdant al-Sus and to convert their *Tahukat* rivals into Saharan aspirants to the same space. Notwithstanding their notoriety in the nineteenth century however, the antiquity of the *Iqzulin* and *Tahukat* *Leffs* is more suspect than either colonial ethnography or Susian discourse tended to concede. By taking Ibn Khaldun's reference to the *Herbil* in combination with Sidi Ibn Musa's reported introduction of Majat from *Hawz Marrakech*, it becomes evident how a historical these presentations are. The modernism of the Takna further detracts from this proposition. Montagne, *Le Berbère et Makhzan*, 35-56; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 238-241; Sidki Azayquo "Tahukat," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc* tome 6, (1992), 1995-1997.

Azwafit, Ait Ausa and Id Ahmad were the 'brethren' of the *Ait Jamal* Azraqayn, Ait al-Hasan and Ait Musa largely because of their indefatigable fidelity to the *Iqzulin Leff*. The Azraqayn, for instance, were once part of the *Ait Osman* constellation but defected to the *Ait Jamal* in the wake of their conflict with and exile by the Azwafit, the exile that also presaged the conflation of being Azraqayn with living in al-Saqiya al-Hamra. In contrast, protracted disputes with the Ait al-Hasan led the Ait Ausa to quit the *Ait Jamal Leff* and join the *Ait Osman* in 1879.¹⁴⁸ Yet, this trade of places did not impinge on either the Azraqayn or Ait Ausa commitment to the *Iqzulin*. The moments that entitled the Azwafit to Azraqayn sympathy or the Ait al-Hasan to Ait Ausa empathy were precisely the occasions that also drew in non-Takna members of the *Iqzulin* like the Majat, the Ait Umran and the Saharan Rgaybat. If we take comradeship in arms as the ultimate testament of *qabila* fealties, it follows that membership in the *Iqzulin* was more important to the Azwafit or Azraqayn than being Takna per se.

Lastly, there is a suggestive simultaneity between the ethnographic advertisement of the centrality of the *Iqzulin-Tahukat* feud to the Takna political dispositions and, in effect, their sense of comradeship on one hand, and the discreet silence on who presided over or 'spoke' for the *Iqzulin* on the other. According to ethnographic wisdom, the Takna and Majat ought to have supported each other namely because ineffable empathy is the essence of *tribalism*. In the nineteenth-century al-Sus, however, and with the exception of the Bayrouk, the main leaders of and, one might add, beneficiaries from, the *Iqzulin* alignment were the same *zawaya* families who took pride in their foreign origins: the Simlali and the *al-Qa'id* al-Tamanarti. Indeed, because of their patronage by the Alawite court, the *Iqzulin* alignment also became the 'government party' and in that capacity, the Simlali and *al-Qa'id* al-Tamanarti families too often charged their *Tahukat* rivals with living in *siba* (anarchy). At the discursive level then, the Alawite conviction of the *Herbil* (*Tahukat*) with slumbering in *siba* complimented their frequent loathing by the *Iqzulin* Simlali and the Tamanart *Qa'ids*. Interestingly, the Alawite court not only deputized the *al-Qa'id* al-Tamanarti to pacify his *Herbil* neighbors, but also enjoined Bayrouk and al-Husayn al-Simlali to support him.¹⁴⁹

The frequent collusion between the *zawiya* and the dynasty tends to illuminate the suggestive correlation between the Takna, Majat and Ait Umran tendency to man Alawite garrisons and the propensity of their civilian brethren in al-Sus to parade *difference* from the *Tahukat* Herbil and their allies as an adequate boundary marker. The Alawite propensity to cajole the leadership of the *Iqzulin* was a reflex of the proximity of the domains of their *qabila* clients to Essaouira and their domination of the western axis of the Trans-Saharan Trade system. At the risk of repetition, one could add that the *zawiya*, the dynasty, and the caravan had once more teamed up to give shape and meaning to *qabila* notions of identity and territoriality. The same collusion also helps to explain the seemingly invisible link between the geopolitical location of the *Ait Jamal* constituents, their frequent deputation to monitor trade routes and the relatively early

¹⁴⁸On the Azraqayn conflict with the Azawfit and their reported 'flight' to al-Saqiya al-Hamra see, Naimi, "Azraqayn," *Encyclopédie Du Maroc*, Tome CI: 339-340; on the Ait Ausa dispute with Ait al-Hasan and defection to the Ait Osman see, Naimi, "Ait Asa," *Encyclopédie du Maroc* Tome 2: 377-379.

¹⁴⁹On the Alawite deputation of the Tamanart *qaids* (Takna) to harass the Herbil and its intersections with the Simlali (Majat) duel with the *Ba'qila* see, al-Susi, *al-Masul* v.20: 235-243, 251-258.

appearance of their names in European accounts. We can use the tacit links between these variables to override the explicit discrepancy between the location of the site of shipwreck beyond Alawite jurisdiction and the simultaneous imagination of the eventual repatriation of its survivors in terms of shipment to Gulimeme or Illigh and subsequent parading in front of ostensibly non-involved Alawite deputies in Essaouira.¹⁵⁰ In narratives of shipwreck, for example, Saharan *Moors* usually entice the shipwrecked mariners by promises of repatriation to Essaouira but often dump them at the doorsteps of the Bayrouk or Simlali. It was hardly a coincidence that, along with the Saharan Awlad Dulaym and Bu Suba customers of the Simlali, the *Ait Jamal* Takna were the main claimants of rights of *ziata* (escort) dues from caravans using the same route.¹⁵¹

We can use the hybridism of the Takna and their vulnerability to encounters with the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan as frames of reference to explore the seeming disparity between the Bayrouk location of the origin of their ancestry in Tuwat and conception of identity in terms of attachment to one of the Takna constituencies: the Ait Musa. If we take the modernity of the Takna as a point of departure, it becomes possible to compute the place of the advertised moment of the arrival of the Bayrouk ancestor, Yusuf, in Wadi Nun in the evolution of the Ait Musa *qabila*. In contrast, we can use the hybridism of *qabila* to anticipate how the Takna took in the Bayrouk ancestor or why they allowed his descendants to assume a position of authority. Here, we could turn the 'alien' ancestry of the *zawayya* families mentioned in subaltern Takna narratives into historical precedents and impute how the trio of piety, the dynasty and the caravan that served them so well could have also paved the way for the inclusion and empowerment of the Bayrouk. In the next chapter, I will sketch the place of this trio in the history of the advertised site of the Bayrouk origin, Tuwat, and then extrapolate their possible role in the family vision of the journey to and settlement in Wadi Nun, becoming Takna.

¹⁵⁰According to Riley for instance, his Saharan captors tested his knowledge of the reigning sultan, Mawlai Sulayman: "They wanted me to tell his name (the sultan) ... but I could not understand them until they mentioned Moolay Solimaan, this I remembered to be the name of the present emperor of Morocco." Riley, *Suffering*, 66.

¹⁵¹For this vision see, Follie, "Mémoire D'un Français qui sort à L'esclavage", in *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 53-74; Saugnier, "Récit du Naufrage et de la captivité de Saugnier", in *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental*, ed. Barbier, 157-171; Riley, *Loss of the American Brig*, 110-287; Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 3-75.

CHAPTER II

A FUTURISTIC PAST: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE BAYROUK ANCESTRY

My main purpose in this chapter is to delineate the Bayrouk notion of origin and to test whether and how it conforms to the general thrust of Maghribian history. At the empirical level, I intend to show how the Bayrouk locate their ancestors in space and time, and conceptualize the journey from the past to the present. Conceptually, I seek to establish how the Bayrouk narrative measures up to existing anthropological and historiographical location of the main pillar of the family identity, the bounded *qabila*, in relation to the major agents of Maghribian (and Moroccan) history, the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*. To this end, I will take the Bayrouk narrative as the main basis for my discussion. I will cross-reference this narrative with the sources that speak to the history of the spaces the Bayrouk claim as the theatres of the family history, namely, Tuwat and al-Sus. These sources range from classical texts like Ibn Khaldun's *al-Ibar* and Shurafa histories such as al-Nasiri's *al-Istiqsa*, to the colonial and post-colonial ethnographic and historiographical treatises that deal with Morocco in general and al-Sus in particular. To expedite this goal, I have divided the chapter into four main sections.

In the first section, I sought to identify the "colonizing situation" surrounding the inscription of the Bayrouk narrative and what this narrative tells us about the origin of the family, the Bayrouk, and the *qabila*, the Takna and, in effect, the nature of their relation. I showed how our informant resolved the discrepancy between the family and *qabila* conceptions of origin by offering Tuwat as a mutual cradle for the Bayrouk and the Takna respectively. In the second section, I situated the place the Bayrouk claim as the homeland of their first name ancestor, Tuwat, in relation to the rest of the Maghrib. Then I tabulated the identities claimed by or were assigned to its successive occupants from the time of the Arab conquest to the era of the Shurafa dynasties. My main conclusion here is that the classical cartographic and ethnographic presentations of Tuwat and al-Sus render it impossible for us to posit Takna as an inevitable identity for the Bayrouk. I will then return to the Bayrouk narrative and deploy the available sources to amplify its revelations and to bypass its silences. My objective is to extrapolate the circumstances surrounding the migration of the Bayrouk ancestor, Yusuf, from Tuwat and, as such, might have also ensconced his first encounter with Takna elements from al-Sus. In the third section, I posited the extrapolations I made in section two as a premise for my postulation of the Tuwatian identities available to Yusuf's ancestors and the relations he might have left behind. I ranked these identities in accordance with their reported prevalence in Tuwat and drew tentative conclusions as to when and why some of them were more probable than others and which was more likely to ease crossing from Tuwat to al-Sus. In the last section, I surmised the devices and strategies Yusuf and his immediate Susian descendents might have used to endear themselves to the Takna and, in the process, to lay the ground for the Bayrouk ascendancy in times to come. Here, I draw on the malleability of the Takna identities, and used their previous encounters with outsiders as precedents to bring the *Taknization* of the Bayrouk within

the realm of the historically conceivable in al-Sus. I will show how the Susian ancestors of the family used the same forces to which the Moroccan *qabila* has long been susceptible to carve a place for the Bayrouk amongst the Takna of Wadi Nun: (sanctified) knowledge and service to the dynasty.

The overall objective of this chapter is to chart the role of spatiality and textuality in the Bayrouk conception of self and their image in travelogue, ethnographic texts and post-colonial scholarship. Questions about spatiality range from mundane inquiries as to where did the Bayrouk ancestry come from to sublime reflections on how we should conceptualize the place of space in discursive constructs like origin and identity. We can deduce the problem of spatiality from the Bayrouk location of origin in Tuwat and predication of their identity on affiliation with the Takna of Wadi Nun in general and the Ait Musa of Gulimeme in particular. Here, the first question that springs to mind is whether Tuwat and Wadi Nun are alternative names for the same locale? And if Tuwat and Wadi Nun are referents to separate geographical spaces, then how should we explain the discrepancy between the sites of origin and current domicile? At the pedantic level, this question is important mainly because the answer can determine whether one should utilize the primordialist or discursive conception of identification.

In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that the Bayrouk predication of origin on migration from Tuwat tends to subvert the use of notions like segmentation and "natural affinity" to explain their identification with the Takna of Wadi Nun. I added that the incongruity of migration from Tuwat with nativity to Wadi Nun is further compounded by the sense of displacement oozing from the Takna narratives and the lack of clear-cut cultural boundaries that set them apart from other southern Moroccan *qabila* ensembles. I concluded that contrary to prevalent anthropological and historiographical conceptions of *qabila* identity, the geopolitical location of the space the Takna call home, Wadi Nun, and the multiplicity of their narratives of origin do not bode well for notions of segmentation and ineffable attachment. Yet, if we could find a classical source that identifies Tuwat as the homeland of a bounded *qabila* called Takn (or *Zakn*), we could also discount such precautions and posit the Bayrouk affiliation with the Takna of al-Sus as a sign of the perseverance of their mutual Tuwatian heritage. The main obstacle here is that none of the postulations of the *Zakn* and *Takn* origins I mentioned in the previous chapter warrant an assumption of a Takna migration from Tuwat or the central Sahara as a whole for that matter. In this chapter, I seek to reinforce this conclusion by highlighting the spatial distance that separates Tuwat from al-Sus and, as such, might have differentiated their respective inhabitants—i.e. the conceivable (Berber or Arab) relations of the Bayrouk's ancestry and the predecessors of the Takna respectively. As we will see, spatial distance also translated into differences in the identities assigned to the occupants of Tuwat and Wadi Nun. The difference between being from Tuwat and being from al-Sus, I argue, does not sit well with the conception of the Bayrouk as hereditary Takna.

In contrast, we could impute the potential role of textuality in the Bayrouk conception of self and, in effect, how we should deconstruct it from the way they envision the journey from being, the past, to becoming, the present. Here too we need answers to mundane questions like when did the first named ancestor of the family live in Tuwat and when did the first immigrant arrive in al-Sus? The Bayrouk narrative provides provisional answers to these two questions. But, we can neither verify nor

contextualize these answers without recourse to the sources dealing with the period of migration to al-Sus and provide clues to the identities available to the Bayrouk ancestors in Tuwat—namely, Sulayman Ibn Ali and his forefathers. Inasmuch as these are questions about history, we could impute the role of textuality from the way the Bayrouk explain the disparity that lurks beneath origination in Tuwat and identification with the Takna of Wadi Nun. In short, textual information about Tuwat and al-Sus could enable us to differentiate between the historically conceivable and contrived about the Bayrouk narrative, and to further illustrate the pitfalls of the translation of *qabila* to tribe and its situation beyond the realm of the written.

In the previous chapter, I have indicated how such investigative approach could help us fill in the gap that separates the mutation of the Lamta and Jazula from the emergence of the Takna. I also presented the history that underscores both the relative modernity and hybridism of the Takna and supports the utility of the idea of “suturing” to an understanding of the formation of *qabila*. I suggested that the constitution of Takna as a portable identity for the inhabitants of Wadi Nun took place largely because of the frequency of encounter with the three main agents of the Moroccan history: the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*. By highlighting the modernity and hybridism of the Takna, this history also underscores the disparity between the Bayrouk’s confession of descent from Tuwat and any attempt to credit them with an inherent Takna identity. It follows that the migration of the Bayrouk ancestor from Tuwat and the transformation of his progeny into Takna in Wadi Nun can best be understood by converting the ruptures caused by dynastic succession and caravan trading into common denominators of the demographic histories of both Tuwat and al-Sus.

In this chapter, I will deploy the same investigative approach I used in the previous one to recover the Tuwatian identities enshrined in classical texts and to surmise which might have been in use at the time of the immediate ancestry of the first named forefather of the Bayrouk family, Sulayman Ibn Ali. Here, my main purpose is to test how the Bayrouk narrative measures up to the classical Arabic sources that speak to the history of the Maghrib and to extrapolate the identity claims possible for their ancestry in Tuwat. The main advantage of this archeological approach is that it can help us to verify the Bayrouk narrative and to identify potential instances of borrowing from the text. I intend to show that, contrary to the ethnographic distancing of tribe from signifiers of the concentration of power and resources, the dynasty and the *zawiya*, or “writing,” the Bayrouk narrative is riddled with historical metaphors that tend to lead us back to classical Maghribian texts.¹ By establishing intersections between the family saga and textual presentations of the history of the Maghrib, we could also highlight the research that went into the construction of the Bayrouk narrative and, in effect, the discursive nature of their conception of origin. I will use this extrapolation as stepping stone to surmise how (textual) knowledge could have enabled the first ancestor to migrate from Tuwat, Yusuf, or his immediate progeny, to endear themselves to their Susian hosts and, hence, to lay the ground for the aggrandizement of the Bayrouk in the nineteenth century. I will then, postulate how the quest for a history that anticipates what the Bayrouk have accomplished in Wadi Nun might have also inspired the most

¹On the mismatch between the (oral) tribal and the ‘written’ see, Goody, *Power of the Written*, 134.

transparent borrowing from a classical text—namely, Ibn Abd al-Hakim's (803-871) *futuh misr*. The available evidence, I argue, does not lend itself to an identification of the Bayrouk as authentic Takna and, as such, further underlines the futility of notions of segmentation and ineffable attachment. What this evidence suggests instead is the conditionality and contested nature of identification, and the role of foreign elites like the Bayrouk in the schematization of *qabila* notions of origin and history. Herein, I will first identify the circumstances surrounding the commission of the Bayrouk story to the text and then show how its author imagined the relation between his family and *qabila* and, in the process, eschewed the ethnographic, textual, and Takna, subaltern, conceptions of origin. I will use this as a screen to recast the demographic history of Tuwat, the history that we can use to separate the realistic and imaginative about the Bayrouk narrative.

I-Colonial Ethnography, Pre-colonial History

A system foreign to the oriental world is required ... one like that of Rome. Robert Montagne²

In the previous chapter, I noted how living in the same space and at the same historical juncture did not prevent colonial ethnographers and anonymous Takna *nasaba* from providing different conceptions of the origin of the *qabila* ensemble. I added that this discrepancy is also embedded in the most contemporary sources we could have otherwise used to reconcile the ethnographic and Takna conceptions of *qabila* origin: nineteenth-century travel accounts and Shurafa biographies. Furthermore, I suggested that the Takna and ethnographic conceptions of origin are different largely because they were sanctioned by rival traditions of significations. In this section, we will see how the Bayrouk narrative measures up not only to the Takna and ethnographic conception of *qabila* origin, but also to the textual traditions that seem to inform these conceptions. Since the Bayrouk narrative was produced within the confines of the same "colonizing situation" that ensconced the ethnographic conception of Takna origin, it would be interesting to see how it schematizes the relation between *qabila* and its constitutive element, the individuated family, and treats the demographic ruptures that sanctioned the 'rise and fall' of Maghribian identity designations. Here, it is perhaps worth reiterating that the Bayrouk narrative was produced in the context of the same "colonizing situation" that inspired the ethnographic texts I have introduced in the introduction and the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, I noted that the bulk of the ethnographic texts that dwell on the question of Takna origin were produced during the era of civilian administration marked by the issuance of the *Zaheer Berbere* in 1930. Al-Susi collected the raw material for his rendition of the Bayrouk narrative in the wake of the issuance of the *Zaheer Berber*. In that sense, we could credit the French colonial regime with the production of the thing and its other. In the same way that it schematized the *tribalization* of the Moroccan *qabila*, French colonialism also, albeit unwittingly, inspired Shurafa biographers such as al-Susi to produce the kind of pre-colonial history that tends to subvert the ethnographic conception of its origin.

In the introduction, I noted that the main Bayrouk narrative is derived from al-

²Montagne, *The Berbers*, 82

Mukhtar al-Susi's interview of the family patriarch, *Qa'id* Dahman Ibn Abdin (d.1964), in the course of the research for his compendious work, *al-masul*. The material for *al-masul* was collected at a time of searing tension between the French colonial administration and the Moroccan intelligentsia. This tension was partially ignited by the promulgation of the "*Zaheer Berbere*" in May 1930. Here, it suffice to note that the genesis of the *Zaheer Berbere* could be traced back to the same fixation on Romanism that enabled French colonial officials in Algeria to distinguish secular Berber tribes, the so-called *Kabyles*, from their 'fanatic' Arab counterparts. On this occasion, the projection of encounter with the Romans as the last breach with civilization was turned into a frame of reference for the reclamation of the (native) Berbers as lost brethren, their investiture with a severed but redeemable Christian heritage and, hence, the depiction of their Arab compatriots as incorrigible Muslim outsiders. In French colonial discourse, the Berber encounter with (Arab) Islam is reduced to an inconvenient interruption of "la mission civilastre" commissioned by the Romans and is 'now' the moral duty of their French heirs. "From French misconceptions regarding the religious faith of the Kabyles (Berber) and Arabs," Lorcin noted,

arose the erroneous assumption that Kabyles would be ready subjects for ... conversion to Christianity. ... The notion of Kabyle convertibility had its origin in French ideas of their origin. Daumas had suggested that the Kabyles, partially of indigenous and partially of Germanic origin ... were formerly Christians who had not been completely transformed by the new religion (Islam)... Thus not only were the Kabyles, as Berbers, considered to be the original inhabitants of the area, a fact which in itself segregated them from the outsider Arabs, but they had also possibly been Christians and would therefore be receptive to French ideas in a way the Arabs could never be.³

French colonial officials tended to see the "Arabs and Berbers" of Morocco as copies of their Algerian counterparts. In the previous chapter I noted that the *Zaheer Berbere* constitutes a watershed between the era of "pacification" and civilian administration, and, as such, was posited as the blue print of French colonial policy. Since it was also premised on the idea of immutable differences between Arabs and Berbers, we could posit the *Zaheer Berbere* as an incarnation of the *Kabyle* myth and, by implication, a testament of the role of textuality in the construction of (Berber) tribe in Morocco. I have already noted that it was precisely because of the Arab-Berber dichotomy lurking beneath it that the *Zaheer Berbere* also added substance to the division of the Moroccan space into *bled el-Makhzan* and *bled es-Siba*. In conformity to the juxtaposition of the dynastic realm, the *Makhzani*, with the domain of *qabila*, *Siba*, the *Zaheer Berbère* spelled out the French intent to elevate Berber (tribal) customs in the latter to a status equal to what was deemed to be the Arab legal code of the former: the *Sharia*.

The Moroccan intelligentsia took the French advocacy of ostensible Berber customs as a veiled attempt at proselytism.⁴ Al-Susi was one of those Berbers who

³Lorcin, *Imperial Identities*, 62; the term *Kables* is a corruption of the Arabic term *qabila*. In colonial discourses it became a signifier of being an 'authentic' Berber tribesman.

⁴For the history behind this *Zaheer* and the crisis it sparked see, Burke III, "The Image of the Moroccan State

opposed the *Zaheer Berbère* and it was on account of his unfavorable dispositions that the French colonial regime deported him from Marrakech to his (tribal) homeland: al-Sus.⁵ *Al-masul* was the crop of eight years of exile (1936-1944) and, as such, can be seen as the *other* of the ethnographic drive to map out the Berbers as tribes. In any case, both the alleged proponent of the *Zaheer Berbère*, Paul Marty, and its most erudite defender, Robert Montagne, were at once colonial administrators and ethnographers.⁶ It should not come as a surprise that al-Susi tended to celebrate precisely the kind of temporal dispositions colonial ethnographers thought unbecoming of Berber tribesmen: the accumulation of (textual) knowledge and its conversion into power.

Al-Susi used a technique comparable to the notion of field research deployed by colonial ethnographers to access the memories of Susian *zawaya* families and *qabila* potentates. At the pedantic level, we can assume that the Bayrouk were the source of the raw information al-Susi has packaged and passed on to his audience. In terms of the mechanics of its composition, however, *al-masul* is informed by the well-entrenched Maghribian textual traditions in which its author was himself schooled. These traditions were encoded in reputable classical texts such as Ibn Khaldun's *al-'Ibar* and modern Shurafa histories like al-Nasiri's *al-Istiqsa*, and, as such, were not beyond the reach of al-Susi's opulent informants—mainly, the Susian *zawaya* families and the *qaid*s of their *qabila* ensembles. In so far as notions of origin and *nasab* (genealogy) are concerned, al-Susi's vision is indistinguishable from those advanced by classical authors like Ibn Khaldun and were endorsed by contemporary Shurafa historians like al-Marrakechi and Ibn Zaydan. In a rather crisp reference to the question of identification, for example, he invoked the classical Maghribian dictum on the utilitarian nature of *asabiya* (solidarity) and declared "*nasab* presumptive, particularly in the *badiya*." Almost at the same time, however, he promised to report the identity claims and testimonies of his informants regardless of their veracity.⁷

It goes without saying that since *al-masul* itself was written in classical Arabic, this promise does not entail a verbatim recording of the statements made by al-Susi's informants, a key requirement of the anthropological conception of the differences between the "oral" and the written, and hence, the "primitive" (tribal) and civilised condition.⁸ And in so far as the Bayrouk are concerned, it is worth recalling that al-Susi's

in French Ethnological literature," In *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Gellner and Micaud, 175-199; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 383-393; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 186-192.

⁵For the circumstances surrounding al-Susi's exile to al-Sus and his collection of the material for *al-Ma'sul* and its supplements see, Muhammad al-Rudani's editorial introduction to al-Susi, *Illigh*,

⁶On Marty and Montagne's role in the formulation and marketing of the *Zaheer* see, John Halestead, *Rebirth of A nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism* (Cambridge Mass, 1967), 72-74; Brahim Boutaleb, "La recherche coloniale sur la société maghrébine: bilan critique," in *Recherches sur L'histoire du Maroc: Esquisse de bilan* (Rabat: Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université Mohammed V, 1989): 107-173.

⁷Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.8, 6; al-Susi, *min afwah al-rijal*, v.1, 3-5; *Idem.* v. 3, 4-5; for a summary of juridical opinions on *nasab* see, al-Marrakechi, *al-ia'lam*, v.1, 146-151.

⁸For the conflation of "orality" with tribalism and, hence, their mutual distancing from the "written" see, Goody, *The Power of the Written Tradition*, 134-135; Southall, "The Illusion of tribe," in *Perspectives on Africa*, 38-51, 38-39. On what counts as "oral tradition" see, Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*; Tonkin, "Investigating Oral Tradition" *Journal of African History*, 27 (1986): 203-213.

main informant, *Qaid* Dahman Ibn Abdin, was the grandson of Bayrouk's third oldest son, Dahman *al-Awal* (the first), after whom he was evidently named. Very much like his grandfather, Dahman II was an accredited Alawite *qa'id* and, as such, was not stranger to the world of texts. He inherited his official position as *qa'id* at the beginning of the twentieth century and was duly confirmed in office by the French colonial administration. During the Moroccan drive for independence in the 1950s *Qaid* Dahman II also emerged as a nationalist supporter of the Alawite dynast who presided over this process, King Muhammad V (r.1927-1961). It was via their shared Susian heritage and patronage by the court that al-Susi came to know and interview *Qaid* Dahman II.⁹

At the time *al-Masul* was due to be published *Qaid* Dahman II was a member of the Moroccan parliament and, as might be expected, his voice carried a lot of weight in his constituency, Wadi Nun. In contrast, al-Susi became a minister in the first Moroccan national government, a government that, ostensibly, answers to parliamentarians such as Dahman II. From this vantage point, it is not farfetched to conclude that the Bayrouk narrative was circumscribed by Dahman's ability to speak for or influence what was being said about his ancestry. And given the status of his family amongst the Takna and his own national profile, it will be naive to demote Dahman to a tribal man and, hence, to distance him from "writing and literature." That said, al-Susi's rendition of the family narrative was the first known of its kind and is, indeed, the main basis for the later biographical translations for the Bayrouk by the Moroccan sociologist Mustafa Naimi and diplomat Muhammad al-Gharbi.¹⁰ Access to al-Susi's work may also explain the fact that al-Gharbi and Naimi were the only authors to allude to the Bayrouk reference to migration from Tuwat. In contrast, there is a suggestive simultaneity between the refusal of sociologists like Ennaji and Pascon, and historians such as al-Muhammadi and Najih to consult *al-ma'sul* and their silence on the Tuwat connection and what it entails for the study of the Bayrouk identity and history. Interest in Bayrouk's involvement in the caravan trade and relations with the Alawite court led these academics to posit his father, Ubaydallah Ibn Salem, as the founder of the family. His name is at the helm of the family 'genealogical tree' charted by sociologists Ennaji and Pascon, and historians al-Muhammadi and Najih.¹¹ As we will presently see, this use of encounter with the caravan and the dynasty as points of reference to locate the family in time and space is also the hallmark of the Bayrouk conception of the relation between history (past) and identity (present).

Speaking for Ancestry: The Bayrouk Narrative

*The function of narrative is not to "represent," it is to constitute spectacle. Ronald Barthes*¹²

The Bayrouk narrative, then, was born in the womb of a charged "colonizing situation" and was edited and published at a moment of national exuberance. In the light

⁹Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 282.

¹⁰Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176-185; Naimi, "Bayrouk," In *Encyclopédie du Maroc*: 1934-1939.

¹¹Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et Le Sous al-Aqsa*, 41-42; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 107; Najih, "Les Tribus de Tekna: Le cas Ait El jamal," 117-133, 125.

¹²Ronald Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives," in *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 79.

of such ideological strictures and the credentials of the editor, al-Susi, and his informant, *Qaid* Dahman II, it is imperative to anticipate a role for textuality in the making of the Bayrouk history and, hence, to take its entrapment in "the diagram of power and knowledge" as a forgone conclusion. The fact that al-Susi and his informant, the author and the narrator, were part of the Moroccan establishment goes along way towards explaining the politics behind his choice of *Qaid* Dahman II as the main repository of the Bayrouk history. We can deduce the intersection between power and knowledge from the fact that the narrative was, metaphorically, authorized by a male descendant of *Qaid* Dahman I, a descendant who also happened to symbolize the Bayrouk's positional superiority. Figuratively, the Bayrouk narrative is masculine in the sense that its author, al-Susi, and his informant, Dahman II, were males who also happened to command considerable "respect" (*tawqir*) in al-Sus and its beyond. At the same time, the narrative is loyalist and patriotic in the sense that it was co-authored by devotees of the Alawite court, endorsed by adjutants of the same court like the diplomat al-Gharbi and acted upon by post-colonial academics such as Naimi and El Mouddin.¹³ In the same way that textuality seems to add credence to Dahman's testimony, masculinity and loyalty tended to diminish the prospect of a feminine or dissident input to the family history.

The narrative is composed of the Bayrouk *nisba* (genealogy) and the saga of their most successful ancestors. Whereas the *nisba* conforms to standard Moroccan mechanics of composition, the saga is laden with historical metaphors that could be understood only in relation to classical textual representations of Maghribian historical experiences. In terms of content, the section on *nisba* is composed of two brief statements on the Bayrouk and the Takna origins. Collectively, these statements serve as a preamble for the family saga. The first statement is a dense list of the paternal ancestry of *Qaid* Dahman II. According to this list, only two ancestors separate Dahman II from Bayrouk himself, his father Abdin and grandfather *Qaid* Dahman I.¹⁴ In contrast, nine ancestors stand between Bayrouk and his only two named brothers, Hamad and Ibrahim, on one hand, and the Tuwatian founder of the family, Sulayman Ibn Ali, on the other: Ubaydallah (Ibn), Salem (Ibn), Abdul-Qadir (Ibn), al-Hasan (Ibn), Muhammad (Ibn), Saud (Ibn), Abdul-Rahman (Ibn), Yusuf (Ibn) Abdullah (Ibn) Sulayman Ibn Ali—see chart.


The second statement is a crisp presentation of the Bayrouk and Takna origins. This statement advances a proposition with serious implications for the conception of the Bayrouk relation to the Takna. The gist of this proposition is the tracing of both the Bayrouk and Takna origins back to Tuwat and, in effect, tacit denial of infinite nativity to Wadi Nun (al-Sus) or descent from its previous (Berber or Arab) inhabitants: the (Sanhaja) Jazula or Lamta and the (Ma'qil) Shabanat or Hassan. At the same time, al-Susi's informant credited the Bayrouk with a *Ja'farite* origin and proposed the *Hilal* (Arabs) as the ancestors of the Takna.¹⁵ At face value, the Bayrouk and the Takna are

¹³ Al-Gharbi was a seasoned diplomat of the post-colonial government in which al-Susi was a minister. He deployed the Alawite patronage of 'Saharan' families like the Bayrouk as evidence of Moroccan sovereignty over al-Saqiya al-Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab and, in effect, to debunk the Polesario's campaign for an independent Saharan state.

¹⁴ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 273.

¹⁵ *Ja'farite* is an identity designation that signifies descent from Prophet Muhammad's paternal cousin Ja'far Ibn Abi Talib. Ja'far was an early convert to Islam and hence, a *sahabi*. He was killed in the first Muslim

hereditary kinsmen mainly because their ancestors came from the same space. This proposition does not conform to the notion of birth in the bosom of the *zawiya* or the dynasty enshrined in the Takna subaltern narratives. It also veers from the ethnographic conception of the congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun in terms of descent from Berbers of antiquity, *Getules*, Jazula or Lamta. Moreover, the notion of Hilal origin contradicts the ethnographic predication of the prevalence of Arabic speech amongst the *Ait Jamal* Takna on Ma'qil invasion of al-Sus and displacement or absorption of its Lamta and Jazula occupants. If any thing, the statement seems to feed of Ibn Khaldun's investiture of the Almohads with the transfer of the Hilal Arabians to the verdant Maghrib, and much later exile of the "second generation Zanata" (Banu Marin and Abdulwad) and their "fourth generation" Arab "allies," the Ma'qil, to its arid backyard. Discursively,



descent from the Hilal seems more honourable because of the aura of legitimacy conferred by the Fatimid and Almohad sponsorship of their migrations-- they were Arabs rather than *a'rab* (wayward Arabians).

Dahman II also provided al-Susi with an elongated list of the *qabila* constituents of the *Ait Jamal* Leff. This list constitutes a significant departure from the standard ethnographic identification of the Ait Musa, the Ait al-Hasan and the Azraqayn as the main pillars of the *Ait Jamal* Leff. For instance, the list al-Susi received from his informant counts distant western Saharan ensembles like the Awlad Dulaym as *Ait Jamal*. At the same time, however, this list excludes the much nearer Rgaybat compatriots of the *Ait Jamal* (Takna) of al-Saqiya al-Hamra, the Azraqayn and, until 1879, the Ait Usa.¹⁶ This mode of identification is more functionalist and, in effect, historically contingent, than colonial ethnography and post-colonial scholarship seem to indicate.

In contrast to the section on matters of origin, the main purpose of the saga seems to be the ascription of social worth and historical roles to the selective ancestors I have already noted and, as we will see in chapter four, to chart separate careers for Bayrouk's most famous three sons: Muhammad, al-Habib and Dahman I. Overall, the saga adumbrates the high-points in the careers of the informant's most enterprising ancestors. Fixation on achievement led al-Susi's informant, Dahman II, to skip unpatriotic situations that seem to reflect badly on the family legacy such as censure by Alawite dynasts. In a manner reminiscent of the Shurafa biographies, the Bayrouk narrative often trades mundane realities for lofty textual tropes. It does not suggest specific dates of birth or death for his Tuwatian and early Susian ancestors. Discursively, the dynasty and the caravan are the main arbiters of who, among the Bayrouk ancestors, deserves what space in the narrative. This emphasis on achievement seems to underline the narrator's pride in his ancestors' ability to overcome their marginality as outsiders and to prosper in Wadi Nun. It also underlines the relevance of Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the utilitarian nature of *nasab* and the congruence between the quest for power and the articulation of *asabiya* (solidarity).

The narrator's fixation on achievement may also account for some of the glaring discrepancies between the family *nisba* (genealogy) and the saga, history. A cursory comparison of the *nisba* with the saga reveals that not every name enshrined in the former is credited with a contribution to the Bayrouk positional superiority. The *nisba* seemingly acknowledges all male participants in the biological making of the family. In contrast, the saga, as history, is reserved for the select ancestors who paved the way for Bayrouk's exploits in the nineteenth century. The main winners are the first immigrant, Yusuf, the signifier of piety, Ibn Saud, and the wily politician and trader, Ubaydallah. By a simple juxtaposition of the *nisba* with the saga, we can actually divide the ancestors who preceded Bayrouk's father Ubaydallah into three main groups. These groups either begin with or end with an idealized figure. The achievements credited to

¹⁶In addition to the *Awlad Dulaym* of the Western Sahara, Dahman II also claimed the "Saharan Majat" and Arusyeen as well as the coastal *Awlad Tidirarin* and *Ait Husayn* as members of the *Ait Jamal* leff. See al-Susi, *al-masul* v.19, 273.

each idealized figure tend to dwarf his named predecessors or successors. But they also seem to sanction the appearance of such underachievers as parents or progeny in the *nisba*.

The first group of ancestors are the Tuwatian born and can be located astride the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It includes the founding father Sulayman Ibn Ali, his son Abdullah and his grandson and first immigrant to Wadi Nun, Yusuf. The narrator credited Sulayman with piety, involvement in the caravan trade, "high stature" and a "known grave" in a "village" in Tuwat called Temni.¹⁷ Yusuf, the pioneering immigrant, purportedly shared some of his grandfather's spiritual credentials, credentials that seem to have ensconced his prestigious social status in al-Sus. As a reward for his implicit failure to match the achievements of either his father Sulayman or his son Yusuf, Abdullah is deftly excised from the saga. In contrast, the second group of ancestors encompasses the first generation Susians. This group includes Abdul-Rahman Ibn Yusuf, his son Saud and his grandson *shaykh* Muhammad (Ibn Saud). Chronologically, this group straddles the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Infatuation with Ibn Saud's piety translated into a revelry of his purported rescue of a "government army" from death by thirst in a foreboding terrain, the *hamada* (desert) of Tinduf. This revelry seems to expedite both the exclusion of *Shaykh* Ibn Saud's father (Saud) and grandfather, Abdul-Rahman, from the saga. In fact, the narrator's fixation on Ibn Saud's career may also explain the curt identification of his immediate heirs in terms of their "living off his (Ibn Saud) reputation".¹⁸ The third group is composed of Ibn Saud's immediate heirs and, as such, we could use birth in al-Sus to credit them with prolonged provenance in Wadi Nun. This generation includes al-Hasan (Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud), his son Abdul-Qadir and his grandson and Bayrouk's grandfather, Salem. This trio seems to have lived in the eighteenth century. Despite their relative obscurity in comparison to Ibn Saud, we could still credit these three ancestors with at least the conservation of his "reputation" and the garnering of the tangible assets that enabled Bayrouk's father, Ubaydallah, to contest the Ait Musa leadership. The remainder of the narrative is a chronicle of the political and commercial exploits of Ubaydallah, his son Bayrouk and three famous grandsons; Muhammad, al-Habib and Dahman.¹⁹

Besides its chronological convenience, the foregoing division of the family ancestors allows us to juxtapose the fame Ibn Saud, Ubaydallah and Bayrouk had earned in al-Sus with the obscurity of Sulayman's Tuwatian forefathers. We could use the difference in the identities conceivable for each set of ancestors to examine the narrative's conformity to or divergence from what is known about the demographic histories of Tuwat and al-Sus--Wadi Nun and its environs. At the pedantic level, the narrative can be reduced to a linear story about the migration of the Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf from Tuwat and the career of his (Takna) descendants in Wadi Nun. The spatial distance separating Tuwat from al-Sus indicates the incongruities underlying Dahman's

¹⁷ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 273; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176.

¹⁸ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 274; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 178.

¹⁹ Bayrouk reportedly left behind fourteen sons. In contrast, Dahman I left behind seven sons. The narrator's father Abdin was one of these seven named sons. Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 278.

deft invocation of migration from the former to explain the family identification with the Takna of Wadi Nun in terms of reunion with lost *qabila* relations. Discursively, it is impossible to graft the Bayrouk into authentic Takna without tracing the Takna origin back to Tuwat. The prospect of a hereditary Takna identity is, however, further diminished by the narrator's proposition of a Hilal origin for the Takna and a *Ja'farite* descent for his ancestors. In an attempt to reconcile these two premises, al-Susi almost reneged on his earlier promise not to tamper with the testimonies of his informants. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun's relegation of the Ma'qil claim of *Ja'farite* descent to the realm of the "untrue," al-Susi harnessed the Bayrouk invocation of the same origin with an "it is said" rider. The significance of this disclaimer is curtailed by al-Susi's confessed subscription to the juridical censure of dwelling on *ansab* (genealogies). But, on this occasion al-Susi registered his scepticism by noting the lack of "any thing [written] in the family hands that corroborates this [descent from *Ja'far*]"²⁰.

Even if we bypass the notion of *Ja'farite* descent, it will still be difficult to neutralize the tracing of the Takna origin back to Tuwat and their simultaneous investiture with a Hilal origin. Al-Susi's timid contest of the notion of *Ja'farite* origin contrasts sharply with his silence on the narrator's identification of Tuwat as the mutual homeland of both the Takna and Bayrouk ancestors. Al-Susi also did not question Dahman's claim of a Hilal origin for the Takna. Indeed, he did not attempt to reconcile the notion of Hilal origin with what his Regaybat informants has told him about the genesis of the Takna arrival in al-Sus and its Saharan backyards. It is worth recalling that these informants conceptualised the Takna origin and domicile in al-Sus in terms of descent from Ma'qil *a'rab* who used to nomadize between Fez and Marrakech until their exile by the Marinid sultan Abu al-Hasan (1330-1348). In contrast, al-Gharbi and Naimi endorsed the tracing of the Bayrouk origin back to Tuwat but did not dwell on the notion of *Ja'farite* descent. Indeed, while he glossed the ennobling potential of the notion of a *Ja'farite* descent, Naimi did not question the *Arabness* of the Bayrouk ancestors or their infinite association with the dynasty. To him, the Bayrouk descended from "warrior *'arab*" and became powerful courtesy of their patronage by Shurafa sultans.²¹ Nor did Naimi attempt to reconcile the narrator's investiture of all the Takna with a Hilal, Arab, origin with his own predication of the congruity of being Takna and domicile in Wadi Nun on decent from and inheritance of the Berber Lamta. Conversely, the Azwafit *nasaba* (genealogist) Abdul Mawla Bua'lam and historian El Mouddin endorsed the notions of Takna descent from Hilal and origination in Tuwat. Interesting, Bua'lam restricted descent from the Banu Hilal to the *shilha*-speaking Azwafit and, by implication, denied it to the Arabic-speaking *Ait Jamal* brethren of the Bayrouk. In comparison, El Mouddin took the Bayrouk investiture of all the Takna with a Hilalian origin at its face value.²²

The narrator's attempt to harmonize the migration of his ancestor Yusuf from Tuwat with the current identification of his family with the Takna of Wadi Nun led him to transform Tuwat from a bounded geographical space to a historical metaphor. Moreover,

²⁰ Al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 8, 6.; Idem, v. 19, 237.

²¹ Naimi, "Bayrouk," In *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1935; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 178.

²² Abdul Mawla Bu'alam, *shifa al-sidur wa al-hidaya wa al-sirur*, (Gulimeme:n.p. 1957), 18-19; El Mouddin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya*, 76.

the location of the Bayrouk origin in Tuwat also contrasts sharply with the simultaneous silence on the exact *qabia* relations of the first named ancestor of the family, Sulayman Ibn Ali. In any case, it is spatiality rather than kinship that occupies centre stage in his imagination of the Bayrouk relation to the Takna. He did not claim them as blood relations for his Tuwatian ancestry. A return to Tuwat therefore is imperative for any attempt to sort out the structural contradictions in the narrator's revelations and, hence, to account for an otherwise obscure phase in the Bayrouk history. By sketching the history of Tuwat from the era of the Arab conquest to the proposed time frame of Yusuf's migration to Wadi Nun, the sixteenth century, we could also evaluate the prospects of a portable, originary, Takna identity for the Bayrouk. I have already indicated that an investiture of the Bayrouk with an originary Takna identity hinges on a demonstration of whether the term Takna appears as a name for a bounded Tuwatian *qabila* during the period under consideration. Alternatively, if there is no reference to the Takna, the return to Tuwat can still enable us to surmise the identity possible for the first named ancestor of the Bayrouk: Sulayman Ibn Ali. In that sense, the location of Tuwat in space and the tabulation of its identities can help us to surmise how Sulayman's Susian descendants were able to overcome their marginality as Tuwatian outsiders to the extent of rewriting the Takna origin. This line of inquiry can further expedite the dispensation with the notion of ineffable attachment in favour of the discursive approach to questions of identification. On this occasion at least, the discursive approach could also help us to underline the ways textuality could have enabled the narrator to enrich the family history and identity.

II-Space, History and Identity

In this section, I will first show how classical authors like Ibn Khaldun situated Tuwat, as space, in relation to the rest of the Maghrib. I will then indicate the role of spatiality and textuality in the mapping out of Tuwatian identities and how these identities were transformed by the demographic ruptures engendered by dynastic squabbles over space and competitions over trade arteries spanning the period from the Arab conquest of the Maghrib to the constitution of Morocco as a separate dynastic realm. From this survey, it will become clear that neither Tuwat's geopolitical location nor its demographic history warrant an investiture of the Bayrouk with a hereditary Takna identity. On the contrary, spatiality and textuality led classical authors to imagine Maghribian identity claims in ways that tend to subvert any attempt to reconcile being Takna and domicile in al-Sus with origination in or en masse migration from Tuwat.

Tuwat: Man and Space

There are many Berber clans (hayy) and tribes (qabila) all of them descending from Goliath.

Ibn Hawqal²³

As a spatial designation Tuwat did not denote a clearly marked district or province. Rather, it used to be a referent to a group of widely dispersed *wahat* (oases) and *qusur* in

²³ Ibn Hawqal, *surat al-ard*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 50-51

the central Sahara, what is today, South-western Algeria. This oasis formation stretches from north to south for about two hundred kilometres and, as such, it constitutes a string of verdant *qusur* in an otherwise austere Saharan domain: what Ibn Khaldun dubbed *qafir* (wasteland). In classical Maghribian texts, the term Tuwat comes across as a designation for two major constellations of *wahat* and *qusur*, Buda in the west and Tamantit in the east—see map III. The presence of these permanent sources of water, the *wahat* (oases), did not discourage classical authors from dwelling on the prevalence of arid conditions and, by default, the frequent location of Tuwat in space in terms of its distance from or proximity to and difference from, the temperate Mediterranean seaboard in the north and the tropical basin of the Niger River in the south. In fact, emphasis on Tuwat's aridity often led to the demotion of even the verdant *qusur* to unattractive sites of domicile. The famous fourteenth-century traveller, Ibn Battuta (1304-1368), used lack of "cultivation" to paint a disappointing image for Tuwat and, in the process, not only to illuminate its difference from, but also to locate it outside, the Maghrib. "Buda," he wrote,

is one of the biggest villages of Tuwat. Its soil consists of sand and saline swamp. Its dates are plentiful but not sweet; yet its people prefer them to the dates of Sijilmasa. There is no cultivation there, no ghee, no olive oil. These things are brought to it from the land of the Maghrib. The food of its people is dates and locust.²⁴

Taken at its face value, this image leads one to expect people to flee from rather than migrate to Tuwat. In contrast Ibn Khaldun invoked the redemptive sight of "palm and streams," and access to the caravan to turn the same *qusur* into attractive sites of domicile and, as a result, located Tuwat 'in' the Far Maghrib—the domain of his Marinid patrons. "Beyond the erg to the south," he wrote,

is ... a land of palm and running water which is counted as part of the lands of the Maghrib, such as Buda and Tamantit to the south of the Farthest Maghrib ... Each of these is a region containing cultivated lands, with villages, palms and streams ... They (Tuwatians) live mostly by cultivating palms, but among them are merchants who trade to the Land of the Sudan.²⁵

Different as they are, these images of Tuwat cannot be understood without reference to the fixation of classical authors on dynastic succession and the caravan trade. Like al-Sus, Tuwat appealed to Maghribian dynasties and, by implication, attracted the attention of their "organic intellectuals" largely because of its proximity to Sijilmasa and service to caravans travelling to and from the Niger basin. In that sense, the classical tabulations of its *qabila* formations can best be understood in the context of the same dynastic successions and caravan trading set in motion by the Arab conquest. In the previous chapter, I noted that given their destabilizing nature, neither dynastic squabbles in the Maghrib nor the journey to and from Bilad al-Sudan can be entrusted with the

²⁴Ibn Battuta, *tuhfat al-nuzar*, in *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, ed. and trans. Said Hamdun and Noel King, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1994), 73.

²⁵Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.7 (13), 119; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, in *Corpus*, Hopkins and Levtzion, 325.

conservation of human patterns of domicile or modes of identification. But for classical authors like Ibn Khaldun, the ruptures caused by these agents of Maghribian historical experience were the main frames of reference for the location of *qabila* in time and space.

In the wake of the Arab conquest, Tuwat's ethnographic map was deemed to reflect its location in the central Sahara and, figuratively, its equidistance from the basins of the Mediterranean Sea and the Niger River. In spite of fleeting references to the presence of Jewish and *sudan* (black) elements in its *qusur*, the majority of Tuwat's inhabitants were deemed to be *Butr* Berbers.²⁶ Classical authors such as al-Ya'qubi (w. 872-3), Ibn Qutayba (w. 879-80) and al-Masudi (w. 947) deployed the notions of single creation and exodus from the *Mashriq* (orient) as frames of reference to imagine the origins of these groups.²⁷ In such classical texts, Jewish and Berber presence in Tuwat was uniformly attributed to their exodus from Palestine. In contrast, their *sudan* (black) counterparts were grafted into a residue of a much earlier *Kushite* (Ham) migration to the Maghrib.²⁸ As late as the nineteenth century, the erudite *emir* of the Sokoto *Khalifate* (northern Nigeria), Muhammad Belo (1780-1837), could still invoke this motif to credit the Jews with the exile of the Berbers from Palestine to *Afriqiyya* (Tunisia). He then turned this conclusion into a premise to charge Zanata Berbers, the "assassins of Prophet Zechariah," with the displacement of *sudan* from the Saharan backyards of the Maghrib.²⁹ In that sense, textual displacement rather than infinite nativity became the mainstay of classical conceptions of origin in the Maghrib and Bilad al-Sudan. In practice, however, it was spatiality that ultimately enabled the classical and modern author to determine which group was entitled to what origin.

Proximity to the domains of and linguistic similarities to, the *Butr* Berbers of the 'middle' Maghrib led Ibn Khaldun to identify the Berbers of Tuwat as a constituency of the Bani Yaladdas branch of the Banu Wamanu Zanata. "Among the divisions of the B. Wamanu," he noted,

are the clans of the B. Yaladdas, though some assert that they belong to the

²⁶In classical texts, al-Sudan is used as a referent to Sub-Saharan Africa in general and the basins of the Senegal and Niger in particular. At the same time, *sudan* (sing. *aswad* or *sudani*) becomes meaningful courtesy of its juxtaposition with *bidan*, (sing. *bidani* or *abyad*)—white. Sudan and its derivatives were posited as designations for both the inhabitants of *Bilad al-Sudan* per se and 'look a like' in the Sahara and the Maghrib. For examples of this use of *sudan*, see al-Yaqubi, *al-buldan*, In *Corpus*, Hopkins and Levzion, 20-21; al-Bakri, *al-masalik*, In *Corpus*, trans. ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 22-87; Ibn Battuta, *tuhfat al-nuzar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 279-303; Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 79-82.

²⁷Al-Masudi, *muruj al-dahab*, in *Corpus*, trans. ed. Levzion and Hopkins, 31-32, 35-37; Ibn Qutayba, *al-ma'arif*, in *Corpus*, trans., ed. Levzion and Hopkins, 15; al-Ya'qubi, *tarikh*, in *Corpus*, trans., ed. Levzion and Hopkins, 20-21.

²⁸The notion of descent from *Kush* (Ibn Ham) informs the works of earlier authors like al-Masudi and was endorsed by Ibn Khaldun; al-Masudi, *muruj al-dahab*, in *Corpus*, Levzion and Hopkins, 31-32, 35-37; Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar* v.7 (13), 7, 19, 114-119; On the Saharan Jews, see Bovill, *The Golden Trade*, 50; H. Z. Hirschberg, "The Problem of the Judaized Berbers," *The Journal of African History*, 4 (1963), 313-339; Hirschberg, *A History of the Jews in North Africa*, (Leiden: Brill, 1981)

²⁹Belo, *Infraq al-maysur*, Chadli ed. 63-64.

Maghrawa (Zanata). Their homelands are strung out to the south of the Farthest and middle Maghrib ... In their homelands, they have built qusur and strongholds and made gardens of palms ... one of their homelands ... is called Tuwat.³⁰

In a manner reminiscent of the presentation of the Lamta and Jazula of al-Sus, classical authors were unable to certify the exact ancestry of the Bani Yaladdas and, as a result, did not provide genealogies that we can use to endow the notions of segmentation and ineffable attachment with an intellectual probity. Rather, the seeming confusion over the exact origin of the Bani Yaladdas contrasts sharply with the certainty over their exact location in space. In keeping with the classical use of spatial distance and linguistic difference as frames of reference to distinguish the *Butr* Zanata from the *Baranis* Sanhaja and Masmuda, Ibn Khaldun did not credit the Lamta and Jazula with either nativity to or a belated migration to Tuwat. Nor did he credit the upstart *Zakn* he lumped with the Shabanat heirs of the Lamta and Jazula in al-Sus with descent from Tuwat.

Fixation on exodus from the sacred centre of the world, the *Mashriq*, tends to blur the role of encounter with or service to the caravan and the dynasty in the initial tabulation of Tuwat's *qabila* groupings, and the explanation of the subsequent shifts in its ethnographic makeup. For caravans from the middle Maghrib and the Niger basin, for example, Tuwat was a rendezvous point, a source of provisions, transport camels, escorts as well as news about commodity prices and security. For traders from the Maghrib, moreover, Tuwat was on the road to the salt mines of Taghaza whose produce was in high demand in Bilad al-Sudan.³¹ Befittingly, both Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun located Tuwat in space primarily in terms of its proximity to Sijilmasa and the propensity of its inhabitants to service the caravans. "One of their [Zanata] homelands," Ibn Khaldun wrote,

lies ... to the south of Sijilmasa and is called Tuwat. It consists of some 200 qusur ... of which the most easterly is ... Tamantit, nowadays a flourishing place and a point of departure for merchants who pass ... between the Maghrib and ... (the empire of) Mali ... Buda, the most westerly of these qusur, used to be the point of departure for Walatan (Walata) ... but it was abandoned when the Bedouin Arabs from the desert of the Sus took to acts of brigandry. ... The caravans ... left that place and followed the route to ... the Sudan by way of Tamantit (emphasis added).³²

³⁰Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 324-325, 338-339; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.7 (13), 114-119.

³¹On the location of Taghaza and the commercial significance of its salt mines, see Hamdun and King, *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, 30, 73; Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moor*, 68-69, 121-122, 160-164, 237-41; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 112, 216, 232.

³²Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, 7 (13), 118; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 339; for a similar vision see, Ibn Battuta, *tuhfat al-muzar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 303-304. "The Arabs from the desert of al-Sus" Ibn Khaldun alluded to were probably Hassan clients of the Marinids. Their incursions in the central Sahara coincided with the Marinid punitive expeditions against Sijilmasa, expeditions that anticipated its later destruction by their Watisid viziers. For the Marinid, Watisid, expeditions to Sijilmasa see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7: 594, 660-665, 722; Leo Africanus, *wasf afriqiya*, ed. and trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar, 128; al-Nasri, *al-istiqa*, v. 3, 120.

Tuwat's mediation in the Trans-Saharan Trade also entailed its susceptibility to demographic shifts caused by dynastic squabbles in the Maghrib. In fact, dynastic squabbles over space and trade routes became the main frame of reference for the extant authorial tabulations of post-conquest population mobility in Tuwat.

It is worth recalling how being Zanata itself was first demarcated in terms of opposition to the vanguard of the Arab conquest and, one might add, complicity in the death of the legendary Umayyad commander Uqba Ibn Nafi' (d.683).³³ In the previous chapter I noted how historians such as Julien, Levtzion and Abun-Nasr deployed Zanata as the "tribal" identity for Kharijite principalities like Sijilmasa as well as the Maghribian expatriates in the basins of the Senegal and Niger rivers, Awdaghust, Walata and Gao. Africanists also invoke Zanata as a referent to the most dogged opposition to the Fatimids as well as the protagonists of the (Sanhaja) Almoravids and their Lamta and Jazula 'brethren' in al-Sus.³⁴ Yet, adherence to *Kharijisim* and journeying to Bilad al-Sudan were also bound to impinge on Tuwat's demographic map and, hence, contribute to the hybridization and displacement of its occupants.³⁵ Notwithstanding its provisional nature, Ibn Khaldun's classification of the Bani Yaladdas as Banu Wamanu or Maghrawa Zanata tends to render the survival of their identities contingent on the fortunes of these *qabila* ensembles. Even if we ignore the role of *Kharijisim* in either the enunciation or reconfiguration of being (Banu Wamanu or Maghrawa) Zanata, it is difficult to imagine how the usable identities of Tuwatians could have survived the impact of the *Kharijite* conflicts with the Umayyads and Fatimids let alone the frequent association of being Zanata with exodus to Bilad al-Sudan?³⁶ As we will see below, dynastic squabbles over space and the displacement of its occupants were eventually to lead to the effacement of the Tuwatian identity designations tabulated in the wake of the Arab conquest.

Tuwat: Rights of Conquest, Rites of Identity

Any Berber tribe who founds an empire is always ... defeated by its own triumph; it becomes Arabized and gradually disappears. Emile Gautier³⁷

³³ On the constitution of Zanata as protagonists of Umayyad deputies see, Hannoum, *Colonial Histories*, 2-28. For classical presentations of the conflicts between Umayyad deputies and the two main leaders of the Zanata, Kusayla and the Kahina see, Ibn Abd al-Hakam (803-871), *futuh misr wa al-maghrib*, ed. Charles Torrey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920); Ibn Abd al-Hakam, *futuh misr*, in, *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 12-13; Ibn al-Athir (d.1233), *al-kamil*, in, *Corpus*, ed. and trans. Hopkins and Levtzion, 157-158.

³⁴ On the positing of Zanata as the "tribal" identity for the opponents of the Fatimids and Almoravids see, Levtzion, "The Western Maghrib and Sudan," in *Cambridge History of Africa*, v.3, ed. Oliver: 331-462; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 63-64, 79, 82, 84, 111, 120, 134, 140; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 121, 164; On the Zanata commercial 'imperialism' see, Levtzion "The Sahara and the Sudan," in *Cambridge History of Africa*, v.2 ed. Fage: 637-684; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 37-50; Talbi, "The Independence of the Maghrib," in *General History of Africa*, v. 3: 130-145.

³⁵ In the previous chapter I noted how emphasis on tribalism and the Arab-Berber divide, quite often blurs the role of ideologies such as Kharijism in the reconfiguration of Zanata identities. See, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 39.

³⁶ For the conflation of being a *Kharijite* Zanata with caravan trading see, Ibn al-Saghir (w.903), *Chronicle*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 24; al-Bakri (w.1068), *al-masalik*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 62-74; al-Wisayani (w.1166), *siyar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 90-91.

³⁷ Amile F. Gautier, *Sahara: The Great Desert*, trans. Dorothy F. Mayhew, (New York: Columbia University

In the following sub-sections, we will see how the cartographic and ethnographic production of Tuwat in the wake of the Arab conquest of the Maghrib also set the stage for the authorial explanation of its demographic history up to the Marinid period. I intend to show how the predication of the social birth and mutation of *qabila* on dynastic successions led Ibn Khaldun to conceptualise Tuwat's demographic history in terms of its domination by "first" and "second" generation Berber (Zanata) and its subsequent inheritance by "fourth generation" Arabians (Ma'qil). Colonial and post-colonial historians such as Julien and Abun-Nasr tended to use the ethnographic notion of "tribal solidarity" to historicise the *Makhzan-siba* dichotomy and, as a result, they also posited the linear drift from Berber, Zanata, to Arab, Ma'qil, as the cornerstone of demographic change in the Maghrib and its Saharan backyards. My objective is two-fold. Firstly I seek to underline the fact that the conflation of domicile in Tuwat with being Zanata does not auger well for the narrator's inclination to cast the Bayrouk merger into the Takna of Wadi Nun as reunion with *lost*, albeit spatial, brethren. Secondly, the current imagination of change in patterns of domicile in Tuwat in terms of a single shift from generic Zanata Berbers to generic Ma'qil Arabs not only simplifies the demographic history of the central Sahara, but also blurs the contingent nature of *qabila* notions of origin and identity. It hardly allows us to reflect on the role of 'foreign' ideologies like *Kharijism* or worldly dispositions such as hankering after the caravan trade in the constitution, reconstitution and mutation of identities. Herein, I will use Ibn Khaldun's testimonies to recover the complexity of the demographic history of the central Sahara and show why being from Tuwat was not the same as being from al-Sus.

In an attempt to schematise an intellectual credibility to the conflation of domicile in the central Sahara with being Bani Yaladdas, Ibn Khaldun turned the Zanata of the Maghrib into an inexhaustible backup for their brethren in Tuwat. Julien and Abun-Nasr used the same premise to underline the centrality of tribalism to Berber modes of identification. As a result, they blurred the demographic impact of the Almoravids and Almohads conquest of space and, hence, the role of displacement in the constitution and reconstitution of being Zanata or Berber for that matter.³⁸ In fact, they were also able to conserve Zanata as a composite, tribal, identity until the mutation of the *qabila* formations Ibn Khaldun dubbed "the first generation" Berbers. The Arab-Berber modality lurking beneath such ethnographic simplifications tends to underline the pitfalls of Ibn Khaldun's own fixation on dynastic succession and its systematic use as a frame of reference to explain population mobility. It reduces concomitant changes in patterns of domicile and migration to a linear exile of recalcitrant Zanata from the verdant Maghrib, the *hadar*, to its arid backyards, the *qaf*. For example, Ibn Khaldun tended to convert Zanata conflicts with the vanguards of the Umayyad expeditions to the Maghrib to a prelude for the

Press, 1935), 214. Gautier tended to 'berberize' Ibn Khaldun's conflation of the rise of *qabila* identity (*asabiya*) with the rise of the dynasty (*mulk*).

³⁸ Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 82; for a classical representation of the Almoravid approach to Kharijite (Zanata) centres like Sijilmasa, Tahert and the central Sahara see, Ibn Idhari, *al-bayan*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 220-230; for an account of the Almohad conquest of the Saharan Zanata see, Levi-Provencal, "Notes Histoire Almohade: Un Nouveau Fragment de Chronique Anonym," *Hesperis*, (1930): 49-90, 53-55.

Kharijite rebellion against the Fatimids led by Makhlad Ibn Kaydad (943-946). The *zanatization* of *Kharjism* seems to have enabled him to conflate being an immigrant from the Fatimids' Maghrib to the central Sahara with being Zanata.

In keeping with his systematic use of dynastic succession as a frame of reference to chronicle the rise and fall of *qabila* formations, Ibn Khaldun also credited the Almoravids and Almohads with the exile of deviant Zanata from the urban core of the Maghrib, the *hadar*, to its Saharan backyards, the *qaf*. He did not dwell on when and how did the Zanata return to Sunnite orthodoxy or in what ways did it affect their modes of identification. It is worth recalling that it was the Arab conquest that sanctioned his induction of the Bani Yaladdas as "first generation Zanata." In contrast, the conversion of the Marinid era into a graveyard for "first generation" Berbers and "conquest Arabs" also seems to have sanctioned Ibn Khaldun's own certification of the mutation of Bani Yaladdas. He nominated "second generation" Zanata like the Banu Marin and Abdulwad as their immediate heirs. While we know enough about the role of *Kharjism* in the construction of the "first generation Zanata," we can only surmise the meaning of the implicit overlap between return to the Sunnite mainstream and the emergence of "second generation Zanata" like the Banu Marin and Abdulwad. Discursively, the hybrid Banu Marin and Abdulwad were 'different' from the authentic, "first generation," Zanata partly because they were not *Kharijites*. That was also part of the reason why they were, unlike their *Kharijite* predecessors, able to bring the urban core of the Maghrib, the *hadar*, under their control.

Ibn Khaldun posited the rise of the two polities the Marinids and the Zayanids (Abdulwad) had established, to herd their "second generation Zanata" brethren to the "cities" and then assign the sites of their former exile in the *qaf*, the Sahara, to "fourth generation" Arabians: the Ma'qil. "When the (second generation) Zanata became rulers of the Maghrib," he noted,

and entered the cities ... these Ma'qil ... had the wastes to themselves. They multiplied in a way that has no like and ruled the *qusur* of the desert which Zanata had established in the waste such as the *qusur* of the Sus in the west, then Tuwat, then Buda, then Tamantit, then Rakan, then Tasabit then Figuration in the east. ... The Arab Ma'qil have absorbed these districts into their territory and imposed on them dues and taxes which have become a revenue for them ... From the earliest times they (Ma'qil) have paid *sadaqat* (tribute) to the kings of Zanata who make them pay fines for their ... feuds ... These Arabs used not to ... do any harm to travellers from Sijilmasa or elsewhere to the land of the Sudan. This was because of the might of the states ... in the days of the Almohads and Zanata (the Marinids and Zayanids) after them.³⁹

In the interim, Ibn Khaldun used the archetypal demarcation of being Zanata in juxtaposition with dynastic successions spanning the Arab Conquest and the first two Berber empires, the Almoravids and Almohads, to turn encounters between immigrants

³⁹ Ibn Khaldun used "second generation" Zanata as a generic designation for the Marinids (Morocco) and their Zayanid rivals (Algeria); Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, 7 (13), 119; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 324.

from the verdant Maghrib, the *hadar*, and the inhabitants of its arid Saharan backyards, the *qafir*, into a sort of Zanata family reunions. In that sense, the textual retention of the Bani Yaladdas as a coherent *qabila* ensemble was made possible largely through the *zanatisation* of displacement and, in effect, the blurring of the demographic impact of dynastic squabble over space and trade arteries. In the previous chapter, I noted how this strategy enabled Ibn Khaldun to delay the final mutation of the Lamta and Jazula until the Marinid period and, in effect, to blame the *de-berberization* of Wadi Nun on encounter with the Ma'qil Shabanat and Hassan. As we will presently see, fixation on dynastic succession seems to have dictated the Africanists' use of the same strategy to explain the disappearance of the Zanata of the central Sahara

Julien and Abun-Nasr picked up from where Ibn Khaldun has left off and, as a result, also underestimated the impact of the incursions of upstart *qabila* formations like the Banu Abdulwad and Banu Marin in the central Sahara on patterns of domicile and modes of identification in its *qusur*. Julien, for instance, attributed the mutation of the "Zanata tribes" to the Ma'qil invasion of their homelands. These were the same Ma'qil Ibn Khaldun put their original number at "less than two hundred" (families).⁴⁰ "Notwithstanding wars and destruction," Julien wrote,

the Zenata tribes continued to be strong enough to ... slow down the Bedouin advance. Nevertheless, these Zenata suddenly disappeared from history. Were they driven out by the Arabs ... Could it not rather be that in the course of the fifteenth century there came about a fusion of nomadic Zenata with nomadic Arabs?⁴¹

Julien's proposition of a sudden disappearance of the Zanata seems to rest on the ethnographic location of the Berbers, as tribes, in binary opposition to an Arab dynastic realm: the *bled el Makhzan-bled es siba* dichotomy. Neither Abun-Nasr nor Brett explicitly supported Julien's suggestion of the fifteenth century as the definitive time of the 'disappearance' of the Zanata. There is, however, a suggestive link between lapses in their use of Zanata as a name for a viable *qabila* formation and their assessments of the decline in Marinid and Zayanid fortunes in the 15th century.⁴² Abun-Nasr, for example, mentioned the Zanata for the last time in the course of his treatment of the Zayanid-Marinid squabbles during the second half of the fourteenth century. In contrast, Brett and Fentress presented the Marinids as "that Zanata Berber dynasty in terminal decline" who lost Ceuta to the Portuguese in 1415.⁴³ Yet, we can combine Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on

⁴⁰"At the present time", he noted, "this tribe (the Ma'qil) is one of the most numerous of the Arab tribes of the Maghrib ... They entered the Maghrib in small numbers with the Hilalis. It is said that they did not reach 200. The Banu Sulaym barred their way and weakened them, so they have for long sided with the Hilalis ... They were the neighbours of the Zanata in the western deserts." Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 324

⁴¹Julien, *History of North Africa*, 169; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 109.

⁴²The founders of the Zayanid regime, Zaydan (r. 1234-36) and his brother Yaghmurasan (r. 1236-1280), also started their career as Almohad deputies. The state maintained a precarious independence until the arrival of the Ottomans in the 1510s. The Marinids, Hafisids and later, the Spanish often invaded the Zayanid state—hence, the frequent reference to Abdulwad 'retreats' to the central Sahara.

⁴³Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 140; Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 170.

the utilitarian nature of identity with his own predication of the demand for *qabila asabiya* (solidarity) on the quest for power to qualify the notion of sudden mutation.

In spite of his predication of the Ma'qil inheritance of the *qafr* on "the Zanata" conquest of the *hadar*, Ibn Khaldun traced their mutual relocation in the central Sahara back to the Almohad defeat and then enlistment of the Hilal in 1153, and subsequent dispersion of the (Zanata) Banu Marin in 1217 and 1239.⁴⁴ It is worth recalling that Ibn Khaldun also denied authentic Arab and Berber origins to "second generation" Zanata, the Banu Marin, and "fourth generation" Arabs, the Ma'qil. We can also combine the tracing of the origin of the Banu Marin identity to Spain with the impressive proliferation of the Ma'qil to underline the pitfalls of the ethnographic notions of Berber tribalism and segmentation.⁴⁵ Neither the notion of "tribal solidarity" nor the Arab-Berber, *makhzan-siba*, modality can help us explain the mutation of the Banu Yaladdas. These notions also blur the demographic ruptures lurking beneath the emergence of the Banu Marin and Abdulwad, and then the Dhawi Ubaydallah Ma'qil as the dominant *qabila* groups in the central Sahara. We can bring the Banu Marin or Banu Abdulwad domination of the central Sahara within the realm of the historically conceivable only if we credit them with the conquest of the space the Bani Yaladdas used to call home. It would, for instance, be naive to explain the Banu Marin or Abdulwad hegemony in the central Sahara in terms of their mere invocation of Zanata "solidarity" to convince the Bani Yaladdas to give up their "gardens of palms". Without the assumption of a much earlier mutation of the Bani Yaladdas identity, it is equally impossible to make sense of Ibn Khaldun's investiture of the upstart Banu Marin and Abdulwad rather than the Bani Yaladdas with the bequest of the "qusur of the desert" to the Ma'qil 'Ubaydallah.⁴⁶ The constitution of Zanata as an originary identity for successive occupants of the central Sahara tends to gloss the role of dynastic squabbles, the caravan trade and the forced or voluntary migrations they set in motion in the transformation of Tuwat's demographic and cultural map.

Like Ibn Khaldun's investiture of the Shabanat and Hassan with the incorporation of the Lamta and Jazula residue in al-Sus, the representation of the Bani Yaladdas encounters with different immigrants from the Maghrib as Zanata reunions delays the mutation of their identity and, as such, expedites its attribution to what Julien called "the Bedouin advance." Dispensation with the notion of a generic, ethnic, Zanata identity enables us to integrate the disappearance of the Bani Yaladdas in the cumulative boundary constructing process that goes beyond the fifteenth century. The era of the Arab conquest rather than the Marinid period seems to be the most conceivable genesis of this gradual, albeit inexorable, demographic transformation. What Ibn Khaldun characterised as the Zanata "abjuration" of their Berber identities also seem to have overlapped with the Ma'qil desertion of their ostensible Yemenite origin in favour of *Ja'farite* descent, the claim he stridently disputed. In a manner reminiscent of what happened in al-Sus, these

⁴⁴On the Almohads and the Zanata see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.6, 209; *Idem*, v.7, 554-555, 594, 645.

⁴⁵Abun-Nasr reversed Ibn Khaldun's predication of the emergence of a Banu Marin *asabiya* on the rise of their leader and Almohad client, Abd al-Haq Ibn Mahyu. In his text they appear as an insulated "first generation" Berbers. "Like most Zanata Berbers," he wrote, "the Banu Marin ... led a pastoral life until they become involved in political conflict with the Almohads" Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 103.

⁴⁶I noted (chapter 1) that in the course of his 'partition' of the *qafr* (Sahara) among the Ma'qil, Ibn Khaldun assigned Tuwat to the Dhawi Ubaydallah; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v.7 (13): 59, 114-115, 128.

shifts in Tuwatian patterns of domicile and modes of identification also seem to intersect with the decent towards *sufism* and the notion of Shurafa origin.⁴⁷ We could attribute the temporal incentives behind claims of descent from pious *Sahaba* (companions) like *Ja'far* (d.629), and the aggrandizement of their *sufi* propagators to the same kind of patronage I identified in the previous chapter.

In the realm of commerce, we could juxtapose the Marinids' deputation of Shabanat and Hassan clients to monitor the western axis of the caravan trade with the inclination of their Zayanid (Abdulwad) rivals to patronize the 'Ubaydallah of Tuwat. According to Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus, the Ubaydallah of Tuwat were the main Ma'qil branch not on amicable terms with the Marinids. In fact, the general parameters of being Ubaydallah were charted in terms of their tendency to escort caravans issuing from Zayanid Tilmisan (Tlemcen).⁴⁸ Very much like their Shabanat and Hassan brethren in al-Sus, the Ubaydallah were located in time and space courtesy of their patronage by the Zayanids and escort of caravans passing through Tuwat. Interestingly, Tuwat's commercial reputation reached new heights at a time when the partition of the Maghrib spawned by the Marinid-Zayanid rivalry was augmented by the intensification of their conflicts with the Iberians (Portugal and Spain).⁴⁹ This rivalry over space was eventually bequeathed to the Ottoman heirs of the Zayanids in Algeria (1510s-1830s) and the Sa'dian successors of the Marinids in Morocco.⁵⁰

The Marinid-Zayanid rivalry over space continued to reverberate in the Tuwat the Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf was soon to leave to Wadi Nun. On the eve the Ottoman conquest of Algeria in the early sixteenth century and the Sa'dian take over of Morocco, for instance, Tamantit was rocked by a crisis stirred by an itinerant *sufi* figure from Zayanid Tilmisan called Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Karim al-Maghili.⁵¹ Despite its limited

⁴⁷On the proliferation of *sufi* centres and *uruq* (orders), see Abd al-Latif al-Shadhili, *al-tasawwuf wa al-mujtama'* (Sla; matba't Sla, 1989); Nafessa al-Dhabi ed. *al-ribatat wa al-zawaya fi tarikh al-Maghrib* (Rabat: matba't ukaz, 1997); Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*, 3-63.

⁴⁸On his return trip from Mali, Ibn Battuta received "news" that the "Awlad Kharaj (Ubaydallah) and Ibn Yagmur (Zayanid) had rebelled and occupied Tasabit of Tuwat." The statement signifies the connections between the Ubaydallah and the Zayanids. Ibn Battuta, *tuhfat al-nuzzar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 304; According to Leo Africanus, the Ubaydallah received annual gratuities from the Zayanids. Leo Africanus, *wasf afriqiyya*, ed. and trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar, v.1: 33-34, 44-45; Idem. v.2, 8-9; on the Ubaydallah escort of caravans from Zayanid domains see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar*, v. 7(13), 119, 175; on their alienation from the Marinids see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar* 6 (11), 123. For the Marinid deputation of Hassan and Shabanat to monitor the western axis of the caravan routes see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar* v.7 (13), 121. On the replication of the Zayanid-Marinid rivalries in the central Sahara see, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar* v.7 (13): 363-364, 386-388.

⁴⁹On Tuwat's fame see, John Hunwick, *Sharia' in Songhay: The Replies of al-Maghili to the Questions of Askia al-Hajj Muhammad*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 29-42; Muhammad A' lief, "al-masalik al-sahrawiyya: Tuwat", in Muhammad Zanayber ed., *al-a'laqat bayn al-maghrib wa afriqiyya al-gharbyia* (Rabat: matba't ukaz, 1987): 49-59.

⁵⁰On the Ottoman regency of Algeria see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 144-168.

⁵¹Al-Maghili took issue with what he saw as a discrepancy between Jewish affluence and their status as *dhimis* (protectorates), a discrepancy he blamed on the laxity of their localized patrons: Tamantit's Arabized elites. What began as a juridical debate soon degenerated into skirmishes with inconclusive results because al-Maghili himself left Tuwat to Bilad al-Sudan. On al-Maghili's career in Tuwat see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 143; John Hunwick, "Al-Maghili and the Jews of Tuwat: the Demise of A community," *Studia*

span and scope, this crisis exacerbated the dislocations leading to the Ottoman conquest of Algiers in 1516 and subsequent attempt to annex Tuwat in 1583-4. The Ottoman incursion alarmed the Sa'dian sultan Mawlai Ahmed al-Manсур and as part of his plans to expand across the Sahara, he conquered Tuwat in 1587. Tuwat became a springboard for the S'adian expeditions to the Niger basin, the expeditions that culminated in their conquest of the *sudanic* Empire of Songhay in 1591.⁵² In the course of the succession dispute that followed al-Manсур's death in 1603, Tuwat remained outside the jurisdiction of the Simlali *emirate* of al-Sus—the "first" Illigh. But, because of its proximity to the Alawite home base, Tafilalt (Sijilmasa), Tuwat soon became one of their prized dominions. The Alawite sultan Mawlai Ismael (1672-1727) merged Tuwat, Tafilalt and Wadi Dra' into a single *amala* (province) which he entrusted to his son and heir-apparent, al-Mamun. Ismael's letters to his son al-Mamun provide us with ample clues to the identity designations current in Tuwat in the early eighteenth-century. The correspondence indicates the mutation of the Ubaydallah as a coherent *qabila* ensemble. Instead, Tuwat began to be identified as a homeland for a plethora of upstart Arabic and Berber-speaking *qabila* constellations such as the *Dhawi Mana'* and the *Ait Khabash (Atta)* respectively. In contrast to the certification of the Takna presence in al-Sus, Mawlai Ismael's letters to al-Mamun do not mention a *qabila* ensemble with a similar name in Tuwat.⁵³ In that sense, we can conclude that there was no bounded *qabila* ensemble called the Takna in Tuwat well after the reported time of Yusuf's migration to Wadi Nun: the late 16th century.

Possible Identities, Impossible Origins

The forgoing discussion allows us to draw four main conclusions with significant implications for the narrator's investiture of the Takna with a Hilalian and Tuwatian origin as well as his claim of a *Ja'farite* descent for the Bayrouk, the claim that seems to justify his simultaneous silence on the exact *qabila* relations of the first named ancestor of the family: Sulayman Ibn Ali. Firstly, neither the classical Arabic sources nor current academic treatises mention an en masse Hilal migration to either the central or Western Sahara. We can, therefore, deduce descent from Hilal and domicile in Tuwat or al-Sus only from Ibn Khaldun's attribution of the proliferation of the Ma'qil to their propensity to incorporate different elements. Here, one can imagine a Hilal migration to Tuwat in terms of the fusion of some Hilal elements in their former Ma'qil protectorates, a fusion that also entails the excision of their previous identities. In the light of Ibn Khaldun's meticulous

Islamica, 61 (1985), 323-71; Hunwick, *Sharia in Songhay*, 32-39.

⁵²On the Ottoman-Sa'dian rivalry and its role in the Sa'dian conquests in the Sahara and Sudan see, Abderrahmane El Mouddin, "The Idea of the Caliphate Between Moroccans and Ottomans: Political and Symbolical Stakes in the 16th and 17th century-Maghrib," *Studia Islamica*, 82 (1995), 103-112; Michael Brett, "Morocco and the Ottomans," *Journal of African History*, 25, (1984): 331-341; Michel Abitbol, "The end of the Songhay Empire," in *General History of Africa*, v.5 ed. B.A Ogot: 300-327; Abdullah Kanun, *Rasa'il S'adiya* (Tetuan: dar al-tiba' al-maghribiya, 1954), 118-129; l'institut des Études Africaines, ed. *Le Maroc et l'Afrique subsaharienne aux débuts des temps modernes, Les Sa'diens et l'empire songhay: Actes du Colloque International organisé par l'institut des Études Africaines, Université Mohammed V, (Rabat: Publications de l'institut des Études Africaines, 1995)*

⁵³For Mawlai Ismael's letters to his son al-Mamun, see al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 217-260.

tabulation of the Hilal elements the Almohads had reportedly transferred to the Maghrib, it is hard to imagine how he could have missed such migrations or failed to use it to mitigate his explicit surprise at the rather spectacular proliferation of the Ma'qil in space with a limited economic absorptive capacity: the *qafir*. In contrast to his attribution of the disappearance of the last Lamta and Jazula of al-Sus to their absorption by the Shabanat and Hassan, for instance, Ibn Khaldun was bemused by the inclination of "second generation" Berbers like the (Abdul-Wad) Zayanids to trade the notion of Zanata origin for claims of Arab descent.⁵⁴ Collectively, these observations do not auger well for the narrator's location of Hilal elements in Tuwat let alone the possibility of their subsequent 'reincarnation' as Takna in al-Sus: Wadi Nun and its Saharan backyards.

Secondly, from a mere geographical vantage point, Tuwat is much closer to the middle Maghrib than it is to al-Sus and the Western Sahara. The classical authorial use of service to caravans and conquest by (Far) Maghribian dynasties to nudge Tuwat towards Sijilmasa blurs both its spatial distance from al-Sus and the cultural differences this distance tends to entail. If we take the classical and current authorial juxtaposition of the *Butr* and *Baranis* Berbers as a point of departure, it will be difficult to imagine a significant crossing from the "first generation" Zanata of the central Sahara, the Bani Yaladdas, to their "first generation" Sanhaja contemporaries in al-Sus, the Lamta and Jazula. In the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, we could rule out the prospect of a compelling historical precedent for the narrator's explanation of the Takna origin in terms of migration from Tuwat to al-Sus. Instead, we can take the narrator's proposition as an indicator of how his attempt to legitimise the Bayrouk status amongst the Takna has led him to rewrite the demographic histories of Tuwat and al-Sus.

Thirdly, the authorial explanation of demographic change during the Marinid era in terms of the devolution of rights in space from "second generation" Zanata like the Banu Marin to "fourth generation" Arabs such as the 'Ubaydallah Ma'qil, tends to institutionalise the differences between Tuwat and al-Sus, the differences first charted in the wake of the Arab conquest of the Maghrib. After all, the explanation of shifts in Tuwatian identity claims in terms of the transformation of the central Sahara from a domain of "second generation" Zanata like the Banu Marin to a fief for "fourth generation" Arabs such as the Ubaydallah also corresponds to the transfer of the Sanhaja (Lamta and Jazula) rights in al-Sus and its Saharan backyards to the Shabanat and Hassan Ma'qil. Here, the linguistic similarities between the Shabanat and Hassan of al-Sus and the Western Sahara on one hand, and the Ubaydallah of Tuwat on the other hand were abrogated by their investiture with divergent political and commercial dispositions like patronage by the Marinids and Zayanids, and escort of caravans from their respective domains. Pedantically, the "mixing" (*ikhtilat*) of genomes and the "corruption" (*fasad*) of *ansab* (genealogies) Ibn Khaldun used to explain the emergence of the "second generation" Berber and the "fourth generation" Arab *qabila* formations can be imagined in terms of crossing from Zanata to Ubaydallah in Tuwat and from Lamta or Jazula to Shabanat or Hassan in al-Sus. Yet, even at this pedantic level, significant encounters between the Ubaydallah and Lamta or Jazula in al-Sus on one hand, or the Shabanat and the Zanata of Tuwat on the other hand can still be deemed beyond the realm of the

⁵⁴ *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 125; Ibn Khaldun, *al-'Ibar* v.6 (11): 121-122.

historically conceivable. What this means is that we can hardly trace the Takna origin back to Tuwat and at the same time ignore the long association of being from Tuwat with being Zanata, Yaladdas and Marin or Abdulwad.

Conversely, it would be naive to credit the Bayrouk with a "natural" attachment to the Takna of Wadi Nun and at the same time trace the origin of their ancestor Yusuf back to Tuwat. After all, until the proposed time of Yusuf's migration, the Sa'dian period, notions of being from Tuwat or the central Sahara and being from al-Sus or the Western Sahara were mutually exclusive. They were irreconcilable mainly because of the difference in the identities used by their occupants as well as the political and commercial agendas that made such identity claims stand out. Whether it was sanctioned by tangible historical experiences or by a mere fidelity to textual traditions, the parallelism between being from Tuwat and being from al-Sus seems to go all the way back to the post-conquest cartographic and ethnographic production of *Near (Adna)* and *Far (Aqsa)* Maghribs and their respective cultivation with *Butr* (Zanata) and *Baranis* (Sanhaja) Berbers. Evidently, the Bayrouk case renders this parallelism too constrictive to accommodate every Tuwatian or Susian experience. It would be naive to posit the Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf as the first to migrate from Tuwat to Wadi Nun. That said, one could still utilize the deft emphasis of the spatiality of identities lurking beneath this parallelism to differentiate between the realistic and imaginative about the revelations of al-Susi's informants.

Finally, in the previous chapter I noted the relatively recent articulation of Takna as an identity designation for a bounded Susian *qabila* ensemble. In light of the discursive predication of being Takna on deference to known Susian *zawaya* and service to named Shurafa dynasts, the presence of Takna bodies in Tuwat becomes conceivable only in relation to the Sa'dian or Alawite incursions into the central Sahara. I also noted how amicable relations with the leaders of the *Jazulia sufi tariqa* in al-Sus had enabled the Sa'dians to recruit the Takna in their armies. Here, one can use the Takna service to the S'adian dynasty and deference to its *Jazulia* benefactors to propose the sixteenth century as the possible time frame for a conceivable arrival of Takna elements in Tuwat.⁵⁵ By cross-referencing the known date of the first Sa'dian incursion into the central Sahara, 1587, with the purported time of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun, the late sixteenth century, we could also extrapolate possible reasons for his migration to Wadi Nun. The establishment of a timeframe and probable motives for migration to Wadi Nun can help us to surmise the identities available to Yusuf's forefathers and the relations he might have left behind in Tuwat, the identity that became a casualty of his own migration to al-Sus. Herein, I will return to the Bayrouk narrative and use the narrator's revelations to establish a historical context for Yusuf's migration to al-Sus and, hence, impute the circumstances that might have eased his first encounter with Takna elements from Wadi Nun. The frequent overlap between the narrator's recollections and textual presentations of the history of the period under review does not encourage one to blame his silences on the frailty of human memory. Silence sometimes is as eloquent as remembrance.

Tuwat's Gift to Al-Sus: Bayrouk Revelations and Silences

⁵⁵On the Sa'dian recruitment of the Takna see, al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 7, 40-43.

You do not go to the desert to find identity, but to lose it... to become anonymous. Edmund Jabes⁵⁶

I have already noted that al-Susi's Bayrouk informant, *Qaid Dahman II*, revealed scanty information about the first named family ancestor, Sulayman, and practically nothing about either his father Ali or his son Abdullah. In fact, the narrator's silence on these two Tuwatian ancestors extends to Yusuf's immediate Susian descendants as well. While he credited Yusuf with the honour of first arrival in Wadi Nun, for example, the narrator excluded Yusuf's only named son Abdul-Rahman as well as his grandson Saud from the family saga. Instead, the narrator leapt directly to the sixth name in the family *nisba*, *shaykh* Muhammad Ibn Saud, and converted his reported rescue of a "government army" from death by thirst in the *hamada* (desert) of Tinduf into a certificate of social birth for the Bayrouk. The narrator's silence on Sulayman's distant ancestry and Yusuf's immediate heirs contrasts sharply with his invocation of lofty historical metaphors such as *Ja'farite* descent and the Banu Hilal *taghriba* (exile) to insert both the Bayrouk and the Takna into the main stream of Maghribian history.⁵⁷ One can, of course, ponder whether the careers of these ancestors were the casualties of either al-Susi's editorial interventions or the conscious decision of his informant.

Al-Susi's confessed infatuation with things Susian may explain the limited revelations about Yusuf's Tuwatian ancestors: Sulayman, his father Ali and his son Abdullah. As outsiders, these ancestors do not seem to belong in a text intended to celebrate Susian achievements. Al-Susi's provincial biases, however, cannot be blamed for the exclusion of Yusuf's son Abdul-Rahman and his grandson Saud from the family saga. In any case, both Abdul-Rahman and Saud were Susian by birth and, by implication, were in a position to preside over the transformation of the Bayrouk into members of the Ait Musa *qabila* and the Takna ensemble. One could infer that al-Susi's provincialism merely complemented what his informant wanted to reveal about the Bayrouk past. A collation of the narrator's sketchy revelations with what we know about the histories of Tuwat and al-Sus could shed some light on the circumstances surrounding Yusuf's migration to Wadi Nun as well as the identities available to his ancestors.

According to al-Susi's informant, Sulayman Ibn Ali lived in Tuwat "before the eleventh-century (*qarn*)" of the *Hijra*—i.e. before 1590. In contrast, Yusuf reportedly arrived in Wadi Nun at the "beginning of the eleventh-century (of the *Hijra*)," in the 1590s. The lack of definitive dates can be amended by recourse to the classical Maghribian use of Muhammad's prophecy and dynastic succession as frames of reference to imagine life expectancy and generational successions. Using Prophet Muhammad as a model, Ibn Khaldun posited "forty" as the zenith of a productive life span and conferred

⁵⁶Edmund Jabes, *The Book of Margins* trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), xvi.

⁵⁷I have already noted that the arrival of the Banu Hilal, Sulaym and, arguably, the Ma'qil in the Maghrib was explained in terms of their exile (*taghriba*) to Syria and subsequent encounter with the Fatimids, the encounter that presaged their migration westwards. In this sense, encounter with the dynasty is at the centre of what came to be known as *Seyrat Banu Hilal*. On the folkloric aspects of the Banu Hilal *taghriba* (the *seyra*) see, A. Aoub, "The Hilali epic; material and memory," *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 11 (1984): 189-217; H.T. Norris, "The Rediscovery of the Ancient Sagas of the Banu Hilal," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 51 (1988): 462-81.

three generational successions on each century (*qurn*).⁵⁸ When applied to the narrative, this strategy reveals that the narrator's choice of "before" and "the beginning" of the eleventh-century of the *Hijra* as watersheds in the journey from Tuwat to Wadi Nun is not as random as it seems to be. Rather, this chronological device implies a tacit subscription to the textual use of encounter with the dynasty to locate *qabila* in time and space as a point of departure to concoct a genesis for the Bayrouk career. The narrator's deployment of the (Shurafa) dynasty as a witness to historicity seems to bring the Bayrouk story within the scope of classical Maghribian textual traditions and the *Ait Jamal* narratives of origin.

It is worth recalling that the "beginning of the eleventh century" was also the high point in the career of the S'adian sultan Mawlai al-Mansur (r.1578-1603). It is hardly a coincidence that the narrator should situate Yusuf's moment of arrival in al-Sus in the wake of the S'adian defeat of Portugal in 1578 and conquest of Songhay in 1591. It is also worth noting that while al-Sus was the cradle of the Sa'dian dynasty, Tuwat served as a base for Mawlai al-Mansur's expeditions to the salt mines of Taghaza and the Niger basin. In the previous chapter, I noted how the *Ait Jamal* subaltern narratives of origin tend to 'jump' from the reign of the Sa'dian al-Mansur to the career of his Alawite peer, Mawlai Ismael, and, in the process, bypass Mawlai Rashid's reported "dislike" for *ahl al-sahil* groups like the Takna. We could posit this observation as a premise and infer a discursive co-relation between the narrator's silence on the whereabouts of Yusuf's immediate heirs and Mawlai Rashid's (r.1666-1672) decapitation of the *ahl al-sahil* clients of the Simlali emirate.⁵⁹ It is probable that al-Susi's informant did not want to dwell on a past that does not support the choice of "service" (*khidma*) in Mawlai Ismael's Saharan expeditions as the genesis of the family career, the choice enshrined in the leap from Yusuf to his grandson Muhammad Ibn Saud. Otherwise, it is difficult to account for the disparity between the narrator's ability to remember the moment of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun and his silence on the ancestors who lived through and, hence, ought to have at least witnessed the conflict between Abu-Hassoun al-Simlali (r.1592-1658) and the Alawite scourge of his *ahl al-sahil* clients, Mawlai Rashid. In either case, the situation of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun during the high point of al-Mansur's career provides a clue that one can use to surmise both the circumstance surrounding his migration from Tuwat and the identities available to his ancestors.

The year 1590 was the end of the Muslim century that had begun in 1490: the tenth-century of the *Hijra*. By assigning three ancestors to this century, we could use encounter

⁵⁸ *Qarn* is the Arabic equivalent of century— a hundred years. Maghribian notions of the ideal life span were modelled after Prophet Muhammad's age when he died, sixty-three. This tradition informs Ibn Khaldun's idea of the 'best time to die'. Ibn Khaldun distinguished between the "natural age" and the useful lifespan. While he put the "natural age" between a hundred and a hundred and twenty years, Ibn Khaldun posited "forty" as the peak of youthful exuberance, the sixties as the mean time of death and computed three generational successions in each "natural age". In this model, forty is the cut-off period for generational succession. Leo Africanus endorsed this estimation and noted that while 65 and 75 were the mean life expectancy in the Maghrib, people in the Atlas Mountains often lived for more than a hundred years. *Muqadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 159-160; Leo Africanus, *wasf afriqiyya* v.1, ed. and trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar, 66.

⁵⁹ According to al-Susi, Susians retain fond memories of the Sa'dian dynasty: he called it "their state" (*dawlatahum*). In contrast, Naimi blamed the decline in Takna fortunes on Mawlai Rashid's defeat of the *ahl al-sahil*. Al-Susi, *Illigh*, 29; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 163.

with the dynasty to bridge the gap that separates the situation of Sulayman "before the eleventh century" of the *Hijra* and the placement of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun at its "beginning", the 1590s. According to this chronological order, Sulayman's named father, Ali, and his "anonymous" grandfather might have lived through the dislocations that presaged the eventual partition of the Maghrib into Ottoman Algeria and Sa'dian Morocco, the late Marinid, Watisid, period (1420s-1510s). The main benefit of this suggestion is that it enables us to situate Yusuf's father, Abdullah, in Tuwat on the eve of the Ottoman incursions in the central Sahara, the incursions that inspired Mawlai al-Mansur's annexation of Tuwat in 1587. One could further propose that by the time of al-Mansur's conquest of the central Sahara, Yusuf was old enough to be of marriageable age. Otherwise, it would be hard to imagine how he could have decided to desert Tuwat on his own and to relocate in Wadi Nun where he reportedly "left his progeny."⁶⁰

In the context of the current academic articulations of the relation between displacement and the quest for origin, Yusuf's desertion of Tuwat lends itself to two plausible explanations: a forced or voluntary migration.⁶¹ The Bayrouk narrative does not reveal the motives behind Yusuf's migration from Tuwat nor does it invoke the dynasty either as a benevolent or malevolent agency of displacement. Taken at its face value, the deft exoneration of the dynasty does not sit well with forced migration. Since the ultimate destination, al-Sus, was also the cradle of the Sa'dian conquerors of Tuwat one could utilize its appeal to Yusuf to further discount the prospect of forced migration. It is difficult to imagine how a displaced Tuwatian such as Yusuf could have sought refuge from the Sa'dian conquerors of his homeland amongst their diehard *zawaya* and *qabila* supporters in al-Sus? Instead, one could gainfully use al-Susi's association of the Bayrouk's Tuwatian ancestors with the caravan trade as an indicator of the probable incentives behind Yusuf's decision to relocate in al-Sus. The prominent role the caravan trade had played in the Sa'dian decision to turn Tuwat into a conduit between their power base in al-Sus and new acquisitions in the Niger basin might have tempted Yusuf to migrate to Wadi Nun. In comparison to Tuwat, al-Sus was spared the vagaries of the Ottoman-Sa'dian competition over space and, as I have noted in the previous chapter, because of the 'opening' of the Atlantic for trade, was already a venue of growing exchange with Europe. Neither Leo Africanus nor Marmol, for example, alluded to Tamantit let alone Buda. In contrast, they identified Teqauost as the main hub of trade in al-Sus. The disparity between silence on Tamantit and reference to Teqauost convey timely impressions of the difference in the commercial fortunes of Tuwat and Wadi Nun.⁶²

⁶⁰Al-Susi, *al-masul* v.19, 273.

⁶¹On the relation between displacement and hankering after origins see, Spivak, "Acting Bits," in *Identities*, ed. Appiah and Gates: 147-180; Hall, "Introduction," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Hall and Du Gay: 4-5; Bauman, "From Pilgrim to Tourist," in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, 18-35.

⁶²Leo Africanus and Marmol tended to posit productive capacity and access to the caravan trade as frames of reference to grade the living conditions of the groups that inhabited the geographical locales mentioned in their texts. In this context, their failure to mention either Buda or Tamantit is important because it coincided with references to the desertion of old Sijilmasa and the emergence of Tegaoust (Wadi Nun) as a major hub of the Trans-Saharan Trade. In the previous chapter, I noted how this vision anticipated Jackson's location of the Takna, as "free" tribes, outside Wadi Nun, the "depot of Merchandise". For Leo Africanus's representation of Wadi Nun see, Leo Africanus, *Wasf Afriqiyya*, v.1, trans. and ed. Hajji and al-Akhdar, 94-

It would be stating the obvious to say that relocation in Wadi Nun also implies subscription to the identities most conducive to living with its inhabitants. Conversely, Yusuf's departure from Tuwat was bound to lead to the severing of the social attachment used by his named ancestors as well as those cultivated by the relations he left behind. To surmise the strategies Yusuf might have used to endear himself to Susian hosts like the Takna, it is imperative to consider the identities that could have served his ancestors but had become redundant as a result of migration to Wadi Nun. An extrapolation of the identities possible for Yusuf's Tuwatian ancestry will further underscore the discursive nature of identification and the gap that separates the narrator's tracing of the Bayrouk origin back to Tuwat and claim of an ancient connection to the Susian Takna. In the following section, I will use the proposed time of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun to bypass the narrator's silence on his *qabila* identity and to surmise the social attachments the Bayrouk ancestors might have utilized in Tuwat itself. I will then use my findings with regard to the Tuwatian identities the narrator have 'concealed' as a backdrop to suggest the enabling strategies that might have eased the transformation of Yusuf's heirs into Takna.

III-Inheriting the Zanata: Arab *Qabila*, Hartani *Qasr*

Ham went his own way towards the Maghrib until he arrived in al-Sus al-Aqsa. Al-Masudi⁶³

So far, we have seen how textuality has enabled classical authors to impute different origins and identities for the inhabitants of Tuwat and al-Sus. In contrast, spatiality enabled the same authors to surmise how and why being from Tuwat and being from al-Sus continued to mean different things throughout their respective histories. From this vantage point, one would have to assume that migration from Tuwat is also tantamount to a trade of the prevalent identities in its *qusur* or their arid backyards with social attachments more conducive to domicile in al-Sus or its Saharan hinterland. In that sense, to posit Takna as an inherent identity for the Bayrouk, one would have to abrogate the spatial distance and textual traditions that seem to have ordained separate origins and identities for the inhabitants of Tuwat and al-Sus. In as much as being Takna is congruent with domicile in their *trab* (homeland), al-Sus or *al-Maghrib al-Aqsa*, one could explain being from Tuwat only in relation to the extinct or extant identity groups classical chronicles situate in the central Sahara or *al-Maghrib al-Adna*. Herein, I will posit Ibn Khaldun's election of the Marinid period as the graveyard of the *qabila* formations tabulated in the wake of the Arab conquest to impute the identities available to the Bayrouk ancestors in Tuwat. These were the identities the narrator did not assign to Yusuf either because they were no longer in use in Tuwat or because they were 'useless' in al-Sus. My intention, however, is not to sketch a genetic or even cultural profile for the Bayrouk ancestry. Rather, I invoke Ibn Khaldun's depiction of origin as an "illusion" to surmise the strategies that could have enabled Yusuf's forefathers to transcend the identities that became redundant during the Marinid period, the strategies

96, v.2, 117-134; for Marmol's almost identical description of the same space see, Marmol, *Afriqyyia Li Marmol*, v.3, trans. and ed. Taoufiq et al: 137-143, 163.

⁶³ Al-Masudi, *muruj*, in *Corpus of early Arabic Sources*, Levtzion and Hopkins, 34—See chapter 1.

that might have also helped him to 'sell' himself to Susian hosts like the Takna.

To begin with, a cross-referencing of Julien's proposition of the fifteenth century as the watershed for the disappearance of the Zanata tribes with the proposed time of Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun, 1590s, makes it possible to extrapolate the identities his ancestors might have used. One can posit the narrator's situation of Sulayman "before the eleventh century" of the Hijra (before 1590), to imagine the differences between the identities available to Sulayman's anonymous grandfather and the succession of *qabila* groups known to have dominated the central Sahara in the wake of the Arab conquest. By taking the Arab conquest as a point of departure, it becomes clear that the Ubaydallah Ma'qil were the most obvious addition to the "first" and "second" generation Zanata of the central Sahara, the Bani Yaladdas, and the Banu Marin and Banu Abdulwad respectively. Through recourse to the estimates of life expectancy advanced by Ibn Khaldun and later endorsed by Shurafa literati like Leo Africanus, it becomes possible to convert Sulayman's parent, Ali, and his anonymous father and grandfather into a separate generation. By turning Ali and his immediate ancestors into a separate generation, we can also add an extra century to the family presence in Tuwat and push it back to the Tenth-century of the Hijra, the period before 1490. Since the narrator did not mention any migration from somewhere else it is reasonable to credit Ali's ancestors with prolonged provenance in Tuwat.

The addition of an extra, albeit anonymous, generation to the Bayrouk *nisba* pushes the duration of their ancestry's domicile in Tuwat back to the time Julien has proposed for the "disappearance" of the Zanata. Yet, if we take Ibn Khaldun's predication of the Ma'qil inheritance of the *qafr* on the "Zanata" (Marinid and Zayanid) conquest of the urban core of the Maghrib, it becomes feasible to include the anonymous ancestors of Sulayman's father Ali among the hybrid bodies he, Ibn Khaldun, stripped of authentic Arab and Berber origins. After all, the Zanata "became rulers of the Maghrib and entered the cities" long before the proposed time of their collapse before the "Bedouin advance"—the fifteenth century. Ibn Khaldun's suggestion, for example, does not lend itself to the proposition of a viable connection between "first generation" Zanata like the Banu Yaladdas and the anonymous ancestors of Sulayman's father Ali. At the same time, it does not militate against the inclusion of "second generation" Zanata like the Banu Marin and Abdulwad or their "fourth generation" Arab allies and successors in the central Sahara, the Ubaydallah Ma'qil, among the possible associates of Ali's anonymous ancestry. In fact, Ibn Khaldun's proposition makes it possible to suggest that Ali's immediate ancestors might have lived during the period when it was no longer feasible to tell who was an 'obvious' Arab or Berber.

More importantly, these changes in the demographic map of the Maghrib also underscore the gap that separates the much earlier association of nativity to the central Sahara with being "first generation," albeit *Kharijite*, Zanata and the emergence of the term *Haratin* as a generic name for black or brown, Sunnite, elements widely dispersed in the *qusur* and *wahat* straddling Tuwat in the east and al-Sus in the west.⁶⁴ In other

⁶⁴*Haratin*: plural; sing, *Hartani*. In the literature the term is used as a designation for heterogeneous Arabic and Berber-speaking groups widely dispersed in Northwest Africa. Gautier imputed a servile origin for the *Haratin* of Algeria. At the same time, he invoked the notion of descent from "the Melano-Getules of

words, there is a discernable overlap between the constitution of *Haratin* as different social strata on one hand, and the mutation of certifiable Zanata and the emergence of their upstart Arabic-speaking heirs on the other hand. In fact, the inscription of *Haratin* as a signifier for visible, albeit marginalized, Saharan bodies also seems to have anticipated the effacement of the classical deployment of *sudan* (black) as the generic other of the Maghribian (Berber and Arab) conception of self as *bidan*.⁶⁵ In a clear break from the classical tradition, the mere presence of black or "red-skinned" (ahmar al-jilda) *Haratin* tended to confer meaning on the Arab and Berber conception of self as *bidan* without recourse to difference from *sudan* whether as an idiom for 'present' Maghribian or 'absent' sub-Saharan Africans.⁶⁶ Along with the pastoral Arabians, the sedentary *Haratin* became the most visible inhabitants of the Tuwat Yusuf had left to Wadi Nun. An extrapolation of the identities available to Yusuf's ancestors, therefore, hinges on matching Sulayman's given profile with those of the last Zanata, and their Arab and *Haratin* successors in Tuwat.

Notwithstanding their mutation, the retention of the "second generation" Zanata as plausible associates for the ancestors of Sulayman's father Ali underscores the use of marginality in the *qusur* as a signifier of being *Hartani*. The Bayrouk narrative itself contains no clue that warrants either the exclusion of the extinct Zanata or the inclusion of the extant Arabians, Jews or *Haratin*. That said, the authorial distancing of the absent Zanata from the present *Haratin* could be traced back to the classical classification of the Saharan Zanata as a branch of the *bidan* Berbers of the Near Maghrib and, by implication, their frequent identification in terms of their difference from Saharan or sub-Saharan *sudan*. The pitfalls of this generalization can be seen from the fact that

antiquity" to credit their Moroccan counterparts with nativity to the Maghrib. Lloyd Briggs traced "the Neolithic nucleus" of the *Haratin* back to a possible "mixture of slender Negroid Sudanese and sturdy white Mediterraneans." In contrast, Jacques-Meunie used the classical notion of exodus from 'holy land' to credit the *Haratin* of Wadi Dra' with infinite nativity to the Maghrib. In Morocco, the etymology of the term spawned equally tantalizing explanations of the *Haratin* origin. According to al-Nasiri, for example, *Hartani* is coined from two Arabic words, *hur* (lit. free) and *thani* (lit. second) and, thereby, implies descent from slaves. Some recent studies tend to underline the discursive nature of identification and focus on the situational circumstances surrounding the advertisement of or 'charge' with *Haratinism*. As we will presently see, *Haratin* origin continued to be explained in terms of their difference from ostensibly 'authentic' Berbers, Arabs and *Sudan*. Gautier, *Sahara: The Great Desert*, 197, 212-213; Lloyd Briggs, *Tribes of the Sahara* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 66; Jacques-Meunie, *Le Maroc Pre-Sahariene*, v. 1, 181; al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, v.7, 58; for a summation of the theories on *Haratin* origin and emphasis on the politics of identification in Mauritania see, Meskerem Brhane, "Narratives of the Past, Politics of the Present," (PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 1997), 50-71, 120-161.

⁶⁵For an example of the discursive juxtaposition of *sudan* and *bidan* see, Ibn Battuta, *tuhfat, al-muzar*, in *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, ed. and trans. Hamdun and King

⁶⁶The shift towards the use of colour as an indicator of social status also bred the inclination to credit the *Haratin* with a servile descent. For examples of polemics on colour and slavery pertaining to the Shurafa (S'adian and Alawite) period, see Bernard Barbour and M. Jacobs, "The Miraj: A legal treatise on slavery by Ahmad Baba," in *Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa*, v.2, ed. John R. Willis, (London: Frank Cass, 1985): 125-159; Aziz Batran, "The 'Ulama' of Fas, M. Isma'il and the Issue of the *Haratin* of Fas," in *Slaves and Slavery in Muslim Africa*: 1-15; al-Nasiri, *Istiqa*, v.5: 130-135; John Hunwick, "Islamic Law and Polemics over Race and Slavery in North and West Africa," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Shoun E. Mormon, (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1999): 43-68.

classical authors like al-Istakhri (d.951) and Ibn Hawqal (wr.988) often used similarities in complexion as an excuse for the confusion of "brown" (*sumr*) Saharan Berbers with "red-skinned" (*ahmar al-jilda*) Saharan *sudan*. For example, classical historians frequently used proximity to Bilad al-Sudan to account for the perceived aberrance of "brown" Saharan Berbers from what they deemed to be the normal pigmentation of their northern brethren. According to al-Istakhri:

The inhabitants of that part of the Maghrib which lies on the eastern Mediterranean ... are mostly brown. The further they live towards the south and east the darker they become, until in the country of the Sudan the people are the deepest black of all nations.⁶⁷

In contrast, Ibn Hawqal invoked distance from the tropics, Bilad al-Sudan, and proximity to the Mediterranean basin, the Maghrib, to explain the tendency of the Saharan *sudan* living 'in between' to approximate the complexion of their Berber neighbours. In this model, investiture with authentic Berber origin comes across as a sign of deference to the positional superiority of the formerly *sudan* but 'now' Berber bodies being described. "I have," Ibn Hawqal reminded his audience,

repeated more than once that there are many Berber clans (*hayy*) and tribes (*qabila*) all of them descending from Goliath. ... As for the Banu Tanamak, the kings of Tadmakka, and the tribes related to them, *it is said that they were originally Sudan whose skin and complexion became white because they live close to the north and far from the Land of Kawkaw (Gao) and that they descended on their mother's side from the progeny of Ham. Some say, however, that they actually belong to the Sanhaja. Those who attach the Banu Tanamak to the descendants of Ham base themselves on the theory of al-Kindi that the whites, when they breed for seven generations in the land of the Sudan, take on their external appearance and black colour. Also the Sudan, when they breed in the country of the whites for seven generations, assume their appearance ... Descent, however, may not be discussed with this kind of argument ... The supreme kings of Tadmakka in our time ... combine leadership with learning, jurisprudence, and political skill, as well as some knowledge of biographies and they are versed in traditions and history* (emphasis added).⁶⁸

Such testimonies make it naive to surmise that *in the beginning*, the Saharan Berbers

⁶⁷Ibrahim al-Istakhri, *masalik al-mamalik*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 41-42; The environment occupies centre-stage in Ibn Khaldun's theory on differences in human pigmentation. In so far as the *sudan* are concerned, it enabled him to satirize the attribution of their dark complexion to Noah's "curse" of their ostensible ancestor, Ham. Instead, he posited proximity to and distance from the equator as the main cause of disparities in human complexions, Ibn Khaldun, *Muqadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 82-84.

⁶⁸Ibn Hawqal, *surat al-ard*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 50-51. Ibn Hawqal's agonization over the origin of the Banu Tamanak might have something to do with the fact that they were the 'brethren' of the Zarid deputies (r. 971-1062) of his Fatimid patrons. In contrast, Leo Africanus and Marmol 'mistook' "fair" blacks for "dark" Berbers or Arabs. For this vision, see Leo Africanus, *wasf Afriqiyyia*, v. 2, ed. and trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar, 29, 120; Marmol, *Afriqiyyia li-Marmul*, v. 3, ed. and trans. Taoufiq *et al*, 146, 162.

were of, to borrow from Gautier, "white blood" but had since gone *sudan* courtesy of their importation and consumption of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa. And in the light of this early example of the centrality of positional superiority to the authorial allocation of origins, one cannot use either the mutation of the Zanata or the perceived color bar between the extant, "red-skinned," *Haratin* and extinct, "brown," Saharan Berbers to rule out the probability that Sulayman's ancestors might have identified with the Zanata. The addition of the absent Zanata to a list that also includes the pastoral Ubaydallah Arabians and the sedentary *Haratin* can enable us to use adherence to Islam to exclude the prospect of a Jewish heritage for the Bayrouk ancestry.⁶⁹ The exclusion of the Jews narrows the list of probable identities down to the extant Arabs (*Ja'farites*/ M'aqil) and *Haratin* and extinct Berbers (Zanata). I will posit the narrator's invocation of *Ja'farite*, Arab, identity as an enabling discourse and then use it to assess the prospects of either a *Hartani* or Zanata heritage for Sulayman's ancestors.

Tools of Empowerment: *Ja'farite* Descent

Even today one finds the great Berber gaidas constructing noble Arab family trees for themselves and, in their later years, even becoming 'sherifs'. Montagne⁷⁰

The prospect of an originary Arab identity rests on the narrator's investiture of the Bayrouk with a *Ja'farite* descent and the Takna with a Hilal origin. If we take the invocation of descent from a sanctified *Mashriq* and the concomitant disdain of nativity to "the tail" of the world, the Maghrib, as the bedrock of Maghribian conceptions of origin, it becomes possible to imagine the discursive import of the notion of *Ja'farite* descent. The narrator's combination of hankering after absent *Ja'farites* with silence on the present *Haratin* and Ubaydallah Arabians, underscores the role of the sanctified idioms deposited in the wake of the Arab conquest in his conception of origin. One can use this emphasis on the sacred rather than the secular connotations of *Ja'farite* descent to qualify the significance Africanists (ethnographers and historians), have hitherto attached to the Arab-Berber modulation. It is tempting to use the mutuality of the Bayrouk and the Ma'qil invocations of *Ja'farite* descent to lump the Bayrouk Tuwatian ancestors with the heirs of the "second generation Zanata" in the central Sahara, the

⁶⁹The prospect of a Jewish heritage rests on the antiquity of their presence in Tuwat and al-Sus, Bayrouk's patronage of Jewish trading families in Gulimeme and Essaouira, and his reported 'enrolment' of twenty Jewish families into the Ait Musa *qabila*. In spite of these linkages, there is nothing in the Bayrouk narrative or the extant academic commentaries on the family career that warrants their investiture with a severed Jewish connection. Rather, an investiture of Sulayman with a Jewish heritage militates against the narrator's assertion that his grave in Temni was the object of folk, Muslim, visitation (*zyara*). One could take this emphasis on Sulayman's Islamic credentials as a metaphor for the antiquity of the family adherence to Islam. While the conversion of Jews to Islam was within the realm of the historically conceivable in the Maghrib, it could not have happened late enough to justify an explanation of Yusuf's migration to Wadi Nun in terms of flight from or banishment by 'intolerant' kinsmen. On the association of Saharan Jews with the caravan trade, see Michel Abitbol, "Juifs maghrébins et commerce transsaharien au moyen âge," in *Communauté juive des marges sahariennes du Maghreb*, ed. Michel Abitbol, (Jérusalem: Institut Ben-Zvi, 1982): 229-251. On Bayrouk's addition of a Jewish component to the Ait Musa, see Monteil, *Notes sur les Takna*, 7; Najih, "Les tribus de Takna", *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 125.

⁷⁰Montagne, *The Berbers*, 72

Abaydallah. But the narrator's silence on the Ubaydallah of Tuwat and the general tone of his testimony hardly lend themselves to a secularization of *Ja'farite* origin and its treatment as a signifier of a biological Arab descent.⁷¹ In any case, in Maghribian discourses on origin, *Ja'farite* descent often comes across as a signifier of acquirable credentials like learning and piety rather than pathology.

Fixation on the sacred import of this idiom, *Ja'farite* descent, led the narrator to credit Sulayman with exemplary piety and to advertise his "known grave" in Temni as an object of folk visitation (*ziyara*).⁷² The narrator's silence on Sulayman's *qabila* relations and his elevation of spatiality, being from Tuwat, to a matrix of the Bayrouk notion of origin does not violate Maghribian traditions of signification. In these traditions, however, the posting of spatiality as the grid of identification is often reserved for cosmopolitan scholars in the *hadar* or their (*Shurafa* and *sufi*) peers in the *badiya*.⁷³ A cross-referencing of *Ja'farite* descent with the narrator's investiture of Sulayman with piety and the location of his "known grave" in the "village" of Temni can further enable us to convert this mode of presentation into a metaphor of positional superiority rather than innate pathology. We can use this proposition to shore up the investiture of Sulayman's anonymous ancestors with prolonged domicile in Tuwat and, hence, probable identification with the "second generation" Zanata who bequeathed Tuwat to "fourth generation" Arabs, the Ubaydallah, and upstart *Haratin*.

Firstly, in as much as it rests on association with Prophet Muhammad, *Ja'farite* descent is the poorer variant of the notion of *Shurafa* origin. It is a portable identity designation and, as such, does not denote a bounded group that dwells in specific space or lived in a particular historical time. Rather, *Ja'farite* descent ennobles its claimants by elongating and authenticating their adherence to Islam—i.e. through the cooption of *Ja'far* (d.629) the *sahabi* (companion of Muhammad) into a forefather. In the previous chapter, I noted that the notion of *Ja'farite* descent itself became popular during the same period Ibn Khaldun turned into an erasure of authentic Arab and Berber origins and, by default, a cradle for the "second generation" Berbers and "fourth generation" Arabs: the Marinid era. In that sense, we can relate its advent in Tuwat to the demographic shifts he associated with the "Zanata" conquest of "the cities" and the *M'aqil* inheritance of their Saharan backyards, the *qafir*. Famous claimants of *Ja'farite*

⁷¹Emphasis on Islamic credentials is best exemplified by the suggestive absence of those relations of Muhammad who refused to convert to Islam from extant myths of origin like his uncle and reputed tormentor Abu Lahab—the one cursed in the *Quran*.

⁷²On the designation of Sulayman's "known grave" as a site of folk visitation, see al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 19, 273; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176.

⁷³Examples of this preference for spatiality in al-Sus include proper names like al-Mukhtar al-Susi (of al-Sus), Sidi Ibn al-Mubarak al-Aqawi (of Aqa), Sidi Ya'zi al-Asawi (of Asa), Sidi Ibn Musa al-Simlali (of Simlala) and Sidi Muhammad al-Tamanarti (of Tamanart). Emphasis on spatiality seems to correspond with the break from the classical use of *qabila* or family as points of identification—Umayyad, Abassid, Fatimid etc. While it is not without historical precedents, the popularization of this form of identification could also be traced back to the Marinid era. In fact, Ibn Khaldun attributed the popularity of this mode of identification at his own time, the Marinid period, to urbanization, the "mixing of genus" (*ikhtilat*) and "the corruption (*fasad*) of *ansab*"—the same factors he used to 'deny' authenticity to "second generation" Berbers and "fourth generation" Arabs. In contrast, al-Marrakechi elevated the use of spatiality as a point of identification to a 'virtue'. *Mukadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 123; al-Marrakechi, *al-ia'lam*, v.1: 149-152.

descent such as the founders of the *Nasiriya tariqa* and *zawiya* of Tamkrut (Wadi Dra') often used piety as a passport to 'sell' themselves to both Arab and Berber *qabila* ensembles.⁷⁴ In that sense, *Ja'farite* was desirable precisely because it could have enabled Sulayman or his immediate ancestors to transcend cultural boundaries in Tuwat, or to transform themselves from privileged Zanata to noble Arabs—i.e. to trade a redundant identity for a potent one. Secondly, the cryptic investiture of Sulayman with "high stature" and the location of his "known grave" in Ternni further underline the discursive import of the notion of *Ja'farite* descent. After all, al-Susi's informant, *Qaid* Dahman I, did not trace the Bayrouk *nisba* beyond Sulayman's father Ali. Nor did he identify the ancestors linking Sulayman Ibn Ali to *Ja'far* Ibn Abi Talib (d.629) or suggest a previous flight from the original homeland of the latter, the Hijaz. One can posit such silences as signifiers of the discursive rather than factual basis of this mode of identification.

The main advantage of the conversion of *Ja'farite* descent to an enabling discourse is that it narrows down the search for the probable identities of Sulayman's ancestors to the (Muslim) groups most likely to invoke descent from venerable *Sahaba* (companions) as an antidote to accusations with origination in a 'pagan' Maghrib or descent from 'cursed' *Kushites* (Ham) and *Philistines* (Goliath): the extant *Haratin* and the extinct ("first" and "second" generation) Zanata. In the existing literature, skin pigmentation comes across as the tangible thing that could have barred crossing from the (Berber) Zanata to the ('African') *Haratin*. What this entails is that the Zanata could have transformed themselves into Arabs simply by changing their speech. In contrast, a similar change in speech could not have entitled the *Haratin* to Arab origin precisely because of the color 'bar'. In the following two sections I will first test the prospect of a *Hartani* heritage for the Bayrouk and then demonstrate the pitfalls of an automatic use of color to discount the possibility of a discarded Zanata identity.

Signifiers of Marginality: *Haratin*

A myth no sooner comes into being than it is modified through a change of narrator. Levi Strauss⁷⁵

I have indicated that the current use of the term *Haratin* as a generic designation for bounded Maghribian groups cannot be traced beyond the Shurafa period. It is worth recalling that colonial ethnographers used the Berber-Arab dichotomy and its discursive doubles, *Makhzan-Siba*, indigenous-outsider, as a frame of reference to allocate origins

⁷⁴The Nasiri family also produced ardent critics of Ibn Khaldun's assertion that no *Ja'farite* had migrated to the Maghrib, Muhammad al-Maki al-Nasiri (d.1757) and historian Ahmed al-Nasiri. In the nineteenth century, the *Nasiriya tariqa*, enjoyed a considerable influence in al-Sus. *Qaid* Dahman I was counted amongst its followers. As we will see in the last chapter, the Susian leaders of the *Nasiriya* played a leading role in the suppression of the rebellion that set the stage for the rise of Dahman's grandfather, Ubaydallah Ibn Salem, the buhilas rebellion of 1792. For the Nasiris' critique of Ibn Khaldun see Muhammad al-Maki al-Nasiri, *al-durar al-murasa'a bi akhbar Wadi Dra'*, ed. Mohamed Nouhi, (Rabat: M.A thesis, Jama't Muhammad V, 1987); Ahmed al-Nasiri, *tal'at al-mushtari fi al-nasab al-ja'fari*, manuscript, (Rabat: al-khizana al-'ama, K1443).

⁷⁵Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Naked Man*, trans. John and Doreen Weightham (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 675.

and identities. It goes without saying that such essentialist treatment of the demographic map of the Maghrib also blurs the historicity of groups that failed to live up to notions of authenticity embedded in ethnographic terms like primitive and tribe. In so far as the secular colonial ethnographer and historian of the Maghrib were concerned, the *Haratin* were a puzzle because they tend to combine characteristics that seem to violate the Arab-Berber modality—black/brown complexion and Arabic or Berber speech. To solve the *Haratin* puzzle, colonial pundits deployed the same strategy that helped ethnographers like De La Chapelle to conceptualize the Takna origin and bilingualism: encounter with Romans and conquest by Arabs. Metaphorically speaking, the “change of narrator” tended to ensconce slightly different functions for the same discursive strategy. Here, spatiality and textuality determine the location of the *Haratin* in time. In contrast, color seems to script their social status and, in so doing, legitimizes their stripping of Berber or Arab identity. Emile Gautier, for instance, imagined the *Haratin* origin in terms of descent from either “black slaves” or “the Melano-Getules” of antiquity. Ironically, he posited spatiality as the arbiter that determines which *Haratin* get what origin. But spatiality in this case is also a metaphor for encounter with either Romans, as “antiquity”, or Arabs, as caravan. “The majority of the natives of the (Algerian) oases,” Gautier wrote,

are *haratin*... Not only have they as a whole no common and ancient tradition, but individually each seems to have the memory of a grandfather or an ancestor who came as a slave from some place in the Sudan. They speak only Arabic or Berber ... all of which would seem to indicate that *the haratin* ... are not an indigenous population but a residue left from centuries of an interrupted importation of black slaves ... Throughout all these (Moroccan) oases, particularly in (Wadi) Dra'a, a large part of the population is made up of the *haratin* class. These *haratin* are a Negroid people with what seems to be a Berber dialect; but they seem also to have been established here from very early times. It has yet to be determined whether they are descendents of imported slaves like the Negro cultivators of the Algerian oases, or represent a truly aboriginal population. Are these peasants of Dra'a perhaps the Melano-geutles of antiquity, a last reminder of the Saharan Negro.⁷⁶

Lloyd Briggs turned Gautier's last uncertainty into a provisional answer. “The Neolithic nucleus of this (*haratin*) population,” he wrote, “seems to have been a mixture of slender Negroid Sudanese and sturdy white Mediterraneans.”⁷⁷ In contrast, Bovill picked up from where the abolitionists have left off and, as a result, credited the *Haratin* with a servile origin. “The abolition of the slave trade,” he wrote in *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (1933),

has also had an unfavourable effect on ... life in the desert. The oases used to be cultivated principally by Negro labour imported from the Sudan, the *Haratin* of the Arabs and the *Bella* or *buzu* of the Tuareg (Berbers).

⁷⁶Gautier, *Sahara: The Great Desert*, 197-98, 212-213.

⁷⁷Lloyd Briggs, *Tribes of the Sahara* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 66.

In the revised edition of this text, *the Golden Trade of the Moor*, however, Bovill utilized Brigg's suggestion to qualify his earlier investiture of the *Haratin* with servile origins. "It has," he wrote,

often been thought that the Haratin must be descendants of negro slaves ... but the Haratin are not only of slave origin: although they possess some negro features in their dark complexion and kinky hair, the shape of their nose and face is often quite unlike that of the negroes of the Sudan ... The Haratin contain among their ancestors people of that negroid stock which inhabited the Sahara in Neolithic times.⁷⁸

Discursively, then, abolitionism arrested the production of *Haratin* in much the same way that colonialism was later to obliterate the tribal condition. By positing encounter with Romans and the Arab conquest as adequate frames of references to surmise the genesis of the *Haratin*, colonial ethnographers and historians also credited this designation with a much longer history than the available evidence seems to warrant. The disparity between the use of Latin texts to trace the *Haratin* origin back to "antiquity" and simultaneous refusal to dwell on the failure of classical Arabic texts to acknowledge their social existence tends to reify the chasm that separates the ethnographic and Takna conceptions of tribe/*qabila*.

Interestingly, Shurafa biographers such as al-Nasiri and al-Susi were, like colonial ethnographers, unable to surmise the *Haratin* origin without also falling back on encounter with the dynasty and the caravan. In comparison to colonial ethnographers, however, al-Nasiri seems to be conscious of the fact that, very much like those of extant Moroccan *qabila* formations, the history of the *Haratin* cannot be traced back to the Marinid period. In any case, his definitive authority on the pre-Shurafa period, Ibn Khaldun, did not mention such groups. To resolve the disparity between the visibility of the *Haratin* at his own time, the nineteenth century, and their seeming lack of history, al-Nasiri credited the Arabs with the authorship of their name and then blamed the shipment of their 'African' ancestors to Morocco on the most famous S'adian dynast, Mawlai Ahmed al-Mansur (r.1578-1063).⁷⁹ Figuratively, the Moroccan *Haratin* are similar to the Ait Musa *qabila* in the sense that they were born at the same time and to the same 'father,' the Sa'dian garrison. I will presently test the merits of the idea of descent from 'African' slaves and the ways post-colonial anthropologists and historians have handled this ethnographic mythology. For the time being, let us take the ethnographic tracing of *Haratin* origin back to "antiquity" at its face value and consider whether they can be elected as possible relations of the Bayrouk ancestry in Tuwat.

The problem of historicity aside, the viability of a *Hartani* connection rests on the currency of the carriers of this designation in Saharan *qusur* straddling the Bayrouk sites of origin and domicile, Tuwat and al-Sus. The presence of the *Haratin* in Tuwat and Wadi Nun is shored up by the similarity of their skin pigmentation to that of Bayrouk and his

⁷⁸ Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara*, 9; Bovill, *Golden Trade of the Moor*, 45-46.

⁷⁹ According to al-Nasiri, for example, *Hartani* is coined from two Arabic words, *hur* (lit. free) and *thani* (lit. second) and, thereby, implies descent from "abscond" slaves; al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v. 7, 58.

senior son Muhammad. Despite the antiquity of the European investiture of the *Moor* with "dark" complexion, for example, some of the nineteenth-century travellers who passed through Wadi Nun like Cochelet were mesmerised by the seeming incongruity of Bayrouk's high status with his "almost black" complexion.⁸⁰ It is tempting to use the *Haratin* presence in Tuwat and al-Sus' and the similarities of their complexion to that of Bayrouk to override the narrator's silence on the identity of the relations Yusuf might have left behind. This proposition does not violate the narrator's schematization of becoming Takna as a reunion with former Tuwatian relations—i.e. the tracing of the Takna origin back to Tuwat.

Tempting as it is, however, the theorization of a *Hartani* heritage for the Bayrouk is hampered by the dubious historicity of the term itself and the pitfalls of taking a malleable attribute such as colour as an indicator of origin in the Maghrib. Firstly, there is no credible evidence one can use to turn Temni into an exclusive *Haratin* "village" and, hence, to trace Bayrouk's complexion all the way back to his Tuwatian ancestors. In fact, even if we invoke the visibility of the *Haratin* in the *qusur* of Tuwat to convert Temni into one of their exclusive enclaves, it would still be difficult to inject its ethnographic present with enough history to override the relative modernity of this designation. Secondly, there is no credible evidence that indicates an en masse, forced or voluntary, migration of black bodies to Tuwat. In that sense, an exclusion of a possible *haratinization* of the Zanata residue in its *qusur* will make it impossible to explain the rather sudden appearance and rapid proliferation of the *Haratin* without falling back on what Bovill called the "extreme virility" of Saharans.⁸¹ Post-colonial academics did not dwell on this disparity between the historicity of *sudan* and the modernity of the *Haratin*. Rather, they seem to believe in the congruity of identity with colour. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain their tendency to oscillate between the ethnographic tracing of the *Haratin* origin back to antiquity and the idea of descent from black slaves imported after the Arab conquest of the Maghrib.

In what seems like an attempt to bypass the disparity between the current visibility of the *Haratin* in Saharan *qusur* and the obscurity of their origin, post-colonial ethnographers and historians sought to reconcile the abolitionist fixation on forced migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the classical authorial belief in the antiquity of *sudan* (black) domicile in the Maghrib. "Little," anthropologist Andre Adam wrote,

is known about the origin of these people (*Haratin*). Some of them are the descendants of slaves captured by nomads south of the Sahara ... It is likely however, that most of them are the descendants of black populations which once lived in the Sahara ... We do not know when or how they adopted the Berber language. Indeed, some of them came under Arab influence.⁸²

In contrast, historian Jacque-Meunie was able to retain the congruity of color with origin precisely by reifying the classical predication of Berber and *sudan* domicile in the pagan

⁸⁰ Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 53-54.

⁸¹ According to Bovill, "the people of the desert are extremely virile"! Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara*, 8; Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors*, 11

⁸² Andre Adams, "Berber Migrants in Casablanca," in *Arabs and Berbers*, ed. Gellner and Micaud: 325-343, 327.

Maghrib on exodus from its sacred other, the *Mashriq*. "Aujourd'hui", he concluded, "les descendants de Kouchites sont les Haratine."⁸³ For the most part, however, the ethnographic oscillation between the notions of infinite nativity and servile descent continued to haunt historians who dwelled on the mechanics and modes of crossing between the two 'shores' of the Sahara, the caravan trade: "The whole question of the origin of the *haratin*," historian John Hunwick recently wrote,

is one shrouded in mystery: even the meaning of the term is in dispute. One of the more plausible explanation is that in origin they represent the remains of aboriginal black populations of the Sahara ... Although they are of inferior social status and often function economically in client-type relationships, they are considered free; a folk etymology of their name—a deformation of *Hurr thani* (free in the second degree)—asserts as much, and in certain areas freed slaves may have been assimilated to them. According to Batran, many *haratin* had moved from Saharan oases into northern Moroccan cities in the wake of natural disasters and political upheaval (emphasis added).⁸⁴

Besides the obvious deference to the ethnographic conception of *Haratin* origin, what Hunwick and Batran have taken as "a folk etymology of their (*Haratin*) name" is actually a reincarnation of the textual trope informing al-Nasiri's much publicised conception of the term *Haratin*. Hunwick and Batran did not dwell on whether and how we could reconcile al-Nasiri's tantalizing translation of *Haratin* with the demographic history of the pre-Shurafa Maghrib. Rather, they tended to supplement al-Nasiri's translation of *Haratin* to "hurr thani" with the abolitionist predication of "Negro" domicile in the Maghrib on forced transportation from its African beyond, via the caravan. In the next chapter, I will return to the relation between the abolitionist discovery of Africa and the discursive assassination of the historicity of *sudan* (black) domicile in the Maghrib. Here, it is enough to note how silence on al-Nasiri's belief in the impossibility of history outside the dynastic realm also led post-colonial historians to obviate the role of politics in his investiture of the *Haratin* with a named 'father', and an exact site and moment of social birth—Mawlai al-Mansur and his sub-Saharan African colony. A cross-referencing of the demographic history of the central Sahara with the process leading to the first known authroial location of *Haratin* bodies in space and time may also help us to determine whether they might have been the underachieving relations the narrator did not want to remember.

In so far as Tuwat is concerned, the limited absorptive capacity of the *qusur* and their

⁸³Jacques-Meunie, *Le Maroc Pre-Sahariene*, v. 1, 181. For examples of the combination of reference to the caravan with emphasis on descent from ancient "Ethiopians" or Kushites see, Mustafa Naimi, "Caravans Au Service des Producteurs, Les Hratin, Sauteurs des Lieux Brûlés", in *Les Oasis de Wad Nour*: 106-116; Abdellatif El-Bernissi, "Les Draa et ses tribus d'après les documents anciens", in *Le Bassin du Draa: Carrefour Civilisationnel et espace de Culture et de Création, Actes des journées d'étude* (Agadir: Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 1996): 19-25; Abdelaziz Agrir, "L'ancien rôle commercial du Draa," in *Le Bassin du Draa*: 27-37.

⁸⁴Hunwick, "Islamic Law and Polemics over Race and Slavery," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Mormon, 43-68, 57-58; for Batran's treatment of this subject see, Aziz Batran, "The 'Ulama' of Fas," in *Slaves and Slavery*, Willis ed: 1-15.

tendency to attract refugees, commercially minded elites and indigent (Arab or Berber) herders who might have lost their flocks to drought or disease, tends to militate against the attribution of either the late appearance of the *Haratin* or dramatic increment in their numbers to the importation and manumission of sizable numbers of slaves.⁸⁵ The fact that Ibn Khaldun did not mention the *Haratin* either as clients of the (first and second generation) Zanata or as slaves of their (fourth generation Arab) Ubaydallah heirs, adds to the mystery surrounding their conquest by what Adams has called "the Berber language" and "Arab influence." It is perhaps worth recalling that in the literature covering the period from the Arab conquest to the time of the so-called Berber empires, the Almoravids, Almohads and Marinids, *sudan* was the main constitutive other of Maghribian perception of self as *bidan*. It was imposed on *Berberized* or *Arabized* black bodies in Saharan *qusur* and their ostensible relations in Bilad al-Sudan. Classical authors did not posit 'scientific' data like hair texture or "blood-group pattern" to grade the *sudan* into different types. In classical Maghribian texts, moreover, *Haratin* does not appear either as a discreet alias for *sudan* or as a referent for a particular servile condition. Very much like the juxtaposition of Arab with Berber in the Maghrib, the deployment of *sudan* as the generic other of *bidan* continued to inform authorial significations of differences in colour well after Yusuf's departure from Tuwat. For example, neither the author of the *Diwan qaba'il al-Sus*, al-Hassani, nor Leo Africanus and Marmol used the term *Haratin* as a designation for black Susians or Saharans.⁸⁶ The fact that these texts were researched at about the same time of Yusuf's migration to al-Sus, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, does not warrant the conclusion that there was already a generic group called *Haratin* in the Maghrib. In contrast, the term *Haratin* appears in a text composed in Timbuktu in the wake of the Sa'dian conquest of the Niger basin in 1591, Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'di's *Tarikh al-Sudan*.⁸⁷ The question of how this term has found its way to the Maghrib is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, it is enough to note that al-Sa'di's testimony suggests the Niger bend as the known cradle of the first *Haratin*.

The congruity of being from Tuwat with being *Hartani* does not seem to have predated the time of Yusuf's migration to al-Sus. The subsequent transfer of the term to the Maghrib tends to underscore the fact that *Haratin* is an imposed designation. It also indicates the possible role of textuality in the transformation of *haratinism* to a generic and portable badge for marginalized groups that live in separate spaces and speak different

⁸⁵ Fixation on 'flight' from the Maghrib often leads to silence on similar migratory trends from the south and, hence, the simplification of the modes of black migrations from the south, Bilad al-Sudan—i.e. its attribution to enslavement. "In Taghaza" Dahiru wrote, "on receiving news of the impending arrival of the (Sa'dian) invasion forces, the inhabitants fled to neighbouring Tuwat and Walata." Dahiru, *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century*, 151.

⁸⁶ For such tabulations of Saharan and Susian identity designations see, Leo Africanus, *wasf Afriqiyya*, v.1, ed. and trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar: 93-96, 114-115; Idem. v.2, 117-122, 129-134; Marmol, *Afriqiyya li-Marmol*, v.3, ed. and trans. Taoufiq et al: 139-151, 159-164; al-Hassani, *diwan qaba'il al-Sus*, ed. Afa, 30-34.

⁸⁷ Al-Sa'di also used encounter with dynasts as a frame of reference to locate the *Haratin* in time and space. His reference to the *Haratin*, however, does not confirm either their servile descent or positional inferiority. "Askiya (king) Muhammad Bani," he wrote, "dismissed Kala-sha Bukar and appointed one of the *haratin* of Tindirma in his place." *Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa'di's Tarikh al-Sudan down to 1613 and other Contemporary Documents*, ed. and trans. John Hunwick, (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 1999): 168, 220.

languages.⁸⁸ Al-Sa'di's text also predated the first Moroccan debate over the origin of the *Haratin*, a debate that also spawned the first known drive to de-historicize the presence of *sudan* (blacks) in the Maghrib-- i.e. by turning them into *Haratin* and, hence, their investiture with a servile descent. It is perhaps ironic that Shurafa biographers like al-Nasiri and al-Susi should strive to impute an Arabic genesis for the term *Haratin* almost at the same time that they traced the origin of its carriers to the Sa'dian colony of al-Sudan. Once again, it seems that conquest by the sword has also inspired conquest by the pen. Here, one can take this debate as an indicator of the modernity of the term *Haratin* and, in effect, why its carriers cannot be taken as probable associates for those Bayrouk ancestors who lived before the Shurafa period.

Firstly, the controversy over the nativity of *sudan* or "red-skinned" bodies to Morocco was sparked by Mawlai Ismael's forceful enlistment of ostensible *Haratin* in his famous *Bukhari* army. The conscription of the *Haratin* was made on the ground that their ancestors were "originally slaves" brought from Bilad al-Sudan by his Sa'dian peer Mawlai al-Mansur. Dissident scholars (*ulama*) used the antiquity of *sudan* domicile in the Maghrib and the free status of Mawlai Ismael's query to challenge the notion of servile descent.⁸⁹ In retaliation, Alawite "organic intellectuals" built a case for the servility of the *Bukhari* recruits by upholding Mawlai Ismael's claim that they were the descendants of abscond slaves of Mawlai al-Mansur.⁹⁰ This official interpretation became an intellectual genealogy for the futuristic conception of *Haratin* origin advertised by modern Shurafa biographers like al-Nasiri, the conception that still echoes in the works of historians such as Batran and Hunwick.⁹¹ It is perhaps ironic that al-Nasiri's de-historicisation of *sudan*, as *Haratin*, nativity to the Maghrib should come in the wake of Belo's lamentation of the Berber eviction of the ancestry of such groups from their Saharan homeland.

Secondly, al-Nasiri and al-Susi utilised the classical use of encounter with the dynasty

⁸⁸My demotion of *Haratin* to an imposed designation is based on the fact the most visible carriers of this designation in Southern Morocco today--namely, in Wadi Dra'-- identify themselves by a different name: *Drawa*. These are the same groups Gautier credited with a possible "Melano-geutle" origin. According to al-Susi, Naimi and El-Bernissi, the *Drawa* contest the idea of servile descent and, indeed, do not take kindly to being called *Haratin*. Contrary to his 'promise' not to question the testimonies of his informants, Al-Susi recorded another myth of origin that also denies servile origin but then dismissed it as "pure superstition." Instead, he reified the textual notion of descent from abscond "slaves" of Mawlai al-Mansur. Al-Susi, *khilal Jazula*, 22; Mustafa Naimi, "Caravans Au Service des Producteurs, Les Hratin, Sauveurs des Lieux Brûlés", in *Les Oasis de Wad Nour*: 106-116; El-Bernissi, "Les Draa et ses tribus d'après les documents anciens", in *Le Bassin du Draa*: 19-25.

⁸⁹Ismael's critics posited the *Haratin* tendency to include the so-called "red-skinned" elements (*ahmar al-jilda*) as a 'mitigating' factor to further question the notion of descent from *sudan* slaves al-Mansur had ostensibly brought from the Niger basin. For the dispute between Mawlai Ismael and dissenting *Ulama*, see al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, v.7: 51-95; al-Susi, *khilal Jazula*, 22. For examples of academic treatments of this issue see, Batran, "The Ulama of Fas," in *Slaves and Slavery*, ed. Willis: 1-15; Mohammed Ennaji, *Serving the Master: Slavery and Society in Nineteenth-Century Morocco*, trans. Seth Graebner (New York: St. Martin Press, 1999): 69-62. Abdelfattah Kilito, "Speaking to Princes: Al-Yusi and Mawlai Isma'il" in *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, ed. Bourqia and Miller: 30-48.

⁹⁰Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqa*, v.7: 56-59; Hunwick, "Islamic Law and Polemics over Race," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Mormon: 43-68

⁹¹Batran, "The 'Ulama' of Fas," in *Slaves and Slavery*, Willis: 1-15; Hunwick, "Islamic Law and Polemics over Race," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Mormon: 43-68, 57-58.

and the caravan to locate *qabila* in time and space, to imagine *Haratin* origin in terms of service to Mawlai al-Mansur. As a result, they also glossed the equally classical use of the term *sudan* to refer to such groups as well as the concomitant concession of the antiquity of their presence in the Maghrib, the concession enshrined in the notion of descent from Noah (Ham or *Kush*) and exodus from the *Mashriq*.⁹² Needless to say that such a concession would have also amounted to a criminalization of Mawlai Ismael's decision. The fact that the importation and manumission of slaves both predated and outlived al-Mansur's conquest of the Songhay Empire further militates against the de-historicisation of the nativity of *sudan* elements to the Maghrib and the Sahara. Moreover, the demographic history of Tuwat renders it difficult to make a case for en masse emancipation or flight of the ostensible 'African' ancestors of the *Haratin* before the European "scramble" for Africa. Until that time manumission was not only intermittent, but also tended to be seen as a reward for individual merit rather than a concession of inalienable rights. And in the Maghribian tradition, manumitted slaves usually progress to *mawali* (allies) and, as such, remain entrapped in the identities of their benefactors. They were identified by the same terms used for their benefactors and were expected to honour the responsibilities contingent on their new status.⁹³ In fact, the conception of manumission as a viable historical contingency for the social birth of a *Haratin* constituency seems to have its origin in (European) abolitionism. En masse emancipation had no precedent in the Maghrib. Inasmuch as abolitionism also overlapped with the recrudescence of nationalism in Europe, it becomes feasible to imagine how fixation on racial differences and the concomitant conflation of being African with domicile in "Afrique noir" (black Africa) might have also spilled into the ethnographic conception of *Haratin* origin.⁹⁴ From this vantage point too, one can say that the articulation of *Haratin* as a signifier for an 'African' diaspora in the Maghrib happened well after Yusuf's departure to Wadi Nun and, as such, can hardly be posited as a discarded identity for his ancestors in Tuwat.

In the previous chapter, I noted how the emergence of nationalism and the concomitant fixation on race have led to the substitution of sanctified identities like *Moor* and *Monselemine* with ostensibly secularized designations such as tribe, the designation that also served as a discursive other for the European conception of the nation.⁹⁵ This

⁹² Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.7: 56-59, 92-95.

⁹³ *Mawali*: Arabic (sing. *mawla*, v. *wala*). The term *mawla* often signifies the 'thing' and its opposite: (junior) client, ally, manumitted slave or (senior) master, lord. As a signifier of 'junior' ally, *Mawali* was used during the era of the Arab conquests to refer to non-Arab Muslims such as the Persians and the Berbers. The notion of *wala* was informed by a juridical injunction to the effect that "the *Mawla* (ally, manumitted slave) of a people is one of them" (*mawla al-qaum minhum*) and as such, it does not lend itself to the constitution of a separate identity. For the juridical strictures of *wala* see, Malik Ibn Anas, *al-Muwatta'*, ed. and trans. Muhammad Rahimuddin, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1980), 280-283; for a treatment of its 'practical' aspects see, *Mukadimmat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 127.

⁹⁴ For instance, fixation on descent from sub-Saharan Africa led Levtzion to gloss the antiquity of *sudan* (black) domicile in the Maghrib. "In Southern Morocco," he wrote, "as well as in Jebel Nefusa, blacks from the Sudan were prominent among the Kharijites. They could well have contributed to the southward orientation of the emerging Kharijite centres." Levtzion, "The Sahara and the Sudan," *Cambridge History of Africa*, v.2, Fage, ed. 637-685, 644.

⁹⁵ There is a discernable interface between the debut of nationalism in Europe and the onset of the (French)

shift in European modes of identification, however, happened too late to influence the travellers' perception of the Bayrouk. We will presently see whether Bayrouk's colour has enticed early European observers to either question his *Moorish* credentials or to distance him from what the British consul to Essaouira, Dupuis, classified as "distinct" Arab and Berber "races of people."⁹⁶ Here, it is enough to note that the secularisation of Moroccan identities happened too late to influence European conceptions of the Bayrouk identity. Even if we take Cochelet's investiture of Bayrouk with an "almost black" colour at face value, there is simply no credible evidence that warrants the inference of a *Hartani* heritage for the family. If we take al-S'adi's statement as an indicator of where and when the term *Haratin* was first born, it also becomes difficult to assume that it was already current in Saharan *qusur* like Tuwat and, as such, could be grafted into a possible identity for Yusuf or his grandfather Sulayman Ibn Ali. Whether because of its belated introduction to Tuwat or its marginalizing connotations, being *Hartani* also seems to be at odd with the sense of positional superiority oozing from the investiture of Sulayman with "high stature" and "a known grave." I have noted that these were the signifiers of positional superiority that could have also inspired the contestation of *Ja'farite* descent. The same history that enabled us to bypass the *Haratin* can also help us to surmise the most probable contemporaries of the Bayrouk ancestors who lived in Tuwat long "before the eleventh century (of the *Hijra*)," the "second generation" Zanata.

Muted History: The Zanata

In crossbreeding, the white blood tends to be eliminated! Gautier⁹⁷

I have already noted that the demographic history of the Maghrib does not allow us to synchronize descent from Tuwat with a hereditary Takna identity. Because of the spatial distance that separates Tuwat from al-Sus and the difference between the extant (classical and contemporary) conceptions of the origins of their respective inhabitants, it is impossible to take the Bayrouk narrative at its face value without also eschewing the textual tradition that made its production possible in the first place. In the previous chapter, I noted how the demographic history of al-Sus tends to de-historicize the current congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun. To concretize the disparity between the Bayrouk and Takna notions of origin, it is imperative to consider how their narratives measure up to the demographic history of Tuwat. So far, we have seen how Tuwat's demographic history was, for the most part, dominated by the activities of Berber-speaking groups collectively known as the Zanata. In that sense, our search for the identity the Bayrouk ancestors might have traded for the notion of origin that seemingly anticipated their current identification with the Takna, will remain incomplete without a consideration

"scramble" for North Africa" on one hand, and the 'descent' to "racial classification" on the other. Here too, nineteenth-century travelogue often served as raw data for such postulations. On this subject see, Thompson, "La classification raciale de l'Afrique du Nord au debut de XIXe Siecle," *Cahiers d'etudes africaines*, v. xxxiii (1993): 19-36; Pouillon, "Simplification ethnique en Afrique du Nord: Maures, Arabes, Berbers," *Cahiers d'etudes africaines*, v. xxxiii (1993): 37-49.

⁹⁶ Adams, *The Narrative of Robert Adams*, 211—see chapter one.

⁹⁷ Gautier, *Sahara: The Great Desert*, 198.

of the extinct Zanata.

In the following pages, I seek to reinforce two propositions pertaining to migration from Tuwat and whether we should or should not use colour as a determinant of the identities possible for the Bayrouk ancestors. Firstly, if the presence of the Bayrouk ancestors in Tuwat is to be pushed beyond the fifteenth century, then it is inconceivable how they could have either failed to benefit from or were able to evade the burdens of, living amongst powerful *qabila* ensembles such as the Zanata. Besides the honorific location of its carriers in terms of dogged opposition to or inception of, the dynasty, being Zanata was also a metaphor for ownership of Tuwat's "gardens of palm" and control of the network of trade linking the Maghrib with Bilad al-Sudan. Regardless of the narrator's silence, then, it is difficult to impute a meaningful social existence for his anonymous Tuwatian ancestors without thinking of the possible terms of their interaction with either the "first" or "second generation" Zanata. Secondly, in the light of the hybridizing connotations of conversion to *Kharijism*, vulnerability to dynastic squabbles over space and hankering after caravans "of gold and slaves," it would be difficult to credit the Zanata with stable ethnic core.⁹⁸ Whether because of its early confusion with *Kharijism* and the frequent deployment of encounter with the dynasty to assess the 'rise and fall' of its successive carriers, *Zanatism* can be taken as a signifier of an ideologically charged and historically contingent identity and, as such, tended to transcend both the Arab-Berber and *sudan-bidan* modalities. In other words, it is injudicious to posit either Bayrouk's "almost black" complexion or Arabic speech as pathologies and distance his Tuwatian ancestry from the Zanata. After all, the only "natural given" about Zanata identity was its spatiality—i.e. domicile in *al-Maghrib al-Adna* and its *qafir* (Sahara).

To begin with, the conversion of *Ja'farite* (Arab) descent into an ennobling discourse and the exclusion of the *Haratin* leave the Zanata as the most probable associates of Sulyaman's anonymous ancestry. Given its long association with ideologies like *Kharijism* and activities such as caravan trading, being Zanata can best be understood as a signifier of conditional identities rather than a referent to a distinctive "race" or culture. We can also use the mutual heterogeneity of the Zanata and the *Haratin* and the commonality of their sites of domicile to ignore the mutation of the former and to strip the latter of an endogenous origin or distinctive culture. This proposition enables us to divest being *Hartani* of an immutable essence and to imagine its capacity to befall dark Zanata who, either because of their indigence or, to borrow from Ibn Hawqal, inability to "combine leadership with learning," also did not qualify for *Ja'farite* (Arab) descent.⁹⁹ In so far as the question of Bayrouk's colour is concerned, one can fall back on the classical notations of the dark complexion of Saharan Berbers and its frequent attribution to their proximity to Bilad al-Sudan. The Zanata not only furnished us with the earliest examples

⁹⁸On the role of *Kharjism* in the 'making' of Berber identities, see, Muhammad Talbi, "La conversion de Berberes au harigisme ibadito sufrite et la nouvelle carte politique du IIe/VIIe siècle," in *Etudes d'histoire ifrigyenne et de civilisation musulmane medievale* (Universite de Tunis, 1982): 13-80.

⁹⁹As might be expected, there was an a priori assumption of the incongruity of marginality and noble origin. To deter pretenders from using Shurafa origin to dodge "duties" (*wajib*), the Alawite court frequently confiscated the written genealogies of such claimants and repatriated them to "their original *qaba'il*." On this issue, see Abdul-Salam Ibn Suda, *dalil muarikh al-Maghrib al-Aqsa* (Casablanca: dar al-kitab, 1960): 48, 90-91, 99.

of the role of ideology and displacement in the authorship and reconstitution of identities, but also produced more than their share of famous "swarthy" *Moors*. One can turn the frequent notations of the Zanata involvement in the caravan trade and references to their prolonged sojourn in al-Sudan into historical antecedents for al-Susi's association of the Tuwatian ancestors of his Bayrouk informant with "*tijarat al-Sudan*" (the Sudan trade). Classical Maghribian texts are replete with notations of the Zanata (Tuwat) and Sanhaja (al-Sus) tendency to combine trade with al-Sudan with consorting with *sudan* (black) maidens (*jawari*) as well as references to the careers of some of the most famous male products of such unions.¹⁰⁰

In so far as Bayrouk's complexion is concerned, it is hard to tell whether it was inherited from his Tuwatian ancestors or was contracted by their descendants in al-Sus. For example, Naimi identified Ubaydallah's mother, Bayrouk's grandmother, as the maternal aunt of Mawlai Sulayman's half brother *emir* (prince) Abdul-Rahman. In contrast, Ubaydallah's only identifiable wife was the sister of the reigning Ait Musa leader, Ahmad *al-Hiri*.¹⁰¹ The circulation of free (Arab or Berber) and slave (black) females amongst the family's Susian peers and Alawite relations makes it plausible to attribute Bayrouk's complexion to either the uncles or in-laws of his father Ubaydallah: namely, the family of Mawlai Abdul-Rahman's Susian aunt and the al-Hiri. Even if we were able to trace Bayrouk's complexion back to Tuwat, it can still be taken as a sign of Sulayman's reported "high stature" and involvement in the caravan trade. After all, "high stature" was a precondition for both the acquisition of *sudan* maidens (*jawari*) as well as the claim of ennobling origin such as *Ja'farite* descent. We can also turn "high stature" into collateral for *Ja'farite* descent and use it to explain the narrator's silence on Tuwat's Zanata past, the past often chronicled in terms of encounter with dynasties and service to the caravan. Here, the narrator's ability to recall the *taghriba* (exile) of the Banu Hilal and, as will presently be seen, to borrow from Ibn Abdul Hakam's (d.871) *futuh misr*, make it difficult to attribute his silence on Tuwat's Zanata past to the frailty of human memory. Nor it is possible to overlook the suggestive disparity between his invocation of the 'ancient' Banu Hilal and simultaneous silence on those ancestors who lived through the much later interface between the mutation of Zanata identities and the Ubaydallah inheritance of Tuwat: Ali's father and grandfather.

It is perhaps not a mere coincidence that the narrator's silences should also correspond to the existing authorial oscillation between deference to the Bayrouk positional

¹⁰⁰Examples of such figures include the ostensible founder of the (*Kharijite*) principality of Sijilmasa, Ibn Yazid, the notorious (*Kharijite*) rebel against the Fatimids in 943, Makhlad Ibn Kaydad (approx.885-946), the Marinid Sultan Abu-Inan (1348-1358) and Mawlai Ismael himself. Examples from the 'sacred front' in al-Sus include Sidi Y'azi al-Asawi, Muhammad Ibn al-Husayn al-Simlali and al-Susi's maternal grandfather and dean of the Nasiriya *tariqa* in al-Sus, Sidi Muhammad al-Arabi al-Aduzi (1833-1905). Al-Tadli's *at-tashawwuf* teams with *sufi* savants who are described as "black" (*al-aswad*) but were identified in terms of affiliation with named (Berber) *qabila* groups: "*al-Aswad al-zanati* (the black Zanata)", "*al-aswad al-sanhaji* (the black Sanhaja)". On Ibn Kaydad's rebellion and Abu Inan's career, see Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*: 11-113, 65-67. On the al-Aduzi family see, al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 17, 142-207. For examples of "black" (Berber) *sufis* see, al-Tadli, *at-tashawwuf*, ed. Taoufiq: 133, 152, 157-58, 213-222, 232-234, 282, 305, 343-44, 444.

¹⁰¹On the Bayrouk marital relations see, Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936-1937.

superiority and indifference to the dark complexion of some famous family figures, namely, Bayrouk and his oldest son and heir Muhammad. In a manner reminiscent of al-Rabati's presentation of Ubaydallah, Bou Mogdad, al-Walati, al-Susi, al-Garbi and Naimi did not dwell on the corporeal features of Bayrouk or his sons. None of these authors suggest linkages between the migration of Bayrouk ancestor Yusuf from Tuwat and the historicity of Zanata domicile in its *qusur* either.¹⁰² Instead they turned Arabic speech and attachment to the *Ait Jamal* into affirmations of the narrators' claim of an originary Arab identity for his ancestry. For example, al-Susi and al-Gharbi prefaced their biographical translations for the Bayrouk with notations of their privileged status amongst the Takna and indefatigable service (*khidma*) to the Alawite court. In such literary offerings, the narrator's invocation of an originary Arab identity becomes the pathology that seemingly explains contingent Bayrouk dispositions like the regaling of guests with "Arab generosity" or derisive mimicry of *mawali* (non-Arab) 'ellipsis'.¹⁰³ In contrast, Naimi digressed from this literary track only to the extent that he replaced the notion of *Ja'farite* origin with descent from "warrior *a'rab*." It is worth recalling that the demeaning connotations of *a'rab* are embedded in the classical distancing of hybrid, "second generation," Arabians like the Ma'qil from the "*Arab al-fath*" (the conquest Arabs).¹⁰⁴ By substituting *Ja'farite* origin with descent from predatory *a'rab*, Naimi was also able to retain the notion of originary Arab identity and to bypass both the problem of colour and the prospects of a Zanata heritage.

It is besides the point to assume that the status of the Bayrouk has no bearing on either their investiture with an Arab origin or the simultaneous silence on the possibility of a discarded Zanata identity. In a manner reminiscent of Ibn Hawqal's homage to "the supreme kings of Tadmakka," the Bayrouk power has much to do with the historicisation of their current Arab identity by Moroccan literati and academics. Indeed, deference to what the Bayrouk accomplished in Wadi Nun also tarnished nineteenth-century European conceptions of their identity. I have noted how the investiture of the *Moor* with "dark complexion" often presages *his* depiction by shipwrecked mariners such as Adams, Riley and Cochelet as a ravenous barbarian. Yet, in his presentation of Ubaydallah and Bayrouk, Adams combined the elevation of the former to a "governor" with silence on the corporeal features of the latter. In contrast, Cochelet's reminiscence of his first encounter with Bayrouk underlines the ability of "elegance" to influence the allocation of identities. "We," he recalled,

¹⁰²For examples of nineteenth-century Moroccan and Saharan silences on the Bayrouk complexion see, al-Rabati, *tarikh al-Da'eef*, 340-343; al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijaziya*, 186-100.

¹⁰³During one of his visits to his Simlali in-law, al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, *Qaid Dahman* I reportedly made unsavoury remarks about the "*mawali*" in the presence of al-Susi's 'swarthy' maternal grandfather, Sidi Muhammad al-Aduzi. According to al-Susi, Dahman's "despise" for the "*Mawali*" (ostensibly, *Haratin*), inspired Sidi al-Aduzi to accuse him of "ignorance" and to compose a treatise on their "virtue" (*fadl*). On this incident, see al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v.17, 187; Idem. v.19, 280; for nostalgic notations of Dahman's "Arab generosity" see, al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 320; Muhammad al-Akrari, *rawd al-afnan fi wafiyat al-a'yan*, ed. Arfaq Abdul-Rahman (Agadir: M.A Thesis, Jamat Ibn Zohr, 1992): 63-65.

¹⁰⁴The oscillation between pride in *Arab* origin and the use of *a'rab* as a demeaning designation for 'wayward' Arabians informs al-Shinqiti's much earlier conception of (predatory) Hassan as the other of (pious) *zawayya*; al-Shinqiti, *al-wasit*, 475-482.

saw two travellers arrive, the youngest (Bayrouk) ... to whom all the demonstrations of respect were addressed was attired in a much more elegant and costly manner.... His haïque ... was much finer ... hung beautifully over another garment ... ornamented ... with silk embroidery... Red morocco boots, tastefully figured, added still more to the elegance of his dress. [He] was ... well made, and of an athletic form ... his swarthy and almost black complexion indicated that the Moorish blood which flowed in his veins was mixed with that of the Negro.¹⁰⁵

The impact of "demonstrations of respect" and "elegant" attire in the assignment of identity is evidenced by Cochelet's simultaneous equation of indigence/ nudity with *negritude* and, in effect, the deft denial of "Moorish" identity to his Saharan captor. "We discovered," he noted,

*at a distance a black figure coming towards us. The contrast of his colour (for he was entirely naked) with the paleness of the soil soon removed all doubt: it was a Negro! (Emphasis added).*¹⁰⁶

In the same way that it commissioned the mellowing of Bayrouk's complexion, opulence was capable of serving as palpable collateral for omissions of association with indigent Zanata or Arabians and the advertisement of an origin that commands "respect" like *Ja'farite* descent. A combination of "high stature" with the stated antiquity of the Bayrouk involvement in the caravan trade can therefore enable us to turn the claim of *Ja'farite* descent by either Sulayman or his ancestors to a rite of passage from a privileged Zanata to a proud Arab.

Deference to the Bayrouk positional superiority may also explain the slanting of the challenge facing the narrator's tracing of the Takna origin back to Tuwat and, hence, the obviation of the classical juxtaposition of being from al-Sus and being from the central Sahara. Of course, the slanting of this tradition of signification also blurs the differences in the identities possible to Yusuf's Tuwatian ancestry "before the eleventh century" and what his descendants have become in Wadi Nun afterwards. By recalling the parallelism between being (*Butr*) Zanata and (*Branis*) Lamta or (*M'aqil*) Ubaydallah and Shabanat, it becomes feasible to surmise a link between the narrator's silence on Tuwat's demographic history and his invocations of *Ja'farite* and Hilal origins. The actuality of the Zanata mutation in Tuwat, and the omnipresence of the *Jazulia* networks and Sa'dian mastery of space in al-Sus, could not have been lost on an immigrant like Yusuf. It is, however, besides the point to imagine that the survival of certifiable Zanata in Tuwat might have discouraged either Yusuf or al-Susi's informant from invoking *Ja'farite* descent. After all, the notions of descent from *Sahaba* (Muhammad's companions) and exodus from *holy land*, the *Mashriq*, arrived in the Maghrib long before the "eleventh century" of the *Hijra*. The utility of such claims to migration from one place to another and the transcendence of the boundaries that separate their occupants could have hardly escaped Yusuf's attention. In that sense, the reinforcement

¹⁰⁵ Cochelet, Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia, 53-54.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. 7.

of temporal and religious credentials with a *Ja'farite* descent may have enabled Yusuf to mollify localized apprehensions and, indeed, paved the way for the inclusion of his "progeny" by his Takna hosts. What remains to be seen are the tools Yusuf may have used to endear himself to his Takna hosts.

IV-Becoming Takna: Spatiality and Textuality

In this section, I will sketch the role of spatiality in the transformation of the first named Tuwatian immigrant, Yusuf, and surmise the intangible credentials and practical skills he could have used to market himself to his Susian hosts and, hence, to induce the promotion of his descendents to Takna. To this end, I will posit the Takna tendency to imagine social existence in terms of "respect" (*tawqir*) for the *zawiya* and "service" (*khidma*) to the dynasty to surmise Yusuf's first hosts and how he might have 'discovered' the *Ait Jamal* in general and the *Ait Musa* in particular. I will then posit the congruity of identity with spatiality as backdrop and highlight the contribution of textuality to the narrator's imagination of how his Susian ancestors had overcome their marginality as descendants of an outsider and set the stage for the Bayrouk aggrandizement in the nineteenth century. My purpose here is to show that the transformation of the Bayrouk into privileged Takna was made possible by and is, indeed, explained in terms of, their ability to harness precisely the kind of academic credentials ethnographers tended to consider beyond the reach of tribesmen—literacy and "literature."

Tuwatian Immigrant, Susian Hosts: The Takna Bayrouk

I have noted that in comparison to his identification of a time frame for Yusuf's arrival in Wadi Nun, al-Susi's informant did not reveal the whereabouts of his son Abdul-Rahman and grandson Saud or what became of them. This silence is hardly alleviated by al-Gharbi's subsequent situation of Yusuf in "southern Wadi Nun" and his investiture with the "respect of the *qaba'il* of al-Saqiya al-Hamra."¹⁰⁷ After all, al-Gharbi did not identify the *qabail* Yusuf had chosen as his first hosts. The omission of the names of the "*qabail* of al-Saqiya al-Hamra" leaves the question of who were Yusuf's first hosts or in-laws without an answer. A definitive answer to this question could have helped us surmise the maternal relations of Yusuf's son Abdul-Rahman and grandson Saud. In that sense, al-Gharbi's replication of the narrator's lack of interest in underachievers tends to condemn Yusuf's immediate descendants to obscurity. While Yusuf was at least credited with the "respect" of the "*qabail* of al-Saqiya al-Hamra", the main function of Abdul-Rahman and Saud seems to be the production of the ancestor who put the Bayrouk name on the map: *Shaykh* Muhammad Ibn Saud. It is worth recalling how the narrator's enchantment with Ibn Saud's performance in the *Hamada* (desert) of Tinduf also sanctioned the cryptic identification of his son al-Hasan in terms of "living off his (Ibn Saud) reputation."

The discursive assassination of underachievers is best exhibited by the sharp contrast

¹⁰⁷ Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176-177.

between the spacious slot occupied by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Saud and the exclusion of his father Saud and grandfather Abdul-Rahman from the family saga. True, the narrator posited piety as the common denominator of both his Tuwatian and early Susian ancestors. Yet, the explicit investiture of Yusuf and Ibn Saud with the inheritance of Sulayman's religious credentials also highlights the demotion of Abdul-Rahman and Saud to idle consumers. It is worth recalling that the confinement of these two figures to the *nisba* also coincides with the decline in the fortunes of Susian *zawaya* and *qabila* groups often blamed on Mawlai Rashid's "dislike" of the *ahl al-Sahil*, the Simlali and their Susian clients. Conversely, Ibn Saud's burst into fame coincided with Mawlai Ismael's appeasement of Susian *zawaya* families and his recruitment of their *qabila* associates in his Saharan expeditions. In both cases, al-Susi's informant seems to use encounter with the dynasty and the caravan to determine the historically significant and insignificant about the Bayrouk past. Befittingly, he turned the Takna participation in Mawlai Ismael's Saharan expeditions into a theatre to display Ibn Saud's pious credentials. One can use the narrator's collation of Yusuf's arrival in al-Sus with the reign of the Sa'dian al-Mansur and Ibn Saud's burst into fame with service to Mawlai Ismael as frames of reference to propose a tentative scenario for how the Bayrouk might have become Ait Musa Takna.

It is worth recalling that southern Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra were the domains of the Azraqayn and, until 1879, Ait Usa constituents of the *Ait Jamal Leff*. We can use this conventional wisdom to bypass the narrator's failure to identify Yusuf's first Takna hosts. By using the investiture of the *zawiya* and the dynasty with the stitching of the Takna we could also extrapolate the strings Yusuf might have pulled to endear himself to Azraqayn or Ait Usa Takna. One can also posit the investiture of the *zawaya* of Asa and Tamanart with the "respect" of the Takna of southern Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra to further shore up the suggestion of the Ait Usa and Azraqayn as Yusuf's first probable hosts. If Yusuf had arrived on his own, as the narrator seems to suggest, the utility of piety can be imagined in terms of its capacity to lead the *zawaya* the *Jazulia tariqa* had spawned to recruit him as a disciple and to recommend him to their *qabila* clients or Sa'dian benefactors. Here, we can turn Wajaj Ibn Zallu's recommendation of Ibn Yasin to the Saharan Sanhaja into an indicator of the historicity of *qabila* deference to devout outsiders like Yusuf. The social networks the *zawaya* of Asa and Tamanart had spun could have paved the way for encounter between an immigrant like Yusuf and Sa'dian deputies on the spot. In the previous chapter, I noted how Sidi Ibn Ibrahim *al-Tamanarti* was credited with the delivery of Takna recruits to his Sa'dian benefactors. *Zawaya* patterns of recruitment and the Sa'dian avarice for soldiers could have created a niche for the induction of Yusuf as a nominal Takna. I have already noted that Ait Usa and Azraqayn were also the identities of the Saharan Takna who patronised the *zawiya* of Asa. Up until the 1870s fidelity to the *Iqzulim Leff* also ordained the Ait Ausa and the Azraqayn as the brethren of the Ait al-Hasan and Ait Musa of Wadi Nun. The identification of southern Wadi Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra as the domains of the Ait Usa and Azraqayn brethren of the Ait Musa also preceded the Bayrouk assumption of the leadership of the *Ait Jamal Leff* (alignment). The fact that the *Ait Jamal* Takna were also in the habit of trading tribute to Shurafa dynasts for service (*khidma*) in their armies tends to prop up the prospect of an early encounter between Yusuf and Ait Usa or Azraqayn recruits.

The suggestion of the Saharan Ait Usa and Azraqayn as Yusuf's first probable

hosts, however, does not sit well with the Bayrouk use of being Ait Musa and domicile in Gulimeme as the essences of the family identity. One can of course, dispose of this problem by crediting Yusuf's heirs with a subsequent crossing from the Ait Usa or Azraqayn to the Ait Musa. Alternatively, we can combine arrival during al-Mansur's reign with entry through al-Saqiya al-Hamra to propose a direct encounter between Yusuf and the Ait Musa without recourse to *zawaya* mediation or agonising over the possibility of a subsequent break with his Ait Usa or Azraqayn hosts. In fact, we can ignore the prospect of independent arrival and credit Yusuf with direct encounter with Takna auxiliaries of the Sa'dians in Tuwat. As the investiture of Ibn Saud with the rescue of "a government army" suggests, the narrator tends to credit his ancestors with a providential gift to find water in arid terrains. A secularisation of this gift also enables us to collate the worldly skills it signifies with Ibn Khaldun's investiture of Saharan Zanata with "strange method of digging" for water. "In these desert lands," he noted,

they (Zanata) have a strange method of digging for running water, which is not found in the Tell. A well is dug very deep and its sides are lined until the excavation reaches hard rock. This is cut away with pickaxes until it is thin. Then the workmen come up and throw a mass of iron onto it. This breaks the layer of rock over the water, which gushes upwards, fills the well, and overflows onto the surface of the ground as a river ... this strange phenomenon is to be seen in the qusur of Tuwat, Tigurarín, Wargala, and Righ.¹⁰⁸

Given his migration from one of "the qusur of Tuwat," Yusuf could have harnessed such skill to endear himself to Susian auxiliaries of the Sa'dians who were most certainly less educated in the wiles of Saharan terrains. The Sa'dian quest for scouts for their trans-Saharan expeditions was also capable of creating a market for the skills of Tuwatians of Yusuf's calibre.

In the previous chapter, I noted how Naimi's anonymous Ait Musa informants explained the social birth of their *qabila* and the career of its leading family, the al-Hiri, in terms of patronage by al-Mansur and service with his Ait Musa deputy, *al-Qaid* Baraka. It is worth recalling that Bayrouk's father, Ubaydallah, not only married into the al-Hiri family but, later on, also inherited their leadership of the Ait Musa. Taken in conjunction with the identification of the Takna in the *diwan qabail Sus* in terms of being in the "company of the sultan," al-Mansur, this proposition helps us to avoid confining the Ait Musa to one locale.¹⁰⁹ We can retain the suggestion of southern Wadi Nun or al-Saqiya al-Hamra as Yusuf's possible points of entry without discounting the possibility of direct encounter with mobile Ait Musa elements. Whether because of their enlistment in Shurafa armies or their comradeship with the Ait Usa and the Azraqayn, the Ait Musa treks to the Western Sahara continued well after their purported transformation into sedentary traders. I noted that Robert Adams credited his transportation from the Western Sahara to Gulimeme to "Hieta Mouessa Ali."¹¹⁰ We can attribute the Ait Musa "respect" (*tawqir*)

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *Ibar*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levzion, 340; Ibn Khaldun, *al-Ibar* v.7 (13), 119.

¹⁰⁹ Al-Hassani, *diwan qabail Sus*, ed Afa, 29.

¹¹⁰ Adams, *Narrative of Robert Adams*, 61-62. On the Ait Musa mobility, see Leopold Panet, *Première exploration*, 190-192.

for Yusuf to the valuation of the same worldly skills that may have endeared him to Sa'dian auxiliaries in Tuwat.

One can also credit the posterity Yusuf had left in Wadi Nun with at least a semblance of the spiritual and temporal assets he might have used to sell himself to the Ait Musa. In that case, it becomes possible to anticipate the narrator's conversion of Ibn Saud's fame to a genesis for the positional superiority the Bayrouk have come to signify. I have already noted how the real turn in the Bayrouk fortunes in Wadi Nun is attributed to the "reputation" Ibn Saud had earned as a result of his rescue of a stranded Alawite expedition in the *hamada* (desert) of Tinduf. The most significant result of Ibn Saud's purported discovery of water was his investiture with an honorific *laqab* (nickname): *Oshin* for *Shilha*-speaking Berbers and *al-Dheeb* for their Arabic-speaking counterparts. This *laqab* (nickname) continued to be the celebrity name of his Susian descendants well after the inscription of Bayrouk as a lasting name for the family.¹¹¹ In the family commercial ledgers, for example, Bayrouk is often identified as *al-Shaykh Mubarak Ibn Ubaydallah Ibn Salem al-Dheebi*. A return to the incident that sanctioned this designation can help us better understand the narrator's tendency to collate right to history with excellence in the caravan trade and service to the dynasty.

Textualized Experience: *Shaykh* Ibn Saud

The narrator's presentation of the incident behind Ibn Saud's fame underscores my earlier emphasis on the role of textuality in the structuring of *qabila* sense of identity and history. The Bayrouk narrative also demonstrates the pitfalls of the current translation of *qabila* to tribe and, in effect, its separation from "literature and writing." Herein, I will first present a translation of the standard narration of the incident that sanctioned *al-Dheeb* as a nickname for Ibn Saud as it was relayed to al-Susi and then identify its most probable textual origin. "The reason behind this nickname (*al-Dheeb*)," al-Susi wrote,

was that he (Ibn Saud) was in the company of a government army that camped in the place called *al-hamada* without water. Thirst impaired men, horses and mules. Shaykh Muhammad was sitting next to his mare (*faras*) when it began to *paw the ground* with its hoof thereby uncovering moist soil. He used the iron [tools] he had with him to dig and promptly uncovered a gushing spring. He drank, watered his mare and filled a waterskin. When he got to the campsite, he asked to see the commander (of the expedition) who was in seclusion lamenting the calamity that had stricken his army. Once allowed in, he showed the waterskin to the commander and told him what had happened. Allah has thus warded off a certain affliction on account of his [Ibn Saud] mare and that is [also] *why this place is to date called al-Farasiya* (the Mare's well). The army was composed of *Shiluh* (Susian Berbers) and Arabs and one of the *Shiluh* witnesses mused "*Shaykh Muhammad is verily an oshin*." This became the *laqab* (nickname) for the family by which it is still known (emphasis added).¹¹²

¹¹¹Oshin (*Shilha*), al-Dheeb (Arabic): literally, wolf. Metaphorically, the nickname seems to denote providential blessing with an acute sensory faculty.

¹¹²Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 274.

This incident and the nickname it spawned mark the certification of the Bayrouk as part of a bi-lingual, *Shilluh* and Arab, Takna ensemble. The narrator also posited this incident as the most tangible genesis of the Bayrouk career in al-Sus. One can, of course, use Ibn Khaldun's investiture of the Saharan-Zanata with "a strange method" of overcoming the natural limitations of their arid homeland to gauge the realistic experience behind Ibn Saud's modes of discovery and drilling for water in the *hamada* (desert). On this occasion, however, the already noted inclination of the narrator to barter mundane experiences for lofty textual tropes becomes much more elaborate than the tardy invocations of historical metaphors like the Banu Hilal *taghriba* (exile) or the notion of *Ja'farite* descent seems to indicate. The reader is left with an impression of the narrator's struggle for a literary plot that expedites the elevation of a mundane activity like digging for water to evidence of a link between piety and ability to force the Sahara to yield what negates its identity as Sahara: water. At the same time, fear of, to borrow from Geertz, "reducing (the) particularity" of the family stature seems to sanction the deft omission of the classical 'manual' that might have alerted Ibn Saud to the existence of al-Farasiya, *Ma' Faras*, in the first place.¹¹³

The evidence supporting the possibility of apriori knowledge hails from the deep recesses of Maghribian history and, as such, demystifies the translation of *qabila* into tribe and its location beyond the realm of the written.¹¹⁴ Apart from the addition of "iron" to Shaykh Ibn Saud's arsenal, the gist of the tale is almost identical to Ibn Abd al-Hakam's tantalizing account of the adventures of the legendary Umayyad commander Uqba Ibn Nafa' (d.683) in Africa. "Uqba Ibn Nafi al-Fihri," Ibn Abd al-Hakam (d. 873) wrote,

went to the Maghrib in the year 46/666-7... (He) halted in a place now called *Ma' Faras* (the Horse's Water), in which there was no water at that time. 'Uqba and his followers suffered great thirst and were at the point of death. 'Uqba prayed two genuflections, and called to God, whereupon his horse began to paw the ground with its two fore hooves until it uncovered a rock from which water was seeping. The horse began to suck up this water. 'Uqba, seeing this, called his men to dig. They dug 70 holes in the sand, and drank, quenching their thirst. For this reason the place was called *Ma Faras* (emphasis added).¹¹⁵

Even if we take the narrator's investiture of his ancestor with the discovery of al-Farasiya at face value, it is still reasonable to suspect that Ibn Saud not only knew the space and its history, but also the location of *Ma Faras* well before his reported arrival with the "government army." From this vantage point, we can take the nomination of Ibn Saud as the first discoverer of al-Farasiya as a timely reminder of how learned outsiders often harnessed their knowledge and perceived piety to endear themselves to their *qabila* hosts. In fact, classical texts are replete with examples wherein the discovery of water in the

¹¹³"Understanding a people's culture", Geertz promised, "exposes their normalness without reducing their particularity." Geertz, "Thick Descriptions," In Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 3-30, 14.

¹¹⁴On the distancing of "tribe" from "writing and literature" see, Southall, "The Illusion of Tribe," in *Perspectives on Africa*, ed. Grinker and Steiner: 38-51, 38.

¹¹⁵Ibn Abd al-Hakam, *futuh misr*, in *Corpus*, ed. Levtzion and Hopkins, 13

Sahara and, hence, rescue from certain death is invariably construed as evidence of piety. According to Ibn Idhari, the architect of the Almoravid movement, Abdullah Ibn Yasin, displayed similar powers and was able to induce the same kind of impression amongst his following. "One of the things related about Ibn Yasin," he wrote,

is that he was on a journey with some people and they were all assailed with thirst. They complained of this to him and he said: 'let us hope that God may deliver us from our plight'. Then after they had travelled for some time he said: 'Dig!' They dug, and found water after very little digging. They considered this to be a miracle on his part!¹¹⁶

Of course, Ibn Saud's ability to enchant his "Shiluh and Arab" comrades was sanctioned by familiarity with what they were disposed to consider within the realm of the possible in that place at that time. The prevalence of this lore may also explain why al-Susi, al-Gharbi and Naimi did not question the notion of first discovery nor attempt to recover the textual connection between the present al-Farasiya and the *Ma' Faras* of Uqba Ibn Nafa—see, map 1. After all, Ibn Saud's purported ability to 'alter' the natural order of things pales beside the spiritual powers credited to redoubtable *sufi* savants like Sidi Ya'zi al-Asawi, Sidi Ibn Musa al-Simlali and Sidi Ibn Ibrahim al-Tamanarti. In the previous chapter, I noted that it was largely because of their spiritual and temporal credentials that these confessed outsiders were also able to establish themselves in their adoptive homes and, in the process, they came to define rather than be defined by the identities of their *qabila* hosts. From this vantage point, the Bayrouk status amongst the Ait Musa is comparable to the position of the Simlali and the *al-Qa'id al-Tamanarti* families in the midst of their *qabila* hosts, the Majat and Id Ahmad Takna. Like the foreign founders of these *zawaya* families, Ibn Saud could have used his religious credentials to neutralise any lingering doubts about the Bayrouk identity and, in so doing, also endowed his descendants with the ability to transform themselves into certified Ait Musa Takna and to contest the right to speak for the *Ait Jamal* as a whole. The narrator's interest in his role in the empowerment of the Bayrouk may also explain Ibn Saud's rather abrupt exit from the scene. In contrast to the narrator's notation of the tendency of Ibn Saud's immediate descendants to "live off his reputation," there is no further reference to his old age or the time of his death. In so far as the narrator was concerned, Ibn Saud seems to have fulfilled his role in the Bayrouk history. It was left to Ubaydallah and his heirs to turn the "symbolic capital" Ibn Saud's nickname and "reputation" began to signify into tangible foundations for the Bayrouk commercial and political enterprises in the nineteenth century.

The narrator's infatuation with historical metaphors aside, the forgoing presentation of

¹¹⁶ Ibn Idhari, *al-bayan*, in *Corpus*, ed. Hopkins and Levtzion, 217-232, 224. Al-Tadli credited Wajjaj Ibn Zulu with similar attributes and provided examples of the predication of the discovery of water in arid terrains on piety. See al-Tadli, *al-tashawwuf*, ed. Taoufiq, 89-90, 125-126, 254-255. For academic treatment of the relation between piety and social, economic and political practices, see Muhamed El Mansour, "Sharifian Sufism: The Religious and Social Practice of the Wazzani Zawiya," in *Tribe and State*, ed. Joffe and Pennell, 69-83; Henry Munson, *Religion and Power in Morocco*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Joumani, "Les Saints et le sacre," in *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 321-343.

Ibn Saud's career enables us to sketch a line between the artistry that went into the making of the narrative and the intrinsic value of what was being told to our understanding of the Bayrouk history. Firstly, al-Susi's choice of *Qaid* Dahman II as the main repository of the Bayrouk history also ensured that what has become a standardized family narrative was authored by the male descendants of *Qai'd* Dahman I, the descendants who symbolize the Bayrouk power in Wadi Nun to this day. The endorsement of this official version by Moroccan authors like al-Gharbi and Naimi and al-Mudin, further diminished the prospects of a history that does not locate the Bayrouk or their *qabila* inside the Shurafa dynastic realm. As the silence on the contemporaries of the ancestor of King Muhammad V, Mawlai Rashid, seems to suggest, the division of roles among selected ancestors, and the space allotted to each figure in the narrative, correspond to a much later recollection of their role in the enhancement of the Bayrouk position. Political discretion aside, this utilitarian approach to history and identity is indicative of the deliberation underlying the remembrance of certain ancestors, the cursory allusions to others and the almost complete silence on their mothers, siblings and relations.

I have already noted how a named Bayrouk grandfather usually begets a single male who in turn leaves behind only one son. It is perhaps ironic that in contrast to his silences on underachievers, the narrator chose to reward the three main Susian heroes of the family, Ibn Saud, Ubaydallah and Bayrouk, with the capacity to reproduce more than one son. Collectively, these three ancestors were credited with more sons than the rest of the Bayrouk figures enshrined in the family *nisba*. Yet, even these revelations were often abrogated by the narrator's refusal to reveal the names of these sons or what they had done with the gift of life bestowed on them by their opulent parents. The effacement of underachieving kinsmen further demystifies the ethnographic fixation on the "tie of blood" and "mechanical solidarity," and turns the idealized Bayrouk ancestors into individualistic career-oriented figures. I have already noted the narrator's tendency to leap from a prodigious grandfather to his enterprising grandson and to use underachievers as bridges to the gap that separates one famous ancestor from another. Like all notions of origin, the Bayrouk narrative was constructed with the benefit of hindsight and, as such, its silences and revelations were inspired by what al-Susi's informant wanted others to know about the family. From this vantage point, the narrative supplements the presentations of the family political and commercial exploits by Alawite biographers and European observers. It also presaged the later conversion of Ubaydallah Ibn Salem into a genesis for the Bayrouk debut into history by Moroccan sociologists like Pascon and Ennaji and historians such as al-Muhammadi and Najih. But it did so because the narrator was careful enough not to stray too far from the realm of texts.

Lastly, in the context of the tacit modelling of Ibn Saud after Uqba Ibn Nafa', the narrator's location of the Takna origin in Tuwat does not belong to what Najib depicted as "orally transmitted histories, emerging in the realm of mythology." Al-Susi's informant seems to be too familiar with Maghribian textual traditions for his revelations to be taken as "orally transmitted histories" or his silences to be blamed on the strictures of tribal "mythology." One piece of information that could not have escaped the attention of a reader of Ibn Abdul-Hakem's text or the Banu Hilal saga is the disparity between the identity designations ascribed to the respective occupants of Tuwat and al-Sus in the wake of the Arab conquest. One does not have to agonize over the scope of the narrator's

expertise in the history of the Maghrib to conclude that such differences do not auger well for the presentation of the Bayrouk as inevitable Takna. The Takna do not even come close to natives of the same space let alone a segmented tribe. Ideally, the parallelism between the demographic histories of Tuwat and al-Sus could have been resolved either by tracing Takna origin back to the former or by the investiture of the Bayrouk ancestry with nativity to the latter. Of course, tracing the Takna origin back to Tuwat bridges the historical chasm that separates Susians from the Bayrouk Tuwatin ancestry almost at the same time that it spares the narrator the kind of scrutiny a claim of infinite nativity to Wadi Nun might have invited. More importantly, however, the Takna seem to have lost this battle not only because of their modernity, but also because their own notions of origin were often authored by 'foreign' elites such as the Bayrouk.

In the next two chapters, we will see the tangible assets that enabled the Bayrouk to influence the Takna and, as such, lend credence to the narrator's claim to be an authority on their origin. As we will see, involvement in the caravan trade and dalliance with the Shurafa court made the Bayrouk more vulnerable to external influences than the rest of their Takna brethren. Yet, it was precisely because of the frequency of their encounters with the outside world, and ability to accumulate resources and concentrate power that the Bayrouk were able to leave their mark on the politics of the Takna *qabila* ensemble and, indeed, to become the most visible signifier of being Takna.

CHAPTER III PROPHETS OF TRADE: THE BAYROUK MISSION

The main subject of this chapter is the commercial career of the Bayrouk in the nineteenth century. I want to examine how it scripted the family conception of self as well as their image in contemporaneous texts and the academic treatises they have hitherto inspired. I intend to explore the ways the Trans-Saharan Trade has defined the narrator's vision of his ancestors, and how we can use the Bayrouk experience to redefine the caravan and, in effect, revise its image in current scholarship. My intention here is not simply to compare and contrast the Bayrouk and authorial visions of the caravan. Rather, I seek to identify the textual traditions, ideological strictures and historical contingencies that seem to have ordained the Bayrouk and authorial conceptions of the caravan. My working assumption is that difference between Moroccan and European textual traditions were capable of inspiring different images of the same caravan. The two faces of the caravan tend to extenuate the split between the Takna and ethnographic conceptions of *qabila* origin and its location *vis-à-vis* the *Makhzan*. We can trace the genealogy of these two faces of the caravan back to the same ruptures that sanctioned the shifts from sanctified idioms like *Moor* or *Monselemine* to the notion of autonomous or "free" tribe. In that sense, the current, post-modern, image of the caravan is more modern than the literature seems to suggest. And because it was born in the bosom of nineteenth-century abolitionism, the survival of this image tends to validate Hayden White's depiction of history as "the conservative discipline par excellence."¹ To chart the interface between the modern and post-modern images of the caravan and, amplify the role of textuality in their articulation, I have divided this chapter into four main sections.

In the first section, I will sketch a genesis for the Bayrouk involvement in the caravan trade in the nineteenth century. I want to highlight how the textual caravan shaped the narrator's vision of history and the ways it complements or feeds off the Bayrouk image in modern texts. My purpose here is to test the utility of the caravan, as a historical metaphor, to discourses on origin and identity, and to indicate how the narrator invokes it as a witness to situate his ancestors in time and space. To this end, I will cross-reference the narrator's revelations with the subaltern Takna narratives, nineteenth-century Shurafa biographies and the academic commentaries that seem to feed off such sources. In contrast, the second section is a synoptic critique of the historiography of the caravan with special emphasis on how Africanists have, to date, conceptualized the agendas of nineteenth-century traders like the Bayrouk. I want to show how we can posit Shurafa biographers such as al-Nasiri and abolitionists or colonial historians like Richardson and Bovill as intellectual fathers for the post-colonial academic conceptions of the caravan. I will trace academic discourses on the health of the caravan and the identities of its cargo back, to borrow from the Camaroffs, to "the liberal hegemony" abolitionism has spawned.² This will highlight both the

¹ White traced the genesis of history, as an academic discipline, back to the nineteenth century and blamed its conservatism on 'our' tendency to use what he called "Fabian" logic to defend its haphazard location between "science" and "art". White, *Tropics of Discourse*, 27-50.

² Cammaroffs, *of Revelation and Revolutions* v.1, 87: see quotation in the introduction.

conservatism of the historiography of the Trans-Saharan Trade and the role of secularization in the cementation of its conceptual parameters.

In the third section I seek to establish a modern, nineteenth-century, intellectual genealogy for the post-colonial academic conceptions of the object of the caravan and the career of traders like the Bayrouk. To test the relevance of this historiography to the careers of Susian traders like the Bayrouk, I will use the testimonies of nineteenth-century survivors of shipwreck and explorers to gauge the shift in authorial presentations of the caravan and, as a result, Gulimeme and the Bayrouk. Here, I followed on what I did in chapter two and reified the differences between the modes of arrival and reporting of early nineteenth-century travelers like Jackson (1815) and survivors of shipwreck such as Charles Cochelet (1819) on one hand, and explorers and abolitionist like Davidson (1836) and Richardson (1860) on the other hand. As we will see, the same shift in the balance of power that inspired the demotion of Susians from, to borrow from Saugnier, "un peuple connu le nom général de *Monselemine*" to "savage" tribes also sanctioned the inversion of the *Moor* Bayrouk from a "dark" captor of Christian mariners to a 'white' scourge of "negroes." While Bayrouk retains his negative image as a "sensual" predator, there is a discernable shift in the allocation of his prey. The European body lost its place in the menu to that of his "negro" counterpart. Through it all, Bayrouk comes across as an incorrigible slaver who was also hankering after the market that had no use for his human commodities: Europe.

In the fourth and last section, I will utilize the Bayrouk commercial ledger as an arbiter between the realistic and rhetorical about the caravan as it was presented by the narrator and nineteenth-century biographers and travelers, the biographers and travelers post-colonial academics such as Schroeter and Ennaji invoked as witnesses in their assessment of the family role in the Trans-Saharan Trade. My objective here is to amplify the disparity between academic conceptions of the cargo of the caravan and what the Bayrouk commercial ledger reveals.³ I also seek to resolve the glaring discrepancy between the presentation of Bayrouk as an incorrigible slaver and simultaneous allusions to his obsession with European markets. At the same time, the commercial ledger provides us with the type of evidence we can use to explain the seeming failure of survivors of shipwreck to credit Bayrouk with wealth in 'African' captives. What the registers reveal can also help us to explain the politics of trade that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, also set the stage for Mawlai al-Hasan's trek to Gulimeme and the transformation of the narrator's grandfather, Dahman Ibn Bayrouk, to an accredited Alawite *qaid*—the subject of the next chapter.

The Bayrouk commercial registers deserve a preferential status largely because, unlike the Shurafa biographies, European travelogue and the subaltern Takna narratives, they were not intended for posterity or to impress a wider audience. Rather, these records are spontaneous transcriptions of what mattered to the Bayrouk and their

³For a tabulation of the content of these registers see, Mustafa Nâimi, "La rive Sud Saharienne de 1842 à 1872 dans les registres comptables de la famille Bayruk," *Colloque sur les Sources Arabes de L'Histoire Africaine, Commission Internationale pour une Histoire Scientifique et Culturelle de l'Humanité* (Rabat: 1-3 avril 1987): 167-192.

customers at specific moments in history. Fulfillment of the terms of a commercial transaction often leads to forms of erasure that render the identities of the debtor and creditor as well as what they bought or sold unintelligible. In that sense, the registers are valuable repositories for spontaneous presentations of self by the Bayrouk and their trading partners. They team with crisp tabulations of the identity designations the Bayrouk and their partners chose to reveal as well as tallies of the tradable articles that warranted such disclosures. In each register the debtor begins by thanking *Allah* (God) for his bounties, reveals his full name, *qabila* or *zawiya* identity and, then, acknowledges what he received from the Bayrouk, its monetary value, and the terms and projected time of repayment.

The congruity of self-disclosure with exchange of rights in *things* also seems to sanction the inscription of being Ait Musa or Takna and living in Gulimeme or Wadi Nun as the chosen identity designations for the Bayrouk. In return, the Bayrouk used locales like Essaouira or Wadi Dra' and *qabila* designations such as Tajakant or Rgaybat to pin down their debtors: *al-Suwayri* (of Essaouira) and *al-Dra'wi* (of Wadi Dra') or *al-Jakani* (from the Tajakant) and *al-Rgaybi* (from the Rgaybat). Like the differentiation of the Takna from the Tajakant, the spatial distance separating Essaouira from Gulimeme or Wadi Nun from Wadi Dra' was bound to translate into variations in the objects of procurement and distribution. At the pedantic level, subscription to the ethnographic investiture of tribe with a primitive, subsistence, economy entails distancing the Bayrouk and their community from trade.⁴ In contrast, adherence to the notion of ineffable, primordial, attachment entails an expectation that as kinsmen, the Takna were entitled to preferential treatment from their Bayrouk brethren. Here, the registers can help answer mundane questions pertaining to whether the Bayrouk had a preference for outsiders or kinsmen and the credentials they considered as effective guarantors of integrity: piety and literacy or the "tie of blood." As we will see, the registers team with signifiers of what Hammoudi, following Foucault, called "the diagram of knowledge and power" like *Sidi*, *al-Hajj* (pilgrim) and *al-talib* (seeker of knowledge). The excessive use of such motifs raises questions about the qualities the Bayrouk deemed desirable in debtors and, in effect, the *thing* they might have seen as the essence of identification. In that sense, one can use the registers as extra ammunition to dispose of notions like tribal (natural) attachment or egalitarianism, and to restrain both the narrator's nostalgic vision of the caravan and its stylized images in Shurafa biographies, European travelogue and the academic treatises they have inspired.

⁴On the conflation of tribe with "primitive" (subsistence) economy and, hence, its distancing from markets and trade see, Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 87; Montagne, *The Berbers*, 54; The notion of subsistence underpins the substantivist conception of tribe, the conception later criticized by post-colonial, formalist, economic historians. For the substantivist conception of tribal economy, see George Dalton and Paul Bohanan, "Introduction," in *Markets in Africa*, ed. Dalton and Bohanan, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962): 1-26; *Tribal and Peasant Economics: Readings in Economic Anthropology*, ed. George Dalton, (New York: Natural History Press, 1967); for a formalist critique of the substantivist vision see, W.O. Jones, "Economic Man in Africa," *Food Research Institute Studies*, 1(1960), 107-134; Anthony G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 1-7.

Overall, the chapter is intended to amplify the role of textuality in the Bayrouk and authorial conceptions of the caravan, and the ways Moroccan and European traditions of signification have shaped academic postulations of the identity and gender of its cargo. Moroccan and European textual traditions, however, are laced with contending visions of providential truth. Befittingly, the academic conceptions of the Trans-Saharan Trade they have hitherto inspired are entrapped in discursive conventions that tend to blur shifts in the priorities of Susian traders like the Bayrouk and, by implication, changes in the cargo of the caravans. I credit secularisation with the conferring of a scientific aura on what was essentially a holistic vision of the caravan. Secularisation, I suggest, enabled post-colonial academics to strip abolitionist rhetoric of its holistic agenda. But, in the process, secularisation also eased the elevation of abolitionist denunciations of *Moorish* "sensuality" to objective audits of the cargo of the caravan. The inversion of the *Moor* to a metaphor of sensuality, one may add, tends to mystify Bayrouk's reported infatuation with "legitimate trade," the infatuation that, according to Pennell, also elevated him to "a kindred spirit" of its European purveyors.⁵

Firstly, it would be difficult to reconcile the narrator's inclination to posit the caravan as a witness to locate his ancestors in time and space, and tacit silence on the identities of its cargo without gazing at the Maghribian lore that spawned its image as a signifier of affluence. The caravan of the narrator is too majestic to be lumped with mundane articles of trade like gum or 'bad' influences such as tobacco. Here, silence on the cargo of the modern caravan had the added advantage of goading the narrator's audience to credit his ancestry with exotic signifiers of power like gold—i.e. the kind of exotics that captivated the classical authors. In contrast, classical texts enabled learned travellers and survivors of shipwreck such as Jackson and Riley to regale their audiences with mesmerising anecdotes about the "golden trade of the *Moors*" at the time when there was still no shame in enslavement on either side of the Mediterranean. Conversely, the collation of modern caravans with traffic in slaves seemed to help abolitionists like Richardson to posit *Moorish* "sensuality" as the pagan pathology that also ordained Moroccan indifference to abolitionist humanism. In so far as envoys of abolitionist fronts like "the Society of English Gentlemen" were concerned, Moroccan indifference to abolitionism was a manifestation of *Moorish* infidelity. In short, Providence would not mind if the caravan was turned into a medium for the inundation of 'pagan' *Barbary* with signifiers of the moral depravity of its "benighted" inhabitants: "concubines."

Secondly, in the introduction to this thesis, I indicated that the genesis of the post-colonial academic conception of the Takna as autonomous tribes and the Bayrouk as slave traders can be traced back to the shift in the balance of power between Morocco and Europe in the era of the "scramble for Africa." In chapter one, I noted how secularisation paved the way for the discursive assassination of sacred identity designations like *Monselemine* and the cultivation of the space their ostensible carriers used to occupy, al-Sus, with autonomous tribes like the Takna. Here, I contend that the abolitionist tendency to posit "sensuality" as a frame of reference to determine the

⁵ Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 46: see quotation in the introduction

identity and gender of the cargo of the caravan is rooted in the same conflict over providential truth that scripted *Moor* (Muslim) and *Nazarene* (Christian) as primordial identities for Moroccans and Europeans. Fixation on 'sacred' differences tended to distance the *Moor* Bayrouk from his *Nazarene* other in a manner that also mutes Morocco's proximity to Europe and, the longevity of encounters across the Mediterranean and, since the sixteenth century, via the Atlantic Ocean. From this vantage point, the ancient caravan gives meaning to the Bayrouk social existence as temporal participants in, to borrow from Brett and Fentress, "the vast commercial network" that enveloped the Maghrib and Europe.⁶ At the same time, however, the modern caravan sets Bayrouk, as slave trader, apart from industrial Europe and in that sense, also sanctions his discursive position as an infidel or primitive other.

Lastly, secularisation is also the main culprit behind the tacit refusal of Africanists to stare the split between the realistic and imaginative facets of the abolitionist conception of the caravan in the face. Africanists, I suggest, tend to honor the abolitionist heritage by charting separate genders for the human cargo of the European caravel and Maghribian caravan. In the process, they also blur the role of "holy cause" in the production of the testimonies of the "foreign observers" that still underpin academic conceptions of the health and cargo of the caravan. Because of its capacity to elevate the testimonies of "foreign observers" to objective data, secularization also strips the abolitionist text of the sense of "holy cause" that seems to have made its production imperative in the first place. Here, changes in the agendas of traders like the Bayrouk become casualties of the erasure of the abolitionist tendency to posit Providence as the ultimate determinant of what the (pagan) *Moor* was destined to trade on. Without a restitution of the religious dimension of such discourse, it would be difficult to explain the puzzling split between the prescription of slaves as the mainstay of the Bayrouk trade and frequent allusion to their hankering after European markets. The disparity between the premise and conclusion raises pertinent questions like how and why would the Bayrouk, as slave traders, alienate the Alawite court for the sake of markets that had no use for their human merchandise? Herein, I will first sketch the Bayrouk vision of the caravan and how it informs or feeds off their image in the text, and then use it as a screen to recast the historiography of the Trans-Saharan Trade.

I- 'In the Beginning' was the Caravan

Pitch is the remedy for scab in camels; the Sudan is the remedy for poverty in men! Apocryphal tradition⁷

In the introduction I noted how the main pillars of the Bayrouk vision of self, the notions of *nisba* (genealogy) and bounded *qabila*, were often revealed in the context of commercial and political transactions with outsiders. As a result, the Bayrouk presentation of self as Ait Musa or Takna who lived in Gulimeme or Wadi Nun usually comes across as the collateral for and dividend of contingent activities that could be understood only in the

⁶ Brett and Fentress, *The Berbers*, 90—see the introduction.

⁷ Cited by Humphrey Fisher, "The Eastern Maghrib and the Central Sudan", in *Cambridge History of Africa*, v. 3, ed. Oliver: 232-330, 284.

context of encounter with the two most durable agencies of Maghribian history, the caravan and the dynasty. It is worth recalling how European doubts about the health of the Moroccan dynastic realm in the nineteenth century informed the ethnographic conception of Susian *qabila* ensembles, like the Takna brethren of the Bayrouk, as autonomous tribes. I also noted how the abolitionist search for "caravans of slaves" lurks beneath the Bayrouk profile sketched by historians like Daniel Schroeter.

In the preceding chapter, I indicated that fixation on service to the caravan and the dynasty informs the narrator's conception of achievement and his choice of the ancestors who deserve a place in the Bayrouk saga. In much the same way that the narrator, *Qaid Dahman II*, used the *nisba* to acknowledge all the male contributors to the biological making of the Bayrouk, he deployed the combination of piety with temporal achievements to determine the inclusion or exclusion of any given ancestor in the family saga. In the saga, however, it is piety and caravan trading rather than service to the dynasty that come across as the pathology that binds the Bayrouk Tuwatian ancestry to their Susian descendants. Access to the caravan compliments piety in the sense that they were Yusuf's twin passports to Wadi Nun as well as the prerequisites of subsequent Bayrouk parleying with Shurafa dynasts and Susian peers. The narrator's presentation of the caravan is laden with the classical Maghribian aphorism that posits the trek to Bilad al-Sudan as "the remedy for poverty in men." The narrator's fixation on the caravan not only complements authorial presentations of the Bayrouk activities in the nineteenth century, but is also central to the centring of the family in current academic discourse. As we will presently see, dalliance with the caravan tends to determine the narrator's decision as to which ancestor deserves slot in the family saga. It will also become clear that encounter with the caravan occupies centre-stage in the works of Moroccan authors who sought to overcome the narrator's silences on the pre-nineteenth-century history of the Bayrouk.

To begin with, al-Susi's informant, *Qaid Dahman II*, invoked participation in "*tijarat al-Sudan*" (the Sudan trade) as the boundary marker between his successful and underachieving ancestors. Discursively, the elevation of caravan trading to a "remedy for poverty" tends to complement the classical predication of origin on migration from the *Mashriq* (orient) and, in effect, disdain of nativity to the "tail" of the world, the Maghrib. The collation of domicile in Wadi Nun with being a caravan trader, however, makes it injudicious to draw boundaries between local and long distance trade. As lore, *tijarat al-Sudan* lurks beneath the Bayrouk modes of procurement and distribution on the spot as well as their conception of what they could deliver to, and expect from, the rest of the world. Wadi Nun and *al-Sudan* were not mere geographies that spewed out material means of social existence. Rather, crossing between these locales was, to borrow from Geertz, "the webs of significance" that underpins the Bayrouk worldview.⁸

Al-Susi, for instance, invoked "the antiquity of the family trade with al-Sudan and procurement of goods from Timbucto" as the proper context for his informant's presentation of Bayrouk's immediate ancestors. To avoid boring his audience with the "givens" of the social existence of a Susian caravan trader, al-Susi casually added that the

⁸Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution", in Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture*, 255-310: see introduction.

Bayrouk were "in the habit of trading with al-Sudan since their days in Tuwat."⁹ The conversion of *tijjarat al-Sudan* to a family heritage also led to the demotion of the ancestors separating Bayrouk's father Ubaydallah Ibn Salem from *Shaykh* Ibn Saud to underachievers, namely, al-Hasan Ibn Saud and his son Abdul-Qadir. It is worth noting how the investiture of Yusuf and Sulayman with piety anticipated the presentation of Ibn Saud as a rescuer of stranded Alawite expedition from death by thirst. By divesting al-Hasan and Abdul-Qadir from involvement in *tijjarat al-Sudan* and belittling their religious credentials, the narrator was also able to justify their presentation as idle consumers. The identification of al-Hasan in terms of vicarious "living off" his father's "reputation" seems to justify his cursory description as "*falah wa kassab*" (farmer and peddler).¹⁰ The curt introduction of his son Abdul-Qadir as "likewise" (*kazalik*) is a reminder of the narrator's use of caravan trading as a pre-requisite for admission into the family saga.

In an attempt to bypass these silences, al-Gharbi and Naimi built on al-Susi's induction of "trading with *al-Sudan*" as a family heritage to credit these two ancestors with similar commercial dispositions. They took the agrarian disabilities attributed to al-Hasan and Abdul-Qadir as a veneer masking a continuous Bayrouk involvement in the caravan trade. To al-Gharbi, piety and parleying with the caravan were the twin matrices of the "high stature" ascribed to Sulayman in Tuwat and Yusuf in al-Saqiya al-Hamra. In his account, Sulayman was credited with "the habit of dispatching caravans to al-Sudan and Egypt". In keeping with the same tradition, Ibn Saud added to his reported discovery of *al-Farasiya* by digging "numerous wells" in al-Saqiya al-Hamra. In contrast, Abdul-Qadir introduced "improved date nursery-plants and crops which had never been known before in al-Saqiya al-Hamra." But Abdul-Qadir's main passion was the same *tijjarat al-Sudan* that beguiled his ancestors.¹¹ Naimi picked up from where al-Gharbi had left off and used local, Azwafit, traditions to credit Abdul-Qadir with "paving the way for Salem to trade with Timbuktu and the rest of *Bilad al-Sudan*."¹²

On the strength of these testimonies, one can turn the contribution of al-Hasan and Abdul-Qadir to casualties of Ubaydallah's fame. In the Bayrouk narrative, Salem's "return" to *tijjarat al-Sudan* also anticipates the spacious slots preserved for his son Ubaydallah (d. 1810s) and grandson Bayrouk. Salem's stature seems to have been the anonymous collateral for Ubaydallah's marriage to Ahmed al-Hiri's sister as well as his succession in the Ait Musa leadership. Rather than starting from scratch, Salem and Ubaydallah may have harnessed Ibn Saud's "symbolic capital" and the resources accumulated by his son al-Hasan and grandson Abdul-Qadir to enhance the family stature. It is hard to imagine the web of marriage relations linking Salem and Ubaydallah to the Alawite court or opulent Susian families like the al-Hiri and the Simlali as rewards for instantaneous achievements. Since early marriage was the norm rather than the exception, Salem's ability to secure powerful maternal relations for Ubaydallah is indicative of the tangible assets passed on to him by his immediate ancestors, namely, Abdul-Qadir and al-

⁹ Al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 19, 274.

¹⁰ Ibid. 274. *Kassab* (Arabic), v. *kasab*: to earn— figuratively, to earn a living by peddling things like grain and livestock. *Fallah* (Arabic), v. *falah*: to till the earth: farmer, peasant (sp. in Egypt).

¹¹ Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 178.

¹² Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, v. 6B: 1934-36.

Hasan. Despite the rather menial occupations accorded to his immediate ancestors, it is reasonable to posit Salem's involvement in the caravan trade as a precursor of the subsequent careers of Ubaydallah and Bayrouk.

In the previous chapter, I noted how fixation on caravan trading led Moroccan sociologists like Ennaji and Pascon, and historians such as al-Muhammadi and Najih to posit Ubaydallah Ibn Salem as the founding father of the Bayrouk family.¹³ Infatuation with *tijarat al-Sudan* can further be drawn from the fact that Ubaydallah's rise to fame also occasioned the narrator's first explicit investiture of a Bayrouk ancestor with more than one named son, Susian in-laws and, indeed, the identification of his mother and wife. The seeming pride in Ubaydallah's maternal relations corresponds to the narrator's effacement of the ascription of success to providential intervention or its qualification with recognition of human endeavour. In the narrative Ubaydallah is bereft of the spiritual credentials attributed to Ibn Saud, Yusuf and Sulayman. In fact, his privileged position in Wadi Nun is signified with 'secular' attributes like "wide commerce" and "a pressing hand over all the Ait Jamal."¹⁴ Ubaydallah's acquisition of the leadership of the *Ait Jamal qabila* ensemble also seems to have entitled him to *ztata* (escort) dues from caravans heading to or returning from al-Sudan. We can cross-reference the narrator's testimony with the presentations of Ubaydallah by nineteenth-century Shurafa historians like al-Da'eef al-Rabati. It is conceivable that the narrator was aware of al-Rabati's presentation of his ancestor. In what seems like an anticipation of the narrator's testimony, al-Rabati too drew a direct connection between Ubaydallah's "command over *ahl* (people of) Gulimeme" and his ability to deploy "1500 *kanun* (families) to escort (*yazatit*) caravans for a distance of nineteen days journey into the Sahara."¹⁵

Al-Rabati's estimate of Ubaydallah's wealth in men has become a staple in the discourses of Moroccan academics. Indeed, it seems to have informed Mustafa Naimi's investiture of the Bayrouk with "specialization in slave-trading" (*nikhasa*). In contrast, Ennaji identified "the Bayrouks" as "a family established in the Oued Noun valley in the far south, and enriched by Saharan trade, owned 1500 slaves, if we believe the histories of the period."¹⁶ Besides al-Rabati's account, however, there are no other extant "histories of the period" that one can use to verify Schroeter and Naimi's association of the Bayrouk with slave trading (*nikhasa*) or to rationalize the ceremonious conversion of Ubaydallah's "1500 *kanun*" into slaves. Yet, this academic consensus on the identity of the cargo of the Bayrouk caravans tends to reinforce the family profile sketched by travelers like John Davidson and James Richardson.

In comparison to al-Rabati, the narrator credited Ubaydallah with "keen interest in farming and the rearing of livestock."¹⁷ But in so far as the narrator was concerned, it was

¹³ Ennaji et Pascon, *Le Makhzen et Le Sous al-Aqsa*, 41-42; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama*, 107.

¹⁴ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 275.

¹⁵ Al-Rabati, *tarikh al-Da'eef*, 341.

¹⁶ Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936; Ennaji, *Serving the Master*, 5; for similar invocations of al-Rabati's "1500 *kanun*" as a signifier of the Bayrouk wealth in men, see al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama*, 107; Rhita Aouad, "Aspects de L'esclavage Marocain: 1880-1922," (Thesis de Maîtrise, UER d'histoire, Université de Provence, 1987), 34.

¹⁷ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 275.

flight to *al-Sudan* in the wake of the *Buhilas* rebellion of 1792 that spawned Ubaydallah's fame and distinctive *laqab* (nickname): Ubaydallah *al-far* (the fugitive). In the introduction, I indicated that the narrator posited opposition to *Buhilas* and flight to *al-Sudan* as the immediate precursors of Ubaydallah's acquisition of the Ait Musa leadership and his foundation of Gulimeme.¹⁸ Metaphorically, flight to *al-Sudan* seems to have enabled the 'secular' Ubaydallah to accomplish what the pious Ibn Saud had earned as a result of his 'discovery' of water in a foreboding Saharan terrain: a distinctive *laqab* (nickname) and spacious slot in the family saga. Upon his "return from *al-Sudan*," Ubaydallah deployed the political clout and material assets of his family to turn Gulimeme into a substitute for historic Susian caravanserai like Nul Lamta and Tegaoust. Under the auspices of his sons and heirs, Ibrahim and Bayrouk, Gulimeme also earned its reputation as the northern termini of the two major caravan routes that serviced the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco—see map IV.

The westernmost of these trade routes, *tariq Gulimeme* (the Gulimeme road), was none other than the erstwhile *tariq Lamtuna* (the Lamtuna, Almoravids, road). *Tariq Gulimeme* traversed the Western Sahara parallel to the Atlantic coast and splattered into trails leading to commercial hubs in the Senegal and Niger basins like St. Louis and Timbuctu. The Bayrouk used their stature amongst the *Ait Jamal* and connections with the Saharan Awlad Dulaym and the Trarza of southern Mauritania to ensure the security of caravans using this route. We can gauge the efficacy of this mode of control from the congruity of shipwreck in the Western Sahara with the frequent delivery of its survivors to Gulimeme. The frequent redemption of such mariners by the British trader and consul in Essaouira, Willshire, is indicative of a level of familiarity that could have resulted only from strong trade connections. Willshire was also the persona who arranged Bayrouk's encounter with John Davidson and still later, forwarded the "correspondence" of James Richardson to Gulimeme.¹⁹ The intersection between the vitality of this trade artery and its tendency to lead to *dar* (house of) Bayrouk can be seen from narratives of exploration and pilgrimage. In spite of the spatial distance separating their points of departure, Leopold Panet (St. Louis, 1850s) and al-Walati (Walata, 1870s) crossed the Sahara via this route and lodged with the Bayrouk.²⁰ In contrast, the second route linked Gulimeme to Timbuctu via Tinduf, Taudeni and Araouane. This route was prescribed for the French explorer Rene Caillie (1830s) in Timbuctu and was later recommended to his British counterpart John Davidson (1830s) in Gulimeme. In the nineteenth century, the fame of this route was

¹⁸ Ibid. 275.

¹⁹ In response to a letter from Willshire on February 13/ 1837, Bayrouk addressed him as "Our friend, Merchant Willshire, English Vice-Consul." Davidson, *Notes*, 202. On the congruity of European arrival in Wadi Nun with acknowledgements of Willshire's services, see Riley, *Loss of the American Brig, Cochelet, Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, Davidson, *Notes*, Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*.

²⁰ Panet, *Première Exploration du Sahara*, 154-155; Norris, *The Pilgrimage of Ahmed*, 4-6; al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijazyya*, 15-101. This was also the route used by the Senegalese pilgrim Bou Moghdad. See "Voyage de Si Bou Moghdad," *Nouvelles Annales Des Voyages*, v. 2: 257-270.

enhanced by the emergence of the (Saharan) Tajakant of Tinduf as the main purveyors of the journey from Gulimeme to Timbuctu.²¹

In subaltern Takna narratives, Ubaydallah's return from al-Sudan and assumption of the leadership of the *Ait Jamal* also spawned Gulimeme's commercial clout. No wonder, in the narratives of the *Ait Osman* Azwafit, he is accused of connivance in the eclipse of much older caravanserai like Tegaoust and Asrir. There is a sharp contrast between the narrator's discreet silence on this other Ubaydallah and his negative image in the Azwafit conception of this juncture in the Takna history. In the Azwafit traditions synthesised by Mustafa Naimi, Ubaydallah comes across as the "warrior *a'rabi* (wayward Arabian)" who made his way in life through trickery and brute force. According to Naimi, Ubaydallah contrived the transfer of the site of Wadi Nun's main market place from *Quwarat al-Suq* in the Azwafit domain to Gulimeme. Trickery is encoded in his reported advertisement that unlike Gulimeme, *Quwarat al-Suq* was not only "insecure" but was also, "too far" from and, in effect, inaccessible to *Iqzulin* allies of the Takna like the coastal *Ait Umran*. Ubaydallah ostensibly shored up his bid by "convincing the *qabail* to sell him the security of the market." He was able to sell his project to these anonymous Susian *qabail* courtesy of his access to European firearms, ownership of "slave army" and covert assistance from his Alawite "cousin" and sultan Sulayman's half brother, *emir* Abdul-Rahman. By elevating Gulimeme from a dreary encampment to a commercial hub, Ubaydallah was also able to lure the *tujjar* (merchants) of Essaouira and by proxy, their royal, Alawite, patrons.²²

The presentation of Ubaydallah as the wily trickster behind the Azwafit abdication of caravan trading tends to blur the overlap between the emergence of Gulimeme as the commercial hub of Wadi Nun and the shift towards the Atlantic seaboard marked by the Alawite foundation of Casablanca in 1764 and Essaouira in 1765. The Azwafit vision also bypasses the suggestive congruity of the *Buhilas* rebellion of 1792 with the bouts of drought and famine that devastated the nineteenth-century al-Sus and, in effect, might have contributed to the desertion of older trade centres like Tegaoust and Quwayrat al-Suq.²³ Like the Bayrouk narrative, however, the Azwafit traditions hark back to the same classical Maghribian utilization of access to the caravan trade and patronage by the dynasty as the main boundary markers between positional superiority and marginality. The tilt towards the Atlantic seaboard and the increasing encounters with Europeans were imagined as illuminations of the vitality rather than decline of the caravan trade. In this vision, the caravan trade did not die of old age or starve for lack of imports from Bilad al-Sudan. Rather, it merely changed its suitors. Conversely, Gulimeme and its *Ait Jamal* proprietors, the Bayrouk, did not win because of the proximity of the former to the Atlantic coast or the dalliances of the latter with European traders and Alawite dynasts. Rather,

²¹ On Tinduf's commercial significance see, Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan*, 112-113; Davidson, *Note*, 103-113; Panet, *Première Exploration*, 155; Norris, *The Pilgrimage of Ahmed*, 2.

²² Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936.

²³ On the congruity of these shifts with the Alawite promotion of Essaouira, see Schroeter, "The Jews of Essaouira (Mogador) and the Trade of Southern Morocco," in *Communautés juives*, ed. Abitbol: 265-390; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 107-108, 161-187. On bouts of draught and famine, see Afa, *masalat al-niqud*, 175-180.

Gulimeme was able to steal the Alawite and European attention namely because of Ubaydallah's hijack of "the security of the market" in Wadi Nun and siphoning of the right to *ziata* in its Saharan backyards.

Ironically, lamentations of Ubaydallah's lust for power led Naimi's anonymous Azwafit informants to credit Bayrouk with the renunciation of his father's "war-like" postures and the promotion of peace and commerce amongst the Takna. "Shaykh Bayrouk," Naimi wrote,

was noted for his shrewdness, his peaceful policies and his skill in handling relations with all groups in the Takna confederation. Unlike his father 'Ubayd Allah Bin Salim, the oppressor of the maraboutic families of Asrir, Bayrouk worked to restore peace within the confederation and encourage prosperity.²⁴

This emphasis on Bayrouk's commercial and peaceful dispositions compliments what al-Susi's informant, *Qaid Dahman II*, recalled about his great grandfather as well as his image as a compulsive trader in European travelogue. The narrator's presentation of Bayrouk's response to ostensible Azwafit provocations tends to enforce his investiture by Naimi's (Azwafit) informants with the restoration of "peace" and "prosperity" to the Takna. According to al-Susi's informant, Bayrouk did not consider war an adequate solution to recurrent Azwafit acts of "thievery." Once the Azwafit "thievery" became unbearable, he utilized trade to impart the benefits of peace to his inveterate protagonists. "He," al-Susi's informant fondly recalled,

sent emissaries to the neighbouring *qabail* to enlist all those known for thievery and they were in the hundreds. He said to them: 'go after the Azwafit. Whoever brings me even a dog's collar, a rope, a pail or any trifles let a lone valuables, I will buy it from him'. The thieves began to infest the Azwafit (*qusur*) stealing whatever they could find without distinction between valuables and trifles until the Azwafit grumbled. They (Azwafit) came to him asking for grace and compassion. ... After they repented and promised to desist from thievery, he decreed that whoever was missing any thing should come and recover it ... He said to them: 'the needy should not be denied his means of existence even when the battle grounds were swarmed with our and your cavalries'!²⁵

The idea that Bayrouk was a man possessed with peace and trade also oozes from Leopold Panet's nostalgic presentation of their first encounter in Gulimeme. By turning Amir Abdul-Qadir's impediment of French expansion in Algeria into a signifier of (Arab)

²⁴Naimi, "the evolution of the Tekna confederation," in *Tribe and State*, ed. Joffe and Pennell: 213-238, 234. With the exception of the addition of the "oppression of the Maraboutic families" to the list of Ubaydallah's sins, this vision also informs Naimi's much earlier conception of the difference between Bayrouk and his father; see Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 178.

²⁵Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 277. For the political aspect of this rivalry, see the next chapter

Moorish "fanaticism," Panet was able to paint Bayrouk as an emissary of peace and trade.²⁶

Emphasis on Bayrouk's commercial dispositions can also be gleaned from his investiture with the concentration of the Ait Musa in Gulimeme and their transformation from a pastoral *qabila* to itinerant traders. According to a local tradition reported by De La Chapelle and Naimi, Bayrouk not only pressurized the Ait Musa to embrace trade, but he was also behind their posting in far-flung Sudanic commercial hubs like Timbuctu and St. Louis. This postulation compliments the simultaneous use of Bayrouk's commercial dispositions to centre displaced Saharans, Jews and *sudan* in Gulimeme. According to Naimi's anonymous informants, it was Bayrouk who first encouraged the Saharan *Arayb* traders to relocate in Gulimeme. The congruity of being *Arayb* with living in Gulimeme became a marker of Bayrouk's struggle to spin a network of commercial confidants that straddled al-Sus, the Western Sahara and al-Sudan.²⁷ The inclination to use trade to bridge spatial distance or cultural difference also enabled Bayrouk to make the *sudan* come to him rather than follow his father's footsteps and trek to their land. According to traditions cited by De La Chapelle and Naimi, Bayrouk also provided shelter to *sudan* traders displaced from Timbuctu by the founder of the Macina *Caliphate*, Ahmed Lubu (1775-1845).²⁸ These subaltern traditions enabled Schroeter to credit Bayrouk with the centering of Susian Jews in Gulimeme. "Of all the local entrepreneurs," he wrote,

who were the most successful in adapting to western ways of commerce... the Afriat stand out ... The transformation from traders of Sheikh Bayruk in Gulimeme to merchant-bankers of Essaouira, Marseille, and London took place in one generation. ... The prestige of their family in Essaouira was enhanced by the legendary martyrdom of their ancestor, Judah Afriat... alleged to have been burned to death by the rebel Bu Ihlal ... Naftali Afriat's family became Sheikh Bayruk's principal traders in Gulimeme.²⁹

Discursively, the attribution of Jewish migration to Gulimeme to sufferance of Buhilas's wrath in 1792 corresponds to the casting of Lubbu as the culprit behind the displacement of *sudan* traders, the traders who trekked to Gulimeme. The association of politicians such as Lubbu and Buhilas with the persecution of merchants seems to amplify the advertisement of Bayrouk as a peaceable trader. The invocation of the *Buhilas* rebellion

²⁶ Panet, *Première exploration*, 155-156; On the French conquest of Algeria (1830) and conflict with Abdul-Qadir (of the Qadiriyya sufi *tariqa*) see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 249-263.

²⁷ De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud-ouest Marocain", 43-47; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 176-179; Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936; Najih, "Les tribus de Takna: le cas Ait El jamal," in *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*: 117-133, 125-26.

²⁸ Lubbu's field of operation was the area straddling Timbuctu in the north and Jenne in the south: Masina. The investiture of Lubbu with despise for the worldly dispositions of traders in Jenne and Timbuctu corresponds to his accusation with complicity in the displacement of elements such as Bayrouk's guests-- their descendants are still living in Gulimeme. On this issue see, De la Chapelle, "Les Tekna du sud-ouest marocain", 43-47; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 176-179; Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936.

²⁹ Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 47; Schroeter, "The Jews of Essaouira", in *Communautés juives*, ed. Abitbol: 365-390, 375-6.

of 1792 to situate internal Susian migrations makes it possible for us to imagine the role of Ubaydallah's hijack of the caravan and his "purchase of the security of the market" in the population of Gulimeme. Like their Ait Musa compatriots, the Jews Bayrouk had lured with promises of a *millah* and credit were mostly from Teqaoust and, as such, were not strangers to the caravan trade.

As signifiers of a commercial disposition, the settling of Susian Jews, Saharan Arayb and *sudan* refugees in Gulimeme and the posting of Ait Musa in Timbuctu hardly distances the peaceable Bayrouk from his pugnacious father. While Ubaydallah and Bayrouk might have followed different paths, the herding of caravans and traders to Gulimeme is at the centre of their respective endeavours. One can only imagine the ways their respective infatuation with the caravan had impacted the composition of the Ait Musa as a *qabila* or the demographic map of Gulimeme as a town. Seen as an identity designation for a 'company of traders,' being Ait Musa can hardly be brought under the canopy of the ethnographic notions of endogenous descent and segmentation or treated as a signifier of ineffable attachment. And notwithstanding the lopsided nature of the available information on Ubaydallah and Bayrouk, it is still possible to posit *tijarat al-Sudan* as the matrix of the images of the imperious warrior and peaceable trader attached to their names. Even if we posit differences in the degree of their devotion to politics as a possible boundary marker between Ubaydallah and Bayrouk's careers, it will still be difficult to explain their mutual use of Gulimeme either as a garrison or a warehouse without recourse to the caravan. Ideally, the frequent positing of Bayrouk as the reason behind the congruity of being Arayb, Jewish and *sudan* with domicile in Gulimeme or being Ait Musa and camping in Timbuctu makes it possible to imagine the articles of trade he might have been chasing. Alternatively, one can invoke Jackson's depiction of Wadi Nun as "an intermediate depot for merchandise" traded between Timbuctu and Essaouira to surmise the identities of the Bayrouk goods and, hence, to anticipate the content of the family's commercial ledger. To amplify the discrepancy between the Bayrouk and authorial conception of the caravan, however, it is imperative to identify the general parameters of the historiography of the Trans-Saharan Trade first. Herein, I will first provide sketch of the main themes of the academic conceptions of the caravan and then use it as a backdrop for a discussion of the nineteenth-century travel accounts that seem to have inspired them.

II-Of Gold and Maidens: Caravan of the Author

These people [are] without exercise of body or mind except a constant praying after sensual enjoyment and for gold, gold. John Davidson³⁰

In post-colonial academic discourse, the relative antiquity of the Trans-Saharan system seems to have endowed the caravan with rights of structure that tend to dictate authorial assessments of what traders like Bayrouk were up to. Notwithstanding differences in styles of presentation, the family image in post-colonial academic treatises still reflects the impression Ubaydallah and Bayrouk had left on nineteenth-

³⁰ Davidson, *Nofes*, 89.

century Moroccan and European literati. A review of academic visions of the health of Trans-Saharan system in the nineteenth century will help us illustrate the similarities and differences between what the caravan *meant* to al-Susi's informant and academics on one hand, and the realities expounded in the Bayrouk commercial registers on the other hand. My working assumption is that academics who approached the caravan trade from its northern end, the Moroccanists, tend to pick up from where Shurafa biographers like al-Nasiri had left off. As a result, they tend to take the health of the Moroccan dynastic realm as an indicator of continuity and change in the cargo of the caravan. In contrast, those who approached the Trans-Saharan Trade from its southern termini, the Africanists, tend to posit the Trans-Atlantic caravel as a frame of reference for their assessments of the volume, identity and gender of the cargo of the caravan. And in much the same way that they spawned the ethnographic notion of the "free" tribe, nineteenth-century travelogue also set the tone for the current Africanist discourses on the cargo of the caravan and, hence, the presentation of families such as the Bayrouk. In that sense, spatiality tends to concretise the differences I blamed on Maghribian and European traditions of signification.

To date, Moroccanist and Africanist conceptions of the health of caravan trade in the nineteenth century tend to oscillate between precipitous decline and persistence or increase in its volume. Oscillation between these spectrums also informs the current authorial assessments of change and continuity in the articles of trade as well as the modes of their procurement and distribution. But the perceived difference between the notions of decline and persistence tend to gloss a remarkable consensus on the deployment of the opening of the Atlantic as a highway of trade and the Sa'dian conquest of Songhay in 1591 as adequate points of departure for the diagnosis of the health of the Trans-Saharan Trade system in the nineteenth century. It should be recalled that neither of these events can be understood without reference to the *Moorish-Nazarene* contest of primacy in the Mediterranean basin, the contest which was also advertised as a dispute over providential truth. It is also worth noting how this schematisation corresponds to the narrator's conception of the Bayrouk origin in terms of the arrival of Yusuf in Wadi Nun in the sixteenth century and the situation of his most famous ancestors, Ibn Saud, Ubaydallah and Bayrouk, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By turning the *Moorish* (Maghribian) caravan and the *Nazarene* (European) caravel into cultural referents, it becomes possible to surmise the textual traditions that made the construction of the Bayrouk image possible in the first place. In the following pages, I seek to chart the place of Maghribian and European traditions of signification in Moroccanist and Africanist conceptions of the caravan.

Metaphors of Masculinity: Caravans for Royalty

The Moroccan vision of the caravan is rooted in its classical image as the "cure of poverty" in the Maghrib and the economic mainstay of the powerful dynasties that left their marks on *Nazarene* Europe: the Umayyad, Almoravids and Almohads. In that sense, the dream of exotic products and the spectre of their loss inform Moroccan textual tradition on the impact of the pre-modern encounter with Europe on the health of the caravan and

the Shurafa dynastic realm it served. In anticipation of current academic discourses, *Shurafa* historians like al-Nasiri frequently invoked the ability to fend off "Nazarene" incursions and to safeguard *tijarat al-Sudan* to either trumpet the health of or to mourn the decapitation of the Moroccan dynastic realm. This vision underlines the recurrent oscillation between authorial infatuations with the careers of imperious dynasts like the Sa'dian al-Manur and the Alawite Ismael, and lamentations of the difficulties their embattled heirs had faced in the nineteenth century. In the light of Alawite losses to France (1844) and Spain (1860), and commercial concessions to Britain, it would be naïve to expect the *Shurafa* historian to give either the dynastic realm or the caravan that serviced it a clean bill of health. *Shurafa* historians like al-Nasiri tended to take the weakness of the Moroccan dynastic realm as a sign of a quantitative decrease in the gold consignment traders had previously reaped from *tijarat al-Sudan*, a decrease they ceremoniously blamed on its diversion to 'Nazarene' Europe.

Lamentations of the decrease in gold supplies, however, often lead to confessions of a concomitant decline in the demand for slaves. Discursively, a weak dynast is not only incapable of stashing slaves in his garrisons, but also becomes a toy in the hands of his black courtiers. This vision informs al-Nasiri and al-Susi's nostalgic investiture of powerful sultans such as Mawlai al-Mansur and Mawlai Ismael with treasures of gold and impressive slave legions like the *Bukhari* army. Al-Mansur's nickname, *al-Dhabi* (the golden one) tended to suggest that much. In contrast, they collated Sidi Muhammad's (r.1757-90) redemption of Morocco from the "*Bukhari* tyranny" that followed Mawlai Ismael's death in 1727 with the decline rather than increase in the demand for slaves. The juxtaposition of the end of the "*Bukhari* tyranny" with the enthronement of Sidi Muhammad in 1757 also reverses a classical authorial tendency to posit the dynasty as the main consumer of slaves.³¹ As a signifier of the opulence of *Shurafa* sultans, *tijarat al-Sudan* also becomes a metaphor for Moroccan demand for masculine bodies and its main customer tends to be the royal garrison. Conversely, the attribution of the weakness of the dynastic realm and, by default, the decrease in its appetite for slaves to "Nazarene" siphoning of gold or military pressure often sanctions cursory allusions to trade in less fabulous articles like ostrich feathers or cloth. Lamentations of the descent from gold to ostrich feather also sanctioned the strident denunciations of the corruptive influence of new hitchhikers with the caravan like tobacco.³² In this vision there is a distinction between the continuity of *tijarat al-Sudan* and its centrality to Morocco's economy, and tallies of the identity and volume of the cargo of the caravan. Like the dynastic realm it served, the

³¹ Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v. 7, 51-58; al-Susi, *min afwah al-rijal*, 21-23; for a similar attribution of responsibility for the dislocations that followed Ismael's death to the "tyranny" of his *Bukhari* army see, Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 236-241. On the *Bukhari* army see, Allen R. Meyers "Slave Soldiers and State Politics in Early Alawi Morocco, 1668-1727," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 16,1,(1983): 39-48. On the relation between Morocco's descent towards colonialism and decrease in exotic imports see, Yahya Jalal, *al-maghrib al-kabir: al-a'sur al-haditha wa hijum al-isti'mar alayhi*, v. 3, (Beirut: Dar al-Nahda, 1981), 438.

³² For the debate on tobacco see, Aziz Batran, "Consensus and Controversy in Islam: The Fetawi of West and North African Ulama," in *Fes et L'Afrique*, ed. l'Institut des Etudes Africaines, (Rabat: Université Mohammed V, 1996): 183-233.

caravan was still alive but its gold and slave deliveries come across as a far cry from the days of Mawlai al-Mansur and Ismael.

Al-Nasiri's vision lurks beneath the inclination of post-colonial Moroccan historians like Abitbol (1980) and al-Mansur (1990) to collate the decrease in the gold and slave imports with the decline of the Moroccan dynastic realm.³³ In fact, this Moroccan tradition also seeped into Schroeter's much earlier assessment of the significance of slaves to the caravan trade in the nineteenth century. In that assessment, he endorsed the Moroccanist proposition of a shift from the importation of gold and slaves to trade in less alluring articles like gum Arabic and ostrich feathers. Indeed, Schroeter also embraced the Moroccanist suggestion of a causal relation between the decline of the Alawite dynasty and decrease in slave imports from sub-Saharan Africa. "Foreign observers in the nineteenth-century," he wrote in 1988,

often remarked that many of the inhabitants of the town (Essaouira) were black, believing that this was due to the importation of slaves from the western Sudan ... In all probability, these foreigners were seeing the descendants of the 'abid (Bukhari army) ... The actual number of slaves in the town was probably small, particularly since the importation of slaves via the Trans-Saharan route had diminished significantly in Mawlay Sulayman's reign (1792-1822).³⁴

Schroeter did not dwell on the complicity of Shurafa historians such as al-Nasiri and al-Susi in the authorship of a dubious servile origin for the "abid" (slaves) Mawlai Ismael had enlisted in his army, the *Bukhari* army. In the previous chapter, I noted how expediency had led the "organic intellectuals" of the Alawite court to invent an 'African' origin for the so-called *Haratin*. The obviation of the historical contingency behind the construction of the *Haratin*, alas *Bukhari* or "abid," origin may also account for Schroeter's tacit refusal to dwell on the acrimonious debate surrounding Mawlai Ismael's decision or the textual tradition lurking beneath al-Nasiri's collation of being *Hartani* with being of servile origin.

It is enough to recall that in so far as al-Nasiri was concerned, Mawlai Ismael's recruits were made up of descendents of the runaway slaves ostensibly introduced by his Sadian peer Mawlai Ahmed al-Mansur and, as such, were not new to Morocco. Here, my proposition that the Trans-Saharan Trade has become *structure* is not enough to bridge the chasm separating the inversion of the caravan of "slaves and gold" to an inevitable origin for the black "inhabitants of" Essaouira, and the actuality of its annual deliveries. In fact, Schroeter's implicit apology for the difficulty of telling the difference between being black and being slave or of servile origin is a left over from the works of the same "foreign observers" he cited in his 1992 article, namely John Davidson and James Richardson.³⁵

³³ Michel Abitbol, "Le Maroc et le Commerce Transsaharien du XVII Siècle au début XIX Siècle," *Revue de L'Occident Musulman et de La Méditerranée*, 30, (1980): 5-19, 11-14; Muhammed El Mansour, *Morocco in the Reign of Mawlay Sulayman*, (Outwell, Wisbeck: Menas Press, 1990), 82-93; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 92-95.

³⁴ Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 133.

³⁵ I am referring to his statement (Introduction) that: "Davidson reported in 1936 that four caravans, each carrying between 300 and 1000 slaves left Gulmime annually. This suggests that about 2000 slaves

His disavowal of the Moroccanist suggestion of a decrease in slave imports and embracement of Davidson's estimate of Gulimeme's annual slave imports also represents a shift towards the Africanist vision of the caravan, the vision whose intellectual genealogy can be traced back to abolitionism. Before returning to the role of abolitionism in the constitution of Gulimeme as, to borrow from Schroeter, "an important collection point" for slaves; however, it is imperative to demarcate the centrality of Bovill's work in the discourses of those Africanists who took the carrying capacity of the trans-Atlantic caravel as a model to quantify the cargo of the caravan.

Signifiers of Sensuality: Caravans of Concubines

Their sensuality knows no bounds: ... they are allowed ... as many concubines as they are able to support.
Jackson³⁶

In much the same way that Moroccanists like Abitbol picked up from where al-Nasiri had left off, Africanists tend to start by either affirming or critiquing Bovill's conception of the health of the caravan. Bovill's conception is also rooted in his simulation of the duel between the European caravel and the Maghribian caravan, a duel he traced back to the 'ancient' Christian-Muslim feud in the Mediterranean basin. Not surprisingly, he presented the caravel as a means of European delivery from the tyranny of the *Moorish* caravan. In his vision, the pre-modern encounter with mercantilist Europe is the genesis for the economic and political transformations that ultimately suffocated the caravan. Bovill identified the Atlantic commercial system and the abolitionist movement it spawned as the twin scourges of the *golden trade of the Moors*. "The European," he wrote,

had always been rigorously excluded and only by right of conquest was he finally able to open new outlets ... and thus divert trade from the ancient caravan routes ... The abolition of the slave trade ... caused the decay of the Trans-Saharan caravan routes ... Once the interior had been thrown open, the gold, ivory and ostrich feathers which had been principal exports across the desert were conveyed to the northern market by the more circuitous... and cheaper sea routes.³⁷

Bovill's conception of decline feeds off the ostensible similarities between Maghribian and European expectations from Africa beyond the Sahara. In spite of his notation of less alluring articles of trade like ostrich feather, however, Bovill tended to dwell on the same two exotic articles of trade classical authors like Ibn Khaldun and Leo Africanus routinely posited as signifiers of affluence in the Maghrib and the impetus behind dalliance with the foreboding *qaf*, the Sahara—what Bovill called "gold and slaves, slaves and gold." In his vision, the intersection between the European search for gold, the opening of the Atlantic and the subsequent shift to the triangular trade on one hand, and the onset of the industrial

passed through Gulimime each year, but if all routes were included the total number could have been twice as high." Schroeter, "Slave Markets and Slavery," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 185-213, 189.

³⁶ Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 53—see chapter two.

³⁷ Bovill, *Caravans of the old Sahara*, 246, 258.

revolution and the advocacy of "legitimate trade" on the other hand, serve as textual nooses for an inexorable suffocation of the *Moorish* caravan. The "Barbary merchants" sought to make up for the European siphoning of gold by increasing their slave intakes. But because of mounting abolitionist pressure in the nineteenth century, this substitute was also reduced to a trickle.

As we will presently see, Bovill's conception of the duel between the caravel and the caravan anticipated current Africanist assessments of the Trans-Saharan Trade. Yet, because Bovill's conclusions were based on textual insights rather than field research, his premises are strikingly similar to those informing the works of Shurafa historians such as al-Nasiri. Like al-Nasiri, for example, Bovill tended to balance his concession of the survival of the caravan in the nineteenth century, with emphasis on the decline in its gold intakes and, then, the abolition of the slave trade the *Moors* used to offset their losses.

Oscillation between the notions of decline and continuity became the bedrock of the discourses of post-colonial Africanists who sought to recover the identity and gender of the cargo of the caravan in the 1960s. This oscillation is enshrined in the chasm that separates Boahen's quantitative assessment of the human cargo of the caravan from those advanced by Francophone academics like Reymond Mauny and Louis Meige.³⁸ The consensus among these otherwise rival assessments is that Maghribian traders sought to offset the decrease in gold by increasing their slave intakes. According to Adu Boahen, for example, the status of gold in the "Sudan export" to the Maghrib had declined to the extent that caravan trading become synonymous with slave trading. "From the end of the sixteenth century, however," he noted,

the traffic began to decline, and by the nineteenth it had become concentrated on four main routes ... To sum up the caravan trade in the nineteenth century was but a fraction of its former volume ... Gold which used to be the most valuable commodity in the days of Ibn Battuta and Leo Africanus and continued so until the middle of the seventeenth century, was by the nineteenth century almost negligible ... By the nineteenth century, the caravan trade had dwindled until it was almost entirely a traffic in slaves.³⁹

To Boahen, moreover, the plantation system in the Americas is the patentee of the shipment of record numbers of slaves. The caravan is incomparable to the caravel precisely because of the lack of an equivalent economic absorptive capacity in the arid Maghrib. The idea of incomparableness enabled him to discount the high numbers of

³⁸ Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan*, 103-138. According to Mauny, 1000,000 bodies were shipped out of "Afrique Noir" in the fourteenth century alone and then about 200,000 for each century thereafter—up to the nineteenth century. He put the total for the period from the seventh century (onset of Arab conquest) to the twentieth century (debut of French colonialism) at 14000,000; see, Reymond Mauny, *Tableau Géographique de l'ouest africain au moyen age*, (Dakar: L'IFAN, 1961), 61, 393; Reumond Mauny, *Les Siecle obscures de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris: Foyard, 1970); for a more 'conservative' critique of the idea of a wholesale decline see, Jean Louis Miegé, *Le Maroc ET L'Europe (1830-1894), Tome III, Les Difficultés*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 74-95.

³⁹ Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan*, 104, 131.

'recent' captives paraded by abolitionists. "From the various figures supplied by explorers as well as consular agents in the Sahara and Barbary," Boahen wrote,

the number of slaves exported annually ... may be estimated at about 10,000 rather than 20,000 as (the abolitionist) Boxtton thought. Of these until about 1860, 5000 were exported to the Regency of Tripoli ... About 2,500 to Morocco ... It is evident that as compared with the volume of slave traffic across the Atlantic ... which has been estimated at 70,000 per annum at least by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the trans-Saharan traffic was only a trickle.⁴⁰

In comparison to Boahen's scepticism about abolitionist estimates, Mauny tended to jack up their censuses and, as a result, also credited the Maghrib with an absorptive capacity for a much higher number of slaves.⁴¹ In either case, adherence to the classical conflation of caravan trading with the procurement of gold and slaves, also set the stage for the predication of its decline on the drying up of these exotics products, products which, one may add were beyond the reach of the rank and file.

In contrast, post-colonial academics who emphasise the fallibility of the idea of decline certify the persistence of the caravan trade with propositions of substantial increases in its slave intakes. Like Bovill and Boahen, however, critics of the notion of decline retained the use of the opening of the Atlantic as a frame of reference to evaluate the health of the Trans-Saharan Trade and, indeed, also posited slaves as the secret behind the caravan's ability to cope with the European siphoning of gold. In a manner reminiscent of Shurafa historians like al-Nasiri, however, earlier critics of the notion of decline such as Anthony Hopkins tended to make increase in the slave cargo of the caravan contingent on the health of the dynastic realm. "On the present evidence," Hopkins noted in 1973,

it would be unwise to conclude that there was a sharp decline in the Seventeenth century. Even though gold was being sent to Europe ... the overland trade though greatly reduced continued in the nineteenth century ... The expansion of Arab power led to an increased demand for slaves in North Africa and the Middle East for use as soldiers, labourers and servants. This northbound trade continued without serious disruption until the late nineteenth century and in a clandestine way and on a much-reduced scale it survived well into the twentieth century.⁴²

⁴⁰ Ibid. 127-128; for Boxtton's tabulations see, T.F. Boxtton, *The African Slave Trade* (London: 2ed ed. 1840) 68-70.

⁴¹ According to Mauny, 1000,000 bodies were shipped out of "Afrique Noir" in the fourteenth century alone. In contrast, as many as 2000,000 slaves were shipped across the Sahara during the Sa'dian period and then about 200,000 for each century thereafter—up to the nineteenth century. He put the total for the period from the seventh century (onset of Arab conquest) to the twentieth century (debut of French colonialism) at 14000,000; see, Reymond Mauny, *Tableau Géographique de l'ouest africain au moyen age*, (Dakar: L'IFAN, 1961), 61, 393; Reumond Mauny, *Les Siecle obscures de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris: Foyard, 1970); for a more 'conservative' critique of the idea of a wholesale decline see, Jean Louis Miegé, *Le Maroc ET L'Europe (1830-1894), Tome III, Les Difficultés*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 74-95.

⁴² Hopkins, *Economic History of West Africa*, 82; Hopkins was referring to Mauny's estimates.

Of course, one can also use the notable dip in the fortunes of the Alawite dynasty lamented by Shurafa biographers and endorsed by Moroccan historians to dispose of this circular argumentation. Logically, the decline of "Arab" powers such as the Alawites vis-à-vis their European competitors should have also triggered a corresponding reduction in the slave imports that ostensibly sustained the caravan after its loss of gold to the caravel. More recently, the deployment of the health of the dynasty as indicator of the volume of slave imports tended to disappear from Africanist discourses on the caravan of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Moroccan share in the 'caravan of slaves' tends to grow simply because there were no 'other outlet' for such merchandise. As a result, descent towards colonialism seems to correspond to increase in slave imports across the Sahara. "While," Peter Urs recently (1998) wrote,

during the 18th century about 2000 slaves per year were brought to the latter destination (Morocco) on various routes, their number grew during most of the first half of the 19th century to 3,000 slaves and rose ... to 5,000 slaves per year from 1876-1895 ... *subsequent to the abolition of the Atlantic trade, a new climax in trade lasted from about 1840-56 ... the numbers of slaves traded between the western Sudan and Morocco, according to a conservative estimate, are likely to have been between 4,000 and 7,000 per year. This increase reflected the fact that all other Maghribi destinations for the many Sudanese slaves were already closed by this time* (emphasis added).⁴³

In Africanist discourses, however, the idea of decline is more frequently exorcised through emphasis on the ostensible difference rather than similarity between Maghribian and European expectations from sub-Saharan Africa or the division of space amongst their respective feeders. In this alternative version, European avarice for gold was partially met by shipments from the Americas and, in due time, was overtaken by the demands of the plantation. Conversely, Maghribian thirst for gold was quenched by the discovery of alternative, albeit more distant, sources of supply. In contrast the Maghribian demand for slaves was not jeopardized precisely because of the *Moor's* fixation on the gender and age-grade his European other wanted the least: maidens and "children". Here, the identification of "concubines" as the main Maghribian query advanced by historian like Humphrey Fisher becomes the common thread that unifies early advocates of decline such as Boahen and proponents of the comparability of the volume of slaves carried by the trans-Saharan caravan and the trans-Atlantic caravel like Claude Meillassoux (1991) and Ralph Austin (1992). "The European market," Meillassoux wrote,

absorbed adult men ... the demand for women and children from this market was low ... The continental African market, provided an outlet mostly for

⁴³ Peter Ruf Urs, *Ending Slavery: Hierarchy, Dependency and Gender in Central Mauritania* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 116, (F.N.) 323. Urs attributed the "conservative estimate" to Ralph Austin (1992) and Daniel Shroeter (1992)—we can, in effect, trace it back to James Richardson and (hence) John Davidson.

women and children and had little use for adult males ... when the American markets were closed off ... there was no longer any outlet for male captives ... from this time onwards they were generally massacred on the battlefield.⁴⁴

The *feminization* of Maghribian slaves is one of the oldest and, one might add, the most popular themes in abolitionist and Africanist discourses on the caravan trade.

In the introduction to this thesis, I indicated how historians such as Fisher (1977) not only credited the caravan with an equal carrying capacity to that of the European caravel, but also demoted "the majority of slaves crossing the Sahara" to "concubines."⁴⁵ The *feminization* of Maghribian slave import and, hence, their location in impregnable 'harems' rather than open fields is often used to dispose of the glaring disparity between the record numbers of black bodies the caravan had arguably dumped and the dearth of physical evidence of their actual arrival in their projected destinations: the Maghrib, the Middle East or the "Islamic world". "It is evident," Boahen noted,

that as compared with the volume of the slave traffic across the Atlantic ... the trans-Saharan traffic was only a trickle. In spite of this, it had certain unique features which made it probably even more hideous than the trans-Atlantic traffic ... about 60 percent of the slaves were young women and 10 percent of the rest were children under the age of ten ... A second and even more hideous feature was that a good number of the men were eunuchs employed as keepers of harems, reliable couriers, and generals of the rulers.⁴⁶

I will presently trace this use of "numbers" to credit the *Moorish* caravan with an edge in "hideousness" over the European caravel back to its abolitionist roots. Here it is enough to note that under normal circumstances, one can hardly posit concubinage as the main culprit behind the absence of a separate black constituency in the Maghrib without also *believing* that the "dark" *Moors* (Arabs and Berbers) were, to borrow from Hanoum, "at the dawn of time from among us," but had since 'gone African.' Nevertheless, the feminization of the Trans-Saharan Trade not only remains the common denominator between abolitionist and Africanist discourses, but is also the sinew that binds current explanations of the stark disparity between the "young" bodies the caravan had, arguably, delivered and the absence of a corresponding 'African' diaspora in the Maghrib or the Middle East. Advocates of continuity who pondered the numbers assigned to the Maghrib are occasionally perplexed by the lack of enough black bodies that warrant such speculations. "At present," Hopkins noted,

the general assumption is that the trans-Saharan slave trade was never as important as the Atlantic trade. If this view is to be proven false, *it will also be necessary to explain what happened to such large Negro communities*

⁴⁴ Claude Meillassoux, *The Anthropology of Slavery: The womb of Iron and Gold*, trans. Alide Dasois, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 62.

⁴⁵ Fisher, "The Eastern Maghrib and Central Sahara," in *The Cambridge History of Africa*, v.3, ed. Oliver: 232-330, 270.

⁴⁶ Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan*, 128.

(assuming that they existed), for they appear virtually to have disappeared from North Africa and the Middle East today (emphasis added).⁴⁷

The use of European preferences as a point of departure also muffles the role Maghribian lore and the absorptive capacity of their space had played in determining either the gender and age or the volume of their slave imports. Besides, fixation on "concubines" and "children" often leads to silence on vulgar articles like cloth or gum. It goes without saying that silence on such articles of trade also expedites the use of the impressive size of the caravan as an indicator of the sizable number of its human cargo.

To date, the debate on the cargo of the caravan itself frequently splatters into a Herculean struggle to quantify the slaves annually shipped across the Sahara and the contrivance of answers to why there are almost no traces of their arrival in the arid Maghrib and Middle East. In Africanist discourse, the chief culprits behind the failure of black slaves to leave behind visible traces in their host society tend to range from incapacitating acts that do not apply to females such as "castration" to disabilities that do not distinguish between servile and free bodies such as "low birth rate" or "high mortality rates."⁴⁸ Such explanations also seem to enable Africanists to retain their belief in the comparability of the slave cargo of the caravan to that of the caravel. Ralph Austin, for example, was able to posit the quantitative toolbox developed by historian Philip Curtin to "measure" the volume of the Atlantic slave trade to impute the carrying capacity of the "caravans of slaves."⁴⁹ In such quantitative tabulations, the upgrading of slave numbers often corresponds to silence on the other exotic product that mesmerized classical Maghribian authors and Shurafa historians: gold.

In earlier academic attempts at quantification such as the ones carried out by Boahen and Jean-Louis Miegé, there is an inclination to use the record numbers of bodies shipped across the Atlantic to trivialize the cargo of the caravan.⁵⁰ Early and recent critics of the notion of decline such as Fisher and Ralph Austin, however, believe in the comparability of the slave consignments of the trans-Saharan caravan and the trans-Atlantic caravel and, indeed, turn "the Islamic slave trade out of Africa" into a

⁴⁷ Hopkins, *Economic History of West Africa*, 83. Samir Amin did not dwell on census but took the dearth of blacks in the Maghrib to ask the 'embarrassing' question: where did these slaves go? In the television series produced by the B.B.C., "the Africans," Ali Mazrui used the term "disappearing act" to satirize the same fallacy in treatments of the Trans-Indian Ocean slave trade. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical origins," *Journal of Peace Research*, 9 (1972), 105-120; Ali Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*, Television Series (London: B.B.C., 1986)

⁴⁸ Austin and Hunwick invoked "concubinage", "castration", "low birth rate" and "high mortality rates" as the causes why these record numbers of slaves left no visible traces behind. Austin, "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 214-248; Hunwick, "Black Africans in the Mediterranean world," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 5-38.

⁴⁹ For Curtin's model, see Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). For a critique of Curtin's estimates, see Joseph Inikori, *The Chaining of a Continent: Export demand for Captives and the History of Africa South of the Sahara, 1450-1870* (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of West Indies, 1992)

⁵⁰ Miegé, *Le Maroc et L'Europe*, 74-95; Jean Louis Miegé, "Le Commerce Transsaharien au XIX Sicle: Essai de quantification", *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 32, 2 (1981): 93-119, 99.

macrocosmic model for a 'secular' and smaller European slave trade. "Invidious comparisons," Austin wrote,

between European taking Africans across the Atlantic and Muslims using routes across the Sahara Desert... have long been staple of slave trade historiography. Now that Philip Curtin has provided us with the basis for calculating the demographic impact of the Atlantic slave trade, it would appear appropriate to attempt something similar for the forced movement into the Islamic world. ... The works of those who have presented approximations of the Trans-Saharan slave trade fall short of the possibilities of even the unsatisfactory data available. ... Even if ... Curtin's 11 million plus for the Atlantic traffic is revised upward, it will probably remain slightly short of the total calculated here for Muslim exports.⁵¹

It is worth noting that the "direct evidence" supporting Austin's most recent, albeit still "tentative," census was drawn from the accounts of the same "travellers, diplomats or other outside observers" behind his much earlier estimate.⁵² These informants were also the same "foreign observers" Schroeter has earlier charged with the confusion of being black in Essaouira with being slave and exaggeration of the number of slave imports.⁵³ In fact, the main difference between Austin's hypothesis and Fisher's much earlier, but similar, proposition is its empowerment with the perceived exactitude of "numbers." In comparison to words, "numbers" seem to have the capacity to, as Geertz aptly noted, "carry the day."⁵⁴

Whether as a metaphor for the "Islamic" parallel of the "Atlantic traffic" or a mere signifier of disciplinary fixation on "forced migration," Austin's postulation also blurs other items of exchange and, by default, inducts slaves as the main objective of the caravan. As well, the predication of "African" arrival in the "Islamic world" on forced transportation glosses other hitchhikers with the caravan like traders, pilgrims or refugees.⁵⁵ The most glaring fallacy in this postulation, however, is the deployment of similarity with the Atlantic experience as a proxy to de-historicize the nativity of the *sudan* (blacks) to the Sahara and the Maghrib, a perfect example, one might add, of how rites of

⁵¹ Austin, "The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade," in *Uncommon Market*, ed Gemery and Hogendorn: 23-76, 23, 69; Austin, "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade," in *Human Commodity*, ed Savage: 214-248.

⁵² Austin, "The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade," 27.

⁵³ In his contribution to *The Human Commodity* however, Schroeter seems to 'retract' his earlier assessment. See Schroeter, "Slave Markets and slavery," in *the Human commodity*, ed. Savage: 185-213

⁵⁴ "Footnotes," Geertz noted, "help, verbatim texts help even more, details impresses, numbers normally carry the day." Clifford Geertz, *After the Fact*, 17; Austin, for example, criticized Mauny's methodology but then used Curtin's model to confirm the same number of slaves suggested by Mauny: 14000,000.

⁵⁵ In the era of abolition, European observers such as Richardson frequently identified black travelers from the Mediterranean basin to sub-Saharan Africa as manumitted slaves on their way home! For examples of Africanist endorsements of this trope see, Allen G.B Fisher and H. Fisher, *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1970); on pilgrimage, see Umar al-Naqar, "Takrur: the History of a Name," *Journal of African History*, 10(1969): 365-74; Umar al-Naqar, *The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1972); Fatima Harrak, *West African Pilgrims in 19th Century Morocco: Representation of Moroccan Religious Institutions* (Rabat: Institute of African Studies, 1994)

discourse sometimes gloss historical experience. In fact, the conversion of all black Maghribians into signifiers of forced transportation across the Sahara underpins both Hopkins's scepticism about and Austin's belief in the centrality of slaves to the caravan trade.⁵⁶ The problem, however, is not limited to the absence of enough numbers of black Maghribians that support this hypothesis. Rather, the figures generated in the era of abolition and their recent "upward" revisions for the period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries hardly mesh up with estimates of population density in the Maghrib by the same "outside observers."⁵⁷

At the discursive level, the Africanists' deployment of census to de-historicize the presence of blacks in the Maghrib is reminiscent of al-Nasiri and al-Susi's predication of the social birth of Mawlai Ismael's recruits, the so called *Haratin*, on al-Mansur's conquest of the purported homeland of their ancestors. In much the same way that the latter wisdom is a relatively modern invention, the Africanist quest for quantifiable slaves can, as Joseph Miller has noted, be traced back to the onset of abolitionist humanism.⁵⁸ There is a suggestive simultaneity between the abolitionist quest for redeemable souls in "Barbary," denunciations of *Moorish* "sensuality" and cruelty, and the shift in European modes of reporting on Africa. I have already credited this shift with spawning the ethnographic mapping out of the Berbers as tribes. This is also the same shift which, according to Philip Curtin, inspired "antislavery writers" to produce what he called "pious hoax" and "pious forgeries."⁵⁹ One can, therefore, take abolitionist societies as, to borrow from Spivak, the "institutions" that fathered the current academic inclination to posit slaves as the main

⁵⁶For examples of the Africanist tendency to conflate being black Maghribian with being of 'African' descent see, Michael Brett, "The Fatimid Revolution (861-973) and its Aftermath in North Africa," *Cambridge History of Africa*, v.2 ed. Page: 589-631, 644; Hopkins, *Economic History of West Africa*, 83; Austin, "The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade," in *The Uncommon Market*, ed. Gemery and Hogendorn: 23-76; Austin, "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 214-248.

⁵⁷In this tradition, the 20000 slaves per year (2000,000 per century) is either confirmed or jacked up. According to Mauny, Meige and Austin, for example, Morocco's average intake between the 1840s and 1870s was about 4000 per year. This was the figure Austin considered too modest and Schroeter assigned to Gulimeme alone. If one were to take this figure as the mean and project it backwards into history, it becomes possible to imagine a point in the near past when the cumulative product of the "concubines" the caravans had ostensibly deposited ought to have surpassed or at least equalled the number of Berbers and Arabs. According to the travellers and diplomats Africanist and Moroccanists frequently cite, however, Morocco's population was both modest and predominantly of the Arab and Berber "races". Mauny, *Tableau géographique de l'ouest africain*, 61, 393; Meige, "Le Commerce Transsaharien au XIX siècle, essai de quantification," *Revue de L'Occident Musulman*, 32, 2, 99, 116; Austin, "The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade," in *The Uncommon Market*, ed. Gemery and Hogendorn, 41; Schroeter "Slave Markets and Slavery," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 185-213. For estimates of Morocco's population and its break down into "races," see Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 25-28; Richardson, *Travels in Morocco* v.2, 7.

⁵⁸Joseph C. Miller, "Muslim Slavery and Slaving: A Bibliography," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 249-271.

⁵⁹"In the eighteenth century," Curtin noted, "the romantic view of the noble savage aroused the European interest in Africans ... Later, in the nineteenth century, the romantic interest in Africa was replaced by the humanitarian concern of the anti-slave trade movement. Both motives, however, prompted Europeans not only to record slave narratives, but also to manufacture them out of whole cloth." Philip D. Curtin ed. *Africa Remembered: Narratives by West Africans from the era of the slave trade* 2nd ed. (Illinois: Waveland Press, 1997), 4-5, 6-7.

cargo of the nineteenth-century caravan as well as the simultaneous fixation on "concubines."

I have suggested that the consecration of slaves as the main cargo of the caravan constitutes a significant shift from earlier European modes of reportage on *Barbary* and its *Moors*. By bringing the inversion of all black Maghribians into displaced Africans under the canopy of what Europeans, as Christians, had long thought of their Moroccan captors, we can also recover the sacred impetus behind the exaggeration of the wealth in captive "women and children" of caravan traders like the Bayrouk. Herein, I will first highlight the centrality of the sacred in abolitionist discourses on Moroccans and then identify the rupture that also set the stage for the inversion of the caravan to a signifier of wallowing in slavery. As we will see, there is a causal relation between the diffusion of abolitionist sentiments in Europe and the inversion of the caravan to a metaphor of *Moorish* "sensuality" and cruelty, an inversion that also blurred the quiet shift to "legitimate trade" by Susian traders like the Bayrouk. In the same way that secularisation enabled Africanists to retain the abolitionist premises, classical disparagements of *Moorish* sensuality enabled the abolitionists to add the "caravans of slaves" to the list of 'holy objections' underpinning the Christian-Muslim solitude.

III-For the Sake of "Holy Cause": Caravans of Slaves

If men are to be civilised, they must first be found. James Richardson.⁶⁰

The induction of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade as a frame of reference to measure the human cargo of the caravan tends to blur the role of religious differences in the abolitionist deployment of "Negro" captivity as a signifier of Moroccan (*Moorish*) inferiority. According to Joseph Miller, for instance,

Western writing on Muslim slavery arose from the British-led abolitionist campaign against slavery around the globe. Nineteenth-century liberals castigated Muslims in general terms, some times distinguishing them only slightly from Arabs in particular, as inveterate master slavers.⁶¹

In spite of its obviation of the role of abolitionism in the creation of this discipline, Austin's juxtaposition of a secular "European taking" of Africans with their "forced movement into the Islamic world" is a pale reincarnation of the same ideological corset that spawned the projection of the *Moor* and the *Nazarene* as binary opposites. The influence of this sanctified textual tradition on current academic discourse may also explain the discrepancy between the emphatic assertions of increase in slave shipments across the Sahara and agony over their "virtual disappearance" from the Maghrib and the Middle East. One can blame this structural contradiction on the cleansing of abolitionist censuses from the ideological stuff that sanctioned their production in the first place, secularisation. For abolitionists, however, stripping the *Moors* of redeeming qualities also

⁶⁰ Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*, xvii.

⁶¹ Miller, "Muslim Slavery and Slaving: A Bibliography," *Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 249-71, 249.

entails their conflation with "craving after sensual enjoyment" and, hence, the stashing of their 'harem' with evidence of moral depravity: maidens and children. There is, of course, 'no honour' in the abuse of the 'weakest' humans. But that was precisely what the *Moor*, as barbarian infidel, was in the habit of doing. As a traveller-theologian, the abolitionist was both a custodian and casualty of the kind of "religionist" worldview decried by Enlightenment figures like David Hume. "With what greediness," Hume complained,

are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, ... But if the spirit of religion joins itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. *A religionist may be an enthusiast and imagines he sees what has no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it ... for the sake of promoting so holy a cause* (emphasis added).⁶²

Since the abolitionist "holy cause" in Morocco also involved duelling with "the false doctrines of the impostor of Mecca," it was only befitting that slaves in general and "concubines" and "children" in particular should be summoned to testify against their *Moorish* Other. "Why should we," Trent Cave indignantly asked in his introduction to Richardson's narrative in 1860,

respect ... any community of Mahmetans? Have we effaced from our memory their treachery and inhuman cruelty in India; their utter worthlessness in Turkey ... Civilisation cries aloud for retribution on a race whose religion teaches them to regard us as "dogs" ... We should hunt them out of the fair lands they occupy and force them back on the deserts which vomited them forth on our ancestors ten centuries ago.

It was, however, Richardson's bereaved wife who provided the most telling insight into the abolitionist sense of mission in Morocco. In her vision, abolition was part of a 'regenerative' mission that would remain incomplete if it did not also culminate in the conversion of the *Moor*. "In Morocco," she added,

my late husband ... aimed at the introduction of a *legitimate commerce* with a view, in the first instance, to destroy the horrible and revolting trade in slaves, and thus pave the way for the diffusion of Christianity among a benighted people. ... *We have always in view the complete regeneration of the world by our laws, our learning, and our religion* (emphasis added).⁶³

As a constituency of an undifferentiated "Mahmetan" Other, Moroccans also failed to qualify for a gentler treatment by reason of geographical proximity to Europe. Rather, classical accounts of conflict in the Mediterranean front and narratives of survivors of shipwreck in the Western Sahara turned "Negro" slaves into pawns in an 'ancient' duel

⁶² *English philosophers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Charles Elliot, (New York: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1963), 382.

⁶³ Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*, ix, xiv.

over providential truth. In that sense, the designation of 'African' captivity in "Barbary" and the caravan that made it possible as terrains for combating "Mahmetans" was a necessary precondition for the endowment of their *Nazarene* detractors with a regenerative mission and "legitimate" commerce. Abolitionism also became one of those institutions that produce the realities it purports to have merely transcribed. From the start, the discovery and cataloguing of slaves was inseparable from their commensurate use as leverages in an ancient competition with "fanatic" *Moors*. The exigencies of this competition also explain the stark discrepancy between the abolitionist tendency to produce record numbers of "Negro" captives, their simultaneous feminization and ultimate location in impregnable *harems* and, in effect, beyond the gaze of the foreign observer. The fact that Europe did not 'convert' to abolitionism in one instance helps in magnifying the contemporaneity of British and French denunciations of *Moorish* "fanaticism" and the lapse between their respective designations of "Negro" captivity as a modern site of "holy war."

In chapter one, I noted that the onset of abolition also intersected with the shift in European modes of arrival in and reporting on al-Sus from shipwreck to exploration. In fact, if we convert exploration and abolition to platforms for the assessment of the content of the caravan, it becomes possible to discern a correlation between the abolitionist inclination to collate being black with being slave and the simultaneous inversion of the *Moor* from "a dark" infidel to an inveterate "white" captor. In terms of periodisation, this rhetorical strategy began to take a definitive shape from the 1830s onwards. Until this time, European travellers to "Barbary" often subscribed to the classical association of the caravan with gold and, by default, provided cursory allusions to slaves. Jackson, for example, put slaves at the bottom of Moroccan expectations from the caravan and, as a result, he was also able to capture other modes of 'African' arrivals in Morocco. In a list dominated by "gold dust, twisted gold rings of Wangara, gold rings made at Jenne (and) bars of gold," slaves lagged behind "elephant teeth" and "odoriferous gums" and, indeed, were converted to liabilities on humanitarian *Moors*. "The state of slavery in this country," Jackson wrote in 1814,

is very different from that which is experienced by the unfortunate men who ... work under our Christian brethren in the west India islands ... A man who had served his master faithfully seven years, sometimes get liberated. I have met with many *Moors*, who, on offering liberty to their slaves, the latter have declined it, preferring to continue in obeisance; a clear proof that their servitude is not very severe ... They are received into the *Moorish* families as domestic servants and soon forget their idolatrous superstitions ... Many learn to read the Koran ... (and) often procure their liberation ... It were to be desired, for the sake of *humanity*, that our West-India planters would take a lesson on this subject from the *Moors*, whose conduct, in this particular, is worthy of imitation.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ James Grey Jackson, *An Account of Timbuctoo and Hausa Territories in the Interior of Africa* (London: Franck Cass & co, 1967), 219-220.

It is not, however, difficult to imagine why Jackson was not inclined to either tally captive bodies or berate their captors. The slave trade was still an "honourable" profession in much of Western Europe and, as such, it was not conducive to the conflation of being *Moor* with indulgence "in every vice that is disgraceful and degrading to human nature." But Jackson also saw the *Moor's* failure to put his slaves to work as one of his few redeeming qualities.⁶⁵ In the elaboration of his description of Wadi Nun as "an intermediate depot of merchandise," Jackson did not list slaves among either its prized imports from Bilad al-Sudan or its chief exports to the "territory of the emperor of Morocco." "Gum and wax," he wrote,

are produced here in abundance; and the people ... indulge in the luxuries of dress, and use many European commodities. A great quantity of gold dust is brought and sold at Wedinoo. They trade sometimes to Mogodor (Essaouira), but prefer selling their merchandise on the spot, not wishing to trust their persons and property within the territory of the emperor of Morocco. With Timbuctoo, however, they carry on a constant and advantageous trade, and many of the Arabs are immensely rich; they also supply the Moors of Morocco with (stata) convoys through the Desert, in their travel to Timbuctoo.⁶⁶

In a sense, the obviation of slaves seems to go hand in glove with the acknowledgement of the kind of raw materials that also seem to warrant a trek to "Timbuctoo" and, in effect, might have been offered as collateral for the "many European commodities" already in use.

Jackson's vision of the Moroccan end of the caravan trade can be compared to Rene Caillie's presentation of the journey from Timbuctu to Morocco. In Caillie's narrative, the lure of gold frequently muffles tardy homage to the tilt towards abolition in France. While gold managed to elude him in Timbuctu itself, Caillie was still able to quench his yearning by watching it weighed "in little scales... during halts in the desert." Gazing from a distance was also sufficient to confirm his perception of gold as the ultimate query of Moroccan traders.⁶⁷ In contrast, Caillie's ability to distinguish being black from being slave was compromised by his precipitous journey from the belief that in Timbuctu, expatriate "Moors ... cohabit only with ... slaves" to confusion over the status of the "Negroes" of the caravan that joined his hosts in Araouane. One constant in Caillie's mode of reporting is the congruity of his inclination to efface boundaries between being "Negro" and being slave with the progression in his trek towards the Mediterranean basin. This progression in turn corresponds to the simultaneity between increase in his denunciation of the "fanaticism" of his *Moorish* benefactors and his sense of drawing closer to the theatre of their 'ancient' conflict with Christian Europe, the Mediterranean basin.

⁶⁵ Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 53. At the same time "the more conscientious Mooselmin (Muslims)" consider slaves as "members of the family" and tend to "purchase them for about the same sum that they would pay in wages to a servant during the above period (eight or ten years servitude)." Here too, Jackson used the *Moorish* treatment of slaves as a model to shame the "planters" of "the West India Islands"; Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 293.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 56.

⁶⁷ Caillie, *Travels Through Central Africa to Timbuctoo*, 69, 94-95.

At the time of his departure from Timbuctu, Caillie could barely notice "several slaves ... bidding each other adieu." Once at Araouane, however, he was able to see "camels carrying on their backs Negroes, men, women and children who were on their way to be sold at the Morocco markets."⁶⁸ The same distance from the tropics that made gold glitter also enabled Caillie to equate being black with being exportable merchandise and, in effect, to divest the "Negro" from nativity to the Sahara and the Maghrib. For example, while he located the origin of the Araouane "Negroes" beyond the Sahara, Caillie was still able to credit them with the ability to converse with their ostensible captors in a language he did not comprehend. In the course of the journey northwards the "Negroes" also reveal tradable valuables, gain preferential access to precious water and partake in the *Moorish* "torment" of the 'white' outsider, an outsider who was now frequently suspected of 'acting' like a *Nazarene*.⁶⁹ By the time of his arrival in Tafilalt (Sijilmasa), Caillie's belief in the congruity of being "Negro" with being slave was firm enough to sanction his conversion of the caravan and manumission into dual origins for "free" blacks in Morocco.

Caillie's narrative became popular courtesy of the simultaneity of his induction as the first European to find Timbuctu with his promotion to a witness of the caravan's indulgence in slave trading. On account of its intersection with the intensification of abolition, we can posit the time of his trek across the Sahara as a watershed between the classical fixation on gold and the quest for civilisable "men" inaugurated by abolitionists like Richardson. In comparison to Jackson and Caillie's contentment with porous signifiers of census like a "great many," "a number of" and "several" slaves, for example, abolitionist accounts are marked by the exactitude of their *even* figures: 1500, 2000, or 4000 captives. Accounts such as Jackson's presentations of Susian expectations from Bilad al-Sudan were also the last carry over of the classical imagination of Timbuctu as a repository of gold and, to borrow from Pasternak, "a fairy-tale kingdom."⁷⁰ In contrast, the abolitionist casting of slaves as the primary cargo of the caravan became the genesis of the current academic discourses on the agenda of Moroccan traders like the Bayrouk. To distinguish the imaginative and realistic about the presentation of the Bayrouk by explorers and abolitionist, therefore, it is imperative to retrieve their profile in narratives of shipwreck. Besides their emphasis on religious differences, the explorers and abolitionists used the constitution of being "Negro" as a synonym of being slave sanctioned by the "Atlantic traffic" to dispense with the conventional investiture of the *Moor* with "dark" complexion. This discursive shift enabled explorers like Davidson and abolitionist such as Richardson to transform Bayrouk and his "race" from a "dark" scourge of shipwrecked Christians to inveterate 'white' captors of "Negroes."⁷¹

⁶⁸ Ibid. 55, 107.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 98, 119.

⁷⁰ "At one time," Pasternak wrote, "if you said Zhivago to your sleigh driver in Moscow, it was as if you had said, take me to Timbuctoo! And he carried you off to a fairy-tale kingdom." Boris Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago*, trans. Max Hayward and Manya Harari, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), xi

⁷¹ On the overlap between European and 'African' captivity in "Barbary," see Norman R. Bennet, "Christian and Negro Slavery in Eighteenth-Century North Africa," *Journal of African History*, 1, 1(1960): 65-82; Lucette Valensi, "Esclaves Christian et esclaves noirs a Tunis au XVIII siècle," *Annales: economies, sociétés, civilisations*, 22, 6, (1967): 1267-88; Dhakir, *al-wag'ai wa al-mutakhayal*, 145-186

"The Disgrace of Christendom": Moor Captor, Nazarene Captive⁷²

This generous (act) ... astonished me, it was so little in conformity with the character of the Moor. Cochelet.⁷³

In the following sub-sections, I will posit my distinction of the modes of arrival and reporting of survivors of shipwreck like Cochelet (1819) from those of explorers such as Davidson (1936) as a frame of reference to gauge the shift in the presentation of the Bayrouk. In chapter two, I credited this shift in modes of presentation to the recrudescence of abolitionism and the tilt towards the "scramble for Africa" that also set the stage for the secularisation of *Moorish* identities and, hence, the *tribalization* of the Takna. Here, I will explore the ways this descent towards abolitionism impacted authorial conceptions of the nature of the Bayrouk involvement in the Trans-Saharan Trade and, in effect, perceptions of the cargo of their caravans.

There is one striking feature that needs to be taken into account when dealing with the profile of the Bayrouk sketched by shipwrecked mariners like Adams and Cochelet. Like their medieval predecessors and abolitionist successors, survivors of shipwreck were the casualties of the same sanctified textual tradition that influenced the presentation of the *Moor* by travellers such as Jackson and Caillie. Indeed, frequent expressions of shock at the discovery of redeeming qualities in the *Moor* suggest that survivors of shipwreck were more prone to the sanctified racism that inspired Hume's supplication for relief from the "religionist" presentation of the world. The belief in a "holy cause" often preceded the *Nazarene* survivor of shipwreck in the inscription of the *Moor* as a dark and inveterate captor. For example, Robert Adams' *Moors* were "quite black" and "extremely indigent" to the extent that it is impossible to credit them with either a "golden trade" or "caravans of slaves." The same vision enabled his redeemer, the British consul to Essaouira Joseph Dupuis, to bypass the caravan and to turn the carcasses of European ships into savours in an otherwise cursed terrain, the Western Sahara.⁷⁴ Neither the specificity of Adams' experience nor the consular reports on al-Sus available to Dupuis were enough to inspire a cursory reference to the caravan. Adams, for example, did not report any slaves apart from the Christian mariners the sons of the "Governor" of Wadi Nun, "Boadick (Bayrouk) and Brahim (Ibrahim)" had reduced to "property." Adam himself was, ostensibly,

offered ... for sale to the Governor, ... Amedallah (Ubaydallah) Salem, who consented to take him upon trial but after ... about a week ... was returned to his old master, as the parties could not agree about the price.⁷⁵

Adams did not see any caravan and, indeed, posited Ubaydallah's agrarian hobbies as the main impetus behind the Bayrouk inclination to turn European "seamen" to farm labour. Yet, the investiture of the "sons of the Governor" with rights in European bodies provides

⁷² Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 273; on the advertisement of European captivity as a "disgrace of Christendom" see, Stephen Clissod, *The Barbary Slaves* (London: Paul Slek, 1977).

⁷³ Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 83.

⁷⁴ Adams, *The Narrative of Robert Adams*, 8-9: notes 85-88.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 68.

a clue that one can use to recover the caravan trader lurking beneath the "*Moor*" Bayrouk. According to Adams, his own refusal to go to work enraged his masters who would have

entirely killed him had it not been for the interference of Boadick (Bayrouk), the Shieck's son, who reproached them for their cruelty, declaring that they had no right to compel Adams to work on a market day.⁷⁶

Bayrouk's deference to the "market day" contrasts sharply with the propensity of his older brother Ibrahim to elevate refusal to plough to a crime that, ostensibly, licensed the execution of one of Adams' shipmates: Dolbie. "His (Dolbie) master (named Brahim, a son of the Shiekh)," Adams regaled his interviewers in London,

ordered him to get up and go to work, and upon Dolbie declaring that he was unable, Brahim beat him with a stick. ... But as he still did not obey, Brahim threatened that he would kill him, and upon Dolbie's replying that he had better do so ... Brahim stabbed him in the side with a dagger and he died in a few minutes.

In response to an inquiry about this incident, Dupuis informed "The African Committee" that the story negates what Adams himself as well as his shipmates had told him about the cause of Dolbie's death: of "a fever or a cold" contracted "during heavy rain."⁷⁷ While it helps in imagining Bayrouk's mercantile dispositions, the reproduction of this incident was a good example of the tacit invocation of "holy cause" to demonise the *Moor* and, hence, to incite retribution for death by his dagger.

The inclination to demonise the *Moor* also sanctioned the obviation of the caravan by the next known survivor of shipwreck to report passing through Wadi Nun, James Riley. The oddity of Riley's silence on the caravan is due to the fact that he credited his repatriation to Essaouira to encounter with "two Arab traders" from al-Sus. One of these "Arab traders," Sidi Hamet, Riley wrote,

the old women (in whom as yet I had not discovered one spark of pity) told me, ... had come with blankets and blue cloth to sell; that he came from the Sultan's dominions, and that he could buy me and carry me there if he chose, where I might find my friends, and kiss my wife and children.⁷⁸

Whether because of the relative rapidity of his passage through al-Sus or understandable fixation on his own plight, Riley's narrative does not lend itself to an assumption of encounter with the Bayrouk or their caravans. In fact, it was only after his arrival in Essaouira that Riley began to research the caravan trade. The combination of textual information and the recollections of his former "master," Sidi Hamet, enabled him to flush a cursory remark that "all caravans that go either to or from the Desert are obliged to go

⁷⁶ Adams, *Narrative of Robert Adams*, 71-73.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 73. For Dupuis rejoinder see, note n. 144. By the time of Davidson's arrival in Gulimeme (1835), the *Moorish* "dagger" descended from a metaphor of dreadful death in "Barbary" to a collector's item; see Davidson, *Notes*, 85, 92.

⁷⁸ Riley, *Loss of the American Brig Commerce*, 111.

close to Widnoon" into a sub-narrative. Yet, while he located the caravans' point of departure in Wadi Nun, Riley's Susian informant, Sidi Hamet, credited Hashim *al-Simlali* of Illigh with the organisation of the biggest and, albeit, most disastrous caravan in memory: "about 4000 camels." In contrast, the smaller caravan his informant, Sidi Hamet, reportedly accompanied from Wadi Nun to Timbuctu bartered "goods of almost every kind that are sold in Morocco" for "gum, and gold rings, and gold powder, and great teeth, such as are sold in Swearah (i.e. elephants' teeth) and slaves and fine turbans."⁷⁹ In an ironic way, the situation of slaves at the bottom of Susian expectations from Bilad al-Sudan seems to vindicate Adams's failure to credit Ubaydallah and his sons with black musketeers or notice his "concubines."

There is a sharp contrast between Adams and Riley's omission of the involvement of the inhabitants of Wadi Nun in the caravan trade and its use by Cochelet to atone for Gulimeme's 'misery'. For Cochelet, the first sign of "quitting" the Sahara was the sighting of Bayrouk's "barley fields" and the "Arab dependants" and "very fine Negroes" that arrived "in order to get in the harvest."⁸⁰ The distinction between "Arab dependants" and "fine Negroes," however, did not tempt Cochelet to confuse being black with being slave. In any case, such an association would have undermined Cochelet's own identification of his Saharan captors as "black" and presentation of Bayrouk as "almost black." But, it was not the "barley fields" or the Arabs and "Negroes" harvesting them that made Gulimeme and Bayrouk stand out. Rather, Gulimeme enchanted Cochelet courtesy of its "bustling" market and record numbers of shoppers. In a manner reminiscent of the Bayrouk and Azwafit narratives, infatuation with the caravan also enabled Cochelet to draw a direct connection between the "authority" Bayrouk and his older brother, Ibrahim, commanded in Wadi Nun and "the influence of their riches." According to Cochelet, Gulimeme was too "miserable" to deserve the honorific title of city. In a clear indication of knowledge before encounter, Cochelet used "its commercial importance" as an alibi to excuse "those persons who ... have represented it as more considerable."⁸¹ Cochelet did not provide a tally of the major items of exchange nor did he distinguish between vulgar and exotic commodities. It is, however, possible to use his representation of Bayrouk to override this silence on the identities of Gulimeme's imports from Bilad al-Sudan and exports to Essaouira. In contrast to Adams, Cochelet credited Ibrahim with fewer "menaces" than Bayrouk. Bayrouk's quest for European markets for his merchandise was also to lead him to assail Cochelet, with a daring "harangue." "Do you think," Bayrouk reportedly said,

your captains of vessels, instead of repairing to the ports of the sultan, at Soueirah for instance, would consent to steer their course towards that part of the coast where you were shipwrecked? ... By it, the merchandise brought from your country, and those, which the desert produces, would no longer ... be subjected to duties, which double the value of them. I could if necessary, load more than

⁷⁹ Ibid. 351-52; according to Riley's informant, this caravan was decimated by a sandstorm and thirst.

⁸⁰ Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 58-59.

⁸¹ Ibid. 61, 63.

twenty of your vessels every year with gum, ostrich feather, wool; camels' hair, goat-skin and other articles.⁸²

It suffices to note the explicit exclusion of gold and slaves from the baits Bayrouk had, ostensibly, dangled to attract European ships. Bayrouk's "harangue" also highlights the discursive chasm separating Susian conception of self as itinerant merchants and their demotion to peasants in earlier narratives of shipwreck. We can also use this list of tradable articles to underline the congruity of the onset of abolition and exploration with the reversal in the "order of things" Susian traders like the Bayrouk were willing to credit to the caravan. In the accounts of explorers such as Davidson and abolitionist like Richardson, Bayrouk is at once an incorrigible slave trader and a man bewitched by the world of "legitimate commerce." The structural contradiction between being slave trader and hankering after markets that had no use for his human merchandise also provides a suitable backdrop for a cross-referencing of the abolitionist presentation of the Bayrouk with the verdict of the family's commercial ledger.

Scourge of the "Negro": White Predator, Black Prey

Yet these people pray four times a day. Oh! Spirit of civilization, hither turn your eyes. Davidson⁸³

To date, the best examples of the rupture in European presentation of the Bayrouk in the nineteenth century are the often-cited narratives of the British explorer John Davidson and abolitionist James Richardson.⁸⁴ A reversal of the order in which Davidson and Richardson's accounts were publicised in Europe will amplify the role of textuality in the construction of the Bayrouk image. Unlike Davidson, neither Richardson nor any other envoy of the "Society of English Gentlemen" that sponsored his trek to Morocco actually visited Gulimeme or met Bayrouk. It is worth recalling that Richardson was one of the main sources of Schroeter's estimates of Gulimeme's annual slave imports. Yet, Richardson's narrative reeks with borrowings from Davidson's presentation of Bayrouk. For example, Davidson was the eye witness behind Richardson's assurance that Bayrouk's "revenues were raised chiefly from the duties levied upon slave caravans passing through his territory."⁸⁵ In contrast, narratives of shipwreck and captivity in Wadi Nun helped Richardson to enrich the sense of "holy cause" oozing from Cave's introduction to his report. According to Richardson, Bayrouk had to be 'stopped' because his preying on "the Negro race," was an offshoot of his much earlier collusion with "still craftier Jews" to "render it very difficult for the consular agents to redeem" shipwrecked Christians. The tacit suggestion of a 'Semitic' conspiracy against Christians further enabled Richardson to call in Davidson as a witness to both the congruity of being black in Gulimeme with being a slave and the collusion between wily Saharan Arabs and crafty Susian Jews.

⁸²Ibid. 86-87.

⁸³Davidson, *Notes*, 101.

⁸⁴They are, for example, among the key outside observers informing Austin and Schroeter's estimates.

⁸⁵Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*, v. 1, 247. Richardson "thought of going to Wadnoun" but was ostensibly, discouraged by Willshire. Willshire's intervention also became a reason for the elevation of Davidson's text to a substitute for experience. Richardson, *Travels*, v. 1, 287-289. For examples of his excessive quotations from Davidson, see Ibid. 269-270, 283-284.

There is a suggestive relation between Richardson's debates with "credulous" *Moors* and Jews on the one hand and his enumeration of slaves and estimates of their "extraordinary high price" on the other. The narrative is, for instance, lettered with melodramatic encounters with "credulous" *Moors* and Jews who not only signify, but also confess their own inferiority to the "traveller," Richardson. In the narrative, Wadi Nun figures as the point of entry for "caravans of slaves" heading to Morocco of which the Sultan alone had "upwards of sixty thousand" or the equivalent of "twenty seven millions of dollars." At the same time, however, the empire itself was "desolate" and its people were improvident. "The improvidence of the people," he added,

is so great that should one harvest fail inevitable famine would be the result ... The environs (of Essaouira) offer nothing but desolate sands ... The town where the Sheikh (Bayrouk) resides ... has a millah ... a good market ... (but) the territory around is not ... fertile on account of the neighbourhood of the deserts.⁸⁶

In that sense, the inundation of space with slaves goes hand in glove with lamentations of its desolation and derision of the "improvidence" of its *Moorish* inhabitants. But the conception of space as a wasteland also seems to sanction not only the demotion of its occupant to an indigent other, but also the feminization of his slaves and, in effect, their location in impregnable *harems* rather than in open plantations. Because this is a "holy cause" Richardson did not expect his audience to ask mundane questions like how could the "improvident" procure slaves and 'support' them when harvest fails and "inevitable famine" strikes? After all, Richardson also had a robust textual tradition on his side and, as such, could have referred doubters of his "religionist" testimony to non-abolitionists like Davidson.

The frequency of Richardson's borrowings from Davidson is comparable to the latter's allusions to and, indeed, burning desire to beat Caillie's trans-Saharan adventure. Pride in being a British "gentleman" lurks beneath Davidson's invocation of abolitionist humanism as an additive to his superiority over his present "Mohammedan" hosts and absent French rivals.⁸⁷ Along with his yearning to Timbuctu, the invocation of British leadership of abolition constituted the twin matrices of Davidson's depiction of Bayrouk as an embodiment of his "race." Ironically, Davidson's yearning for Timbuctu was matched only by Susian dreams of access to European markets. It did not take him long to discover that, like the potentates of the coastal Ait Umrán, Bayrouk was haunted by dreams of "free trade" and could not wait to pitch a similar proposal to the one he had, ostensibly, made to Cochelet. On this occasion too, gold and slaves were auspiciously absent from the menu. "The subject of Beiruk's communication," Davidson reported a few days after his arrival in Gulimeme,

⁸⁶For examples of such splits, see Richardson, *Travels in Morocco*, v. I: 225-258, 263, 282; v. 2, 66.

⁸⁷"But think you that", Davidson proudly scuffed, "I who wear the Sword-belt of his Britannic Majesty ... and exalted in fame and dignity, will allow myself to be beaten by a Frenchman!" In contrast to Caillie's total dependence on the largess of his "fanatic" hosts, Davidson was able to hire and, hence, speak to his hosts through a "bad interpreter." Distrust of his sub-Saharan and ex-slave interpreter, Abubakr al-Sidiq, also elevated visual observation to a main means of cognizance. Davidson, *Notes*, 163.

was to have an English consul resident at his port and to open a trade direct with England; that for this purpose he would send one of his sons to London to manage his affairs; that by these means the route to Sudan would be opened at once ... England would receive in exchange gum, almonds, wool, hides, ostrich feathers, ivory, and all the produce of Sudan which would find its way to Wad Nun rather than ... Marocco.⁸⁸

There is an inviolable correlation between Davidson's search for a speedy exit to Timbuctu and his identification of the quest for British markets as Bayrouk's "favourite subject." Delays in his departure to Timbuctu, however, made Davidson "sick" of the *Moors* and, hence, anticipated his subsequent demotion of Bayrouk to a "disgusting" slave trader.

The shift in Davidson's mood and, in effect, mode of reporting, corresponds to his conversion of "Negro" domicile in Wadi Nun into a sign of forced exile and, hence, their investiture with a similar yearning for Timbuctu. At the moment of first encounter, for example, expectation of speedy departure to Tibubucto prompted Davidson to exonerate Bayrouk and his "fine race" from "dark" complexion, and to imagine slaves as signs of positional superiority rather than moral depravity. "We found here the Sheikh," he reported,

waiting for us ... he gave us a good dinner. ... *(He assures me he will send me without the least danger. I like him much: he has a large and fine family. Here one begins to see slavery again: the house swarms with slaves. ... This Beruk is a person of great wealth: he possesses forty thousand heads of cattle, and has never less than one thousand camels working between here and Sudan. ... The people here are a fine race ... and are not at all dark. ... The Sheikh ... is certainly a very superior person (emphasis added).*⁸⁹

Jubilation at the prospect of speedy departure to Timbuctu also mitigated the need for a census of the present slaves almost at the same time that it sanctioned the quantification of absentee cattle, camels and horses. Yearning to Timbuctu seems to have enabled Davidson to distinguish the "almost black" Bayrouk of Cochelet from his slaves and to elevate his "fine race" to 'one of us'. It should come as no surprise that Bayrouk's failure to deliver Timbucto promptly also licensed the blurring of the 'legitimate' signifiers of his wealth and his demotion to scourge of "poor blacks". At this moment of disappointment, it was not only "wonderful to witness the fear the children have of a Christian", but it was also

⁸⁸ Davidson, *Notes*, 89-90. At Fonti he was reportedly assailed with inquiries similar to Bayrouk's "harangue" to Cochelet: "The people were quite delighted to see me as they hoped I had come in the character of a merchant to re-open a channel of commerce that had been diverted elsewhere." In a later report, Davidson underlined Bayrouk's tendency to trade passage to Timbuctu for access to British markets. "Beruk," he noted, "is so proud of the very idea of a ship coming to his territory that he has ordered Haji Abib ('Ubayd) to write to every body who can assist us in the least ... He brings me new milk with his own hand." Davidson, *Notes*, 75, 157.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 84-85, 87, 89.

high time to chastise their 'prostitute' parents and to quantify Bayrouk's wealth in maidens. "Morality", he reported,

is here at a very low ebb; the husband prostitutes his wife and the father his child ... the Sheikh ... has ... forty female slaves and hosts of children in all the tents as he is an universal lover. ... His hoards of treasure must be very great, as much of it is buried, it will be lost, perhaps for ever, should the owner die without disclosing the place of concealment.⁹⁰

The presentation of Bayrouk as a "universal lover" sanctioned the disposal of an earlier use of "forty" as a gender-neutral signifier of the totality of his slaves as well as the accusation of his "race" with "constant craving after sensual enjoyments and for gold." The feminization of the human cargo of the caravan also opened the door for the flooding of Bayrouk's "tents" with black maidens. According to Davidson, "four caravans leave this place annually consisting each of slaves varying from three hundred to one thousand." The search for Timbuctu gave way to a search for "holy cause," a search that also seems to license what Homi Bhabha has aptly called the disavowal of reality and its replacement with the "product of desire."⁹¹ To bridge the "split" between the "desire" for signs of "Mohammedan" shame and the caravan's refusal to oblige, Davidson invoked the congruity of being "poor black" with being slave sanctioned by the Atlantic system and, in effect, also de-historicized black nativity to the Maghrib. The use of black complexion as a sign of alterity allowed him to convert "sad news" about a Tuareg siege of Timbuctu and war between "the Fulani and the Bambari" in the Niger basin into a prelude to the flooding of Bayrouk's "tents" with captive maidens. This rhetorical strategy also expedited the conversion of the arrival of "well-dressed" black females into evidence of Bayrouk's combination of praying to a false deity with preying upon its creatures. "News," he reported,

has been brought ... the Tawariks have assembled on the east of Tumbuktu, ... the Fulani ... have been again beaten. ... Some of the female captives have been brought to the Sheikh; four as a present: they look well and are well dressed and do not seem to have suffered as much by the journey as their inhuman traffickers. ... Little feeling is shown for the poor blacks; and they seemed to think less of their own fate. ... One poor creature however, who was... less black than the rest, shed tears. ... And yet these people pray four times a day ... Oh! Spirit of civilization, hither turn your eye.⁹²

⁹⁰Davidson, *Notes*, 99.

⁹¹Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 91.

⁹²Davidson, *Notes*, 88, 101. In a second report Davidson used the same rhetorical strategy to produce more "poor female slaves" and to charge their (black) 'race' with a natural disposition for servility. "I was", he noted, "astonished at their spirits especially when I saw the parting of two sisters; they certainly have not the same feelings as the whites." Davidson, *Notes*, 122. Schroeter invoked these particular testimonies to shore up his proposition of an increase in slave imports. In contrast, Boahen posited the wars Davidson alluded to and the political instability they generated to argue for decline in the caravan trade. "Timbuctu", he wrote, "was the most typical of the (southern) entrepôts. In view of the chronic anarchy and the rivalry between the Fulani and the Tuareg for the mastery of the town, it is obvious that

It is perhaps worth recalling how Cochelet used elegant attire and nudity as a frame of reference for identification and, in the process, was able to credit the "almost black" Bayrouk with a *Moorish* identity. In comparison, the conflation of being black with being slave enabled Davidson to override the social status of Bayrouk's "well-dressed" and rested guests. We can hardly explain this shift in modes of presentation without reference to the inversion of the *Moors* from "dark" to white predators, the inversion that also seems to warrant the change in their intended prey from Euro-Christians to black "creatures."

Together, Davidson's conversion of slave trading into a sign of "Mohammedan" inferiority and his subsequent death by a *Moorish* "dagger" turned him into the kind of martyr abolitionists like Richardon loved to quote. Even if one were to forgo the association of being black in Wadi Nun with being slave, the gap between the investiture of Gulimeme with "four" annual "slave caravans" and the trickle of maidens Bayrouk was ostensibly stashing in his "tents" will remain unbridgeable. By including census among the discursive arsenal abolitionists used against their Muslim Other, it also becomes possible to account for Davidson's demotion of vulgar articles of trade to signifiers of discomfort. Almost at the same time that he associated Bayrouk with stocking in "female captives," Davidson tended to turn the realistic signifiers of the family wealth into tethers of his own entrapment. The "whole place," he complained, "is so full of ivory, feathers, gum, and wool, that it is difficult to get about." Davidson's sense of entrapment and frustration also triggered his appropriation of "the poor blacks" of Gulimeme as surrogate inmates yearning for verdant tropics. As metaphors of his yearnings for tropical climes, the "people of the Sudan" also became "better than those of Wad Nun". Their "haggard looks" seemed to belie an emotive sense of comradeship in exile. "All of them," he melancholically noted, "are my friends, and I only wish that they and we were moving southwards."⁹³

Davidson's inclination to posit black bodies as metaphors for his own sense of entrapment is evidenced by the shift in his mode of reporting following the reception of "news" of the impending arrival of the caravan he hoped to leave with. The arrival of this caravan filled him with "better spirits." It also triggered a dispensation with feminine captivity, a dispensation that facilitated his discovery of black travellers from Timbuctu to whom "all here are very civil."⁹⁴ Instead of bringing in feminine fodder for Bayrouk's "tents," however, this caravan swelled the articles of trade that ought to have added to Davidson's discomfort. "The Kafilah (caravan)," he reported,

very little retail trade could be done there. Indeed, the fanatical Fulani, according to Barth, drove a way the pagan Mandingo and Bambara traders who carry on almost the whole commerce with the countries to the south of the Niger." Schroeter "Slave Markets and Slavery," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 185-213, 187-88; Boahen, *Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan*, 116.

⁹³ Davidson, *Notes*, 106-107.

⁹⁴ The caravan was the biggest Davidson had witnessed. It was probably the only trans-Saharan caravan Davidson actually witnessed. Its impending arrival led him to left a self-imposed boycott of "fairs" and to look for prospective fellow travellers. This search also sanctioned his frequent encounters with "scamp" (Fulani) 'relative' of Ahmad Lubu who had been among Bayrouk's guests long before Davidson's arrival. Davidson 'put up' with him in anticipation of the services he was ostensibly capable of delivering upon arrival in Timbuctu. These discoveries, however, came too late for a 'revision' of his tendency to convert black travellers to al-Sus to slaves. Davidson, *Notes*, 107, 125.

brought large quantities of ivory packed in skins; about four, six, or eight teeth on each camel looking like small canoes; many loads of ostrich feathers; one hundred camels laden with gum, packed in hides, through which sticks are passed, and they are then slung like panniers on the back of the camel. Several Tamar dates and a few bales of Sudan clothe; the camels that carry gold have each a man riding to take charge of it.⁹⁵

There is, however, a causal relation between this shift in Davidson's presentation of the cargo of the caravan and the casting of its Saharan, Awlad Dayman, escort as prospective guides to Timbuctu. This expectation seems to underpin the tacit parallelism between Davidson's anger at Bayrouk's delays and the hoisting of his, Bayrouk, "wild" guests to the status of 'most favourite *Moors*'. "At length," he noted, "the Damanis have been to my rooms, and told me that if no kafilah is to go for some time, they will proceed with me. I like them much; they are fine specimens of wild men, but not savages."⁹⁶

Apart from its centrality to the abolitionist and current academic visions of the Trans-Saharan Trade, Davidson's presentation of Bayrouk underlines the role of authorial lore in the conception of the cargo of the caravan. In as much as this presentation feeds off the classical European perception of the *Moor* as captor and "Barbary" as a dungeon, Davidson differed from survivors of shipwreck only in his use of the predicament of "poor blacks" rather than the "suffering" of Christians to decry the moral depravity of the *Moor*. A dispensation with his investiture of Bayrouk with fixation on maidens for his "tents" can enable us to amplify the striking similarities between the cargo of the 'last' caravan he had witnessed in Gulimeme and the articles of trade Riley and Cochelet mentioned in their account. These items were also similar to those Bayrouk had ostensibly offered as dowry for direct trade with England. The frequent exclusion of gold and slaves corresponds to Bayrouk's seeming failure to use them as baits in his "harangue" to Cochelet and "communication" to Davidson.

The caravan's tendency to fulfil or betray the authorial lore can also be gleaned from a comparison of Richardson's absentee report on Wadi Nun and its "sheikh" with the observations of his Senegalese contemporary, Leopold Panet:

Places entre Maroc et Soueïra où ils vont s'approvisionner de marchandises européennes, les commerçants de Noun achètent, en retour, la gomme, les peaux de chèvre, la laine de chameau et de mouton, les plumes d'autruche apportées de Saguia et différents autres points de la côte par les tribus nomades qui s'y trouvent. Ils expédient, en outre, des caravanes à Tounbontou, lesquelles en reviennent avec de l'or en grande quantité, deux à trois mille chameaux chargés de gomme, de l'ivoire, de la cire et des esclaves.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Davidson, *Notes*, 112.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* 119.

⁹⁷ Panet, *Principaux explorations du Sahara occidentale*, 155, 159-161.

In Panet's account too, slaves lag behind exotic goods such as gold and ivory as well as vulgar articles of trade like gum, hides and ostrich feather. By positing Essaouira as the final Moroccan destination for the cargo of the caravan, Panet tacitly seconded the investiture of Bayrouk with dreams of access to European markets. The congruity of buying from the caravan with selling to Essaouira also expedites the use of the family commercial ledger to further illustrate the disparity between the frequent investiture of the Bayrouk with specialization in slave trading (*nikhasa*) and simultaneous references to their diligent search for access to markets that had no use for their human commodities.

As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, these registers were not intended for either posterity or a wider audience. As such, they provide us with a more realistic perspective as to what the Bayrouk were trading and when. As we will presently see, the articles of trade enshrined in the Bayrouk registers indicate the centrality of raw materials to the Trans-Saharan Trade in the nineteenth century and, in that sense, amplify the discursive nature of the narrator's tendency to gaze at the classical, textual, caravan. And by crediting the *Moor* Bayrouk with a share in "legitimate trade" of his *Nazarene* other, the registers also amplify the tendency of post-colonial academics to disavow the realistic about the Trans-Saharan Trade in favour of the lofty ideals underpinning abolitionist discourse, the discourse that, perhaps ironically, also lead us back to the classical authorial fixation on the exotic.

IV-Caravans of Gum and *Khunt*: The Bayrouk Commercial Ledger.

The trader who is proficient in commerce does not transport except the articles in general demand by the rich and poor, sultan and subjects. Ibn Khaldun⁹⁸

As signifiers of means of social existence in the nineteenth century al-Sus, the Bayrouk registers demystify both the narrators' nostalgic vision of *tijarat al-Sudan* (Sudan trade) and extant academic conceptions of the caravan. Like the textual image of the caravan, the narrator's fixation on *tijarat al-Sudan*, was rooted in the classical Maghribian aphorism that prescribed al-Sudan as "the remedy for poverty in men." The narrator honours this aphorism by refusing to reveal the exact exotics that plotted the inversion of professions like *fellah* (farmer) and *kassab* (peddler) into signifiers of underachievement. To contextualize the narrator's elevation of involvement in *tijarat al-Sudan* to a ticket to the Bayrouk saga, it is imperative to gaze at the textual tradition that ordained access to the caravan as the collateral for positional superiority in the Maghrib. In that sense, the narrator's preference for fabulous literary tropes is at par with the current academic tendency to barter the classic fixation on gold with the tabulation of slaves. There is a tacit congruity between the current authorial citations of al-Rabati's investiture of Ubaydallah with "1500 *kanun*" of retainers and the frequent invocation of Davidson's tallies of Bayrouk's "buried" treasures and the number of Gulimeme's annual "caravans of slaves." Yet, such mesmerising estimates of the observable and "buried" wealth of Susian powerhouses like the Bayrouk and the Simlali are the rule rather than the exception. Even academics who stared at the split between the "products of desire" and the realities of

⁹⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. al-Juwaydi, 367.

social existence in al-Sus tended to shy away from confronting the conventional stuffing of the caravan with gold and maidens.⁹⁹

In his pioneering study of the Simlali of Illigh, Paul Pascon invoked the prospect of a separate and hitherto unaccounted for method of marketing slave imports from al-Sudan to defer judgement on the glaring disparity between their legendary wealth in men and the "tres peu" records of sales he was able to identify in the family's commercial ledger.¹⁰⁰ In a seeming retraction of his earlier critique of the inflation of slave numbers by "foreign observers," Schroeter later jacked up these same assessments and indeed, transferred the main venue of their distribution in Morocco back to arid Tinduf, the caravans' point of entry.¹⁰¹ In contrast, Naimi's tabulation of the Bayrouk registers produced less than fifty transactions in slaves for the period extending from 1842 to 1872. The mediocrity of this figure may also explain his tacit emulation of Pascon's suspension of judgement on the dearth of slave sales in the Simlali commercial ledger. Naimi too deferred judgement on the extent of the Bayrouk involvement in slave trading pending the tallying of the content of "other registers" that has yet to be identified. In the interim, he disavowed the Bayrouk registers in favour of al-Rabati's "1500 kanun" and credited Gulimeme with de facto cashing on the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade. This return to established textual conventions also enabled Naimi to retain his much earlier investiture of the Bayrouk with specialisation in slave trading (*nakhasa*). Interestingly, this suggestion predated his later discovery and tabulation of the Bayrouk commercial ledger.¹⁰² In that sense, authorial lore and the reputation of the Trans-Saharan Trade once more superseded the known about the experience of the beneficiaries from its services.

Conceptually, one does not need the commercial registers to argue for split between the actuality of the Bayrouk wealth in people and its mesmerising presentations by explorers like Davidson or Shurafa biographers such as al-Rabati. The split between the realistic and imaginative about the Bayrouk involvement in the caravan trade can be

⁹⁹ Toufiq credited Southern Morocco with "an economic of scarcity". This vision is reminiscent of Ibn Khaldun's distinction between 'hungry' *Badiya* and affluent urban core. The same vision lurks beneath the inclusion of southern Morocco in what 'disappointed' French colonial officials duped "useless Morocco." Toufiq, *al-mujta' al-maghribi*, 265; for an application of the notion of "scarcity" to the economic history of nineteenth-century al-Sus, see Afa, *masalat al-niqud*, 263-70.

¹⁰⁰ Paul Pascon, *La Maison d'Illigh*, 77; Pascon identified only 19 'slave auctions' for the period from 1853 to 1868. This figure seems to shore up al-Susi's much earlier dismissal of the Simlali's reported slave entourage as "slaves of their stomachs": free bodies, *Haratin*, looking for a 'free' ride. In a manner reminiscent of his attribution of the decline of the Moroccan dynastic realm to the "Bukhari tyranny," al-Susi charged these 'slaves' with the siphoning of the Simlali "treasures"; al-Susi, *Illigh*, 297, 304.

¹⁰¹ Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 93.

¹⁰² Mustafa Naimi, "La rive Sud Saharienne de 1842 a 1872," *Colloque sur les Sources Arabes de L'Histoire Africaine*: 167-192, 174-176; for his 'return' to al-Rabati's figures, see Naimi, "Bayrouk", in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936. Pascon and Naimi's censuses tend to subvert the investiture of Morocco with inheritance of Algeria's share in the caravan trade by authors like Miegé, Schroeter and Ruf. Miegé's attribution of decline in Algeria's share in the caravan trade to its diversion to southern Morocco is a carry over of the same French 'disappointments' in the wake of their conquest of Algeria. Miegé, *Le Maroc et La Europe* v. 3, 91; Miegé, "Le Commerce Transsaharien au XIX siècle," *Revue de L'Occident Musulman*, 32, 91-92, 99; Schroeter, "Slave Markets and slavery," in *The Human Commodity*, ed. Savage: 187, 190; Ruf, *Ending Slavery*, 323.

demonstrated by recourse to classical textual advice on "proficient" trade offered by authors like Ibn Khaldun and was available to Susians like the Bayrouk. Neither the haphazard projections of Gulimeme's population in narratives of shipwreck and exploration, nor the meticulous colonial tallies of the *Ait Jamal* bodies and their taxable assets can help bring the figures proposed by al-Rabati, Davidson and Richardson within the scope of the historically conceivable in al-Sus. For example, Pascon and Ennaji posited the Simlali seniority as a frame of reference to accuse their anonymous informant on Bayrouk's wealth with "exaggeration." The figures they cited, however, correspond to those advanced by Davidson: "40 000 têtes de bétail, 1000 chameaux et 400 chevaux de guerre et de course (autruches)." In his tabulation of the Takna, Monteil put the total number of *Ait Jamal* families at 2780. The *Ait Musa* of Gulimeme amounted to 680 families. In contrast, camels rather than cattle were the mainstay of the *Ait Jamal* economy, which is in tone with domicile in an arid terrain.¹⁰³ The estimation of the caravan size in thousands of camels and its investiture with the shipment of gold and slaves makes one wonder why the abundance of such exotics did not bring them within the reach of "improvident" *Moors*? In spite of their reported abundance, however, these exotics continued to be special insignias of royalty.¹⁰⁴ A re-instatement of vulgar articles of trade like gum and cloth as the more realistic matrices of trade will enable us to attribute the durability of the trans-Saharan system to its relevance to the "rich and poor, sultan and subjects." This proposition also provides us with a more convincing explanation to the Bayrouk's diligent search for access to European markets, the search that ultimately inspired Mawlai al-Hasan's expedition to Gulimeme.

Catering to the European appetite for "raw materials" lurks beneath Bayrouk's seeming refusal to advertise the most mesmerising signifier of the caravan trade, gold, to prospective trade partners like Cochelet or Davidson. The silence of the Bayrouk registers on gold stands out precisely because of its intrinsic capacity to force European "captains of vessels" and traders to dally with shipwreck or even risk death by *Moorish* daggers. The samples covering the period from 1831 to 1860 tend to drift from affable confession of to tacit denial of, trade in gold. The silence on gold, however, also intersects with uniform invocations of the Alawite "silver *dirham*" as the normal medium of exchange. In the Bayrouk registers, there is also a suggestive simultaneity between this shift from the "gold *mithqal*" to the "silver *dirham*" and the fiscal reforms introduced by the Alawite court in the course of the nineteenth century. The Alawite fiscal reforms were defeated by the shift in the balance of trade in favour of Europe, the introduction of the Spanish *Rial* and French Franc as rival mediums of exchange, and the prevalence of counterfeit coins. "Foreign trade," Paul Zeleza noted,

also spelled disaster for the Moroccan currency. The country's bi-metallic system of bronze and silver was disrupted as foreign trade grew, for only silver coins qualified as foreign exchange. Indeed, the repatriation of silver coins to finance

¹⁰³ Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzen et le Sous Al-Aqa*, 41; Davidson, *Notes*, 85, 90; Monteil, *Notes Sur Les Tekna*, 6, 19-22, 43-45.

¹⁰⁴ Hopkins elevated gold and slaves to "state necessities" and listed cloth among "luxury items" like ivory and ostrich feathers. See Hopkins, *Economic History of West Africa*, 81.

trade and pay debts and indemnities led to a situation whereby the Spanish piaster established itself as the silver standard in the country. The uqiya, Morocco's currency, began to inflate against the Spanish piaster. This triggered the counterfeiting of the copper coin, known as flus, which formed small denomination of the uqiya. This reduced the uqiya's value. The sultan's attempt to set up fixed exchange rate between the Spanish and French silver coins and the uqiya were to no avail.¹⁰⁵

In travel accounts and current academic discourses this economic slide is frequently attributed to a precipitous descent towards colonialism, the descent evidenced by Morocco's territorial losses to France (1844) and Spain (1860) and its conquest by British "free trade".¹⁰⁶ Ironically, even critics of the notion of *bled es-siba*, tended to credit this shift in the balance of power and trade in favour of Europe with the erosion of the sultans' ability to put a cap on the activities of Susian potentates like the Bayrouk. "Foreign trade," Pennell recently wrote,

did indeed underpin powerful leaders in remote regions that the Makhzan could not control... Shaykh Bayrouk of Guelmin, had no religious prestige. In the 1820s, he turned his tiny settlement into an important trading center by diverting some of the trans-Saharan trade. Relying on his own tribe, he established a web of trading posts across the Sahara and traded with Europeans on the coast. Indeed, he forced them (Europeans) to do business with him by holding for ransom European sailors shipwrecked on the coast. Control of commerce gave him political influence, which he increased by allying himself with local maraboutic families.¹⁰⁷

In the next chapter, I will test the limits of the Bayrouk autonomy. Here, it is enough to note the disparity between their identification as tribesmen and hankering after caravans and foreign markets. At face value, Pennell's statement also begs "common sense" questions like why would Bayrouk coerce Europeans "to do business with him" if his main speciality was "gold and slaves"? I have noted that gold is endowed with an intrinsic capacity to "force" European traders to come to Bayrouk. In contrast, in the age of abolition slaves were more likely to drive such traders away. The family commercial registers amplify the conclusion one does not need them to draw. The quantities of gold and slaves enshrined in the Bayrouk registers are not enough to vouch for the frequency of their citation as the main cargo of the caravan let alone the estimation of their respective volume in camel loads or in the thousands

¹⁰⁵Paul Tiyaambe Zeleza, *A Modern Economic History of Africa v.1: The Nineteenth Century*, (Dakar: Codesira, 1993), 263; Afa, *masalat al-niqud*, 324-384; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 142-152.

¹⁰⁶"The advantage of trade with this empire," Jackson noted, "must be evident from ... (the fact) that nearly the whole of the exports to Morocco consists of manufactured goods and that the returns for these are entirely raw materials many of which are essentially necessary in our manufactures." Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 256; on the descent to "raw materials", see Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 131-160.

¹⁰⁷Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 46-47.

The sparsity of references to gold corresponds to the mediocrity of slave sales in the sense that the declared numbers subvert Naimi's proposition of *nikhasa* (slave trading) as the mainstay of the Bayrouk trade. There is, indeed, an embarrassing disparity between the 'slave auctions' enshrined in the Bayrouk registers and the annual caravans reported by Davidson, reified by Richardson and most recently, invoked by Schroeter. For the period from 1831 to 1864, I was able to identify thirty-seven certifiable transactions on slaves by Bayrouk and his oldest son and heir apparent Muhammad. These transactions fall short of Naimi's statistical tabulation of the same records.¹⁰⁸ Slave sales were not only too few and intermittent to warrant "specialisation," but the differences and shifts in their prices do not suggest cashing on the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade or stark preference for innate, reproductive, over acquired, productive, aptitude. In the family commercial ledger, silence on the age and physical attributes of slaves contrasts sharply with the uniform insistence on "safety from defects"—i.e. incapacitating disabilities.¹⁰⁹ The buyer usually poses as "the slave of his Lord" (*abd rabihi*) and uses the terms *ama* (maid) and *wasif* (domestic servant/butler) as signifiers of the gender and productive potentials of his acquisition. The productive connotations of these designations are shored up by the frequent equalisation of the *ama* and *wasif* in prices.

From the 1830s to the 1840s, "thirty five silver *dirhams*" is frequently used as the standard and gender-neutral price for a slave with no "defects." In 1852 however, the price dipped to "thirty *dirhams*" but then, crept back to between thirty-five and forty "silver *dirhams*" in 1854 where it froze again until 1864. This equity in monetary value seems to vindicate al-Nasiri's contemporaneous assertion that in the course of his search for recruits for his *Bukhari* army, Mawlai Ismael instructed his deputies to pay "ten (gold) *mithqals* for each 'abd (male) and ten for each *ama* (female)".¹¹⁰ The equalisation between the sexes also contradicts the conventional academic wisdom that there was an automatic preference for, to borrow from Meillassoux, "women and children" over "adult men." The prevalence of designations like *ama* and *wasif* also constitutes a departure from the classical use of terms like *jariya* (maiden) and *ghulam* (page) as signifiers of age. The use of some of these terms as generic designations of seniority provides a clue on age differences between slaves. The implicit age difference between *wasif* (adult) and *ghulam* (youth) correspond to that between *ama* (adult) and *jariya* (maiden).¹¹¹ One can therefore use this seeming

¹⁰⁸ From the duplicate folios Dr. Mustafa Naimi have graciously made available to me, I was able to verify only 37 individuated transactions. This figure is slightly short of the sales tabulated by Naimi for the period from 1842 to 1872. The similarities between the number and gender of slaves sold in some years may have resulted from the duplication of records. The slight overlap between the periods covered by his quantitative study (1842-1872) and this thesis (1831-1864) is offset by the decrease in slave sales with progression towards the 1870s. For Naimi's estimates see, Naimi, "La rive Sud Saharienne de 1842 a 1872 dans les registre comptables de la famille Bayruk," *Colloque sur les Sources Arabes de L'Histoire Africaine*: 167-192, 174-176.

¹⁰⁹ The Bayrouk Registers (henceforth, Bayrouk Registers): 27 *Dhul Ga'da*, 1248 H. (1831); 6 *Muharam*, 1269 (1852); 13 *Muharam*, 1270 (1853).

¹¹⁰ Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v. 7, 51

¹¹¹ Bayrouk Registers: 26 *Dhul Qa'da*, 1262 H (1845); *Shawal*, 1264 H. (1847); 6 and 25 *Muharam* 1269 H. (1852). These prices can be compared to Pascon's identification of 60 *rials* as the average of slave

preference for "adults" to qualify Boahen and Meillassoux's assumption of a generic fixation on "concubines and children," an assumption which, in any case, is rooted in their discursive use as evidence of the "sensuality" and cruelty of their captors.

The mediocrity of the slave sales encoded in the Bayrouk commercial registers tends to corroborate the tacit refusal of survivors of shipwreck to refer to other captives, the refusal that also seems to license the frequent *negroidization* of their Saharan captors. In fact, the certifiable figures of black slaves fall short of the number of the shipwrecked Europeans ostensibly dumped at the Bayrouk doorsteps by their Saharan confidants. For example, Naimi credited the Bayrouk with the acquisition of fifty-three shipwrecked European mariners from anonymous Saharan captors and their extradition to Essaouira in exchange for hefty ransoms.¹¹² One can take the disparity between the Bayrouk inclination to purchase survivors of shipwreck and their propensity to barter them for monies as evidence of the lack of tangible incentives for the concentration of slave labour in Wadi Nun. Narratives of shipwreck, however, do not disclose the exact sums the Bayrouk had received in exchange for the repatriation of their European guests to Essaouira. Without naming his source, Barbier put the amount paid in exchange for Cochelet's "party of five" at 12500 francs a 'piece'.¹¹³ In contrast, Jackson made frequent references to the ransoming of survivors of shipwreck and their repatriation from Wadi Nun to Essaouira. But, Jackson did not dwell on the exact *qabila* identities of their "Arab" captors nor specify the "pecuniary disbursements" they had received from "itinerant Jew traders" in exchange for European mariners. Instead, he attributed the inclination of "Jew traders" to offer less for "Christian captives" to the inability of the latter to function in Saharan conditions. According to Jackson, this perception rendered survivors of shipwreck "inferior to black slaves." "They (Saharans)," he wrote,

carry the Christian captives about in the Desert, to different markets to sell them, for they soon discover that their habit of life render them altogether unserviceable, or very inferior to the black slaves, which they procure from Timbuctoo ... They (Christian captives) at length become objects of commercial speculation, and the itinerant Jew traders, who wonder about from Wedinoon ... find means to barter for them tobacco, salt, a cloth garment or any other thing ... and then return to Wedinoon with the purchase.¹¹⁴

The lack of adequate disclosures of the pecuniary amounts either "the itinerant Jew traders" or the Bayrouk might have received from European middlemen like Willshire makes it difficult to compare the value of survivors of shipwreck with the prices of black slaves listed in the Bayrouk commercial registers. Notwithstanding this silence, the Bayrouk propensity to barter European captives for ransom is indicative of the limited absorptive capacity of an arid terrain like Wadi Nun. Besides the looming spectre of

prices, with 30 *rials* as the minimum and 90 as the maximum "pour une feme dite 'de beauté," Pascon, *la Maison d'Illigh*, 27; on gender preferences, see Tamouh, 'Le Maroc et Le Soudan,' 141.

¹¹² Naimi, "La Rive sud Saharienne," 172-176.

¹¹³ Barbier, *Trois Français au Sahara Occidental*, 95.

¹¹⁴ Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 272-273

providential tests by drought, locust and famine, the productive potential of Wadi Nun's "barley fields" hardly warrants the retention of "Christian slaves."¹¹⁵ According to Cochelet, stalling in the negotiation on ransom led a frustrated Bayrouk to call them a "useless burden." In contrast, Davidson met "many beautiful women" whose husbands were "all gone to Sudan."¹¹⁶ By analogy, it was foolhardy to stock on *sudan* mouths when prolonged exile in their verdant world had long been the prescribed "remedy" for indigence in the arid Maghrib. *Sudan* slaves could have been few for the same reasons that sanctioned the bartering of rights in their European counterparts for trifles like "tobacco, salt, a cloth garment" or their grooming as potential commercial partners: Wadi Nun's aridity and limited absorptive capacity. The lack of interest in the concentration of labour contrasts sharply with stocking in the kind of articles Bayrouk had ostensibly advertised to Cochelet and Davidson.

The Bayrouk registers also subvert any attempt to explain the caravan trade in terms of a linear conveyance of products from Bilad al-Sudan to al-Sus and, ultimately, Essaouira.¹¹⁷ In contrast to the narrator's nostalgic infatuation with *tijarat al-Sudan*, the registers harbour normative activities such as the rearing and marketing of livestock or the advancement of loans in return for grain surplus. Trade in edibles like barley and dates suggests that Bayrouk and his sons did not give up on the profession the narrator uses as a signifier of underachievement—*kassab*. In return for perishables like barley, camels, apparel (*kisswa*) and saddlery, Saharan debtors surrendered animal refuse like ostrich feathers, hides and wool. The web of exchange with Saharan traders was further enhanced by the Bayrouk mediation in the network of trade linking al-Sus to *al-Gharb* (the west): northern Morocco in general and Essaouira in particular. The registers team with references to "diverse apparel" (*malabis mukhtalifa*) and "miscellaneous articles" (*sila' mukhtalifa*) descending from *al-Gharb* and disappearing in al-Sus and the Western Sahara: garments (*haiks*), blankets, linen, woollen and leather items. The sense of variation implied by terms like "miscellaneous articles" was, however, also a disguise for a myriad of perishable European products dumped at Essaouira. These products ranged from mundane articles like textiles to technologies of violence such as rifles and munitions. The most outstanding sign of European invasion of the Bayrouk imports from *al-Gharb* (the west), however, was the textiles frequently listed under the generic term *khunt*. The genesis of the term *khunt* is not exactly clear. In his description of the attire of Saharan Ait Usa and Rgaybat, al-Susi identified *Khunt* as "blue" cloth and traced its origin back to "bilad al-Sudan." In contrast, al-Shiquiti used *Khunt* as a signifier for multi-coloured cotton clothes procured from French traders in Senegal in return for Gum. In the registers *Khunt* is a porous coverlet for miscellaneous textiles ranging from affordable (European) clothes to

¹¹⁵ Al-sus was tested by a plague in 1799. It was 'visited' by floods and locust in 1812. In 1815-1816 and 1820, it was hit with two bouts of drought and famine. Drought continued to stock its occupants for the rest of the 19th century; On drought and famine see, Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 171-188; Afa, *masalat al-niqud*, 90-110.

¹¹⁶ Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 77; Davidson, *Notes* 96.

¹¹⁷ Umar Afa, "Les dimensions historiques de l'économie d'Agadir au 19^{eme} siècle," in *Actes du Colloque sur l'agglomération du Grand Agadir : Axe Historique*, (Agadir: Université Ibn Zohr, 1990): 231-246, 243.

the more expensive (Kano) "blue cloth" (*khunt azrag*). It is probable that the 'European *khunt*' became popular among Saharans and Susians because of its mimicry of the familiar, albeit more expensive, "Sudan cloth" that had long been part of the cargo of the caravan.¹¹⁸ In any case, *Khunt* was the main item the Bayrouk sought from the "merchants of Essaouira" and it also dominated their offerings to Saharan customers.

I have already noted that trade in *things* also inspired the Bayrouk and their customers to disclose their identities. For example, being a *Suwayri Hajj* (pilgrim) was frequently used to refer to suppliers of "diverse clothes" and "miscellaneous articles" hailing from *al-Gharb*. The conversion of religious motifs to signifiers of credit worthiness is evidenced by the addition of *al-Hajj* (the pilgrim) to the identity designations of the two *Suwayri* families enshrined in the register, Muhammad Ibn *al-Hajj* al-Mahjub and al-Madani Ibn *al-Hajj* Muhammad al-Awad.¹¹⁹ In contrast, the Susian and Saharan agents the Bayrouk 'contracted' to distribute these items were identified either by locale or *qabila* affiliations: *Dra'wi*, (of Wadi Dra'), *Zafati* (from the Azwafit), *Zarqi* (from the Azraqayn) or *Hashtuki* (from the Hashtuka).¹²⁰ In return for apparel (*kisswa*), "miscellaneous merchandise" and grain, the Bayrouk accepted raw materials like gum, ostrich feathers, ivory and hides. That said, it is still difficult to sever the procurement of exportable articles from the cycle of production and consumption linking the cultivation of barley and date trees, and the rearing of camels on the spot to the hunting of ostrich and the tapping of gum trees (acacia) in distant places. The intersections between long-distance trade and local production is evidenced by the uniform positing of "six months" as a grace period in all the registers and the synchronisation of lending and repayment with the harvest season and the cycles of major Susian *mausems* (annual markets). The timing of the *mausems* was in turn, inseparable from the time of the arrival of the caravans in al-Sus or their departure to Bilad al-Sudan. The success of the *mausem* of *Sidi al-Ghazi* in Gulimeme was, for example, contingent on the collusion of a good harvest in al-Sus with the timely arrival of the caravans and 'hungry' Saharans.

In so far as the caravan trade is concerned, the Bayrouk commercial registers tend to revoke the classical authorial fixation on "gold rings" and "beautiful" maidens. Instead, they accord priority to mundane items of trade like gum, blue cloth (*Khunt azreg*) and ostrich feathers. This disparity between the content of the Bayrouk registers and conventional authorial presentations of the caravan is evidenced by Naimi's endorsement of De La Chapelle's identification of "gold and slaves" as the matrices of Gulimeme's trade. While she did not subscribe to this ranking, Zahra Tamouh reserved large slots to gold and slaves. In contrast, she situated the peak in the demand for ostrich feather in the

¹¹⁸ al-Susi, *al-masul* v. 3, 404; al-Shinquiti, *al-wasit*, 523; on the valuation of the "Sudan cloth", see Caillie, *Travels Through Central Africa to Timbuctoo*, 60.

¹¹⁹ Bayrouk Registers: 25 *Raba'*, 1265 H (1848); 2 *Jumada*, 1266 H (1849).

¹²⁰ Examples of the use of space and *qabila* to locate itinerant contractors include a certain Muhammad Ibn Sa'eed "the Hashtuki by origin and Ait Musa by affiliation" and al-Mukhtar Ibn Bilal al- *Dra'wi* (of Wadi Dra'); Bayrouk Registers: 21 *Jumada II*, 1266 H.; 20 *Ramadan*, 1268 H. (1851); 6 *Muharam*, 1277 H. For similar modes of identification, see (Azwafit) 2 *Raba'*, 1262 H.; 25 *Jumada I*, 1285 H.; (Azraqayen) 15 *Shawal*, 1268 H.; 16 *Dhul Qa'da*, 1271; (Ait Musa) 10 *Ramadan*, 1282 H.; (Bu Suba') 4 *Ramadan*, 1261 H.; 21 *Jumada II*, 1268 H.; 22 *Sha'ban*, 1270 H.; (Regaybat) 15 *Raba' II*, 1258 H.; 5 *Jumada II*, 1262; 18 *Ramadan*, 1268 H.; 15 *Shawal*, 1268 H.; 1 *Safar*, 1272 H.

1860s and put gum in the middle of the pack.¹²¹ According to Davidson, however, Bayrouk was already complaining about the depreciation in "the prices of ostrich feather", in the 1830s. Davidson's testimony is shored up by Riley's reference to the hunting of ostrich and collection of ostrich feather and gum in, to borrow from Faidherbe, "the empty space between the Senegal and Wadi Nun."¹²²

The Bayrouk commercial registers tend to reconcile being *kassab* in Wadi Nun with the dispatch of camels to the salt mines of Taodenni and the collection of gum or the sale of European textiles to Saharan customers like the Rgaybat and Awlad Dulaym. In Taodenni, the hitherto idle camels were saddled with salt and delivered to Timbuctu. A cursory scanning of the intersection between the rearing of camels in al-Sus's Saharan backyards and procurement of salt in Taodenni reveals that gum and *khunt* were the main exotics the Bayrouk were procuring and distributing. The significance of this vision of *tijjarat al-Sudan* is evidenced by the use of "camel load" and *qintar* (100 pounds) as standards of measurement and indeed, the willingness to part with "corporeal gold" to 'bail' out gum and *khunt*. Bayrouk, for example, gave up "corporeal gold" in return for goods from Ibn al-Hajj al-Awad *al-Suwayri* and offered "160 *mithqals* of gold" as dowry for gum from two Tajakant traders, Sidi Mawlud and Sidi al-Abd of Tinduf.¹²³ The frequent positing of "miscellaneous" as a signifier of *no name* articles tends to amplify the identification of gum and *khunt* by their standard names. Very much like the use of "the products of *al-Gharb*" as a collective signifier for acquisitions from the north, Essaouira, the invocation of *tijjarat al-Sudan* as a coverlet for imports from the south, the basins of the Niger and the Senegal, also tends to gloss the European origin of some of the items procured in Timbuctu. The caravan stooped to the transportation of objectionable articles of trade like tobacco.¹²⁴ Overall, there is a suggestive simultaneity between procurement of "camel loads" of gum, ivory, ostrich feather and *khunt azrag* (blue cloth) with the return of the caravans from Bilad al-Sudan. The distinction between *sudanic* (*azrag*) and European (miscellaneous) *khunt* is comparable to the tacit distancing of local gum from its highly prized imported 'cousin'. The Bayrouk registers do not spell out this distinction. The conflation of the procurement of "camel loads" of gum with the arrival of the caravan and its exchange with "corporeal gold" is indicative of the Bayrouk (and European) preference for the "gum of Senegal." The intersection between exportation from Essaouira and the arrival of caravans in Gulimeme also underlines the congruity of the preferential treatment afforded to Saharan suppliers of exportable products like the Tajakant of Tinduf with the quest for access to European markets. One result of this orientation is the utilisation of living in al-Sus and being Takna to trade with Saharan outsiders rather than to

¹²¹ Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 168; Zahra Tamouh, "Le Maroc et le Soudan aux XIX siecle," These pour le doctorat de 3eme cycles (Paris : Sorbonne I, 1982): 117-145.

¹²² Davidson, *Notes*, 98; Riley, *Loss of the American Brig*, 382,388

¹²³ Bayrouk Registers: 15 *Raba' II*, 1265 H.; 1 *Raba'*, 1264 H.; 20 *Ramadan*, 1268 H.

¹²⁴ According to Davidson, Bayrouk was an avid smoker. The arrival of tobacco was a byproduct of the opening of the Atlantic. Like gold, tobacco arrived in Timbuctu first but subsequently 'hitch-hiked' with the caravan to the Maghrib. Its arrival sparked a juridical debate on the merits and demerits of smoking. Davidson, *Notes*, 99; Aziz Batran, "Consensus and Controversy in Islam: The Fetawi of the West and North African Muslim Ulama", in *Fez et L'Afrique*, 183-225.

commiserate with localised brethren, a clear violation, one might add, of the ethnographic distancing of tribe from long distance trade and the concentration of wealth.¹²⁵

Utilitarian Identities: Bayrouk's Favourites

O ye who believe! When ye contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. Quran, III, 282

In the Bayrouk registers, Saharans loom larger than Susians. Indeed, the arrival of Saharans was almost indispensable for the relief of Susian *mausems* from local produce as well as imports from *al-Gharb*.¹²⁶ The quest for caravans that consumed *khunt* and 'laid' gum, ostrich feathers or ivory is evidenced by the size of the credit and the pliable terms of payment Bayrouk and his son Muhammad extended to traders shuttling between Gulimeme and Bilad al-Sudan. In fact, the Bayrouk preference for alien partners translated into subtle variations in compliance with standard Islamic ethics of trade. In contrast to the literal adherence to juridical guidelines with regard to the documentation of debt, for example, the Bayrouk often tinkered with the stipulation of the presence of a scrivener and two neutral witnesses.¹²⁷ The Bayrouk tended to veer towards caution in their choice of debtors or determination of their carrying capacity. This bias is evidenced by the repetitive nature of the debtors enshrined in the registers and the congruity of their sites of operation with the items they passed on to or borrowed from the Bayrouk. There is also a tacit congruity between the Bayrouk quest for exportable articles of trade like gum and their willingness to forgo the need for "two witnesses" or the full disclosure of identity: *qabila* or Sufi affiliation and locales. Like the cap on the number of *Suwayri* customers, the bulk of the Bayrouk trade with the (western) Sahara and al-Sudan was not only dominated by A'rayb and Tajakant confidants, but in reality was also contracted to their leading families.¹²⁸

The Bayrouk registers team with glaring congruities between the large amounts of apparel, "miscellaneous articles," and camels they advanced to named Arayb and Tajakant potentates and the "camel loads" of gum, ostrich feather and (blue) *khunt* the caravans frequently disembarked in Gulimeme. The primacy of the Arayb and Tajakant can also be highlighted by a juxtaposition of their frequent inscription in the registers with the silence

¹²⁵ In chapter one I noted how Najib fortified his identification of the Takna as segmented tribes with the assertion that "trade was usually carried out between leff members." Najib, *Transformation of the Takna*, 29.

¹²⁶ According to Davidson, the Tajakant and Regaybat decision to duel rather than come and shop at Gulimeme was also the main reason why its market day fell short of its projected targets. Davidson, *Notes* 103-107.

¹²⁷ Overall, the registers conform to the spirit of verse 282 of Surah (chapter) III of the Quran: "O ye who believe! When ye contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. Let scribe record it in writing ... No scribe should refuse to write as Allah hath taught him, so let him who incurreth the debt dictate... And call to witness, from among your men two witnesses. ... And the witnesses must not refuse when they are summoned. Be not averse to writing it (the debt) down whether it be small or great, with (record of) the terms thereof." *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*, trans. M. Pickthall, (New York: Penguin Books), 59

¹²⁸ The shortage in Suwayri customers was probably a byproduct of Bayrouk's delegation of the supervision of his interests in Essaouira to his Jewish confidant, Naftali. See Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 47

on the Bayrouk *Iqzul* allies, namely, the Simlali and the *al-Qa'id* al-Tamanarti families. In spite of the frequency of the Bayrouk visits to Sidi Ibn Musa's *mausem* in Illigh and lodging with the Simlali or the recurrent sighting of al-Husayn al-Simlali in Gulimeme and parleying with his Bayrouk in-laws, the registers are devoid of commercial transactions between the two families. The endearment of Saharan outsiders and seeming aversion to Susian relations was, however, the by-product of the fact that Gulimeme, Illigh and Tamanart were offering similar items and chasing and, in effect, vying for the same gum, (blue) *Khunt*, ivory and ostrich feathers. In that sense, the Arayb and Tajakant outsiders beat the Bayrouk's relations and allies on the spot to the family commercial ledger precisely because the former were also the suppliers who made the authorship of the registers possible in the first place.

The most frequently cited Arayb debtors in the Bayrouk registers were the *al-Warith* brothers. The al-Warith brothers were often absolved from the 'prying' of witnesses and, indeed, their older brother Muhammad Ibn al-Hajj Karoum, was designated as "guarantor for all his brethren": the Arayb.¹²⁹ It is not difficult to imagine how Bayrouk could have exerted his offices to either groom or impose the al-Warith as leaders of his Arayb guests. Selling to the Bayrouk looms over the disparity between the constancy of the Arayb treks to Timbuctu and seeming failure to venture beyond Gulimeme or dream of access to the ultimate destinations of their imports: Essaouira or Europe. This sense of contentment with Gulimeme's proprietors can also be seen from the conduct of Bayrouk's favourite Saharan guests, the Tajakant of Tinduf.

According to Davidson, for example, Bayrouk had an inclination to 'waste' numerous sheep on his Saharan guests, an inclination that got worse whenever the Tajakant were in town.¹³⁰ Given their contribution to the Bayrouk's stock of gum, *khunt azreg* (blue cloth) and ostrich feathers, however, the Tajakant were worth such sacrifices. After all, the Bayrouk were not regaling ordinary Tajakant. Rather, the main *Jakani* traders enshrined in the registers were also the descendants of the founders of Tinduf: the families of Sidi al-Mukhtar (al-A'mash), Sidi al-Abd and Sidi Mawlud.¹³¹ In much the same way that Muhammad gradually relieved Bayrouk from attention to tedious transactions, the registers instate sons from these three families in the places of their absentee, retired or deceased fathers. Sidi al-Abd, for example, left his spot in the Bayrouk commercial ledger to his son, Muhammad, and grandson, Abdul-Rahman. In contrast, Sidi al-Mukhtar passed the mantel to his son Muhammad and grandson Muhammad *al-Saghir* (junior).

¹²⁹ There is also a congruity between the positing of al-Warith as debtor or guarantor and 'tolerance' of a single pious scrivener as a witness: a certain Muhammad al-Wanas, "from the sons of Sidi Salih (*zawiya* family)," Bayrouk Registers: 26 *Dhul Ga'da*, 1264H; 6 *Dhul Hajja*, 1266 H.; 25 *Muharam*, 1269 H.; 3 *Muharam*, 1270 H.

¹³⁰ To Davidson's chagrin, a single *Jakani* 'pack' "devoured a sheep with nearly half-hundred weight of kuskusu, and a camel-load of ripe mashmash (apricots)" in one session! Davidson, *Note*, 103, 112.

¹³¹ Like their Susian counterparts, the Tajakant trio also imagined origin in terms of descent from pious pioneers. This trope informs the narrative of Sidi al-Mukhtar family. Sidi al-Mukhtar ostensibly arrived in the foreboding site of Tinduf with 'nothing' except his piety but soon discovered the water source that brought the establishment of this caravanserai within the realm of the possible; for a biography of his family, see al-Susi, *al-ma'sul* v. 18, 158-165; for notations of the al-Abd status, see al-Walati, *al-rihla al-hijaziya* 87.

Muhammad Ibn al-Mukhtar "borrowed" *khunt* from Bayrouk in return for its equivalent in gold and gum but was still allowed to pose as "witness against himself"—i.e. he wrote his own contract and in the absence of the two mandatory witnesses. In contrast Ibn Mawlud vouched for a certain al-Bashir Ibn *al-Talib al-Mustafa al-Jakani* who later became one of the Bayrouk confidants. This Tinduf trio constituted a separate league and frequently vouched for the credibility of hitherto unknown Tajakant traders.¹³² They qualified for credit in absentia and delivered more exportable items. Because of their ennoblement with piety, the Tinduf (Tajakant) trio were often entrusted with gold consignments from Timbuctu. Indeed, in the Bayrouk commercial registers, they often posed as witnesses against debtors who had yet to establish good credit. It is hardly a coincidence that debtors who needed the services of such guarantors were often devoid of honorific titles like *shaykh*, *Hajj* and *Sidi*. In spite of their interspersation with other traders, the Tajakants were the sinews linking Gulimeme with Timbuctu and, as such, seem to objectify the narrator's fixation on *tijarat al-Sudan*.

The significance of the Tajakant network to the caravan trade can be demonstrated by a juxtaposition of the spacious slots they occupy in the Bayrouk registers with the much smaller spaces allocated to the Rgaybat and Bu Suba traders and, indeed, even Takna brethren or Ait Musa confidants. For example, the Rgaybat share in the Bayrouk registers is principally occupied by one section of their *qabila* ensemble, the coastal (*ahl sahil*) Tahalat.¹³³ There is, however, a seeming relation between the Tahalat tendency to take camels, barley, and apparels (*kisswa*) from the Bayrouk and their apparent failure to deliver sizeable amounts of gum and ostrich feathers on the one hand, and the relatively small and intermittent loans they were allowed to take on the other hand. In contrast, the Bu Suba' occupied an even smaller space. In the Bayrouk commercial registers, the Bu Suba' were mainly represented by a certain al-Amin Ould (son of) al-Bashir. The Bu Suba' tended to take similar items from the Bayrouk but brought in larger quantities of ostrich feathers. Al-Bashir's loans from and offerings to the Bayrouk however, pale beside the contribution of his brethren to the Simlali stock of ostrich feathers.¹³⁴ Another feature that also stands out (in comparison with the A'rayb and Tajakant) is the rather formal tone of the Rgaybat and Bu-Suba' contracts with the Bayrouk. Bayrouk and his son Muhammad often entrusted the writing of the Bu Suba' and Rgaybat contracts to members of Sidi Amr's family or the *Imam* of Gulimeme's mosque and tacitly complied with the mandatory two witnesses prescribed in the *Quran*. Indeed, the Rgaybat and Bu-Suba' contracts frequently contain stern strictures that their commitments to the Bayrouk would be honoured "without argumentation or disputation."¹³⁵

¹³² Bayrouk Registers: *Ramadan*, 1267 H.; 12 *Raba'*, 1276 H.; 12 *Safar*, 1277 H; Bayrouk Registers: 1 *Muharam*, 1277 H.

¹³³ On the Tahalat, see al-Hassani, *Les Principales Preoccupations des Rgaybat*, trans. and ed. Naimi, 74-76; for signs of their stocking in camels and guns, see Bayrouk Registers: 29 *Jumada II*, 1244H; 1 *Safar* 1264H; 5 *Sha'ban*, 1264H.

¹³⁴ On the Bu Suba' trade with the Simlali, see Pascon, *La Maison D'Illigh*, 70-77; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 97-109.

¹³⁵ Bayrouk Registers: 2 *Jumada II*, 1249H. (1831); *Jumada*, 1262H (1845); *Safar*, 1272H (1850).

The same orientation can be gleaned from the implicit exclusion of Takna brethren from the Bayrouk's list of 'most favoured' debtors. Apart from the Ait Musa, the main Takna beneficiaries from Bayrouk's lending ability were the *Zafati* (from the Azwafit) and *Zarqi* (from the Azraqayn) traders I have already noted.¹³⁶ In that, sense, rivalry between the Ait Osman Azwafit and the *Ait Jamal* Ait Musa did not influence the Bayrouk choice of ideal customers. The Bayrouk list of favourite customers, for example, included three upstart traders from Wadi Dra' who made their debut in 1851-1852 and are presented as retail distributors of "red and black Khunt."¹³⁷ Two of these traders were identified simply as *Dra'wi* (from Wadi Dra'). The third, however, was from the Ait Muraybit. Interestingly, the Ait Muraybit subscribed to the *Tahukat* Leff and, as such, ought to be sworn enemies of the *Iqzulin*, Takna, Bayrouk. In that sense, trade tended to bridge what the politics of the *Iqzulin-Tahukat* rivalry seemed to render a sunder. In comparison, Ait Musa names began to appear in the commercial registers in the wake of Bayrouk's alleged decision to turn them into traders and their subsequent posting in Sudanic hubs of trade like Timbuctu. The Ait Musa trader frequently enshrined in the registers was a certain Muhammad Benbarka. Benbarka seem to have started his career as Bayrouk's agent in Timbuctu. His name is often mentioned as the recipient of salt shipments from Taodeni and as the dispatcher of gold consignments and "camel loads" of gum and *khunt azrag* (blue cloth) to Gulimeme.¹³⁸ Considerable as they were, however, Benberka's consignments pale beside those entrusted to and delivered by the Tajakant trio: the al-Abd, Mawlud and al-Mukhtar families. In fact, Benbarka himself often entrusted his shipments to Gulimeme to these Tajakant confidants of the Bayrouk. The al-Abd and Mawlud families were not only entrusted with camels earmarked for Taodeni, but also the delivery of salt consignments to Benbarka and the transportation of its equivalent in exportable items to Gulimeme. In that sense, the Bayrouk decision as to who was or was not entitled to preferential treatment also violates what ethnographers consider the norm in tribal settings.

The commercial registers also suggest a causal relation between the Bayrouk involvement in *tijarat al-Sudan* and their reported obsession with access to European markets and, as such, subvert the notion of specialization in slave trading (*nikhasa*). From these registers, the journey to al-Sudan itself was not an alternative to trade with Europe. Rather, it comes across as a ticket to the same Atlantic system that spawned the Alawite imposition of Essaouira as the official southernmost Moroccan port of trade with Europe. To stay solvent, traders like the Bayrouk not only took their cue from the "merchants of Essaouira," but also distributed what these merchants were offering in return. It was hardly a mystery that Essaouira itself was neither the market for the items the Bayrouk accumulated nor the factory that spewed out what they fed to their Arayb and Tajaknat

¹³⁶ The *Zafati* trader was furnished with "kisswa (apparel) to sell in the Sahara for a share in the profits." In contrast, the *Zarqi* trader tended to take barley and apparel and to bring in hides and wool; Bayrouk Registers, 1266 H; 1268 H.

¹³⁷ Bayrouk Registers: *Ramadan* 1268 H.; *Jumada*, 1268 H.; *Ramadan*, 1269 H (1851-1852).

¹³⁸ For examples, see Bayrouk Registers, *Raba'* 1264H; *Safar*, 1264H; *Raba'*, 1265H (1847-1848); on Benbarka's career in Timbuctu, see Abdelwahab Agmir, "Contribution des Marocains de Guelmim a la vie économique, sociale et culturelle de Tombouctou," in *Les Oasis de Wad Nun*: 85-97, 87-88.

suppliers.¹³⁹ Rather, Europe was the ultimate destination of the Bayrouk merchandise as well as the fastest growing source of their offerings to Susian and Saharan customers. It was precisely because of its adaptation to shifts in international trade that *tijarat al-Sudan* was also able to retain its primacy in Susian conception of self and history. From a Susian perspective, direct access to Europe and, in effect, dispensation with Essaouira's middlemen would have cut down on expenses and maximised profits. The quest for access to European markets and, hence, procurement of what was in demand in these markets led the Bayrouk to risk alienating the agency in charge of the only prospective outlets for slave imports, the dynasty. In the next chapter we will see how resentment of Essaouira influenced the Bayrouk political dispositions and, ultimately, paved the way for the Alawite 'conquest' of Gulimeme and the demotion of its proprietors from devotees to *gaids*.

The foregoing discussion allows one to draw two conclusions pertaining to identification and the stuff that goes into the construction or use of identities. Firstly, I have already noted that given its tendency to cross spatial and cultural boundaries, the caravan can hardly be credited with the conservation of the kind of essences advocates of tribe frequently convert into matrices for ineffable attachment: the "tie of blood," "distinct" culture, "tribal religion" etc. The caravan was a medium of physical displacement and a harbinger of changes in modes of production and consumption. It was also a Trojan horse stuffed with foreign influences that tended to modify if not efface distinctive speech, dress, diet as well as social attitudes and practices. The registers indicate how the Bayrouk came to know and deal with outsiders like the Saharan traders and pilgrims or the cosmopolitan "merchants of Essaouira" on a more regular basis than they did with either ordinary Takna brethren or their *Iqzulin* peers. Yet, it was in the course of their regular interaction with such outsiders that the Bayrouk also came to objectify the congruity of being Takna with domicile in Wadi Nun or its Saharan backyards. In that sense, the 'less Takna' Bayrouk also came to enshrine being Takna.

Almost at the same time that it ameliorated the differences between the Bayrouk and their non-Takna customers, the caravan trade also empowered the Bayrouk to the extent that they came to define rather than be defined by being Ait Musa or *Ait Jamal* Takna. The fact that even rivals like the Ait Osman Azwafit were 'forced' to concede that the Bayrouk were "from among them" further underlines the role of *tijarat al-Sudan* in the assignment of identities as well as social roles and rewards. One can take the narrator's inclination to oscillate between nostalgic invocations of *tijarat al-Sudan* and tacit refusal to dwell on its exact content, as a sign of deference to the conventional belief in the empowering potential of the caravan trade. As a pillar of Maghribian conceptions of the relation between history, identity and positional superiority, *tijarat al-Sudan* also became too sublime to be associated with the kind of mundane articles the caravan was delivering in the nineteenth century. At the level of identification, the decent to vulgar raw materials did seem to make much of a difference. It is this descent from trade in gold to traffic in gum and *Khunt* that, perhaps, inspired the narrator to disavow the modern caravan in favour of its classical

¹³⁹ Schroeter named "gum and ostrich feathers" as Essaouira's most prized exports and endorsed Miegé's proposition that the Sudan-Wadi Nun axis accounted for about one third of its export trade. Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 108.

prescription as the "remedy for poverty in men." This tradition also plotted the association of the caravan with what Hopkins called "state necessities" as well as Davidson's investiture of Bayrouk with "buried" treasures.

Secondly, we have noted how Davidson's account lurks beneath the abolitionist representation of the "caravan of slaves" and its image in post-colonial academic treatises. In an ironic way, the abolitionist vision complements the narrator's conversion of the caravan into a matrix of identification. Unlike the narrator, however, the abolitionists tended to criminalize the cargo of the caravan and to use it as a leverage in a crusade against their *Moorish* Other. The *Moor* Bayrouk became identifiable as the Other of his European observer courtesy of his involvement in 'illegitimate' commerce and lack of "civilized" qualities. Africanists upheld this conception of the caravan as a signifier of a secular difference between Europe and Morocco. What was a "holy cause" to abolitionists became a secular academic convention. As the Bayrouk commercial registers indicate, however, the chasm separating the experience of Susian traders from the academic conceptions of this experience can hardly be bridged without a return to the "holy cause" that inspired the abolitionist discourse in the first place. A re-instatement of the sacred dimension of the abolitionist vision of the caravan can also enable us to make sense of the observed disparity between the abundance of slaves in current academic texts and their discreet absence from the nineteenth-century Moroccan realities these texts purportedly describe. In the next chapter, I will posit the Bayrouk political behaviour on the spot, al-Sus, and the shifts in the terms of their interaction with the Alawite court to further demonstrate the ideological nature of the current conflation of being a Bayrouk with wallowing in slave-trading. As we will see, the Bayrouk search for markets for raw commodities like gum also led them to tamper with the Alawite prohibition of trade with European trespassers outside Essaouira. It is difficult to imagine how the Bayrouk could have been short sighted to the extent that they would risk confrontation with the Alawite court in return for access to European markets that have no use for their slaves.

CHAPTER IV RITES OF POWER, POLITICS FOR TRADE

In this chapter I intend to highlight the disparity between the Bayrouk use of the caravan to concentrate resources and power, and their classification as egalitarian tribesmen. I seek to show how access to the caravan has translated into patterns of interaction with foreign agents and markets that tend to turn the Moroccan *qabila* into a binary opposite of the ethnographic tribe. The chapter is geared to enhance my diagnosis of the problems of translation and conception that have hitherto entrapped the Africanist imagination of the identities possible for social formations like the Bayrouk community, the Takna. In the realm of identification, for instance, the Takna were classified as tribes and, as such, located in binary opposition to the Moroccan dynastic realm. I want to show that the Bayrouk experience does not warrant the conflation of tribe with *qabila*. At the conceptual level, the conflation of *qabila* with tribe does not mesh with either of the contrasting modes of social existence credited to the Bayrouk. In academic discourses, the Bayrouk come across as caravan traders whose primary vocation was the procurement and distribution of European and then African captives. In the same literature, however, the Bayrouk were credited with hankering after markets that had use for their human merchandize. Indeed, the quest for European markets for the produce of the caravan becomes the main signifier of the Bayrouk autonomy and, in effect, that of their Takna brethren. Here, I will demonstrate that hankering after foreign market was the byproduct of the Bayrouk equation of economic solvency with involvement in (European) "legitimate trade"—i.e. the procurement and exportation of raw materials and the importation and distribution of manufactured goods. To this end, I have divided this chapter into four main sections.

In the first section, I will provide a synoptic review of the place of the caravan and the dynasty in the extant explanations of the Bayrouk political career in al-Sus as well as the historicity of their service (*khidma*) to Shurafa courts. Here, I will review the current projections of the political careers of those ancestors who seem to have set the stage for the Bayrouk aggrandizement in the nineteenth century. I will cross-reference the Bayrouk narrative with Shurafa biographies and the commentaries they have hitherto inspired. As will be seen, post-colonial Moroccan authors like al-Gharbi and Naimi tended to turn the Bayrouk into natural deputies of successive sultans and, as such, indefatigable guardians of the Saharan frontier of the Shurafa dynastic realm. This vision tends to blur shifts in the Bayrouk relations with the court. In the remainder of the chapter, I will explore the ways fixation on the caravan and the dynasty have shaped the existing explanations of the political fortunes of the actors who epitomized the Bayrouk power in the course of the nineteenth century: Ubaydallah, Bayrouk and his three sons, Muhammad, al-Habib and Dahman I. I seek to identify whether and how the narrator's vision of these modern ancestors corresponds to their image in Shurafa biographies, subaltern Takna narratives, European travel accounts and the academic commentaries they have informed.

In section two I will focus on Ubaydallah's rise to power and the way fixation on the caravan and the dynasty has shaped the existing subaltern and authorial conceptions of his impact on the Takna *qabila* ensemble and the terms of his relations with the

Alawite sultans of his time. As we will see, the Ubaydallah of the (*Ait Jamal*) narrator is starkly different from the Ubaydallah the (*Ait Osman*) Azwafit seem to remember. In contrast, section three deals with Bayrouk's political career and the ways his image in the family and subaltern Takna narratives conforms to or veers from his profile in European travel account and academic commentaries. I seek to explain how and why Bayrouk seems to embody the split in the existing presentations of the family that carries his name. As we will see, in both the Takna narratives and nineteenth-century travelogue, explanations of Bayrouk's political behavior seem to feed off his image as a peaceable trader and reluctant warrior. In this capacity, he is at once an Alawite devotee and a "kindred spirit" of the European chaperons of "legitimate trade." Bayrouk, however, is also a metaphor for "caravans of slaves" that serviced the Moroccan dynastic realm and hankering after European markets that did not want them. I seek to explain how his obsession with the caravan and yearning for the European caravel shaped his relations with his Susian peers, the Alawite court and, ultimately, set the stage for conflict amongst his heirs.

In the fourth and final section, I will explore how the search for European outlets for the commodities enshrined in the Bayrouk commercial registers had impacted the family relations with the Alawite court. As will be seen, Bayrouk's quest for a passage to Europe strained his relations with the Alawite court and, ultimately, triggered the rift amongst his sons that anticipated Mawlai al-Hasan's trek to Gulimeme in 1886. It should be recalled that this was the same trek that facilitated the coronation of the narrator's grandfather, *Qa'id* Dahman I, as the "man of the family" on the spot. Dahman won, I conclude, because he seemed to know when to put the dynasty before the caravan. In contrast, his senior brothers, Muhammad and al-Habib, seem to have lost because of their entrapment in the same dream that consumed their father—the search for a direct outlet to European markets. Obsession with trade, I suggest, goes a long way towards explaining the character of the Bayrouk relation with the Takna as well as their approach to present Susian peers and absent Alawite dynasts.

The problems of translation and conception I identified in the introduction tend to inhibit our appreciation of the role of temporal interests in the orientation of the political and economic behaviour of Moroccan groups Africanists identified as segmented tribes. I have indicated how the translation of *qabila* to tribe led (colonial and post-colonial) ethnographers and historians to stuff it with the kind of atavisms modern theorists like Morgan, Darwin and Marx reserved for primitivity. In Morocco, the most enduring legacy of this problem of translation is the situation of *qabila*, as tribe, in *bled es-siba* and, hence, its prescription as the binary opposite of the *Makhzan*. Besides its capacity to shield *qabila* from the vagaries of dynastic succession and caravan trading, this modality also enabled advocates of the notion of segmentation to turn the domain of *qabila*, *bled es-siba*, into a site where, thanks to the primacy of kinship, power is so broadly diffused that there is no differentiation in social roles. After all tribe is, to borrow from Gellner, a "ruler-less society." As tribe, the *qabila* also became a metaphor for the liberties lost to modern Man. I have also noted that rather than being a transcription of distinctive social realities or practices, the notion of the segmented and autonomous tribe was born in the text. When and why it became a fixture in Africanist discourse can be assessed only in the context of the encounter between Europe, as civilization, and its barbarian other. In the previous three

chapters I have demonstrated how Magribian historical experience subverts the received ethnographic and historiographical wisdoms. I noted that the careers of the main agents of this historical experience, the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*, indicate that the pursuit of power and the frequency of displacement have left no room for atavism. I have also shown how, in practice, even those historians who subscribed to the ethnographic translation of *qabila* to tribe tended to credit the Moroccan carriers of such identity designations with careers that subvert what tribalism is supposed to mean. The Bayrouk ability to impose 'peace' on the Takna *qabila* ensemble, the level of their collusion with foreign dynasts and traders, and the vulnerability of their space to intervention by the Alawite court or its localized *zawaya* devotees do not bode well for the notion of the autonomous tribe. It is next to impossible to assign identities to tribesmen like the Bayrouk without reference to the role of the caravan, the dynasty and the *zawiya* in the social birth and mutation or the displacement and centering of Moroccan *qabila* formations. Like its ostensible constitutive other, the dynasty, the *qabila*, or more precisely, those who stood to benefit from its existence, often aspired to, and even contested the mundane and sublime means of social existence—space, trade routes, origin and historicity. Herein, I will introduce the sublime tricks the narrator used to centre his ancestors and, as such, can be used to distinguish between the realistic and imaginative about the Bayrouk political experience, and the ways it has hitherto been represented.

1-Reared by the Dynasty: "A Family Replete with Leaders"¹

In this section, I will chart the centrality of the caravan and the dynasty to the narrator's location of his ancestors in time and space as well as his imagination of their services to Shurafa courts. The narrator tends to conflate political career with service to the dynasty. As a result, politicians earn their place in the Bayrouk saga courtesy of service to the Shurafa dynasts of their time. The role of textuality in the demarcation of the parameters of this trope can be gleaned from the similarities between the narrator's invocation of the dynasty to center his ancestors and the way these same ancestors were presented by academics like Naimi. As we will see, Shurafa biographers and post-colonial authors tended to conceptualize the political history of the Bayrouk in terms of primordial service to Shurafa courts.

To date, explanations of the political career of the Bayrouk are grounded on the robust textual tradition that designated their site of domicile, al-Sus and its Saharan backyards, as a crossroad of Trans-Saharan trade routes as well as the cradle of most of the dynasties that ruled the Maghrib and Morocco, namely, the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Shurafa. From this vantage point, the nature and extent of the Bayrouk power can be seen as a reflection of their ability to compete for the space the caravans had to cross and the dynasties had to control. I have already noted how al-Susi's informant, *Qaid Dahman II*, tacitly used the reigns of the famous Sa'dian sultan Mawlai al-Manur (1578-1603) and his Alawite peer Mawlai Ismael (1672-1727) as frames of reference to infer the times of the migration of his ancestor Yusuf from Tuwat and the debut of the career of Ibn Saud in al-Sus. It is worth recalling that the use of the dynasty and the caravan as witnesses to

¹Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 273.

historicity is a main fixture of Maghribian textual traditions. In the last two chapters, I noted how historians like al-Nasiri used the sultans' ability to fend off European pressure and to ensure the security of the caravan as indicators of the health of the Moroccan dynastic realm. In that sense, the genesis of the current academic conceptions of the Bayrouk politics can also be traced back to the same shift in the balance of power between Morocco and its main European competitors on the eve of the "scramble for Africa": France and Spain. One can use the location of al-Sus as a crossroad of the commercial network linking the Shurafa dynastic realm with Europe and Bilad al-Sudan to gauge causes for the Bayrouk deference to or alienation from the Alawite court. In either case, the extent of the family political influence can be seen as a reflection of its ability to endear itself to Shurafa dynasts or benefit from perceived lapses in their control over al-Sus.

In the previous chapter, I noted that the current academic conceptions of the Bayrouk's caravan feed off the literary genres pioneered by European travelers such as Cochelet, Davidson and Faidherebe, and Shurafa biographers like al-Nasiri and al-Rabati. In narratives of shipwreck, the presentation of Ubaydallah and Bayrouk as powerful *Moors* also sanctioned the location of their state, Wadi Nun, and subjects, the *Monselemine* or Takna, outside the jurisdiction of the Alawite dynasty. The dissemination of this image can be gauged from a comparison of Adams' conception of Ubaydallah as the "governor" of Wadi Nun, Colonel Faidherebe's investiture of Bayrouk with a "small Berber state" and the later ethnographic and historiographical situation of their tribe in binary opposition to the Moroccan dynastic realm, the *Makhzan*.² Historians such as Hodge and, more recently, Pennell have posited the combination of political autonomy and commercial aggrandizement to elevate Gulimeme to "state" and, indeed, to reconstruct the past that brings its emergence within the realm of the historically conceivable in al-Sus.

According to Hodges, for instance, Gulimeme of the nineteenth century was the reincarnation of Illigh of the seventeenth century.³ I have shown how al-Susi's exile by colonial advocates of Berber tribalism anticipated his translation for Susian powerhouses like the Bayrouk. Al-Susi's duel with the 'culture' of imperialism also anticipated the current nomination of the dynasty as the main benefactor behind the Bayrouk success by Moroccan academics like Naimi. In the introduction, I noted that Moroccan academics often use the testimonies of Shurafa historians like al-Nasiri and al-Rabati to question the ethnographic conflation of the Susian *qabila* with the autonomous, primitive, tribe. Discursively, autonomy (distance) from and dependence on (proximity to) the court remain the main fixtures of the post-colonial academic discourses on the Bayrouk political career.⁴ By cross-referencing the testimony of al-Susi's informant, *Qaid Dahman II*, with the extant authorial presentations of his ancestors one can highlight the merits and limitations of this discursive modality. This will further enable us to delineate the role of *tijarat al-Sudan* in the Bayrouk relations with the Alawite court and how these relations had influenced or were influenced by, their politics in al-Sus and contacts with Europeans. In the following pages, I seek to

² Adams, *Narrative of Robert Adams*, 68-70; Faidherbe, "Renseignements Géographiques": 129-56.

³ Hodges, *Historical Dictionary*, 61-62; Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 45-46—see the introduction.

⁴ Al-Rabati, *tarikh al-da'eef*, 340-343; Ibn Zaydan, *ithaf ia'lam al-nass*, v.5, 427-431; Afa, *masalat al-niqud*, 101-103; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 105-108.

illustrate the centrality of the dynasty to the extant assessments of the Bayrouk political history in general and the recovery of the history of those ancestors who lived before the nineteenth century.

In chapter two, I noted how Sulayman's reported piety and involvement in the caravan trade underpin the narrator's conception of the Bayrouk origin. Fixation on the caravan, however, did not prevent the narrator from positing Ibn Saud's purported "rescue" of a stranded Alawite expedition as the genesis of the Bayrouk career in Wadi Nun. It is perhaps worth recalling how fidelity to sultan Muhammad V, underpins al-Susi's induction of *Qaid Dahman II* as the "man of the family" at his time and, in effect, the main authority on its history. Adherence to the classical use of service (*khidma*) to the dynasty as evidence of historicity, enabled al-Susi to turn the name of the narrator's grandfather, *Qaid Dahman I*, into a title for the family biography and, hence, to commend its "repletion with leaders." Fixation on service to the dynasty also seems to sanction the narrator's positing of the piety of Sulayman and Yusuf as a genesis for Ibn Saud's performance in the *Hamada* of Tinduf, the performance underling his investiture with the honorific title of *shaykh*.⁵ In their drive to dispose of the ethnographic conception of the domain of *qabila*, *beld es siba*, as the binary opposite of the dynastic realm, *beld el-Makhzan*, advocates of the Moroccan "green march" (*al-masyra al-khadra*) turned the Bayrouk into indefatigable flag-bearers of the Shurafa courts.⁶ For example, Naimi described the Bayrouk as "an auxiliary force in the service of the central government since the sixteenth-century."⁷ In contrast, al-Gharbi turned Ibn Saud's "service" in an Alawite expedition to the Western Sahara into a sequence in a historical continuum and used it to 'coerce' the Tuwatian and early Susian ancestors of the Bayrouk to stand as witnesses to Shurafa control of the same "empty space" travellers and ethnographers planted with autonomous tribes.⁸ To al-Gharbi, Sulayman's "high stature" in Tuwat was a reflex of his patronage by contemporary Shurafa dynasts, the Sa'dians. In contrast, Yusuf's "respectability among the *qabail* of al-Saqiya al-Hamra" was an outgrowth of Sulayman's stature in Tuwat. Fixation on birth in the bosom of the dynasty also informs al-Gharbi's use of Ibn Saud's "service" to the Alawites to bypass the narrator's silence on the career of his son al-Hasan and grandson Abdul-Qadir. According to al-Gharbi, Mawlai Ismael (1672-1727) rewarded Shaykh Ibn Saud with a *zaheer* (decree) appointing him as "*wali* (governor) of the Takna and the Rgaybat" of al-Saqiya al-Hamra. Arguably, Ibn Saud bequeathed his position to his heir al-Hasan who, in turn, passed it on to his son Abdul-Qadir. Abdul-Qadir "used to resolve disputes among the *qabail* and to distribute *sadaqat* (alms) with proverbial generosity."⁹

The presentation of the Bayrouk ancestors as born deputies of Shurafa courts blurs lapses in dynastic control over al-Sus and the shifts in the relations between its inhabitants

⁵Shaykh: (Arabic) elder, wise. The term *shaykh* is often used to refer to both revered religious (sp. Sufi) figures and 'secular' *qabila* potentates.

⁶The Green March (*al-masyera al-khadra*) was the official 'mascot' of the Moroccan reclamation of the Western Sahara in 1974.

⁷Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 178-179.

⁸See chapter one: 'secularised identities'.

⁹Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176-179; for other examples of this vision see, Abdul-Aziz Ben-Abdullah, *al-mausu'a al-maghribiya lil-a'lam al-bashriya: mu'alamat al-sahra*, (Rabat: 1976), 127; Ibrahim Harakat, *al-Maghrib a'br al-tarikh*, v. 3 (Casablanca: n.p., 1984), 465; Saduq M. Abiya, *al-sahra al-maghrebya qabl al-ihtilal wa ba'dahu* (al-Muhamadya: n.p., 1989) 24-70

and different sultans. Al-Gharbi did not name either the “*qabail*” Sulayman and Yusuf had presided over or their respective Shurafa benefactors. This silence tends to subvert the assumed longevity of the Bayrouk leadership of the *Ait Jamal* as well as their investiture with continuous patronage by Shurafa courts. By cross-referencing the narrator’s silence on the ancestors who lived through the late Sa’dian and early Alawite periods with the known about the history of al-Sus at this time, one can discount the prospect of continuous Shurafa patronage. For example, the Susian *qabila* ensembles and the Jazulia *zawiya* centres patronised by the Sa’dians and the Simlali, the *ahl al-sahil*, remained in the Alawite hit list throughout the reign of Mawlai Rashid (1666-1672) and the early stages of that of Mawlai Ismael (1672-1727). In chapter one, I noted how Mawlai Rashid’s reported “dislike” for *ahl al-sahil* also corresponds to the excision of his name from the Takna and Bayrouk narratives. Here, a mere inclusion of the Bayrouk among the families that qualified for the “respect” (*tawqir*) of Susians or Saharans can hardly warrant the equation of their political clout with leadership of a single *qabila* like the Ait Musa much less a large ensemble such as the *Ait Jamal leff*. Besides, being Ait Musa at this time was imagined in terms of service with al-Mansur’s commander, *al-Qaid* Baraka, and deference to the al-Hiri family thereafter.¹⁰ The narrator’s attribution of Ubaydallah’s rise to the leadership of the Ait Musa to the demise of his al-Hiri in-law in 1792 further militates against the ascription of a higher political status to his Susian ancestors. In contrast, the narrator’s identification of Ubaydallah as the first ancestor to preside over the Ait Musa *qabila* and speak for their *Ait Jamal* brethren suggest the events surrounding the Buhilas rebellion of 1792 as the most likely context for the debut of the Bayrouk political career. For this proposition to stand, however, it is imperative to dispose of al-Gharbi’s seeming conflation of the investiture of Ibn Saud with a royal *zaheer* (decree) with his official appointment as “*wali* [governor] of the Takna and the Rgaybat.”

Post-colonial Moroccan historians like al-Muhammadi (1989) and El Moudin (1995), tend to distinguish between two sets of royal *zaheer* (decree): a *zaheer* of *tawqir* and a *zaheer* of deputation. The *zaheer* of *tawqir* (respect) per se is usually awarded to *shurafa* and *zawaya* dignitaries. This type of *zaheer* often signifies exemption from “*khidma* and *wajib*” (service and duties). The sultan addresses the recipient of this type of *zaheer* as *muhibana* (our devotee) and may cede to him the right to collect dues from a named *qabila* and to use them to the upkeep of his *madrasa* (school) or *zawiya*-- i.e. as a reward for its edifying services. It goes without saying that the recipient of such royal favours was morally obligated to adumbrate the virtues of obedience to the sultan and to use his influence to ensure the compliance of his *qabila* hosts with official directives. In spite of the tacit exchange of royal favours for services by *zawaya* dignitaries, a *zaheer* of *tawqir* (respect) per se does not entail a formal deputation to manage a bounded *qabila* ensemble or a space on behalf of the court. In contrast, in a *zaheer* of deputation the sultan addresses its bearer as *khadimana* (our server) and authorises him to assume a set of responsibilities on behalf of the court.¹¹ In short, the bearer of this kind of *zaheer* was usually a secular

¹⁰This Ait Musa *qa'id*, Hamu (Muhammad) Ibn Baraka, also appears as a recipient of instructions from Mawlai al-Mansur. Ibn Baraka was ordered to observe a decree of respect (*tawqir*) belonging to the ancestor of the al-Ansari (*zawiya*) family. For a biographical translation for the al-Ansari family, see al-Susi, *khilal Jazula*, 139-151.

¹¹Al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 82-105; al-Mudin, *al-bawadi al-maghribiya*, 229-305.

government employee. This distinction enables us to retain al-Gharbi's proposition that Mawlai Ismael rewarded Ibn Saud with a *zaheer* as conceivable but to revoke its inversion into a warrant of official deputation. What Ibn Saud got was probably a *zaheer* of *tawqir* (respect). It is hard to imagine how al-Susi's informant, *Qaid* Dahman II, could have a vivid recollection of his grandfather's ostensible rescue of a "government army" and yet forget the royal *zaheer* that also historicizes his own status as an Alawite *qaid*. The narrator's suggestion of the *Buhilas* revolt in 1792 and the subsequent arrival of an expedition sent by Mawlai Sulayman as the backdrop for the developments leading to Ubaydallah's assumption of the leadership of the Ait Jamal Takna tends to indicate a much later date for this qualitative improvement in the political status of the Bayrouk than the time frame proposed by al-Gharbi and Naimi. Herein, I will posit the *Buhilas* rebellion of 1792 and Mawlai al-Hasan's arrival in Gulimeme in 1886 as frames of references to periodize the Bayrouk political career. I will first identify the role of Ubaydallah and Bayrouk's commercial dispositions in the evolution of the family power and, later, provide sketch of the events leading to Mawlai al-Hasan's visit to Gulimeme and his promotion of Dahman I to an accredited *qaid*.

II-'Benovelent' Displacement: Ubaydallah "The Fugitive"

To make sense of the narrator's explanation of how Gulimeme and its first proprietor, Ubaydallah, attained their enviable position in Wadi Nun, it is imperative to chart the place of the *Buhilas* rebellion of 1792 in Susian relations with the Alawite court. In the Bayrouk narrative, the *Buhilas* rebellion comes across as the watershed between "living off" Ibn Saud's "reputation" and revelry in Ubaydallah's "wide trade" and imperious position among the Takna. Ironically, the narrator also blamed the same rupture that spawned this qualitative improvement in the Bayrouk fortune with the jolting of a seemingly comfortable way of life. To reconcile the narrator's tacit combination of the lamentation of the *Buhilas* rebellion with the celebration of its ultimate outcome, it is imperative to surmise the rationale behind his demotion of Ibn Saud's immediate heirs to underachievers: the idea that they lived off Ibn Saud's "reputation." According to the narrator, Ibn Saud's performance in the *Hamada* of Tinduf also spawned "the leadership of his *ahl* (people) which he bequeathed to his sons."¹² While he posited the combination of piety with service to the dynasty as the genesis of the Bayrouk power in Wadi Nun, the narrator did not delineate the extent of Ibn Saud's political prerogatives. An estimation of the extent of Ibn Saud's jurisdiction, therefore, hinges on an understanding of what a ubiquitous statement like "leadership of his *ahl*" entails.

Even if the reader assumed that leadership is self-evident in and of itself, the fact that the term *ahl* is used as a signifier for communities large and small makes it difficult to gauge the size of Ibn Saud's constituency.¹³ By positing the investiture of the al-Hiri with

¹² Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 274. Apart from al-Hasan, the narrator did not credit Ibn Saud with any "son" or daughter. Al-Susi, however, alluded to "a message (*risala*) from the sultan" to a certain Muhammad Ibn al-Hajj Ibn Abdul-Na'eem Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud. Al-Susi noted that Muhammad was Ibrahim's "cousin"--"that is", he added, "all we know about him." *Ibid.* 276.

¹³ *Ahl* is used to refer to both 'nuclear' and 'extended' families, *ahl* Bayrouk, the inhabitants of a town, *ahl* Asrir, or a region, *ahl* Wadi Nun and *ahl* al-Maghrib. It was also used as a signifier for religious communities:

the leadership of the Ait Musa as a frame of reference, however, it becomes possible to take *ahl* as a signifier for part of a *qabila*. Whether because of his ability to impress "*shilluh* (Berber) and Arab" recruits of the Alawites or his involvement in *tijarat al-Sudan*, Ibn Saud might have been able to attract clients and, in effect, add to the Ait Musa wealth in people. The narrator's confession that succession to the al-Hiri position was the ultimate reward Ubaydallah had earned as a result of his opposition to Buhilas, suggests that Ibn Saud's constituency was probably large enough to support a holder of a *zaheer of tawqir* but was too small to be considered a *qabila*. Since both Ubaydallah and his father Salem were able to marry well, however, the family status amongst the Ait Musa might have been that of *'ayan* (notables). As *'ayan*, Ubaydallah and his father would have also qualified for a seat in the Ait Musa council of notables: the *jama'*.¹⁴ They could have also used their access to the caravan trade as a leverage to transcend *qabila* boundaries and augment their political weight in Wadi Nun.

In the narrative, *tijarat al-Sudan* and service (*khidma*) to the dynasty come across as the redeeming qualities that set the secular Ubaydallah at par with the pious Ibn Saud. Discursively, it also distances him from those underachieving predecessors who "lived off" Ibn Saud's "reputation," al-Hasan, Abdul-Qadir and his own father, Salem. These ancestors were not pious enough to match Ibn Saud's ascendancy to the leadership of his *ahl* and were too content with farming and peddling to either trek to *Bilad al-Sudan* like Ubaydallah or to make its bounties come their way as Bayrouk had done. In fact, the demotion of these ancestors to underachievers also sanctions the narrator's investiture of Ubaydallah with the "restoration of leadership to the family."¹⁵ The narrator's inclination to posit piety, *tijarat al-Sudan* and service to the dynasty as preconditions for positional superiority can be detected from the overlap between the seeming depletion of the Bayrouk religious assets symbolised by Ibn Saud's exit from the scene and the switch to excellence in caravan-trading underpinning the investiture of Ubaydallah with the "restoration of leadership to the family." In the same way that piety was the collateral for the investiture of Ibn Saud with the "leadership of his *ahl*," *tijarat al-Sudan* enabled Ubaydallah to oppose Buhilas and to earn the "respect" of all the *Ait Jamal*. Ubaydallah's opposition to Buhilas is like Ibn Saud's enlistment in an Alawite expedition because it bridges the gap between public and private spheres.

The Buhilas rebellion of 1792 first started in the domains of the coastal Ait Umran but later spread to Wadi Nun and the Anti Atlas. Buhilas used religion to bypass the secular cleavages binding different Susian *qabila* ensembles and, as a result, he was able to attract members of the *Iqzul* alignment like the Ait Umran and partisans of its opposition,

ahl al-dhima, Christian and Jews, or *ahl al-Kitab* (people of the book), Jews and Christians. In that sense, it is a referent to both portable and bounded identities.

¹⁴*Jama'* (Arabic: v. *jama*: lit to put together): group. In southern Morocco *jama'* signifies the group that 'counts' in any given community-- the notables. *Ayan* and *jama* are the two designations routinely used in Susian *alwah* (written agreements). The preamble to the *Luh* often begins with a standard statement that "the *Jama'* of (such and such *qabila* or *qasr*) has agreed (or decreed) that"-- followed by the terms of the *Luh* (accord). On the functions of these terms, see Ahmed El Bouzidi, "Les accords et leur rôle dans l'organisation des rapports dans les Ksours du Draa," in *Le Bassin Du Draa*, 85-120; Toufiq, *al-mujtama' al-maghribi*, 16-18; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 54-69.

¹⁵Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 274-275.

the *Tahukat*, such as the Awlad Jarar.¹⁶ In spite of his use of religion to transcend secular cleavages, however, Buhilas was still accused of the systematic cleansing of the self-proclaimed guardians of the sacred in al-Sus, the *zawaya*. Befittingly, the *zawaya* clients of the Alawite court also emerged as the main organizers of local opposition to Buhilas. In their "letters to the *qabail*," the dean of the *Nasiriya tariqa* in al-Sus, Sidi al-Arabi al-Aduzi, and his disciple, Sidi al-Taskati, posited the "annihilation" of jurists, their "foreign students (*talaba*)" and "Israelite" (Jewish) clients as the palpable evidence of Buhilas's "sorcery" as well as the "apostasy" of his "barbarous" following.¹⁷ In the letters, Buhilas is frequently represented as a miniature *dajal* (anti-Christ). This representation acquires its full discursive import only by its juxtaposition with the simultaneous devolution of the organisation of his opposition to the *zawaya* establishment patronised by sultan Mawlai Sulayman. As *dajal*, Buhilas also becomes a metaphor of the misguided *Nazarene* and, in that sense, can be stuffed with the kind of vices Maghribian literati used to demote Europeans to barbarians.¹⁸

The conflation of being in rebellion with being "mob," enabled Sidi al-Taskati to gloss Buhilas's embarrassing ability to "bewitch" cosmopolitan elites like the "*fugara and a'yan*" (jurists and notables) of members of the *Tahukat* alignment like the Awlad Jarar.¹⁹ Extant Susian narratives of these events consistently identify the "jurists" and "Israelite" beneficiaries from the Trans-Saharan Trade as the binary opposite of Buhilas's "barbarous" followers. Sidi al-Taskati collated Buhilas's ostensible refusal of burial to the "intermingled bodies" of "jurists" and "Israelites" with the plunder of their "merchandise." In another contemporaneous *maw'aza* (sermon) which was widely distributed in al-Sus, the author, Sidi Muhammad al-Murabit, took the "slaughter" of the *shaykhs* of the *zawaya* and the "plunder of merchandise" in Wadi Nun as a re-enactment of what happened in the Atlantic coast, the domain of the Ait Umran, and a preview of what transpired at a later stage in the Anti-Atlas. Upon arrival at one of the sites of his victories in the Anti-Atlas, Timulai, Buhilas reportedly ordered its occupants "to join his party, to hand over their *murabit* (jurist) the learned Sidi Ahmad Ibn Sa'eed, and to deliver the Jews and their property. They refused (his conditions) and so war commenced between them".²⁰ The Bayrouk narrative seconds this presentation and mentions some of the main actors at both ends of the political spectrum.

¹⁶Awlad (Ait) Jarar is the name of an Arabic-speaking *qabila*. The *qabila* is credited with descent from the *Ma'qil* and migration from the Western Sahara to al-Sus. They settled in the Anti-Atlas in the vicinity of Tiznit: Tala'neet. In the nineteenth century their leadership was in the Buraheem (*zawiya*) family. They subscribed to the *Tahukat* alignment and, in that capacity, were in constant rivalry with the Simlali family: especially Hashim and his son Ali. On the Ait Jarar, and the Burahim family see Hamdi Anush, "Burahim" *Encyclopédie du Maroc Tome 5*, (1992): 1683-1685.

¹⁷For these letters, see al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 5, 143-145. In chapter three, I noted that the dean of the *Nasiriya tariqa* in al-Sus, Sidi al-Arabi al-Aduzi (of Aduz) was also al-Susi's maternal grandfather.

¹⁸Upon his death Buhilas was found to be "ugly, short, hairy, to have never bathed, trimmed his moustache, finger nails or shaved his armpits"! Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 5, 146. For a contemporary depiction of Buhilas see, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed al-Simlali, *nizhat al-julas fi akhbar Buhilas*, ed. Idris Shauti, (Agadir: Ibn Zohr University, 1991). For a reification of this vision see, al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 5, 142-152; *Idem*. V.12, 217-218.

¹⁹In his letter to the Awlad Jarar, Sidi al-Taskati saluted them in the version preserved for 'infidels': "peace be upon those who follow the right path"!

²⁰Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 5 144; for a deployment of the same plot to present the confrontations in the Atlantic coast and Wadi Nun, see al-Susi, *al-masul* v. 1: 129-138, 157-198; *Idem*, v. 5, 142-143.

According to al-Susi's informant, the Buhilas rebellion caused sharp rifts in Wadi Nun in general and among the Ait Musa *qabila* in particular. While he was able to recruit Ubaydallah's brother in-law, Ahmed al-Hiri, and most of his Ait Musa followers, Buhilas "annihilated seven jurists who refused to follow him." Amongst the jurists Buhilas had killed were prominent descendents of Sidi Amr of Asrir: one each from the Sidi *Abishibuk* and Sidi *Abdulwasa'* families.²¹ In contrast to his brother in-law, Ahmed al-Hiri, Ubaydallah sided with the "jurists" and refused to "submit" to Buhilas. Rather than risk martyrdom, however, Ubaydallah

ran off to al-Sudan. The rebel (Buhilas) assaulted and destroyed his quarters and with the aid of his (Buhilas) accomplice Ahmad al-Hiri, the brother of Ubaydallah's wife, almost slaughtered all of his (Ubaydallah) sons. But (then) a group of Samahra (from the Ait Umran) arrived and took them under their protection. Some of the Ait Musa, the brethren of Ubaydallah *al-far* (the fugitive), joined him in al-Sudan.²²

The Samahra intervention, however, seems to have come too late to save Ubaydallah's two oldest, albeit anonymous, sons from the "Buhilas war." Ubaydallah's flight to al-Sudan and the death of his two senior sons also catapulted their oldest remaining sibling, Hamad, to the leadership of the *Ait Jamal* resistance to Buhilas. According to the narrator, Hamad "recruited three thousand Arabs on camel back" and joined the opposition to Buhilas. In the *al-Murabit* account, Buhilas's Susian and Saharan opponents used Sidi Ahmed Ibn Musa's *zawiya* as a rallying point for an army composed of "about twelve thousand cavalry and infantry." Notwithstanding its purported numerical inferiority, this army was able to crush Buhilas before the arrival of an expedition sent by the newly crowned sultan, Mawlai Sulayman (1792-1822).²³

In the Bayrouk narrative, Buhilas's defeat also enabled Hamad to exact revenge for his family. By the time of Ubaydallah's "return from al-Sudan, Hamad had already annihilated his uncle, Ahmed al-Hiri, who had done to their *dar* (house, family) what he had done."²⁴ The death of Ahmed al-Hiri also left the Ait Musa, as a flock, without a shepherd and, as such, ripe to be hijacked by Ubaydallah *al-far* (the fugitive). The intensity of the conflict leading to this change in leadership could have also spawned a revamping of being Ait Musa and, hence, the weeding out of the elements Ubaydallah did not want in 'his' *qabila*—namely, those who sided with his slain brother in-law, Ahmed al-Hiri. One can surmise that in the course of this redefinition of identity and social roles, those who voted for Ubaydallah with their feet and joined him in *al-Sudan* also became the core of the modern Ait Musa *qabila*.

²¹Naimi, "The Evolution of the Takna Confederation," in *Tribe and State*, ed. Joffe and Pennell: 213-238, 234; Naimi counted these "maraboutic families" of Asrir "among the few who symbolize the history of the Lamta in the wake of the Arabian (Ma'qil) invasion." Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 132.

²²Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 275. The *Samahra* were a branch of the coastal Ait Ba Umran. Their origin, however, is traced back to the Saharan, *Ait Jamal*, Azraqayn— i.e. they were once Takna but then 'defected' to the Ait Umran. On the heterogeneity of the Ait Ba Umran, see al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 17-20.

²³Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 275; *Idem.* v.5, 146.

²⁴Al-Susi, *al-masul* v. 19, 275.

Spoils of War, Benefits of Trade: Ubaydallah "The Oppressor"

*All politics is quarrel, and power is the ordering such quarrel sorts out. Geertz*²⁵

Ubaydallah's "return" from al-Sudan and the subsequent redefinition of the Ait Musa as a *qabila* also set the stage for the shifts in the balance of power in Wadi Nun leading to the surfacing of Gulimeme as its metropolis. These shifts can hardly be divorced from the same post-Buhilas jockeying for positions that hatched the emergence of the Bayrouk as the main Takna powerhouse. The narrator's investiture of Ubaydallah with "a pressing hand over all the Ait Jamal" compliments al-Rabati's much quoted predication of Ubaydallah's power on his ability to deploy "1500 *Kanun*" to guarantee the security of caravans for a distance of "nineteen days travel in the Sahara."²⁶ It is worth recalling how the Azwafit traditions synthesised by Naimi seem to distribute credit for Ubaydallah's success between his slave retinue, Alawite maternal cousin, emir Abdul-Rahman, and access to European technology of violence. Discursively, it was this foreign trio that enabled Ubaydallah, the "warrior *a'rabi*," to pick up from where Buhilas, the "apostate," had left off. In much the same way that his "purchase of the security of the market" undermined Azwafit caravanserai like Asrir, the trio of slaves, European muskets and Alawite patronage enabled Ubaydallah to defeat their merchant prince, al-Kuri al-Khanusi. According to Naimi, Ubaydallah's "wars" with the Azwafit and his "oppression" of their "Maraboutic families" also spawned his image as the cultivator of rift between the *Ait Jamal* and *Ait Osman* Takna, the rift the peaceable Bayrouk was later to mend.²⁷

The shift in the balance of power in favour of the *Ait Jamal* proprietors of Gulimeme, the Bayrouk, also sanctions Naimi's induction of the post-Buhilas decades as the graveyard for the Azwafit commercial heritage. Ubaydallah's "oppression" seems to have spawned the subsequent conception of being Azwafit in terms of domicile in verdant *qusur* and agrarian dispositions.²⁸ Interestingly, some of the Azwafit traditions synthesized by Naimi credit the same shift in the center of gravity in Wadi Nun to their own strife to remove "the weakly and annual markets from their domain" and to spare their "watered fields" from the trespassing of shoppers and beasts of burden. Here, the Azwafit leader and Ubaydallah's main protagonist, al-Kuri al-Khanusi, comes across as his accomplice in the decapitation of their "mercantile traditions." In life he backed Ubaydallah's bid for the "security of the market" and after his death, the Azwafit gave up the caravan trade. In the same way that his political proclivities had led to the redefinition of the Ait Musa, then, Ubaydallah's "quarrel" with the Azwafit also impinged on conceptions of the difference between the *Ait Jamal* and an *Ait Osman* Takna.

It is perhaps ironic that in spite of their lamentation of Ubaydallah's "oppression," the Azwafit were also the first to embrace the Bayrouk conception of the Takna origin in terms

²⁵Geertz, *After the Fact*, 17.

²⁶Al-Rabati, *tarikh al-da'eef*, 341—see previous chapter.

²⁷Naimi, "The Evolution of the Takna Confederation," in *Tribe and State*, ed. Joffe and Pennell: 213-238, 234; Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, Tome 6, 1936—see previous chapter.

²⁸Naimi, "Azwafit," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, tome 1, (1989), 364-367, 365-366; on these inter-Takna squabbles see, Naimi, "Bayrouk" *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 178; for a similar presentation of Ubaydallah see, Abiya, *al-sahra al-maghribiya*, 51, 60; on the Azwafit wealth in "grain" see, Ibn Tuwayr al-Jannah, *The pilgrimage of Ahmed*, trans. and ed. Norris, 132.

of descent from Hilal and migration from Tuwat.²⁹ The Azwafit resentment of Ubaydallah and tacit supplication for providential retribution also underpins his accusation with the "oppression" of the symbols of religiosity, the *zawaya*, the accusation that also amplifies his demotion to an *'arabi* (wayward Arabian) and *nakhas* (slave trader). The accusation with disregard for the sacred and its deft use to vilify Ubaydallah's enterprise also blurs the worldly incentive behind the 'defection' of some of the "Maraboutic families" he, ostensibly, "oppressed" to Gulimeme. The Azwafit loss was compounded by the fact that the "jurists" who began to trek to Gulimeme were also the recipients of Alawite decrees of "respect" (*tawqir*), the decrees that solidified their position as "judges" of Wadi Nun. The relocation of these "jurists" in Gulimeme was, however, anything but the result of forced exile. The lure of the Bayrouk wealth and "Arab generosity" pushed the custodians of Sidi Amr's legacy and "judges of Wadi Nun" to move their court from Asrir to Gulimeme and, as such, to legitimate its new status as the capital of the Takna. The fact that these "judges" also appear as authors of and witnesses in some of the Bayrouk commercial registers long after Ubaydallah's death suggests that their relocation in Gulimeme has little to do with his lamented oppression.³⁰

In contrast, Naimi's attribution of Ubaydallah's victories over the Azwafit to his deployment of slave musketeers does not mesh with the narrator's investiture of his son Hamad with the donation of "three thousand Arabs" to the anti-Buhilas camp. Very much like the "1500 slaves," noted by authors like Ennaji and al-Muhammadi, this even figure is too extravagant to be realistic. To impress al-Susi with the extent of the Bayrouk influence, the narrator might have deposited all the "Arabs" who contributed to Buhilas's defeat in Hamad's account. The narrator did not credit either Ubaydallah or Bayrouk with a private army. By blaming Azwafit defeats on militarized slavery, Naimi inadvertently credited Ubaydallah with the kind of, to borrow from Hopkins, "state necessities" classical texts reserve for royalty: "slaves and gold." The fact that Ubaydallah had to abandon his "sons" and the time it took Hamad to call in "Arab," Saharan, allies tend to subvert the investiture of the family with a standing army. Lack of a private (servile or free) army may also explain the narrator's tacit use of the desertion of family and exile in *al-Sudan* as the price Ubaydallah had to pay for his failure to muster enough Ait Musa support to block al-Hiri's decision to join Buhilas. But one can certainly take the direction of Ubaydallah's flight and Hamad's ostensible ability to deploy "three thousand Arabs" as signs of the centrality of *tijarat al-Sudan* to the Bayrouk aggrandizement in Wadi Nun.

Together, Ubaydallah's ability to defeat his Azwafit competition and to "purchase the security of the market" was bound to enhance his position among the Takna and, in effect, boost his input in *Iqzulin* affairs. At the same time, the presentation of Buhilas as an enemy of the dynastic realm also sanctions the investiture of the Alawite court with the rearing of upstarts like Ubaydallah. The predication of empowerment on service to the dynasty exudes from Naimi's attribution of Ubaydallah's aggrandizement to help

²⁹ Bu'alam, *shifa al-sidur*, 18—see chapter two.

³⁰ Gulimeme 'stole' two jurists from the Azawit before it produced its own 'branch' of Sidi Ibn Amr's family, Muhammad Abushibuk (d. 1814) and Kharouf Ibn Abdul-Rahman (d. 1835). Kharouf's son and successor, Muhammad (d.1911) was born in Gulimeme. Both the father and his son appear in the Bayrouk registers as scriveners and witnesses; on the "judges" of Gulimeme see, al-Susi, *khilal Jazula*, 200-201.

from his Alawite cousin, emir Abdul-Rahman, and explanation of his exit from the political scene in terms of their joint "detention" by Mawlai Sulayman in 1808.³¹ Naimi seems to have confused the *emir* Abdul-Rahman al-Rabati has situated in al-Sus between 1779 and 1787 with sultan Mawlai Abdul-Rahman (r.1822-1859) who succeeded Mawlai Sulayman to the throne. Even if one were to take this emir as the future sultan, however, it will still be impossible to reconcile his career with that of Ubaydallah. *Emir* Abdul-Rahman's sojourn in al-Sus preceded the Buhilas rebellion by five years and, as such, coincided with the al-Hiri reign over the Ait Musa. The overlap between the reported time of *emir* Abdul-Rahman's presence in al-Sus and the al-Hiri leadership of the Ait Musa also subverts Naimi's accusation of Ubaydallah with complicity in this emir's bid for the crown, the bid that culminated in their ostensible detention by Mawlai Sulayman.

Naimi's situation of the end of Ubaydallah's career in 1808 also makes it impossible to credit him with connivance with an infant Mawlai Abdul-Rahman in the 1780s. This proposition not only contradicts Robert Adams's encounter with Ubaydallah in 1813, but also subverts the narrator's synchronization of the career of the latter with those of Mawlai Sulayman (d.1822), Hashim al-Simlali (d.1824) and *al-Qa'id* Abdullah al-Tamanarti (d.1826).³² In any case, Mawlai Abdul-Rahman was simply too young to be exiled to or deputized to rule al-Sus in the 1780s. By 1808 Mawlai Abdul-Rahman was a crown prince and, as such, his motions were too transparent to elude Alawite historians like al-Rabati and al-Nasiri. As we will presently see, the "tie of blood" was to fail to either ameliorate the Bayrouk rivalry with their Simlali in-laws or inclination to tamper with Mawlai Abdul-Rahman's explicit prohibition of trade with 'Nazarene trespassers'. Naimi's proposition, therefore, is an example of the potential pitfalls of a random use of deference to the dynasty to explain the Bayrouk political career. Of course, by frequently inviting Alawite dynasts to 'sit' in the Bayrouk narrative, the narrator also contributed to the current confusion over the terms of engagement between his ancestors and the court. But, the narrator's use of encounter with the dynasty to historicize the family position corresponds to the Alawite inclination to take credit for what the Bayrouk had accomplished. "You should remember that," sultan Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahman chided al-Habib Ibn Bayrouk in 1872,

your household (*darakum*), have become great and have become known in these areas and famous amongst their inhabitants because of the services your ancestors have rendered ... to our ancestors.³³

On this particular occasion, the narrator used "contemporaneity to *Mawlai* Sulayman, whose days (in life) ended in 1238 (1822)" as a frame of reference to situate Ubaydallah

³¹ Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1937.

³² Very much like that of Ubaydallah and Hashim (1801-1824), *Qaid* Abdullah's career (1799-1826) also began after the Buhilas rebellion and coincided with the reign of Mawlai Sulayman. Naimi, "Bayrouk," in *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1936; al-Rabati, *tarikh al-da'eef*, 181; Adams, *The Narrative of Robert Adams*, 68; al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 20, 246.

³³ Mawlai Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahman to al-Habib Ibn Bayrouk, 20 *Dhul Hajja*/ 1286 Hijra (1872); for examples of such royal postures see, Boumzgou, "Oued Noun dans les archives de Dar Illigh," in *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*: 57-82.

in time and space.³⁴ To surmise Ubaydallah's political dispositions, therefore, we need to sketch the place of the Buhilas revolt in Susian relations with the Alawite dynasty.

If we posit service to the dynasty and involvement in *tijarat al-Sudan* as our twin points of reference, it may be possible to surmise the options available to Ubaydallah. The *zawaya* clients of the Alawites first presented Buhilas as an imposter and blamed the rebellion on his ability to "misguide" credulous *bedou*. According to some contemporary pamphlets, Buhilas masqueraded as Mawlai al-Yazid (r.1790-1792), and in that disguise he was ostensibly able to mislead gullible Susians. It is worth noting that Mawlai al-Yazid was the son and heir-designate of sultan Sidi Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (1757-1790), the same sultan al-Nasiri and al-Susi credited with the rescue of Morocco from the *Bukhari* "tyranny." According to al-Rabati, al-Yazid died of "wounds" he sustained in the war of succession leading to the coronation of Mawlai Sulayman in 1792.³⁵ Moroccan authors such as al-Susi and al-Muhammadi tended to either report the official interpretation of the Buhilas rebellion or to ignore it altogether.³⁶ The fact that al-Yazid died from "wounds" sustained in conflict with his "brothers" makes it possible for us to revise the official presentation of Buhilas's partisans as traitors of the dynastic realm or the Alawite court for that matter. Buhilas's partisans were probably the same Susians who, according to al-Rabati, presented "gifts" to al-Yazid on the occasion of his coronation and, as such, stood to lose from his premature death.³⁷

In the "sermon" I have already noted, Sidi al-Murabit contradicted the earlier suggestion that Buhilas himself masqueraded as Mawlai al-Yasid. He sought to refute Buhilas's reported claim that he had been "deputized by the seven men of Marrakech" to rally Susian support for al-Yazid. This revelation indicates that the Buhilas rebellion overlapped with rather than followed the events leading to the death of al-Yazid and the coronation of Mawlai Sulayman. In an open "letter" to "all the people of Islam," Sidi al-Taskati inadvertently seconds this proposition. In actuality this "letter" was addressed to those Susians who flocked to Buhilas like Ubaydallah's brother-in-law Ahmed al-Hiri. "If you are still in doubt of this (al-Yazid's death)," Sidi al-Taskati chided his addressees,

then, dispatch one of you to Marrakech to stay for ten days or less. He will come back with indisputable news that Mawlai al-Yazid *the son of the Sultan* had died may Allah forgive him, and has been prayed for at such and such place and was buried in such and such place. If you claim to know more about him

³⁴ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 275.

³⁵ According to al-Rabati, al-Yazid sustained his "wounds" in a conflict with his "brothers". The "wounds", however, were not life-threatening. "It is said" he added, that al-Yazid's subsequent death resulted from the application of the "wrong medication". Al-Rabati, *tarik al-da'eef*, 415-422.

³⁶ For an example of the cursory allusion to the rebellion, see Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 176. For an example of its omission, see al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*.

³⁷ Al-Rabati, *tarik al-da'eef*, 423-424; on this succession dispute, see Mariano A. Palau, "La actuacion de Mawlay Muslama frente a Mawlay al-Yazid," *Hesperis Tamuda*, 3 (1962): 5-33; El-Mansour, *Morocco in the reign of Mawlay Sulayman*.

than those (residing) in Marrakech, then there is no cure for your credulity (emphasis added).³⁸

In that sense, Sidi al-Taskati himself was either unsure of or chose to conceal, the exact time of Mawlai al-Yazid's death and the specific location of his grave. Since neither the death of al-Yazid nor the vacancy of the throne was a foregone conclusion, Buhilas's partisans might have used the same 'margin of error' to elongate the reign of their favorite candidate. This proposition enables us to posit the rift between Ubaydallah and Ahmed al-Hiri as a probable re-enactment of the same jockeying for positions by partisans of warring "sons" of a deceased sultan. The narrator's silence on al-Yazid's misfortune and his synchronization of Ubaydallah's movements with the arrival and departure of Mawlai Sulayman's deputies in al-Sus seems to justify an attribution of al-Hiri's demise to his possible betting on al-Yazid's survival.

One can also take *tijarat al-Sudan* as a frame of reference and attribute Buhilas's initial success to his ability to exploit Susian discontent with Alawite trade policies. In any case, the Buhilas rebellion was neither the first nor the last of its kind. In fact, al-Rabati and al-Nasiri cited the frequent commandeering of al-Sus by rebels like Buhilas as the main reason behind the Alawite decision to establish Essaouira and to close down Agadir in 1765. Agadir's mediation between the Trans-Saharan caravan and the European caravel frequently tempted even Alawite appointees to ignore official directives and to run its port as a private fief.³⁹ In the same way that Essaouira was intended to fill Alawite coffers, the closure of Agadir was designed to deny it to potential Susian rebels. The reported receptivity of the coastal Ait Umran to Buhilas's overtures and their inclination to "plunder the merchandise" of the *zawaya* families patronized by the Alawite court can be attributed to resentment of the rerouting of the caravan trade to Essaouira. The rerouting of the Trans-Saharan Trade turned al-Sus into a colony of Essaouira and in the long run, tended to maximize Susian resentment of the Alawite prohibition of trade with Europeans beyond its confines. The resulting association of fidelity to the court with selling to and buying from Essaouira was to impinge on the relation between the Alawite court and Susian traders like the Bayrouk. The collision between what was good for Susian traders and the crown is evidenced by the narrator's use of *khidma* (service) to Mawlai Sulayman to center Ubaydallah and contrastive omission of Bayrouk's alienation from Mawlai Abdul-Rahman.

Adjutants of Sultan: Susian Trader, Haha Qaid

In keeping with his use of service to the dynasty to center his successful ancestors, the narrator synchronized Ubaydallah's "return from al-Sudan" with the arrival of Mawlai

³⁸ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 5 142-143; emphasis is added to underline Sidi al-Taskati refusal to acknowledge al-Yazid as Sultan.

³⁹ Before his coronation, Mawlai Muhammad served as *Khalifa* (deputy) of Marrakech (1744-1752). He had to put up with the machinations of a recalcitrant Alawite appointee called *al-Talib* Salih Ibn Behi. Ibn Behi ostensibly turned Agadir into a private fief until his defeat in 1752. Al-Rabati, *tarikh al-da'eef*, 118; al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.8, 20; Afa and al-Muhammadi posited this experience as an origin for Mawlai Muhammad's "preference" for the Haha *qai'ds*, a preference he passed on to his heir, Mawlai Sulayman. Afa, "Les dimensions historiques de l'économie d'Agadir au 19eme siècle" in *Actes du Colloque sur l'agglomération du Grand Agadir*, 231-246, 32-34; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 84.

Sulayman's expedition. Al-Susi, however, credited Mawlai Sulayman with three expeditions to al-Sus. The first expedition was dispatched shortly after his coronation in 1792 but still arrived too late to participate in "the Buhilas war." Mawlai Sulayman's entrusted the leadership of his second expedition to al-Sus to his famous deputy, *al-Qaid Abdul-Malik al-Hahi* (of Haha). It reached al-Sus in 1802. The third expedition was commissioned in 1809 and was led by another Haha *qaid* called Muhammad Yahya Aghnaj. The main purpose of these expeditions was to shore up support for Alawite clients on the spot and to pacify recalcitrant potentates like Hashim al-Simlali (Illigh).⁴⁰ The Haha approach to families like the Simlali, however, tended to revive their historic rivalry with Susian power centers, specially, during the reign of Hashim's great grandfather Abu Hassoun al-Simlali (1592-1658). In so far as the Haha were concerned, control of al-Sus was also imperative for the safety of the network of communication linking their new economic capital, Essaouira, with the Western Sahara and Bilad al-Sudan.⁴¹ The Haha *Qaids* adopted a policy of divide and rule and deployed members of the *Tahukat* alignment against the *Iqzulin* Simlali.⁴² One can use the congruity of the dispatch of an expedition (*haraka*) with the need to pacify recalcitrant elements to bypass the narrator's silence on Ubaydallah's possible role in the conflict between the Haha *qaids* and Hashim al-Simlali, and to surmise the nature of his relation with the court.

The arrival of Mawlai Sulayman's three expeditions in al-Sus also coincided with the beginning of the Simlali attempt to restore Illigh to its former glory: i.e. during the days of Abu Hassoun. One can deploy the Alawite oscillation between the dispatch of punitive expedition against recalcitrant Susian power centres and cajolery of their loyalist rivals as a frame of reference to gauge Ubaydallah's political dispositions. This approach makes it feasible to turn the contiguity of the arrival of the first expedition with the end of the Buhilas rebellion into an occasion for the reallocation of social roles and rewards in al-Sus. Mawlai Sulayman's Susian partisans seem to have used their active opposition to Buhilas as a dowry to fill in the vacuum left by the death or marginalisation of his supporters. Al-Susi's informant considered Ubaydallah's "refusal to follow Buhilas" as the main reason behind the "appearance of his family in that atmosphere." In contrast, al-Gharbi posited Mawlai Sulayman's appreciation of Ubaydallah's loyalty as the catalyst for his investiture with "a *zaheer* appointing him as the leader of the Takna, the *zaheer* the Bayrouk family still possesses."⁴³ The Buhilas rebellion, however, also sanctioned the Haha tendency to deploy the spectre of Susian rebellion to justify their preventive expeditions against Hashim al-Simlali. As members of the *Iqzulin* alignment, Takna potentates like

⁴⁰On the Simlali relations with Mawlai Sulayman and Hashim's duels with the Haha *qaids*, see al-Susi, *Illigh*, 244-237; Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et le Sous al-Aqsa*, 37-88; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 101-102.

⁴¹Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 275. One can posit the duel between Abu Hassoun *al-Simlali* (Illigh) and Sidi Yahya Ibn Sa'eed *al-Hahi* (of Haha) during the later Sa'dian period as the precedent for this rivalry. In the nineteenth century, the Haha also benefited from the location of Essaouira in their domain-- they welcomed the closure of Agadir. For the Haha-Simlali duel, see al-Susi, *Illigh*, 52-58; Ibrahim al-Tamiri, *al-mut'a wa al-raha fi trajim a'lam Haha* (Casablanca: matba'at al-Najah al-Jadid, 1995).

⁴²On the *Tahukat* (Ba'qila, Awlad Jarar, Ait Tiznit and Herbil) collusion with the Haha *qaids* see, al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 101-102; Anush, "Burahim," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, tome 5, 1684.

⁴³Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 275; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 179

Ubaydallah probably found themselves in the awkward position of either supporting the Haha *qaid*s or empathising with Hashim. Of course, empathy with Hashim also carried the risk of accusation of disloyalty to the sultan. By distancing himself from Hashim, Ubaydallah could have enticed the Haha *qaid*s to 'sell' him the right of secure passage to Essaouira—see maps 1 and II.

The narrator did not offer any clue that can be used to surmise a rift between Ubaydallah and either Hashim al-Simlali or the third leader of the *Iqzul*in alignment, *Qaid* Abdullah al-Tamanrti. Instead, he skewed the Simlali duels with Mawlai Sulayman deputies, the Haha *qaid*s, and, as a result, he was also able to present Hashim and Ubaydallah as indefatigable auxiliaries of the Alawite court. Arguably, Ubaydallah became one of the "pillars of authority on which the government relied" and in that capacity, served as a "back-up" (*adad*) to Hashim.⁴⁴ The narrator took advantage of the congruity of the Simlali aggrandizement with the end of the Buhilas rebellion to place Hashim and Ubaydallah in the same boat. Al-Susi and al-Gharbi endorsed this proposition. They used Ubaydallah's reported forwarding of "a foreign captive" to Hashim in 1809 and the ostensible appearance of the same captive before Mawlai Sulayman as evidence of Ubaydallah's deference to both the Simlali and Alawites. In contrast, Abdul-Aziz Ben Abdullah credited Mawlai Sulayman with the commission of Ubaydallah to "chase Portuguese invaders from the (Western) Sahara".⁴⁵

Ben Abdullah's attribution of Ubaydallah's sorties in the Western Sahara to his commission by Mawlai Sulayman seems to compliment al-Rabati's notation of his tendency to "escort (*yazatit*) caravans" across the Sahara. In al-Rabati's vision, however, Ubaydallah's dalliance with foreboding Saharan terrains was a marker of his interest in the caravan trade rather than volunteerism to apprehend European trespassers. These linear presentations also gloss the fact that until 1820 Hashim's relations with Mawlai Sulayman were mired in his conflict with the Haha in general and *Qaid* Aghnaj in particular. By cross-referencing the conversion of Ubaydallah into an indefatigable Alawite deputy with the known about the second and third Haha expeditions to al-Sus, one can also surmise his political predilections.

I have already noted the intersection between the Haha tendency to enlist in Alawite expeditions to al-Sus and their search for access to *tijarat al-Sudan*. By imagining the closure of Agadir as a blow to Susian interests, one can also deduce the 'unofficial' agenda behind the Haha harassment of Hashim al-Simlali. This harassment was also the direct cause of Hashim's reported flight to al-Saqiya al-Hamra in 1802 and the "mountains" in 1809. Flight to the "mountains" happened in the same year Hashim had, ostensibly, dispatched the "foreign captive" he received from Ubaydallah to the Alawite court and a year after, if we believe Naimi, Mawlai Sulayman's "arrest" of Ubaydallah. From 1809 until his dismissal in 1821, Aghnaj used the proximity of his headquarters in Tarudant to Illigh and the support of *Tahukat* rivals of the Simlali like the *Awlad Jarar* to keep Hashim on the run. Relief came only after Mawlai Sulayman's discovery of Aghnaj's combination of "corruption" with inability to find a "remedy" for the propensity of the Atlantic Ocean to 'vomit' *Nazarene* trespassers in al-Sus's

⁴⁴ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 275; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 179.

⁴⁵ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 275; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176; Ben Abdullah, *al-mawsua'a al-maghribiya*, 148.

Saharan backyards-- shipwrecked mariners. In his search for an effective solution, Mawlai Sulayman began to covet the cooperation of the Simlali family. In 1821, he appointed his nephew emir Bennasir, the son of Ubaydallah's ostensible cousin *emir* Abdul-Rahman, as his deputy (*khalifa*) in al-Sus and armed him with a cordial letter to Hashim al-Simlali. The letter distanced the court from Aghnaj's "intrigues" against the Simlali, commended their ancestry's effort "to improve the conditions of the Muslims" and encouraged Hashim to rally Susian support for Benasir.⁴⁶

Mawlai Sulayman's 'apology' to Hashim is also the genesis of the subsequent Alawite cajolery of his sons and heirs, Ali (r.1824-1842) and al-Husayn (1842-1886). In chapter one, I have noted how this shift in the relations between the Alawite court and the Simlali also paved the way for Mawlai al-Hasan's appointment of al-Husayn's son and heir, Muhammad, as an official *qa'id* in 1886. Yet, the history leading to this shift in the Alawite policy does not warrant the narrator's investiture of Sulayman and Hashim with joint political custody of Ubaydallah much less its inversion into a driving forces behind his camping in Gulimeme or sorties into the Western Sahara. In fact, the improvement in the relations between the Simlali and the Alawite court in 1821 seems to have come too late to benefit either Ubaydallah or his immediate heir, Hamad.

It is worth recalling that Naimi's situation of Ubaydallah's exit from the political scene in 1808 negates Adams' allusion to his contemporaneity to a "war" between Hashim, the "great warrior," and the "emperor" of Morocco, Mawlai Sulayman. Adams's observation is supported by Riley's reference to Hashim's duel with and flight from an anonymous Alawite deputy, possibly, *Qaid* Aghnaj. Adams' identification of Ibrahim and Bayrouk as the active "sons of the governor", Ubaydallah, contrast sharply with his silence on Hamad's very existence. This silence tends to support the narrator's revelation that Hamad was sickly and did not "delay much" in following his father Ubaydallah to the grave. According to al-Gharbi, Hamad died "a few months" after his father. By the time of Cochelet's arrival in Gulimeme in 1819, there seems to be no doubt about the death of Ubaydallah and Hamad and the devolution of leadership in Gulimeme to Ibrahim.⁴⁷ In spite of his tacit obviation of the exact time of Ubaydallah's death, the narrator did not offer any leads that can be used to discount Cochelet's testimony. According to the narrator, Hamad did succeed his father but upon his death, he left his position to Ibrahim who "did not last very long in leadership either." We are told that Ibrahim died in 1825— three years after Mawlai Sulayman and one year after Hashim al-Simlali. Ibrahim, however, reigned long enough to "dominate all the Ait Jamal" and to enjoy the "known tribute."⁴⁸ Al-Susi causally alluded to an extant "message from the sultan to (Ibrahim and) his cousin, *Qaid* Muhammad Ibn al-Hajj Ibn Abdul-Na'eem Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud." The message seems to be in response to a complaint against their incursions into the Western Sahara. According to al-Susi, the sultan ordered Ibrahim and his "cousin," Qaid Muhammed, "to prevent the Takna from

⁴⁶Benasir was the son of Sulayman's half-brother *emir* Abdulrahman, the same emir who, according to al-Rabati, lived in al-Sus between 1779 and 1878. For this letter, see al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 102. For a French translation, see Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzen et le Sous al-Aqsa*, 37-38.

⁴⁷Adams, *Narrative of Roberts Adams*, 68-73, 76; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 176; Riley, *Loss of the American Brig*, 271-273, 288-89; Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 52-93.

⁴⁸Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 276.

transgressing against the *zawaya* of Shinqit."⁴⁹ The sultan's decision to address Ibrahim can be taken as evidence of the death of his father, Ubaydallah, and senior brother, Hamad. The message also confirms the continuity of the Bayrouk incursions in the Western Sahara and, one might add, their tendency to fleece its occupants. By cross-referencing this message with the observations of survivors of shipwreck, it becomes possible to conclude that Ubaydallah's death probably occurred sometime after Adams' departure from Wadi Nun but before Cochelet's arrival in Gulimeme: between 1814 and 1819. In either case, the situation of the Simlali conflicts with the Haha *Qaids* between 1802 and 1820 still militates against the investiture of Mawlai Sulayman and Sidi Hashim with joint political custody of Ubaydallah.

One can also use Hashim's reported flight to al-Saqiya al-Hamra to question the narrator's designation of Ubaydallah as his "back-up" (*adad*) in the service to the Alawite court. As the domain of the (*Ait Jamal*) Azraqayn and Ait Usa, and their Rgaybat protectorates, al-Saqiya al-Hamra was part of the terrain Ubaydallah and his heirs were advertising as a safe passage for caravans and one of the sources of the "known tribute" they were supposed to have enjoyed. It is difficult to imagine how the Bayrouk could have either authorized or curbed Takna "transgression" in Shinqit without first asserting their influence in al-Saqiya al-Hamra. The reader cannot therefore credit Ubaydallah with ineffable fidelity to Mawlai Sulayman's Haha deputies without also wondering why he did not apprehend Hashim in 1809. Wadi Nun's geographical location between the Anti-Atlas, Illigh, and al-Saqiya al-Hamra renders it unfathomable how Hashim could have eluded his Haha pursuers without Ubaydallah's knowledge or clandestine assistance. After all, the extant Ait Musa *Luh* which seems to have first been proclaimed in 1808 prohibits members of the *qabila* from offering either safe-passage or refuge to an outsider without clearance from the *a'yan*.⁵⁰ Here, one can use the narrative of the third pillar of the *Iqzulin* alignment, the *al-Qaid al-Tamanarti* family, as surrogate history to bypass the narrator's obviation of the impact of Haha "intrigues" on Ubaydallah's relations with the court.

Like Hashim, *Qaid* Abdullah al-Tamanarti (d.1826) seems to have found it difficult to digest the confusion of loyalty to the Alawite court with deference to the Haha *Qaids* and, in effect, to ignore their pandering to his *Tahukat* rivals, the Herbil. In response to Aghnaj's request of his personal attendance at Tarudant, *Qaid* Abdullah used "fear of plunder by his enemies" as an excuse for his inability to carry out these instructions. In a seeming attempt to ward off an interpretation of his "fear" as a sign of infidelity to the court, *Qaid* Abdullah proposed that since his family was "counted among the Takna," Aghnaj could "take whatever he wants from them"—i.e. those close to Tarudant!⁵¹ This evasive response coincided with Hashim's flight to the "mountains" in 1809. In that sense, one can take *Qaid* Abdullah's "fear" and tacit refusal to meet with Aghnaj as signs of his empathy with his *Iqzulin* peer, Hashim al-Simlali. In the wake of Aghnaj's dismissal, "fear of plunder" did not prevent *Qaid* Abdullah from frequenting Illigh or visiting with Sulayman's successor, Mawlai Abdul-Rahman.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 276.

⁵⁰ Ait Musa *Luh* (1223 H), copy in my possession. This clause is also enshrined in the Takna *Luh* promulgated in 1241H. (1826)—i.e. under Bayrouk's auspices.

⁵¹ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.20, 246.

There is nothing in the Bayrouk narrative that can be used to credit Ubaydallah with either overt service to or open break with the Haha *qaid*s. One could use the murky border between deference to the Alawite court and reluctance to be seen with its Haha deputies to credit Ubaydallah with a similar attempt at 'safe' politics. In Wadi Nun, he could have used fidelity to the crown as an ideological cover to charge his Azwafit competitors with perfidy and to pacify them in the name of the sultan. This proposition helps us to make sense of the Azwafit explanation of Ubaydallah's success in terms of his reception of support from an Alawite kinsman, *emir* Abdul-Rahman. At the same time, he might have combined verbal expressions of his loyalty to the sultan with evasion of service under his Haha deputies. The risk of losing access to al-Essaouira could have discouraged Ubaydallah from provoking the Haha *qaid*s. In contrast, a combination of studious neutrality in their clashes with Hashim in the Anti-Atlas with the use of the extent of his reach in the Western Sahara as a bargaining chip could have enabled Ubaydallah to keep the Haha *qaid*s off his back. In any case, whether in their capacity as Alawite deputies or as Haha per se, the *qaid*s were laboring to achieve what Ubaydallah would have done on his own any ways, to keep the caravans coming. In as much as the security of the caravan was the ultimate objective of the Alawite court and its deputies, there was not much to be gained from confrontation between the Haha guardians of the route to Essaouira and Ubaydallah's Saharan clientele. Peace with the Haha *Qaid*s was indispensable for the journey from al-Sus to Essaouira. But the *Iqzulin* connection was too valuable in the Susian and Saharan context to be expendable. Ubaydallah's ability to carve a political base and to pass it on to his sons suggests that he was wise enough to do as much as possible to placate the sultan's deputies, but as little as possible to jeopardize his *Iqzulin* connections. He was first and foremost a trader turned politician and, as such, was unlikely to barter the chance to enhance his trade network for dogmas like dying for the dynasty in the Sahara or martyrdom on behalf of the *Iqzulin* in al-Sus. The political record and dispositions of his son and successor par excellence, Bayrouk, seems to suggest that not withstanding his presentation as a "warrior" or an adjutant of the Alawite court, Ubaydallah's main priority was the security of the caravan.

III-Avid Trader, Reluctant Warrior: Bayrouk

Le premier devoir de ce chef, c'est d'assurer la paix et de ranimer le travail. Shaykh Bayrouk⁵²

In this section I will first provide a sketch of the extant presentations of Bayrouk as a politician and then explore how his profile as an avid trader had oriented his approach to Europe and the Alawite court. In the first part of this section, I will juxtapose the Bayrouk the narrator introduced to the reader with the Bayrouk incarcerated in subaltern Azwafit narratives and travel accounts. As we will see, these Takna narratives present Bayrouk as a peaceable trader and in that sense, the other of his militaristic father Ubaydallah. In spite of the differences in modes of presentation, Bayrouk's image in Takna narratives tends to validate the impression he left on European and sub-Saharan African travelers like Davidson and Panet. In the second part of this section, I will

⁵²Panet, *Premiere Exploration*, 155.

examine whether and how Bayrouk's reported obsession with trade had shaped his attitude towards Europe and the Alawite court. As we will see, Bayrouk's quest for direct trade with Europe cast its shadow on the family relations with the Alawite court and, in the process, became the precedent for what his two older sons, Muhammad and al-Habib, were later to try, albeit in vain.

Rights of Caravan, Rites of Leadership

In the previous chapter, I noted how the narrator and Naimi's Azwafit informants inadvertently agreed to present Bayrouk as the peaceable other of his imperious father. In these narratives, however, Bayrouk's quest for peace comes across as the collateral of his obsession with trade. There is also a surprising congruity between the Takna conception of Bayrouk as a peaceable trader and his presentation by outside observers like Davidson and Panet. As a confession from the enemy within, the Azwafit presentation of Bayrouk is significant precisely because of its tacit refusal to provide concrete examples of his difference from his older brothers. In contrast, the Bayrouk narrative is replete with examples of his magnanimity and capacity to earn the "love" of even "thieving" enemies like the Azwafit. According to the narrator, Bayrouk won the Azwafit respect by displaying his studious preference for peace. Arguably, the Azwafit discovered his peaceable dispositions the hard way. We are told that some anonymous "thieves" sought to steal horses from one of Bayrouk's Ait Musa brethren but did not find the keys to his stable and were unable to break its door. Instead of returning empty handed, however, the "thieves" decided to "shave off the tails of the horses." Upon discovering the "shame" on their horses, Bayrouk's Ait Musa relations immediately concluded that this was the work of their Azwafit enemies. In retaliation, they sneaked into the Azwafit *qusur*, abducted one of their *'ayan* (notables) and "shaved his beard." The equalization of offence against horses with offence against their owners led to the outbreak of a "great war" between Bayrouk and the Azwafit that "lasted for a whole year." According to subaltern traditions, the Azwafit sustained staggering casualties and lost the war courtesy of Bayrouk's "expensive weapons."⁵³ The peace settlement that ended this war in 1826 was also the genesis of the *luh* (written agreement) that continued to guarantee peace between the Ait Jamal and Ait Osman constituencies of the Takna *qabila* ensemble until the emergence of another "war-like" Bayrouk towards the end of the nineteenth century-- Qaid Dahman I.

The fact that the narrator's translation for Bayrouk start with this incident rather than his subsequent use of trade as a cure for Azwafit "thievery" suggests that this war took place immediately after his succession to his brother Ibrahim in 1825. The death of the militarist Ibrahim and the accession of his peaceable brother, Bayrouk, might have tempted the Azwafit to seek redress for the cumulative setbacks they had sustained since Ubaydallah's "return from al-Sudan" towards the end of the eighteenth century. This proposition enables us to trade the symbolic positing of the "shaving" of hair for more tangible causes for war. In the *luh* that "restored" the peace between the two Takna constellations, Gulimeme and its Sunday market were enshrined as the site and

⁵³ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 276; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 178; according to Davidson, Bayrouk was well armed when he took him "to breakfast at the chief Jew, Soleiman." Davidson, *Notes*, 140.

time for the *a'yan's* (notables) deliberation on matters concerning all the Takna. The *Luh* also prohibited any Takna man from harboring an outsider or offering him rights of safe passage (*gafr*) across the domain of his own *qabila* without the "approval of the *a'yan*" after deliberation in Gulimeme.⁵⁴ In the negotiations leading to the promulgation of this *Luh*, the Azwafit, *Ait Osman*, delegation was composed of more than ten notables. In contrast, Bayrouk was recognized as the sole "guarantor for all the *Ait Jamal*." By showing grace to vanquished Azwafit and ameliorating tension between the two Takna constellations, Bayrouk also distanced himself from his pugnacious predecessors and, by default, ensconced his image as an emissary of peace and trade. In the narrative, Bayrouk's advocacy of peace made him "more lovable than his brothers Hamad and Ibrahim." According to the narrator, Bayrouk's preference for peace also enabled the Takna to live for "34 years without a single war."⁵⁵

The narrator's nostalgic conception of Bayrouk as the embodiment of peace and trade tends to correspond to his presentation by the British traveler John Davidson (1830s) and his Francophone, Senegalese, counterpart Leopold Panet (1850s). Davidson and Panet's investiture of Bayrouk with peaceable disposition is significant not only because it veers from the frequent presentation of the *Moor* as a "fanatic" predator, but also on account of its juxtaposition with his sanctification of trade. In Davidson's account, Bayrouk's treatment of the "men" sent by his "enemies" to "steal his favorite horse" was an early warning of his "weakness." Davidson expected Bayrouk to "shoot them" for "riding the horse to death." Instead Bayrouk offered the thieves "about three shillings each" for information about the identity of the real culprit.⁵⁶ Further proof of Bayrouk's disinclination to "shoot" his enemies was enshrined in his approach to the intermittent conflict between the Rgaybat and Tajakant. Bayrouk had a hard time deciding which side he should take. The Rgaybat were until then considered the protectorates of the *Ait Jamal* and, in that capacity, had already qualified for Takna assistance in two previous disputes with the Tajakant, in 1797 and 1819. A decision against the Rgaybat would have alienated the *Ait Jamal* in general and the *'ayan* (notables) of the Saharan Azraqayn and *Ait Usa* in particular.⁵⁷ But the main Tajakant advocates of war against the "impious" Rgaybat, Sidi al-Mukhtar and Sidi al-Abd of Tinduf, were also Bayrouk's best customer and, indeed, had just aided him in the

⁵⁴Takna *Luh*, *Shaban*, 7/ 1241H (16/3/ 1826); the terms of inclusion and exclusion enshrined in this *Luh* are similar to the stipulations listed in the *Luh* of the *Ait Bihi* (*Ait Umran*) issued in 1834. The anonymous authors of this *luh* suggest that the *ayan* of the *Iqzulin* alignment (the *Ait Umran*, *Majat*, *Takna* etc.) had decreed that whoever takes in an outsider on his own will be held responsible for any "misdeed" or "loss of property" caused by his guest. Al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 120, 129.

⁵⁵Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 276.

⁵⁶Davidson, *Notes*, 119-120, 122.

⁵⁷According to the Rgaybat narrative, their first war with the Tajakant took place in 1797—i.e. in the wake of Ubaydallah's "return from al-Sudan". In contrast, the next two wars occurred in 1819 and 1844—before and after Bayrouk's assumption of the leadership of the *Ait Jamal Takna*. The 1844 war, the only one Bayrouk might have resolved, was "followed by a long period of peace." The gaps between these wars tend to subvert Davidson's suggestion. There is no reference to a war that took place at the time of his sojourn in Gulimeme (1835-36). The "war" he mentioned was probably small skirmish. Bayrouk's intervention might have prevented this skirmish from developing into what the Rgaybat narrator would consider a "war". For the Rgaybat version of their wars with the Tajakant, see Muhammad Salim, *Les Principales Preoccupations des Rgaybat*, ed. trans. Naimi, 83-90.

apprehension of the "thieves" of "his favorite horse."⁵⁸ According to Davidson, Bayrouk's resolution to this quagmire was to empathize with the "deputation" the Rgaybat had sent to "explain the cause of their attack upon the Taghkanths." But at the same time, the only solution he could think of was to insist on "reconciliation and friendship" with the Tajakant.⁵⁹ The third example of Bayrouk's vacillation was enshrined in his response to the "two hundred horses" that came to hold a conference about "going to war with a neighboring tribe" whose "Marabout" had killed his "friend." To Davidson's chagrin, a "long consultation" with Bayrouk resulted in the declaration of the assailant "Marabout" as "non compos" and, he sarcastically added, "instead of a fight we had a feast."⁶⁰ Davidson took Bayrouk's reluctance to go to war as evidence of his incorrigible "weakness."

Davidson's presentation tends to shore up the narrator's suggestion that Bayrouk spent "34 years without a single war." It also anticipates Panet's situation of peace and trade at the center of Bayrouk's mission in life. "Beirouk," Panet fondly recalled,

dont les efforts intelligents et le caractère conciliateur assurent la paix autour de lui ... Ajoutons que sa correspondance intelligente avec plusieurs chefs indigènes de l'interior attirent chez lui une foule de commerçants. Pour un arabe, ce n'est pas sans admiration que je lui ai entendu dire un jour dans un groupe forme de ses courtiers de commerce: 'On n'attend pas la fortune chez soi, on doit aller la chercher en portant les produits de son pays pour l'échanger contre ceux de l'étranger. ... Dans sa haute sagesse, 'Dieu a voulu que ce qui se trouve chez un peuple manque chez l'autre, pour contraindre ainsi les hommes a des relations qui en les unissant par le lien de l'intérêt, casse à jamais chez eux l'esprit de la guerre ... Maintenant, le premier devoir de ce chef, c'est d'assurer la paix et de ranimer le travail, source du progrès et des grandeurs.'⁶¹

Bayrouk's ability to restrain his "Arab" instinct and tendency to barter rites of war for rites of trade seems to have impinged on his approach to his Ait Musa brethren and his *Iqzul* allies, the Simlali and the *al-Qaid* al-Tamanrti families. In contrast to his noted inclination to center foreign traders in Gulimeme, Bayrouk was ostensibly less inclined to take in their agrarian and pastoral counterparts. One story invokes Bayrouk's mercantilist dispositions to highlight the disparity between his complicity in the demobilization of the Ait Musa and the growth in the Ait al-Hasan numerical weight and military prowess.

The story feeds off the customary use of what is called *zabiha* (slaughtered animal) offerings by marginal groups to solicit the protection of a powerful leader and, ultimately, become members of his *qabila*. By accepting the *zabiha*, the host also contracts responsibility for the security of his guests almost at the same time that he

⁵⁸ Al-Susi named Muhammad al-Saghir (junior) Ibn Sidi al-Mukhtar as the most outspoken advocate of war against the Rgaybat. Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 18, 162-163.

⁵⁹ Davidson, *Notes*, 122; for examples of the Rgaybat-Tajaknat deference to Bayrouk, see *Idem*, 147.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁶¹ Panet, *Première Exploration*, 155-56; Apart from his prescription of trade as a 'cure' for difference, Bayrouk seems to be paraphrasing verse 13, *Surah* 49 of the *Quran*: "O! Mankind, we have created you male and female and have made you into *shu'ub* (communities) and *qabail* so that you may get to know one another."

adds to the *qabila* wealth in men. Bayrouk was well positioned to inundate the Ait Musa with such outsiders and, hence, to make up for those 'lost' to *tijarat al-Sudan*. To the chagrin of the Ait Musa 'ayan, however, Bayrouk often rerouted the *zabiha* and, by implication, its donors to the Ait al-Hasan. As a result, the Ait al-Hasan tended to grow courtesy of Bayrouk's inclination to give away seekers of inclusion in the Ait Musa *qabila*. "You will," he reportedly told disgruntled Ait Musa a'yan (notables),

become traders. It is better for you. If you do not share the *zabiha* with the Ait al-Hasan, you will become distracted by (military) conflicts. If the status quo (the delegation of matters of war to Ait al-Hasan) were to prevail, they will become like the dogs that guard the flock (without benefiting from it) whereas you will carry on with your trade any way you want (emphasis added)!⁶²

Regardless of its veracity, this story does not violate the healthy consensus on Bayrouk's inclination to dodge war in favor of peace and trade. Davidson, for example, drew a causal relation between "the ceremony of swearing faith" to Bayrouk and his search for "protection to the Kafilahs (caravan) to and from Wad Nun."⁶³ From this perspective, it is not surprising that Bayrouk should have pressurized the Ait Musa to 'convert' to trade while goading their Ait al-Hasan brethren to assume responsibility for the security of "the flock." If Bayrouk was, indeed, the engineer behind this division of roles, the story also subverts Naimi's invocation of the Ait al-Hasan tendency to bear the brunt of the *Ait Jamal* wars with the Azwafit in Wadi Nun to downplay the Bayrouk influence in Takna councils.⁶⁴ The seeming distinction between war and trade parties may also explain the congruity of increase in the Ait al-Hasan military prowess with the rectification of the conventional conflation of being Ait Musa with service in Shurafa expeditions or camping in garrisons. As *ahl* (people of) Bayrouk, the Ait Musa began to be seen mainly as a trading 'cartel'.

Bayrouk's preference for trade and peace seems to have also influenced his approach to the rivalry between the *Iqzulin* and *Tahukat* alignments. According to the narrator, the "primacy" of "the word (*kalma*) of the *Iqzulin* party" in al-Sus, was the fruit of "perfect harmony and collaboration" between Bayrouk and his Simlali in-laws. Like his contemporary, *Qaid* Muhammad al-Tamanrti, Bayrouk was a frequent "visitor to Illigh until his death in 1275 H. (1858)." It is tempting to take his own marriage to one of Hashim's daughters and the wedding of his niece, the daughter of his brother and predecessor Ibrahim, to al-Husayn al-Simlali as evidence of such "harmony."⁶⁵ Yet, notations of Bayrouk's visits to Sidi Ibn Musa's *museum* in Illigh contrast sharply with the lack of reference to his exact role in the Simlali duels with their *Tahukat* rivals in the Anti Atlas: the (*Shilluh*) Ba'qila and Ait Tiznit, and (Arab) Awlad Jarar. In his

⁶² Mutayeb al-Mustafa, "*qabail takna bil janub al-maghribi*" (Agadir: B.A. hons; Library of the Faculty of Arts, Ibn Zohr University, 1989-90), 88. For an abbreviated version of this story, see Najih "Les tribus de Tekna: le cas Ait El jamal," 125. For a much earlier (French) rendition of the same story see, De La Chapelle "Les Tekna du sud Marocain," *B.C.A.F.M.*, 43.

⁶³ Davidson, *Notes*, 138.

⁶⁴ Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 180.

⁶⁵ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 277; on Bayrouk's marriage into the Simlali family see, Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et Le Sous al-Aqsa*, 41; for the notion of "harmony" among the leadership of the *Iqzulin* alignment, see al-Susi, *Illigh*, 266; Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 179.

narration of these intermittent conflicts, al-Susi did not name Bayrouk or his *Ait Jamal* brethren among the Simlali partisans.⁶⁶ As we will presently see, the Alawite court used al-Husayn al-Simlali as private eye to monitor Bayrouk's search for direct access to European markets. Metaphorically, the Simlali subversion of Bayrouk's commercial dreams corresponded to his absence from their wars with localized members of the *Tahukat* alignment.⁶⁷

Bayrouk's abdication of his *Iqzul* commitments is further evidenced by his reluctance to assist the *al-Qaid* al-Tamanarti in his duel with the *Tahukat* Herbil. In a letter to Mawlai Abdul-Rahman (1822-1859), *Qaid* Muhammad al-Tamanarti lamented Bayrouk's failure to answer his repeated "cries" for help. In his response, Mawlai Abdul-Rahman identified Bayrouk as an Alawite "*khadim*" (server) and consoled al-Tamanarti that he had "written" to him on this regard. The *Qaid* later wrote back to acknowledge Bayrouk's compliance with the Sultan's instructions. Bayrouk might have also asked *al-Qaid* al-Tamanarti to inform the Sultan of his compliance and, indeed, even encouraged a defamatory report on al-Husayn, possibly in retaliation for his opposition to the idea of direct trade with Europe. In the same letter, *Qaid* Muhammad told the Sultan that he had yet to receive help from al-Husayn al-Simlali.⁶⁸ In the same way that fidelity to the *Iqzul* alignment ought to have pulled these families together, competition over the same exportable items, foreign markets and royal favors often pushed them apart. On this occasion at least, the Alawite court seemed to have been more eager to encourage cooperation among members of the *Iqzul* alignment than its Susian leaders. And in as much as trade seemed to steal Bayrouk from politics, one can use it to explain the contingent shifts in his relations with the Alawite court. Herein I will posit Bayrouk's attempt to establish direct connections with Europe as a point of departure to gauge the shifts in the family relation to the Moroccan dynastic realm.

A passage to Europe: "Legitimate" Trade, Forbidden Commerce

Les Arabes de Wad Noun, totalement étrangers à la navigation. Bouet-Willamez⁶⁹

In the previous chapter, I proposed a causal relation between Bayrouk's obsession with commerce on one hand and his tendency to center like-minded Jews and Saharans in Gulimeme, and to post Ait Musa confidants in al-Sudan on the other hand. I have also noted his tacit inclination to evaluate goods in terms of their capacity to appeal to European customers. It will be an understatement to suggest that catering to European demands for raw materials also reflects an awareness of the shift in the balance of trade towards the Atlantic seaboard. Fixation on "caravans of slaves" tends to blur such shifts. In the previous chapter, I noted how Naimi's conflation of being Bayrouk with being *nakhas* (slave trader) also led him to disavow the verdict of the family commercial registers in favor of its textual image. In a similar fashion, historians

⁶⁶For the Simlai "quarrel" with the *Tahukat* (Ba'qila, Ait Tiznit and Jarar) see, al-Susi, *Illigh*, 241-48, 256-65.

⁶⁷Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahman to al-Husayn al-Simlali, *Dhul-Qa'da* 1261 H. (1845). For the French translation of this letter, see Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et Le Sous al-Aqsa*, 40-4. For an account of Ali's wars see, al-Susi, *Illigh*, 245-248.

⁶⁸Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 20, 246-252.

⁶⁹Paul Marty, "Une Tentative de Pénétration Pacifique dans le sud marocain en 1839," *Revue de L'histoire des colonies françaises*, 9: 2 (1921): 101-116, 111.

Hodges and, more recently, Pennell posited the ransoms paid for survivors of shipwreck rather the 'caravan of gum' as the source of the Bayrouk enterprise and the inspiration behind their hankering after trade with Europe. "Bayrouk," Hodge wrote,

carried on a lucrative trade in the ransoming of shipwrecked European sailors... This in turn alerted Bayrouk to the idea of establishing direct relations with European governments and traders in the hope of setting up a port which would allow both European ships and Saharan caravans to bypass the Moroccan ports to the North.⁷⁰

Inasmuch as it harks back to the predatory *Moor* and his "caravan of slaves," this idea indicates the resilience of, to borrow from the Camaroffs, "the ideological stuff" abolitionism has spawned. The Bayrouk, however, seem to have kept a breast with the shifts that inspired European traders in the Atlantic coast of West Africa to 'barter' slave trading for "legitimate commerce." Bayrouk's reported "harangue" to Cochelet (1819) and "communication" to Davidson (1835) suggest that he had begun to associate solvency with direct access to European markets at a time when abolitionism had yet to "carry the day" in Europe. One can use the similarity of the articles he, reportedly, advertised to Cochelet and Davidson with the staples the "merchants of Essaouira" were exporting to Europe to anticipate his growing resentment of the lack of a port of trade in al-Sus. Yet, Naimi and Schroeter tended to list Gulimeme among the beneficiaries from the Alawite opening of Essaouira to cater to trade with Europe.⁷¹ This suggestion tends to blur the extra expenses Susian traders had to endure as a result of the simultaneous prohibition of trade with Europeans in al-Sus. Susian traders were also subject to the increasing rights of *nizala* (lodging dues) the Alawite court had bestowed on its Haha clients, the clients who controlled the routes linking al-Sus to Essaouira.⁷²

In a seeming attempt to upstage the complaints of Susian traders like the Bayrouk, the Alawite court also invented a lofty polemic to the effect that the sultans were merely trying to spare al-Sus the dangers of desecration by *Nazarene* trespassers. The contradiction between the Alawite encouragement of European treks to Essaouira and prohibition of trade with the same *Nazarenes* in al-Sus could not have been lost on traders like Bayrouk. The desire for equality in desecration by *Nazarene* traders seems to lurk beneath Bayrouk's tendency to pin his hopes of deliverance from Essaouira's monopoly of external trade on the impossible dream of converting the sites of shipwreck into docks for merchant vessels.⁷³ But Bayrouk's search for a passage to

⁷⁰"He (Bayrouk)," Pennell added, "forced them (Europeans) to do business with him by holding for ransom European sailors shipwrecked on the coast"; Hodge, *Historical Dictionary*, 335; Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 60-61.

⁷¹Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 176-180; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 159-161.

⁷²*Nazala* (v. *nasal*: to land, to disembark): lodge, inn. In Morocco the term signifies a rest house operating on the basis of a license from the court. The license includes stipulation that the proprietor bears full responsibility for the security of the road, the traders using it and their goods. It is the equivalent of *ztata* across the Sahara. In the nineteenth century, the Haha operators of these lodges frequently used the prospect of (justifiable or frivolous) demands for compensation as an excuse to overcharge Susian traders. On this problem, see Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 161. On Susian resentment of the *nizala* dues, see al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mutama'*, 111-114.

⁷³Cochelet, *Narrative of the Shipwreck of the Sophia*, 87.

Europe can hardly be construed as evidence of the independence of his "small state." In the light of his noted commercial dispositions, it is conceivable that in return for direct trade with Europe, he might have ceded to the Alawites the same prerogatives he had 'tricked' the Ait Hasan to assume in Wadi Nun: the security of the "flock." It was the search for relief from Essaouira's monopoly of foreign trade that also led Bayrouk to seek a local port and, in the process, put his family on collision course with the court.

Besides his noted "harangue" to Cochelet in 1819, Bayrouk is credited with two other attempts to blaze a direct passage to European markets, first with Britain in 1835-36 and then with France between 1839 and 1844. Authorial fixation on the European search for a passage to Timbuktu not only blurs Bayrouk's limited agenda, but also enabled some authors to turn his quest for a port into a footnote in an Anglo-French "scramble" for the "fairy tale kingdom" that was Timbuktu. Writing in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Jackson credited the French with an endeavor to establish a "settlement" in the Atlantic coast of Wadi Nun because it was the "nearest point of coast to Timbuctoo, with which emporium they are anxious to become better acquainted."⁷⁴ In contrast, Paul Marty posited Britain's alleged deputation of Davidson to "study" the prospects of direct trade with Wadi Nun as the history behind Bayrouk's later approach to France. "Ver 1835 déjà," Marty wrote,

les Anglais avaient entrepris de faire etudier les possibilites commerciales que la region d'Oued Noun pouvait offrir. Le voyageur Davidson débarque a l'embouchure de L'oued Assaka et se rend à Glimin... Desireux de faire aboutir les projets de Davidson, les Anglais envoyerent le brick Scorpion sur la cote d'oued Noun, avec mission de s'aboucher avec Beirouk... Quand la Malouine vint à Mogador, en novembre 1839, ces (English) présents, destines à Beirouk, étaient toujours en dépôt chez le consul local.⁷⁵

From the French perspective then, Bayrouk's search for a port deserved serious consideration precisely because it signified a British "penetration" of Wadi Nun. I have noted how Davidson himself was haunted by Caillie's trek to Timbuktu and arrived in the wake of the French invasion of Algeria in 1830. Post-colonial historians such as Hodges and Pennell took this proposition at face value and credited Bayrouk with goading British and French ships to Wadi Nun and "contracting" Davidson and Delaporte to "force" direct trade on their respective countries, Britain and France. "In 1835," Hodges wrote,

Bayrouk tried to interest the British government in his plans, but a British naval vessel, the *Scorpion*, sent to bring gifts to Bayrouk, failed to negotiate a landing on the coast. Five years later, a French vessel, *La Malouine*, did succeed in landing at the mouth of the Draa, and its commander Lt. Bout, agreed with

⁷⁴ Jackson, *Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 276.

⁷⁵ Marty, "Une Tentative de Pénétration Pacifique," *Revue de L'histoire des Colonies Françaises*, 102-103. Paul Marty, "les Tribus de la haute Mauritanie," *B.C.A.F.*, 136-146, 140-141; Meige, *Le Maroc et L'Europe*, v. III, 80-85; for recent conceptions of Davidson as 'emissary' to Bayrouk, see Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 161; Ali El-M'hemdi, "Le development économique du Souss," in *La ville de Tiznit et sa Campagne*, 41-46.

Bayrouk that a port might be built at the mouth of the river Asaka (emphasis added).⁷⁶

There is no denying that Davidson's quest for a passage to Timbuktu was supported by the same British diplomat on the spot who often used Morocco's territorial integrity as a scarecrow to discourage French expansion-- ambassador Drummond Hay.⁷⁷ But if Davidson was, as Marty, Hodge and Pennell suggested, deputized to help Bayrouk to build a port, then his British patrons must have failed to educate him on the particulars of his "contract." In the previous chapter, I noted how Davidson was consumed by the prospect of speedy exit to Timbuktu. In the light of Moroccan suspicion of a *Nazarene* plot to hijack the caravan trade and Anglo-French rivalry, it is not difficult to see how Davidson's mere presence in Gulimeme might have been construed as evidence of an official British interest in Bayrouk's scheme. Yet, in what seems like an awareness of the fact that Davidson had the Alawite permission to proceed to Timbuktu, modern Shurafa historians like al-Nasiri did not dwell on his trek to Wadi Nun.⁷⁸ In contrast, post-colonial historians such as Hodge, Schroeter, Boumzgou and al-Muhammadi tended to turn Davidson's trek to Gulimeme into a sequel in a Bayrouk complicity in European trespassing in al-Sus.⁷⁹ The sense of shame lurking beneath such 'post-modern' allegations might have prompted the narrator to excise Davidson's trek to Gulimeme from the family history and to credit Bayrouk with "continuous hoisting of the government flag."⁸⁰

In comparison, Bayrouk's quest for direct trade with France can be seen as a follow-up to his much earlier proposition to Cochelet. On this occasion, Bayrouk seems to have delegated the search for a French investment in his projected port to a team from Essaouira consisting of his Jewish confidant Joseph Naftali and an enigmatic figure called Bu'aza Ibn al-Hajj Muhammad al-Suwayri, the figure Hodge identified as "Bayrouk's minister".⁸¹ Bu'aza and Naftali seem to have conveyed Bayrouk's

⁷⁶Hodge, *Historical Dictionary*, 335. "Bayrouk", Pennell recently wrote, "contracted first the British traveller John Davidson and then the French Consul, Jacques Delaporte." Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 45.

⁷⁷Davidson frequently alluded to his intimate relations with high-ranking British officials and agents in Morocco, from Lord Palmerston and Lord Glenelg down to (ambassador) Drummond Hay and consul Willshire. Davidson, *Notes*, 90, 122-123. On Hay's relations with the Alawite court see, Khalid Benshbir, "A document advocating the Introduction of economic liberalism in Morocco," *Hesperis*, XXX, 2 (1992): 76-98; Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 58-67.

⁷⁸"In Morocco," Curtin wrote, "Davidson, who had read medicine at Edinburgh, placed his knowledge at the disposal of the sultan ... The combination of Davidson's medical knowledge and Abu Bakr's (his "bad interpreter") noble ancestry was sufficient to induce the sultan ... to give them permission to proceed into the desert ... by the more westerly route from Wadi Nun across Wadi Dra." Curtin, ed. *Africa Remembered*, 155.

⁷⁹Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 161-162; Boumzgou, "Oued Noun dans Les archives de Dar Illigh," *Les Oasis de Wad Nour*, 57-83, 63; al-Muhammadi, *al-sulta wa al-mujtama'*, 108.

⁸⁰Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 277.

⁸¹Hodge, *Historical Dictionary*, 235. From the correspondence with the French Consul Delaporte Dr. Mustafa Naimi has graciously given to me, it is difficult to determine the identity of the author. The correspondence identifies the intended recipient of the letters as "the *khadim* (server) of the Sultan of the French" but is silent on the identity of the author. Unless there are missing conclusions, this silence is particularly unusual. The only full disclosure of Bu'azza's name is to found in the letter quoted by Paul Marty. This letter, however, does not correspond to any of the Arabic versions of the correspondence available to me. In contrast, Schroeter presented him as Bu'aza Ibn Mohammed al-Awwad (al-Suwayri). On the basis of Schroeter's identification, we can conclude that Bu'aza was a member of the (al-Hajj) al-Awwad family mentioned in the

proposition to agents of French (Marseille) firms stationed in Morocco and the Senegal (St. Louis). Bu'aza also traveled to Marseille and St. Louis. These protracted contacts anticipated the commission of the French "brig de Guerre", the *Malouine*, to scour the Atlantic coast of Wadi Nun in 1839. Two subsequent surveys in 1840 and 1841 eventually led the ministry of the "Marine et des Colonies" to conclude that the Atlantic coast of Wadi Nun was inhospitable to merchant shipping. Along with Panet's report, Bu'aza's mission and the dispatch of French ships of war is the body of knowledge informing Faïdherbe's much later conclusion that Bayrouk had an independent "Berber state" and by implication, the right to conduct his own foreign policy.⁸² Interpretations of the same incident by Moroccan authors tend to oscillate between the lamentation of the Bayrouk collusion with foreigners and the invocation of *bedou* gullibility as a mitigating factor to slap them with inexperience in the ways of the modern world.⁸³ Like Marty's elevation of Davidson's trek to Gulimeme to a sign of British "penetration," the demotion of Bu'aza's mission to a footnote in a spiraling Franco-Moroccan dispute also blurs the chasm separating Bayrouk's obsession with trade from the politicized interpretations it has hitherto inspired.

Firstly, I have already noted the congruity of Bayrouk's failure to deliver Timbuktu with Davidson's inclination to diagnose him as an incorrigible slave trader. In spite of his tendency to distance the *Moor* from the "spirit of civilization" and "legitimate commerce," and his complaints that he was often perceived as a *Nazarene* "spy," Davidson still found solace in Susian support for the Alawites against Britain's archrival, France. According to Davidson, Wadi Nun teamed with Alawite recruitment agents and was under the thumb of their "humbug" *zawaya* clients. In so far as conflict with France was concerned, Susians were as patriotic as the "Moors of the cities." Susian "detestation" of France enabled Davidson to regale them with "descriptions of the battle of Waterloo." In fact, mutual "detestation" of France became fodder for the decreasing number of "pleasant hours" Davidson and "the Sheikh" spent together. Yet, Bayrouk's support for the Alawite cause did not prevent him from complaining "that all his profits go into the hands of the Sultan ... by the trade through Mogador (Essaouira)." Instead of backing Bayrouk's quest for a private port, however, Davidson encouraged him to ship his merchandise to Essaouira.⁸⁴ This advice is another reminder

Bayrouk commercial ledgers—see the previous chapter. One can attribute the anonymity of the author to Bu'aza's fear of Alawite officials who were in any case closely monitoring his movements. Bu'aza was eventually apprehended and, ostensibly, sent to jail in Marrakech. For Bu'aza's encounters with French officials see, Marty, "penetration Pacifique," 104-110; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 161. For (Joseph) Naftali's career see, Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 46-50.

⁸²The captain of the *Malouine*, Bouet-Willamez, became the governor of Senegal in 1843. He was Faïdherbe's predecessor and, possibly, might have 'briefed' him on the "small Berber state" of Wadi Nun.

⁸³For terse Alawite and Simlali denunciations of the Bayrouk "connivance with Nazarene" see, Mawlai Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahman's letter to al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, *Dhul Qa'da*/29/ 1261 H (1844); Ibn Zaydan, *Ithaf a'lam al-nas*, v. 5, 420. For examples of the oscillation between the reproduction of the official interpretation and the use of *bedou* naivety as a mitigating factor see, Naimi, *Le Sahara*, 179; Bumzugo, "Oued Noun dans Les archives de Dar Illigh," *Les Oasis de Wad Noun*, 57-83, 64-65; Harakat, *al-Maghrib abr al-Tarikh*, v. 3, 465.

⁸⁴Davidson did not record Bayrouk's reaction when he "recommended (to) the Sheik to have nothing to do with the matter (squabble with France), but send his produce to Suweirah ... as I feared the port would be blockaded." Davidson, *Notes*, 125, 91, 97-98.

of the fact that the Alawites not only authorized Davidson's trek to Timbuktu, but also recommended him to the *qaid*s and devotees who arranged his encounter with Bayrouk. Whether because of his appreciation of Alawite assistance or sheer lack of interest in Moorish "legitimate commerce," Davidson did nothing that can be taken as a sign of his endorsement of Bayrouk's quest for a local port. It is too optimistic therefore to take Bayrouk's encounter with Davidson as a yardstick to measure the status of Wadi Nun vis-à-vis the dynastic realm.

Secondly, notwithstanding his British nationality and different mode of arrival in Wad Nun, Davidson treated Bayrouk's quest for a port with no less indifference than his French counterpart, Cochelet. There is in fact, nothing in Davidson's account that can be seen as evidence of either his official deputation by Britain or personal interest in Bayrouk's quest for a port. Rather, Davidson questioned the judgment of the 'merchant-diplomat' who recommended Bayrouk to him in the first place: the British Consul in Essaouira Wilshire. "I perceive that," he wrote to Wilshire,

you have a great idea of his influence, but a week's residence would convince you that ... not a soul would go out of the way to serve him, he is a mean, low, avaricious and crafty savage.⁸⁵

Under the impression that Davidson, the *tabib* (medical doctor), was enamored with trade, the Moor Bayrouk did take him for "a ride" past the proposed site of his port in Asaka. This tour, however, also coincided with Davidson's deepening resentment of Bayrouk's postponement of his departure to Timbuktu, the resentment that plotted his demotion to a "universal lover." In 'retaliation' Davidson dismissed "the reports about the great power of the Sheikh," Bayrouk, as sheer "moonshine." The conviction of Bayrouk with ineptitude also expedited the disqualification of his prospective port. According to Davidson, the proposed site was "too exposed, the surf great and the water shallow."⁸⁶ In any case, Bayrouk's "great expectations" with regard to direct trade with Britain ought to have been quashed by Davidson's 'failure' to live long enough to submit a final report on the merits and limitation of direct trade with Wadi Nun. He was killed in an unexpected raid on the Tajakant caravan he was traveling with, a raid Bayrouk immediately blamed on "the merchants of Tafielt."⁸⁷

In the wake of Davidson's death, Bayrouk seems to have been on better terms with the Alawite court than he was with his Simlali in-law, al-Husayn. Bayrouk's letter to "our friend, merchant Willshire, English vice-consul" in Essaouira, seems to confirm the fact that Davidson had the Alawite permission to proceed to Timbuktu, possibly, in

⁸⁵ Davidson, *Notes*, 125, 127.

⁸⁶ Davidson, *Notes*, 146, 153.

⁸⁷ Bayrouk entrusted Davidson's safety to one of the Tajakant trio who occupy center-stage in the family commercial registers, Sidi Muhammad al-Abd. Confidence in the Tajakant arrangements lurks beneath Bayrouk's attribution of Davidson's death to a conspiracy hatched by "the merchants of Tafielt," a suspicion Willshire duly endorsed. The conspirators were probably operating under the same illusion that Davidson's trek to Wadi Nun was part of an Anglo-Bayrouk plan to re-route the caravans towards *tariq* Gulimeme (the Gulimeme Road). The establishment of a port for direct trade with Europe would have certainly expedited such 'plan'. Davidson, *Notes*, (appendix) 202.

recognition of his medical services to Mawlai Abdul-Rahman. "As to the property of the Tibbib (doctor)," he assured Willshire,

nothing has found its way to this quarter; but should it; I will send it to you. His property will get to Tafilalt ... You had better write to the Sultan Mulai Abderrahman, to give orders to his Viceroy to seek after his books, writings and property ... As to the envy, like that of Wold Isheme (son of Hashim) and others we have heard of, you know better than any one what money the Tibbib had. ... The money which he (Davidson) lent to Mohammed El Abd make yourself easy about it; the day the caravan returns, we will get repaid, and remit it to you.⁸⁸

Bayrouk was alluding to the fact that all remittances to Davidson had to pass through the British consulate in Essaouira and, as such, would have been 'cleared' by Willshire. In another letter he admonished his envoy to Essaouira, Hajj Abid, for dwelling on the rumors, ostensibly, spun by "Wold Isheme" (the son of Hashim):

how comes it that you listen to the words of Wold Isheme, who writes to the Jew his friend, and tells him the Tibbib (medical doctor) had deposited with us the sum you mention in your letter? Why did you not answer Willshire on the point, as you saw the money he delivered over to Mohammed El Abd? God be praised, we are known not to be traitors, like Wold Isheme (son of Hashim).⁸⁹

In so far as Bayrouk's ostensible search for "an English consul" was concerned, media coverage of Davidson's death finished what the latter had begun with negative reporting. It was at this juncture that Bayrouk began to explore the prospect of a French alternative. In an ironic twist, the same way that Caillie's nationality had inspired Davidson's aborted trek to Timbuktu, the elevation of the death of the latter to martyrdom on behalf of Britain may also explain the initial French receptivity to Bayrouk's overtures.

The French coveted Bayrouk because they hoped that he, as the sovereign of what Faidherbe dubbed the "state of Wadi Nun," might help them foil a suspected British plan to hijack the "gum of Senegal". Ironically, Bayrouk's experience with the French was haunted by the same disparity in intentions that derailed his search for direct trade with their British rivals. In fact, Marty's positing of British "penetration" as the proper prelude to the arrival of the first French "brig de guerre" in Wadi Nun suggests that Bayrouk could not have chosen a worst time to parley with "les Chrétiens français," the period between the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 and their war with Morocco in 1844. The French were under the impression that Davidson was the vanguard of a British ship of war and were also anticipating war with Morocco. Befittingly, while Bayrouk strove to insulate trade from politics, his French counterparts goaded his envoy, Bu'aza, into corresponding with their consul, Jacque Delaporte, who in turn summoned in the ministries of "affaires étrangère" and "marine et des colonies."⁹⁰ Here,

⁸⁸Davidson, *Notes* (appendix), 203.

⁸⁹Davidson, *Notes* (Appendix), 205.

⁹⁰On French fears of a British hijack of the "gum of Senegal" see, Miegé, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, III, 80-85.

it is enough to indicate that this marriage of trade to foreign policy and defense is precisely the strange ways of the modern world Moroccan literati tended to use as an alibi to exonerate Susian potentates like Bayrouk from malicious intent. These insinuations may have also spawned the narrator's decision to excise encounter with a French "brig de Guerre" from the Bayrouk history. Yet, Bua'za's letters from Marseille make it difficult to credit Bayrouk with the kind of grand political agenda his French counterparts tended to infer.

Bu'aza's disillusionment makes it possible for us to imagine Bayrouk's own disappointment at the extra riders the French had saddled to his original proposal. They ranged from the dispatch of a "brig de Guerre" to insistence on the exclusion of "Chrétien des autres nations."⁹¹ In the almost identical letters attributed to a dispirited Bua'za, there is emphasis on two related issues and tacit communication of Bayrouk's surprise at the way they were handled by his French counterparts: the opening of a port and its manning with traders. According to Bua'za, the (French) recipient "should know that what is between us and you is the opening of a port." "I am," he added,

asking for a ship (loaded) with traders to come and live with me in the country and to buy and sell at Asaka, where I had left people engrossed in construction and which, has two good anchorages and near by is another good dock. ... *Send to us those who are useful for buying and selling.* If you do not like the port in the Shaykh's domain, (then) I implore Allah and you to put me in a ship heading to my country and not to leave me (stranded) in Marseille (emphasis added).⁹²

A juxtaposition of being from Essaouira with ability to commandeer "people" to carry out improvements in Asaka suggests that Bua'za was speaking for Bayrouk. The insistence on traders versed in "buying and selling" also suggests a tacit dissatisfaction with the type of ship and crew sent by his French counterparts. We can only imagine Bayrouk's surprise at the French 'retaliation' for his quest for trade with the dispatch of a "brig de guerre." Bua'za shored up his own dissatisfaction with the type of ship and crew the French had sent by deriding the ineptitude of its captain, Bouet Willaumez. According to Bua'za:

the captain (of the ship) was small boy who does not know anything. He does not know our interest or your interest. He anchored (his ship) in a place where there was no dock or anything. We told him to steer towards Asaka where there are two good docks. He refused. ... They (the ship and its crew) spent the night there and next day, around noon it (the ship) took off without my permission or that of the Shaykh (Bayrouk).⁹³

Contrary to Hodges' suggestion, Bua'za's letter indicates that Bayrouk was not even there to greet Captain Bouet-Williamuz. In other words, he missed the opportunity to express his disappointment at the absence of traders and abundance of men in uniforms.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* 110-114.

⁹² Archives Nationales, section outre mer, Afrique IV, Dos 3 (*Jumada al-Thani*, 1260 H.), 15/ 7/1844).

⁹³ Archives Nationales, section outre mer, Afrique IV, Dos 3 (*Jumada al-Thani*, 1260 H.), 15/ 7/1844); Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 161.

Bua'za was also not impressed with what seems to have been a test of the navigability of this port unknown. The ship anchored away from the shore and Bua'za and some of the crew were put in a (dummy) raft that was allowed to crash on the rocky shores. In his mind the raft crashed because its crew made to the shore without "securing" their means of transportation. In the light of the fact that the Captain had also "refused to steer towards Asaka," Bua'za took this test as a sign of incompetence. Unless there was more than one ship, Bua'za's estimate of the duration of its anchorage also contradicts Schroeter's report of "two months." In any case, the tendency of French ships to depart without Bayrouk's "permission" also thwarted the prospect of their investment in his projected port. It would, however, be naive to simply blame the failure of Bayrouk's second bid for direct trade with Europe on the combination of the French lack of interest in commerce 'without politics' and the inhospitality of the Atlantic coast of Wadi Nun to merchant shipping.⁹⁴ In the Susian context, the collapse of Bayrouk's project can be attributed to local opposition masterminded by "traitors" like his Simlali in-laws, Ali and al-Husayn Ibn Hashim.

I have already suggested an overlap between Bayrouk's bid for a port in Asaka and the descent towards the Franco-Moroccan war of 1844. Whether out of sheer "envy" of his in-law or genuine fidelity to the Alawite court, al-Husayn al Simlali led a chorus of Susian denunciations of Bayrouk's "conspiracy" with "Nazarenes of the French genome". Al-Husayn's reports to the court leave us with the impression that Bayrouk not only commenced his "Nazarene" trade, but also plucked its forbidden fruits. In a letter to Mawlai Abdul-Rahman, al-Husayn claimed to have "reprimanded" Bayrouk for his breach of Alawite trust and took credit for the organization of local opposition to his proposed port. In what seems like a vote of confidence in the ability of its *zawaya* confidants to foil Bayrouk's plans, the Alawite court merely slapped him with a "sermon" replete with the type of providential wrath that often anticipated the transfer of power from ungrateful to thankful devotees. "Nous avons," crown prince Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahman assured al-Husayn,

ecrit a Bayrouk lui interdistant le commerce avec ce chretien arrive aupres de lui et avec quiconque d'autre. Nous l'avons sermonne, exorte au bien, mis en garde energiquement. Si Dieu lui veut du bien et s'il se repent a lui (Dieu) et renonce a son action, il se sera retire pour sauvegarder son honneur et sa religion, sinon l'elan impetueux de Dieu est aux aguets. Quand a toi, mets-le en garde le plus possible et essaie de faire echouer son action avec le chretien. Nous avons craint qu'il t'embellisse cet acte odieux et que tu lui emboites le pas, mais puisque Dieu t'a preserve, nous le benissons a cette fin pour toi.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Marty, "Pénétration Pacifique," 115-116; Naimi, "La politique des chefs de la Confédération Takna face à l'expansionnisme commercial européen," *R.H.M. 11ème année n. 35-36* (Decembre 1984): 153-173; Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1938. Reliance on consular reports led Miegé to elongate Bayrouk's hunt for European 'protection' and, hence, to attribute the arrival of every European "ship of war" to an invitation from Bayrouk. Miegé also blamed the collapse of Bayrouk's negotiations with the French on "L'hostilité de Grande-Bretagne" and the demands of the Crimean War. Given Bayrouk notoriety, it is not surprising that European consuls and "commandants" should routinely embellish his activities—they had to 'file' in believable reports. See Miegé, *Le Maroc et L'Europe, Tome III*, 83-84.

⁹⁵ Mawlai Muhammad to al-Husayn al-Simlali, *Duhl Qa'da* 1261; for the French translation of this letter, see Ennaji and Pascon *Le Makhzan et le Sous Al-Aqsa*, 40-41.

To help Bayrouk "repent" and redeem "his honor and religion," Mawlai Abdul-Rahman gave him a house in Essaouira and an exemption from the export duties he had hitherto resented. In return, Bayrouk ostensibly "swore on the Quran" that he would "not return" to "connivance with Nazarenes".⁹⁶

Collectively, the failure of his two attempts, the "envy" of his Simlali in-laws and Alawite 'magnanimity', might have tempted Bayrouk to put off his hunt for a private port in Wadi Nun. In the period between the collapse of negotiations with the French and Bayrouk's own death in 1858 he seems to have settled for the use Gulimeme as a conduit between the caravan and the European ships that frequented Essaouira. This period also corresponds to the gradual delegation of matters of trade to his oldest son Muhammad, the delegation amply reflected in the family commercial registers. Contrary to the sense of continuity implied by consular reports and endorsed by authors like Naimi and Schroeter, the Alawite and Simlali silences indicate that Bayrouk lived up to his oath and accepted his position as a "devotee." In the same way that he had waited until the death of his brother Ibrahim before acting on his desire for direct trade with Europe, Bayrouk's own death in 1858 led his two oldest sons, Muhammad and al-Habib, to revive the search for a local port, albeit with starkly different effect on the family status vis-à-vis the Alawite court.

IV-Waiting for "Riches at Home": From Devotee to *Qa'id*

A man should not simply wait for riches at home! Shaykh Bayrouk⁹⁷

According to al-Susi's informant, Bayrouk left his wealth to "fourteen sons" and an undisclosed number of daughters. One can take Naimi's identification of one of these daughters in terms of her marriage to crown prince Mawlai al-Hasan, as a sign that her sisters were also the casualties of the narrator's tendency to excise underachievers from the family saga.⁹⁸ In chapter two, I noted that only three of Bayrouk's reported "fourteen sons," were able to make it to the family saga: Mohammad, al-Habib and Dahman I. There is a tacit connection between the narrator's allusion to these three figures and his assessment of their role in the political melodrama leading to Mawlai al-Hasan's 'conquest' of Gulimeme in 1886. It is worth recalling that Mawlai al-Hasan's trip to Gulimeme further confirmed the choice of the narrator's grandfather, *Qaid* Dahman I, as the Alawite agent on the spot and, in that capacity, the main signifier of the congruity of being a Bayrouk with being an adjutant of the court.

While he did not dwell on the legalistic aspects of the division of Bayrouk's assets, the narrator named Muhammad as the oldest son and successor to his father's political position.⁹⁹ It is tempting to take the lapse between Muhammad's own death in early

⁹⁶These concessions were summed up in Mawlai Muhammad's letter of instructions to his foreign minister and the head of the Moroccan delegation to Spain, Mawlai al-Abbas, after the 1860 (Titwan) war. Ibn Zaydan, *Ithaf al-nass*, v. 5, 420.

⁹⁷Panet, *Première Exploration*, 56.

⁹⁸Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 278; Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1937.

⁹⁹In accordance with Islamic precepts, two thirds of Bayrouk's assets ought to have been distributed amongst his "fourteen sons". In contrast, there are no legal guidelines pertaining to the 'distribution' of power-- very much like piety, one has to 'work' for it.

1879 and Mawlai al-Hasan's arrival in 1886 as an indicator of his succession by the oldest surviving sibling, al-Habib. After all, the narrator mentions that al-Habib lived until 1902. Using "connivance with Nazarenes" as an eraser of right to leadership, however, the narrator decorated al-Habib as the black sheep of the family and presented the 'loyalist' Dahman as Muhammad's rightful successor.¹⁰⁰ But Dahman did not wait for Muhammad to die before inheriting his leadership prerogatives. Rather, Dahman's assumption of the leadership of the *Ait Jamal* alignment seems to have either coincided with or presaged Muhammad's migration from Gulimeme to Tarfaya in 1873, about six years before his death in early 1879. The narrator's location of al-Habib and Dahman at the opposite ends of the political spectrum tends to discourage any attempt to credit Muhammad with unfettered ability to speak for a cohesive Bayrouk family. Matters of trade aside, Muhammad's defection to Tarfaya in 1873 and by default, his surrender of leadership to Dahman tends to second this proposition. There seems to be a casual relation between the narrator's tacit predication of Dahman's assumption of leadership in Wadi Nun on Muhammad's relocation in Tarfaya and his depiction of al-Habib as the violator of the Alawite faith in the family.

As the biological descendant and political heir of Dahman I, the narrator might have been tempted to clear his grandfather of disrespect for a senior brother with redeeming qualities such as Muhammad. In comparison to al-Habib and Dahman, Muhammad "excelled" in *tijarat al-Sudan* and "surpassed his *ahl* (people) in the return to *Allah* and in proverbial Arab generosity." His habit of setting huge dishes "filled with Cuscus every evening" and calling on people to dine "for the sake of *Allah*" made him "known to" and respected by his Alawite contemporary, Mawlai Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Rahaman.¹⁰¹ The juxtaposition of excellence in *tijarat al-Sudan* with commendable "return to *Allah*" suggests an investiture with those redeeming qualities the narrator often reserved for founding ancestors like Sulayman (Tuwat) and Ibn Saud (Wadi Nun). Infatuation with such redeeming qualities also led the narrator to blame Muhammad's subsequent "invitation of English traders" to Tarfaya on a bout of drought and "famine" that swept al-Sus and al-Saqiya al-Hamra. The narrator posited the congruity of Muhammad's entanglement with "English traders" with his "provision of rice" to famished Saharans to blur a deed that puts him at par with al-Habib: the breach of Alawite prohibition of trade with *Nazarenes* outside the confines of Essaouira. In so far as the narrator was concerned, Tarfaya became a security headache for the court and, one might add, a blemish on the Bayrouk's record, only after Muhammad's death "towards the beginning of 1297 (1879)."¹⁰² Indeed, according to al-Gharbi, it was Mawlai Muhammad who armed Muhammad Ibn Bayrouk with the *zaheer* of his appointment as "*wali* (governor) of al-Saqiya al-Hamra" and, later, instructed him to head to Tarfaya to foil "the English ambitions in those areas."¹⁰³ The inversion of defection to Tarfaya to a mission to save hungry Saharans or to fend off foreign invaders also enabled the narrator to bypass the political overtones of Muhammad's

¹⁰⁰ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 277-281; 'Alal Lakhadimi, "Al-nazayil wa al-muwaslat wa al-tadakhul al-ajnabi," *Hesperis*, 31 (1993), 7-21.

¹⁰¹ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v. 19, 278.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 278.

¹⁰³ Al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 181.

"connivance with *Nazarenes*" and, hence, to present Dahman as his devoted deputy in Wadi Nun since 1873 and rightful heir after 1879.

The accounts of the Senegalese pilgrim Bou al-Moghdad and the Spanish explorer Gatell tacitly support the narrator's investiture of Muhammad with the inheritance of Bayrouk's political prerogatives. In contrast to Bou al-Moghdad, Gatell dwelled on the names of Bayrouk's surviving sons and estimated the ages of Muhammad and al-Habib as well as their wealth in children.¹⁰⁴ In spite of the minor differences in their respective presentations of the Bayrouk relation to the caravan and the dynasty, Bou al-Moghdad (1861) and Gatell (1869) leave us with the impression that Muhammad was in charge of a united family. By reconciling the family involvement in the caravan trade with its indefatigable service to the crown, Muhammad kept a leash on all his siblings and was also able to enhance the Bayrouk positional superiority. Bu al-Moghdad's notation of the Alawite appreciation of Muhammad's services tends to shore up Gatell's suggestion that he exerted "great influence" over al-Habib and Dahman. "Après la mort de Beyrouk," Gatell wrote,

le droit de succession devait revenir et revint à Mohammad, en sa qualité de fils aîné, et bien qu'il soit officiellement, comme nous dirions, le premier représentant du pays, tous ses frères jouissent d'une autorité plus ou moins large qui leur permet de se mêler des affaires; le peuple les a en considération, et ils font sentir leur influence non-seulement sur le Ouad-Noun, mais jusqu'à l'extrémité du territoire de Tekna. Les Arabes se présentent indistinctement devant l'une ou l'autre des fils de Beyrouk pour exposer leurs affaires ou questions, et la décision du chef est sans appel. Après Mohammed, ceux qui ont le plus d'influence sont El-Habib et Dahman.¹⁰⁵

The notion of familial harmony, however, becomes sustainable only if one also ignores the possible impact of the Moroccan loss to Spain in 1860 on the relations between the Alawite court and the Bayrouk. It is worth noting that the Moroccan defeat and the peace settlement that enshrines their territorial concessions to Spain preceded Gatell's own trek to Wadi Nun.

The overlap between Muhammad's tenure in office with the Moroccan defeat by and territorial concessions to Spain makes it injudicious to pass on the conceivable impact of this shift in the balance of power on the Bayrouk relations with an embattled Alawite court. In so far as al-Sus is concerned, the Alawites conceded the Spanish right to reclaim a coastal fort called "Santa Cruz" which the Portuguese had lost to the Sa'dians back in the sixteenth century.¹⁰⁶ It goes without saying that concession of the

¹⁰⁴Bou Moghdad, "Voyage de Si Bou Moghdad," *Nouvelles Annales des Voyages*: 257-270; Gatell, "L'ouad-Noun et le Tekna," 257-277.

¹⁰⁵Gatell, "L'ouad Noun et le Tekna," 178. According to Bou Moghdad the Alawite court sent envoys to Gulimeme to encourage Muhammad to send his merchandise to Essaouira. Bou el Moghdad, "Du Tiris à L'Oued Noun," in *Voyages et Explorations*, ed Barbier: 168-173, 172.

¹⁰⁶In so far as the Spanish were concerned the historic "Santa Cruz" was none other than modern Agadir. Their Moroccan counterparts vehemently disputed this suggestion and as a result, the exact location of the space the Alawites had ceded to Spain became a subject of further negotiations. On the history behind this dispute see, Sidki Ali Izaykou, "Mémoires à propos de la construction et de la chute de la forteresse portugaise de "Santa Cruz" à Agadir Ighir," in *Actes du Colloque sur l'Agglomération du Grand Agadir*:

Spanish right to locate and repossess "Santa Cruz" also entails the right to deal with the inhabitants of its hinterland, the Susians. The question of how the Bayrouk brothers might have reacted to the prospect of Spanish presence in al-Sus is a subject that remains to be seen. For now it is enough to note that there is nothing in the Bayrouk narrative that can be used to shore up the idea that Muhammad enjoyed "great influence" over both al-Habib and Dahman. Rather, the narrator's explicit association of Muhammad's reign with increase in European incursions provides a better context for an explanation of the collision of the visions of the future entertained by *awlad* (sons of) Bayrouk, the collision that also seems to have preceded Muhammad's decision to relocate in Tarfaya.

The Alawite concession of the Spanish right to reclaim "Santa Cruz" amounted to an excision of al-Essaouira's monopoly over direct trade with Europe. The narrator posited the prospect of direct trade with Europeans as the reason behind al-Habib's trek to Asaka. It was in Asaka that al-Habib reportedly negotiated a deal with an anonymous Spanish trader. Consular reports support this proposition but they also spun time frames and sites for other clandestine negotiations between al-Habib and various Europeans.¹⁰⁷ In contrast, the Alawite correspondence with Susian confidants like the Simlali teams with lamentations of "*awlad Bayrouk's*" sacrifice of "their religion for this world," and strident denunciations of their "connivance with *Nazarenes* of the Spanish genus." In what sounds like an attempt to forestall the specter of collective guilt, some of al-Habib's own relatives joined the ranks of the Alawite informants.¹⁰⁸

The consensus on al-Habib's contacts with "foreigners" on the written front, contrasts sharply with the dearth of concrete references to the exact sites of his "intrigues." Hodges's account, for example, elevates al-Habib's encounter with Spanish traders to a far more sinister conspiracy than the Alawite correspondence with Susian elites and the Bayrouk narrative seems to warrant. "In 1860....," he wrote,

El-Habib sent an envoy to Tetuan, which had been occupied by Spanish troops in February, offering to aid the Spanish by attacking the sultan from the south. ... The Spanish took care to insert a clause in the ensuing peace treaty with Morocco (May 1860) recognizing their rights to establish a base ... on the old site of Santa Cruz... In consequence three Spanish explorers (Butler, Puyana and Silva) landed on Oued Noun coast in 1867, brought al-Habib to Lanzarote, in the Canary Islands and signed a commercial treaty with him. However, on

109-122; De Cénival, *Tarikh Santa Cruz-Agadir*, trans. Ahmed Sabir (Agadir: Kuliat al-Adab, Jama't Ibn Zuhr, 1994).

¹⁰⁷For examples of these consular reports see, Jean-Louis Miegé, *Documents d'histoire économique et sociale marocaine au XIX siècle*, (Paris: 1969): 110-118.

¹⁰⁸For examples of Alawite acknowledgements of Susian reports on al-Habib see, Mawlai Muhammad to al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, 11 *Raba' al-thani*, 1278 H. (1861); Mawlai Muhammad to Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Ubaydallah Ibn Salem 5 *Raba' al-Thani*, 1278 H. (1861); Mawlai Muhammad to al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, 13 Muharam, 1279 H. (1862); Mawlai Muhammad to al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, 1 *Raba'* 1283 H. (1866); Mawlai Muhammad to *Qa'id* Humayda Ibn Ali al-Sharki, 1 *Raba'* 1283 H. (1866); al-Husayn Ibn Hashim to Mawlai al-Hasan, *Raba'* 1283 (1866); for French translation of the Alawite-Simlali correspondence see, Ennaji and Pascon, *Le Makhzan et Le Sous al-Aqsa*, 53-68.

their return to the mainland, El-Habib changed his tone and imprisoned the three Spaniards until 1874 (emphasis added).¹⁰⁹

In contrast, Schroeter's summary of the Moroccan and European reports on al-Habib's activities tends to highlight the disparity between such conspiracy thrillers and the realities they purportedly describe. "After the death of Sheikh Bayrouk," Schroeter wrote,

his son Habib resumed contacts with foreign vessels along the coast. In 1861, Husayn (al-Simlali) ... reported to the Palace about a *Spanish ship communicating with Habib* ... the following year, *another three foreign ships were reported at Wad Noun*, where Habib Bayrouk *had prepared* some 30 camel loads of merchandise ... In 1864, *fresh rumours about intrigues between Habib Bayruk and the Christians* reached the Sultan. In 1865, *secret negotiations took place on several fronts*. (The French consul) Beaumier reported in 1866 that Habib Bayrouk *had travelled to Tenerife and Cadiz* to discuss commercial relations with Spain. He was alleged ... to have *begun negotiations with the British vice-consul* ... when these allegations reached the palace, warnings were issued to the Sous regions (emphasis added).¹¹⁰

A cross-referencing of the Moroccan and European reports with the Bayrouk narrative enables us to trace these tantalizing scenarios back to the events leading to and branching out from al-Habib's encounter with the vanguard of the Spanish trade mission led by Jacobo Butler.¹¹¹ The narrator, for instance, centered all of al-Habib's activities on his meeting with "Spaniard who descended from the Ocean looking for a trade partner."¹¹²

The narrator did not associate the ship-less al-Habib with maritime treks to Tenerife and Cadiz or contacts with every European ship passing by or camping off the Atlantic coast of al-Sus. Instead, he credited the coastal *Ait Jamal* 'protectorates', the Awlad Tedrarin, with "bringing in" the Spaniard trader to al-Habib while he was in Asaka. Al-Habib and this anonymous trader struck a deal that fell apart with "great losses" to al-Habib as a result of the failure of his Spanish counterpart to arrive at the agreed time. Al-Habib was left with no option but to "return" to Gulimeme where he was "chided" by his relations and was "warned" by Alawite envoys. Unlike his father, Bayrouk, al-Habib failed to read the writing on the wall. What happened next was to become an unwanted additive to the on-going Moroccan-Spanish tug over the whereabouts of "Santa Cruz" and, as such, a delectable fodder for much of the reports descending on the Alawite court and European foreign ministries. "One day", al-Susi reported,

¹⁰⁹Hodges, *Historical Dictionary*, 335-336.

¹¹⁰Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 80-81. For examples of such tantalizing consular reports see, Flex Mathew, "Northwest Africa and Tmbuctu," *Journal of The American Geographical Society*, 13, (1881): 196-219; Miegé, *Documents d'histoire économique*, 117.

¹¹¹According to the American consul, Mathews, Spanish traders often "took advantage of the confidence" Susians put on traders and, as a result, "created a bad impression" of Europeans. On Jacobo Butler's mission and his subsequent detention in Wadi Nun, see Mathews, "Northwest Africa," 199-200. On the diplomatic implications of this detention see, Miegé, *le Maroc et L'Europe*, tome 3, 322-327; Miegé, *Documents*, 116-123; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 187-188.

¹¹²Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 278.

the Spaniard appeared with two of his friends. They came from Essaouira on mules. Al-Habib said to them: 'my property has been lost' – and he claimed that it was worth 100000 rials- and 'you are hereby detained until I get recompense'. The Spaniards sent for the money and after ... it arrived al-Habib set them free.¹¹³

Al-Habib's escapade not only perturbed the Alawite court, but also shattered the façade of unity *awlad* Bayrouk might have managed to display to outsiders in the wake of the death of their father. In comparison to Bayrouk, he was not simply served with a "sermon" nor given the opportunity to "redeem his honor and religion." Rather, al-Habib's breach of the Alawite prohibition of trade with *Nazarenes* and seeming vindication of the tendency of European observers to locate al-Sus outside the Moroccan dynastic realm also became the catalyst for his banishment from Gulimeme and the coronation of Dahman as an official Alawite *qaid*.

In a tacit attempt to exonerate Dahman from complicity in al-Habib's flight from Gulimeme, the narrator fell back on the textual tradition that turns the *qabila* into an auxiliary of the dynasty. None of the extant sources credits the Alawites with the dispatch of a punitive expedition against al-Habib. Yet, the narrator was still able to attribute his flight to one of the *qusur* of the *Ait Osman* allies of the Azwafit, the Ait Brahim, to the 'long reach' of the "government." "When the news (about al-Habib's escapade) reached the government," al-Susi reported,

it incited the *qaba'il* to destroy his (al-Habib) house and it was leveled to the ground. He fled to Taghjijt (Ait Brahim) and (later) contacted (crown prince) Mawlai al-Hasan who set him up in Marrakech at his expense. He (al-Hasan) gave him (al-Habib) a piece of land to cultivate and then, (after his coronation as sultan) brought him to Gulimeme in the year 1303 (1886) where he remained in his house until his death in 1320 H. (1902).¹¹⁴

In one stroke, then, the "government" was able to demote al-Habib from a son of estimable caravan traders to a *falah* (peasant)! The narrator's rendition of this incident is strikingly similar to its presentations in Alawite correspondence and Shurafa biographies. In a letter to his foreign minister and head of the Moroccan delegation in the negotiations with Spain, Mawlai al-Abbas, sultan Mawlai Muhammad posited the events leading to Bayrouk's "repentance" as the background to his denunciation of al-Habib's abjuration of "his religion and connivance with *Nazarenes*." Al-Abbas was armed with the reports sent by the Bayrouk in-law, al-Husayn Ibn Hashim al-Simlali, but was warned not to raise this issue with his Spanish counterpart unless the later brought it in first. In that case, he was to tell his Spanish peer that "the *qaba'il* in that area had cast the son of Bayrouk (al-Habib) out." The letter ends with a supplication to Allah to "hasten his (al-Habib) demise."¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 278; Mawlai Muhammad to Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim 5 *Raba' al-thani*, 1278 H. (1861); Mawlai Muhammad to al-Husayn Ibn Hashim, 13 *Muharam*, 1279 H. (1862).

¹¹⁴ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 278. For this letter, see Ibn Zaydan, *lithaf la'lam al-nass*, v. 5, 420-421.

¹¹⁵ For this letter see, Ibn Zaydan, *lithaf la'lam al-nass*, v. 5, 420-421.

The narrator's attribution of al-Habib's misfortune to the "government" contrasts sharply with his silence on Muhammad's whereabouts during these events. This silence also corresponds to the lack of specific references to Muhammad in the Alawite correspondence with Susian informants. In this correspondence, however, the plural *awlad* (sons of) Bayrouk routinely comes across as a signifier for recognizable conspirators with *Nazarene* trespassers. In contrast, the narrator seems to consider al-Habib's abortive experiment with the Spanish far more sinister than Muhammad's successful transactions with "English foreign traders" in Tarfaya. One can use the Azwafit recollections of the same event to bypass the disparity between the frequent presentation of al-Habib as a traitor and the tacit silence on Muhammad and Dahman's role in the events leading to his flight to Taghjijt and subsequent 'exile' in Marrakech.¹¹⁶ A collation of the narrator's testimony with Azwafit traditions can enable us to surmise the identity of the *qabail* the "government" had deputized to put al-Habib on the run and, hence, to bypass his brothers' seeming lack of involvement.

In the Azwafit traditions synthesised by Naimi, al-Habib appears as a participant in their repetitive, albeit futile, attacks on Gulimeme and its "Sunday market." It is no coincidence that al-Habib's defection to the Azwafit should take place after his reported flight to Taghjijt and before his "contact" with Mawlai al-Hasan, the "contact" that led to his relocation in Marrakech.¹¹⁷ In contrast, the narrator identified the Azwafit as "Dahman's constant foes." Indeed, according to the narrator, it was Dahman's "sound stratagem" that enabled Gulimeme to withstand repetitive Azwafit attacks.¹¹⁸ Dahman's *Ait Jamal* allies were, therefore, the most likely "*qabail*" the "government" had reportedly incited to evict al-Habib from Gulimeme and, by default, to excise his right to succeed Muhammad. The narrator, however, did not reveal Muhammad's role in what was or had become a contest between his younger brothers. One can conclude that al-Habib's loss to Dahman was not simply the result of his breach of Alawite prohibition of connivance with "Nazarenes of the Spanish genome." By joining hands with the "thieving" Azwafit his ancestors had come to revile, al-Habib had also ceased to be a good (*Ait Jamal*) Ait Musa and, as such, was unfit for leadership. In the same way that his entanglement with Spanish traders had cost him the goodwill of the Alawite court, al-Habib's defection to the *Ait Osman* Azwafit amounts to a repudiation of his *Ait Jamal* identity. It is tempting to imagine what al-Habib-- as a 'guest' of an agrarian Ait Osman constituency, the Ait Brahim, or a 'lonely' *falah* in the vicinity of Marakech-- might have become had the newly crowned sultan, Mawlai al-Hasan, not provided him with a chance to redeem himself and to re-enter Gulimeme under royal protection. By the time of his return to Gulimeme, however, al-Habib was too broken to pose any threat to Dahman's position. After all, Dahman's assumption of leadership was sanctioned by the same "institution" that supervised al-Habib's return to his Ait Musa roots: the Alawite court.

¹¹⁶In Susian narratives, there is a tacit agreement to charge al-Habib with betrayal of the Alawite trust, the charge first adumbrated by the Alawite court and its localized clients and, inadvertently, European consulates. These narratives were synthesized by al-Susi and endorsed by authors like Naimi, Boumzugu and Schroeter. Al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v. 20, 12-14; Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 134-135; Boumzugu, "Oued Noun dans les archives de Dar Illigh," 65-66; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 80-81.

¹¹⁷On Taghjijt see, Naimi, "Taghjijt," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, tome 6 (1992): 2068-2071.

¹¹⁸On the Azwafit 'adoption' of al-Habib see, Naimi, "Bayrouk," *Encyclopédie du Maroc*, 1935; on Dahman's 'dislike' for the Azwafit see, al-Susi, *al-ma'sul*, v.19, 279-280.

From three letters going back to 1873, 1877 and 1881, there seems to be a connection between Mawlai al-Hasan's ascent to the throne and his rehabilitation of al-Habib. The first letter (Feb. 1873) was probably written in response to al-Habib's plea for Mawlai al-Hasan's assistance, following the failure of his alliance with the Azwafit. Crown prince al-Hasan chided him for his breach of faith. He reminded al-Habib that the Bayrouk earned their stature and "the deference of people in these areas" courtesy of the "intensity of their devotion to our (Alawite) estimable ancestry." The second and third letters indicate that al-Habib had been excused by sultan al-Hasan and was posted as a "*khadeem*" (server) in the same area that witnessed his fall out with the court, the Atlantic coast of Wadi Nun. He was commended for the information he provided on Spanish "intrigues" and local "conspirators" who included "his brothers," possibly Muhammad in Tarfaya. These were probably the services that enabled al-Habib to "redeem his honour," win al-Hasan's trust and, hence, approval of his return to Gulimeme.¹¹⁹

It is difficult to reconcile Gatell's investiture of Muhammad with "great influence" over his brothers with his seeming inability to either control al-Habib or to upstage Dahman. To make sense of the narrator's silence on Muhammad's whereabouts, one would have either to divest him of leadership of the "*qabail*" or charge him with complicity in the eviction of al-Habib from Gulimeme. By collating Muhammad's departure to Tarfaya with al-Habib's flight to Taghijit, however, we can credit them both with a joint search for the forbidden, *Nazarene*, trade. One can take the congruity of the Alawite ascription of "connivance with *Nazarenes*" to the plural "*awlad Bayrouk*" with the narrator's tacit refusal to dwell on Muhammad's relations with the "government" as an indicator of his possible use of al-Habib as a dummy to test Alawite reaction to direct trade with Europeans. After all, Muhammad had achieved in distant Tarfaya, al-Saqiya al-Hamra, precisely what had eluded Bayrouk and al-Habib in nearby Asaka, Wadi Nun: a port for direct trade with Europeans.

In a manner reminiscent of Bayrouk's population of Gulimeme with 'foreign' traders and quest for Europeans who were good at "buying and selling", Muhammad "invited" the British engineer, Donald Mackenzie, to Tarfaya and according to Pennell "ceded" its port to his upstart North-West Africa Company. "Bayrouk," Pennell wrote,

died in 1859 and in 1880, one of his quarrelsome sons, Mohammed, opened a trading station at Tarfaya. His partner was an eccentric British adventurer named Donald Mackenzie... In 1879 he set up the North West Africa Company and persuaded Mohammed Bayrouk to cede him strip of land at Tarfaya.¹²⁰

This chronology of events does not conform to either the narrator's recollection or the Moroccan textual sources that seems to have inspired it. While Bayrouk did not live up to

¹¹⁹ Mawlai al-Hasan to al-Habib Ibn Bayrouk, 20 *Dhul-Haja* 1289 H. (1873); Mawlai al-Hasan to al-Habib, 3 *Muharam*, 1294 H. (1878); Mawlai al-Hasan to al-Habib, 2 *Ramadan* 1299 H. (1881)—copies in my possession.

¹²⁰ Pennell, *Morocco Since 1830*, 101; for the short history of this company and lamentation of Qaid Dahman's "arousal of the fanaticism of the tribes" see, Robert Lee, "the North-West Coast of Africa," *The Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society*, v. 11, n 4-6, (April-June, 1886): 145-167, 146-149; Donald Mackenzie, *The flooding of the Sahara: An account of the proposed plan for opening Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the North West Coast* (London: Sampson Low, 1877).

1859, Muhammad is reported to have died in early 1879. It is conceivable that Muhammad coveted trade with Europe to the extent that he would "invite" traders like Mackenzie to his new port at Tarfaya. But the idea that he, a fugitive, was able to cede land that belonged to his *qabila* hosts, the Azraqayn, to Mackenzie smacks of invention. In fact, Mackenzie made this claim to back up his application for a "charter" from the British government that would enable his North-West Africa Company to deflect opposition to its activities in the early 1880s—i.e. after Muhammad's death. In combination, the British refusal to grant a "charter" and "the fanaticism of the tribes" put the company's fortunes in jeopardy. Interestingly, emphasis on tribal "fanaticism" led Mackenzie to blur the role of the Alawite court and its deputy, *Qaid* Dahman I, in the events leading to the destruction of the headquarters of the North-West Africa Company.

Tarfaya's distance from al-Sus did not dissuade the Alawite court from classifying Muhammad's "English" guests as *Nazarene* trespassers. Ironically, Muhammad's activities in Tarfaya also convinced the Alawite court of the need to designate a Susian port for direct trade with Europe. During his second visit to al-Sus, Mawlai al-Hasan proclaimed Asaka as the site that would cater to Susian desire for a local port. But in a manner reminiscent of the replacement of Agadir with Essaouira, Mawlai al-Hasan also made the opening of Asaka for trade with Europe contingent on the "closure" of the "whole" (*thulma*) Muhammad had drilled in Tarfaya.¹²¹ The closure of Tarfaya and the eviction of its "English foreign traders" soon became an Alawite priority and, in that sense, also solidified the 'prescription' of Dahman as the best antidote to his brothers' inclination to barter their "religion and honour" for trade with *Nazarenes*.¹²² The narrator shared the official positing of *Nazarene* trespassing in al-Sus and its Saharan backyards as the driving force behind Mawlai al-Hasan's descent on Gulimeme in 1886. In the same way that al-Habib's encounter with Spanish traders had expedited Dahman's rise to leadership, the Alawite attempt to rectify what Muhammad had done in Tarfaya plotted his designation as the indisputable "*qaid* of the *Ait Jamal*" and the "absolute government doyen (*amid*) in all of these areas": Wadi-Nun and al-Saqiya al-Hamra.¹²³ Dahman did not disappoint his Alawite mentors. He 'closed' Tarfaya and repatriated Muhammad's "children" to Gulimeme.

Besides his depiction as the redeemer of the family honour al-Habib had tarnished, *Qaid* Dahman also became the bleach for the "dark spot" the opening of Tarfaya had ostensibly inflicted on the Bayrouk's "clean slate." This discursive posture underpins the narrator's imagination of what the Bayrouk had become under *Qaid* Dahman's leadership as well as what is it that he had done differently from his older brothers. In his dual capacity as the "absolute" Alawite deputy on the spot and the signifier of being a Bayrouk, *Qaid* Dahman was credited with the eviction of "English foreign traders" from Tarfaya as well as the repatriation of Muhammad's "children" to Gulimeme. Loyalty to the crown and the reunification of the family also presaged Dahman's decapitation of his "constant enemies," the Azwafit, and "annihilation" of (Ait Umran) "conspirators" in Asaka. He then enlisted the *al-Qaid* al-Tamanarti family against his Simlali in laws. Dahman handed

¹²¹ On this trade off, see al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v.3 (9), 180-182.

¹²² Al-Nasiri, *al-Istiqsa*, v. 3 (9), 174-182; Schroeter, *Merchants of Essaouira*, 167-195

¹²³ Al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 279

al-Husayn his last humiliating defeat and, as a result, also emerged as the supreme leader of the *Iqzulin* party.¹²⁴

Qaid Dahman also indulged in territorial expansion that established his image as an "arrogant" scourge of *qabila* ensembles and *zawaya* centres from the Anti-Atlas in the north to Takant (Mauritania) in the south. It is perhaps ironic that Dahman's aggrandizement should come at a time when his Alawite patrons were struggling to ward off the European "scramble" for the verdant, Mediterranean, core of the Moroccan dynastic realm. According to al-Susi, however, Dahman became invincible courtesy of the "machine guns" and soldiers Mawlai al-Hasan had "assigned" to help him apprehend "foreign trespassers".¹²⁵ In that sense, the dynasty occupied centre-stage in the narrator's conception of the Bayrouk history precisely because it was the "institution" that empowered his grandfather, *Qaid* Dahman I. While it historicizes the narrator's official position, the adumbration of the dynasty's gift to the Bayrouk also blurs the real genesis of the family power, the caravan.

In comparison to his ancestors, *Qaid* Dahman did not make his mark either as an avid caravan trader or a pious Alawite "devotee." Rather, he is mostly remembered as a wily politician and an "arrogant" deputy. Yet, it would be difficult to explain Dahman's emergence either as a 'secular' *qabila* potentate or an "arrogant" Alawite *Qaid* without reference to the prolonged association of his ancestors with the caravan and their frantic search for markets for its produce. In much the same way that it has plotted the most enduring signifier of being a Bayrouk, the caravan is also the main frame of reference for the extant authorial explanations of the family origin and history. The presentation of *Qaid* Dahman as a consummate "warrior" and wily politician distances him from Bayrouk only to the extent that it puts him at par with Ubaydallah and his senior sons, Hamad and Ibrahim. In contrast, Muhammad comes across as a reincarnation of the pious Ibn Saud and the peaceable Bayrouk. The significance of this distinction is enshrined in the narrators' tacit modeling of Muhammad after those ancestors who lived by piety and trade rather than conquest and tribute. Yet, as a means of social existence, *Qaid* Dahman used the conquest of space and the fleecing of its occupants as guarantors for a status originally made possible by modes of caravan trading that had seemingly out-lived their purpose. It was time to embrace the dynasty and to retire the caravan.

Whether in their capacity as traders or adjutants of sultans, the Bayrouk ability to accumulate resources and to concentrate power tends to subvert the main tenets of the ethnographic notion of the autonomous and egalitarian tribe. Firstly, even if we ignore the frequency and variability of their foreign connections, the Bayrouk population of Gulimeme with outsiders and their transformation of the Ait Musa *qabila* into a company of traders hardly support the idea of tribal segmentation or autonomy. Even if we ignore the historical experience underpinning the Takna tendency to imagine their origin in terms of birth in the bosom of the dynastic realm, the Bayrouk deployment of trade to tamper

¹²⁴ Ibid; 279-280. Al-Husyan died shortly after (1886)

¹²⁵ In the Western Sahara he deployed the Takna and Rgaybat to defeat a Kunta "pretender" and advanced as far as Takant (Mauritania) where an ostensibly frightened Shaykh Bakar Ibn Suwayd (of the Idaw'ash), "gave him his daughter" in marriage: she was also the mother of one of his sons. Dahman then turned against the Rgaybat and used the "machine guns" supplied by the Alawites to 'pacify' them. On Dahman's Saharan conquests, see al-Susi, *al-masul*, v.19, 279; al-Gharbi, *al-Saqiya al-Hamra*, 181-183; Muhammad Salim, *Les Principales Preoccupations des Rgaybat*, ed. trans. Naimi, 87-88, 92-93.

with the make-up of their community, the Takna, tends to highlight the pitfalls of the translation of *qabila* to tribe and, in effect, the irrelevance of notions like segmentation, ineffable attachment and autonomy. As the product of encounters with the dynasty, the *zawiya* and the caravan, the Takna ensemble is more similar to malleable interest groups than it was to tribal agnates or lineages. It should come as no surprise to us that the Bayrouk and their Takna brethren designated writing as the ultimate guarantor of the terms and modes of social interactions ethnographers routinely entrust to kinship.

Secondly, seen in the light of what the foreign founders of the *zawaya* had accomplished in the same space, the Bayrouk ability to impose themselves as the hereditary leaders of the Ait Musa *qabila* or the Ait Jamal constellation also belies another ethnographic conventional wisdom, the entwinement of egalitarianism with "balanced opposition." I have noted how the ethnographic conflation of tribalism with equity in power has spawned the historiographical oscillation between acknowledgement of the role of *qabila* in the production of the state and its location outside the dynastic realm: the *bled es siba-bled el-Makhzan* dichotomy. Here, even if one were to ignore the textual genesis of this trope, the Bayrouk monopoly of power and the contingent nature of their collusion or collision with the court not only subverts the notion of equity in power, but also blurs the ostensible border between the realm of *qabila* and the domain of the sultan. Like the notions of autonomy and egalitarianism, the idea of equality was also made possible by the translation of *qabila* to tribe.

CONCLUSIONS BORN IN THE TEXT

Fetters of Textuality, Casualties of Translation

In the introduction to this thesis, I noted that the Bayrouk conception of identity and history is anchored on three main premises: affiliation with a bounded *qabila*, the Takna of Wadi Nun, service to Shurafa sultans, the dynasty, and involvement in the Trans-Saharan Trade, the caravan. I added that what the Bayrouk posit as 'essences' of social existence are also the main grids of academic discourses on Moroccan (and Maghribian) history and identities. But the similarity in premises also masks stark differences between the Moroccan and Africanist conceptions of *qabila* modes of identification. In Moroccan texts, there are no contradictions between affiliation with *qabila* and living "in the shadow of the sultan," the *zawiya* or the caravan. Indeed, the Moroccan *qabila* occupies the same space coveted by dynasts and *zawaya*, and traversed by caravans. In such academic treatises *qabila* is entrapped in the webs of power and knowledge that permeated its space and, as such, enters the text courtesy of encounter with their temporal custodians, the imperious sultan, the dynasty, and the *sufi* savant, the *zawiya*.

In contrast, colonial and post-colonial ethnographers posited the dynasty and the *qabila* as metaphors for parallel geopolitical settings, *bled el-Makhzan* and *bled es Siba* respectively. They tended to conflate *qabila* with the *zawiya* and to locate both of them beyond the reach of the dynast. In this paradigm, the Bayrouk community, the Takna *qabila* ensemble, belonged in *bled es Siba*. Anglophone historiography of the Maghrib tends to oscillate between deference to the ethnographic conception of *qabila* identity and the production of narratives that tend to subvert this conception. In such narratives Takna patterns of domicile and modes of identification come across as sprouts of the congruity of their common origin with 'infinite' nativity to Wadi Nun. At the same time, however, Wadi Nun, as *trab Takna* (Taknaland), comes across as a crossroad of the network of trade that linked the Mediterranean basin to sub-Saharan Africa—the Trans-Saharan Trade. Anglophone historians did not dwell on how encounter with agents of displacement like the dynasty or the caravan caters to the ethnographic notion of originary identity—i.e. endogenous descent, infinite nativity and ineffable attachment. I blamed this split between the premises and conclusion, the discrepancy between the Africanist, ethnographic, and Moroccan, Takna, conceptions of *qabila* identity, on the two contingent problems of translation and conception.

At the theoretical level, translation is a potential cradle for misconception mainly because it entails crossing from one tradition of signification to another. The casualties of such crossing tend to be high when translation also leads to the disavowal of the discursive import of idioms of identification in favor of the meaning of their equivalents in the host tradition of signification. It is, however, futile to think of the casualties of crossing without also thinking of the thing that validates the translation of foreign idioms to their closest equivalent in a host tradition of signification: textuality. Through analogy, textuality tends to license the infusion of such idioms with the eclectic theories the custodians of a particular textual tradition take as adequate points

of reference for the interpretation of human intentions and experiences. In the course of such treks, the specific experience being translated may also join what Mudimbe called "the visible and recent reasons" that perpetuate textual conventions. In that sense, translation tends to blur the unique aspects of experience the researcher seeks to authenticate. It is worth recalling how the pioneers of anthropology tended to invert what they took as the "experience," to borrow from Morgan, of "the remote ancestors of the Aryan nations" into an ethnographic present for "barbarous tribes."¹ On this occasion, the casualties of crossing seemed inaudible because the concepts being translated are mired in textual tropes reared by different, yet similar, notions of *in the beginning*.

Firstly, the translation of the (Arabic) Moroccan concept of *qabila* to the (Latin) English and French notion of tribe or *tribu* also translated into different conceptions of the identities possible for groups like the Takna. In the introduction and chapter one, I noted how the promotion of the Berbers and Takna to segmented tribes also qualified them for rites of endogenous descent and infinite nativity to Wadi Nun. The translation of *qabila* to tribe was compounded by the simultaneous inversion of the *zawaya* centers that dominated its space to dens of non-involved saints. The problem here is that ethnographers tended to authenticate tribe by stripping it of the redeeming qualities they reserved for its constitutive other, the state: universal religion, literacy, "literature" etc. If we push this theorization to its logical conclusion, then the translation of *qabila* to tribe entails its insulation from harbingers of universal truth and textuality such as the *zawaya*. That was not all. Anglophone anthropologists and historians merged sainthood with tribalism and posited them as Berber atavisms. As a synonym of Berber and saint, tribe becomes intelligible courtesy of its juxtaposition with an equally haphazard amalgam of Arab, orthodox and dynasty. The juxtaposition of Berber, as *zawiya* tribe, with the dynasty, as orthodox Arab, underpins the location of the segmented tribe in the terrain where power and resources are, arguably, distributed rather than contested, *bled es Siba*. The mismatch between tribe, as non-literate, and the *zawiya*, as a den of texts, sums up the split between the ethnographic and Takna conceptions of *qabila* identity.

In chapters one and two, I posited the discrepancy between the ethnographic, and the Takna and Bayrouk conceptions of origin as a point of departure to include the demographic histories of their space, al-Sus and Tuwat, among the casualties of translation. Translation turned the Takna into segmentary tribes precisely because it enabled colonial pundits and post-colonial academics to disavow their mundane, albeit realistic, myths of origin in favor of eclectic moments of social birth like "antiquity" and *in the beginning*. Textuality seemed to resolve the question of Takna origin because it enabled these authors to blur the demographic ruptures that render such solutions untenable. For example, discovery in the text led colonial ethnographers and post-colonial sociologists and historians to conflate domicile in Wadi Nun with descent from its first named inhabitants, "the Getules (Gaetulians) of antiquity." In other words, it was because Takna origin was born in the text that they, as descendants of Getules, also became eligible for the kind of atavisms that eased their classification as segmented tribes.

¹Morgan, "Ethical Periods," In *History of Anthropological Theory*, 46—see Introduction.

Secondly, it would be naïve to imagine that translation per se or even the excavation of a “non-literate” Berber ancestry for the Takna could have, by itself, sanctioned the inversion of their *qabila* ensemble to segmented tribes. On this occasion, translation worked because it also secularized the textual lenses that enabled pre-modern Europeans to make sense of the space they called *Barbary* and the people they knew as the *Moors*. As a metaphor of otherness, the “savage” tribe became intelligible because it functioned as a secular alias for the “fanatic” *Moor* pre-modern Euro-Christians had, to borrow from Riley, “been taught to consider the worst of barbarians.”² The discursive assassination of the *Moor* also eased the obviation of the history that inhibits the demotion of groups like the Takna to “ruler-less” tribes. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine how and why the “diagram of knowledge and power” ethnographers routinely credit with the transformation of “savage tribes” to nations could have failed to do its job in the Maghrib? In the introduction, I noted how secularization enabled colonial and post-colonial ethnographers to retain the holistic idea of single creation and fanning out lurking beneath the notion of segmentation. In chapter three, I noted how secularization led post-colonial historians of the Trans-Saharan Trade to blur the sense of “holy cause” informing the abolitionist text and, in effect, to turn, to borrow from Curtin, the “pious forgeries” it inspired to audits of the cargo of “the caravans of slaves.”³

As an adjutant of secularization, translation tends to blur even the experiences that made it to the mainstream of academic scholarship. For example, the changes congruent with conquest by and conversion to Islam failed to subvert the translation of *qabila* to “savage tribe” because they did not excise the differences that catapulted the *Moor* or *Nazarene* to a barbarian other. In the introduction and chapter one, I noted how the silence of the Takna *nasaba* (genealogists) on “the Getules of antiquity” was offset by their inclusion amongst the “Muslim tribesmen” Gellner located “in the largely arid zone stretching roughly from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic and the Niger Bend.”⁴ I suggested that the Moroccan segmented tribe outlived its non-literate cousin precisely because of its ability to simulate, “at Europe’s doorsteps,” what Fromentin called “the migrations of Israel.”⁵ In that sense, the notion of segmentation has become a secular, academic, dogma precisely because of its illustrious career as a sacred dogma. Yet, when we gaze at the histories ‘in-between’ we also discover that the “givens” that enabled Susians like the Takna to regress from adjutants of “despots” and “fanatic saints” to savage tribes hark back to the kind of “givens” underpinning the juxtaposition of *Moor* with *Nazarene*. As an exhibit of, to borrow from Jackson, “the arrogance of the *Moor*,” *qabila* becomes entitled to the kind of history “oriental despotism” can produce and, in that case, it ceases to be a “free” tribe.⁶ In short, translation bred the kind of inversions that eased the construction of an ethnographic present on the debris of history. If we posit “the scramble for Africa” as a cradle for these kinds of inversions,

²Riley, *Loss of the American Brig Commerce*, 278—see chapter two.

³Curtin, *Africa Remembered*, 4-5—see chapter three.

⁴Gellner, *Muslim Society*, 189—see the Introduction.

⁵Fromentin, *Un été dans le Sahara*, in *Writing French Algeria*, Dunwoodie, 54—see chapter one.

⁶For these kinds of splits see, Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco*, 55-56, 143, 287—see chapter one.

then *qabila* regresses to tribe because the dynastic realm, network of trade and "literature" that 'civilized' its space were reviled rather than feared. The construction of a generic segmented tribe was, then, contingent on the decapitation of the agents of history that made its *Moorish* ancestry glitter.

Lastly, the descent from *Moor* to tribe and from "golden trade" to "caravans of slaves," underpins the split in the Bayrouk and Takna images in the text I sought to critique in this thesis. The split, I suggested, was spawned by the oscillation between the anointment of the dynasty and the caravan as the motors of Maghribian history and the obviation of their ability to tamper with patterns of domicile in places like al-Sus and Tuwat. Silence on displacement tends to compound the problems of translation and conception. At the discursive level, translation also perpetuated the split between the simultaneous presentation of the Bayrouk as 'African' tribesmen and *Moorish* traders. As tribesmen, the Bayrouk become different from the same dynasts Moroccan academics and Africanists invoke to account for the history of their space. By situating *qabila*, as tribe, in binary opposition to the dynasty, translation obscures instances of collusion between the Bayrouk and the Alawite dynasts of their time. In contrast, the Bayrouk as *Moorish* traders tend to procure record numbers of "concubines" that could have been marketed only in the dynastic realm that could not "subdue" them. Instead of cajoling the guardians of this market, for example, the Bayrouk become, to borrow from Pennell, "kindred spirit" of traders with no interest in human merchandise. The mismatch between tribe and *zawiya* is compounded by the incongruity of hankering after wealth or power with the notions of "subsistence" and "balanced opposition."

In contrast, the distancing of tribe from "literature and writing" tends to obviate the role of textuality in the Bayrouk conception of origin and history. In the second and third chapters of the thesis, I noted how the narrator uses historical metaphors and textual knowledge to construct a futuristic past for his family. Literacy was also the main tool that helped the Bayrouk to run the commercial enterprise that, to all intents and purposes, guaranteed their positional superiority amongst the Takna and brought them to the attention of the dynast and the author. These splits between premises and conclusions tend to amplify how the translation of *qabila* to tribe mystifies the Takna and Bayrouk modes of identification and blurs the historical ruptures that could be used to deconstruct them. I noted that a return to the classical conception of *qabila* can also ease the restitution of what was lost as a result of its translation to tribe.

In the introduction, I identified the main conceptual and empirical merits of my return to the notion of *qabila*. Tribe has become suspect because of its derogatory connotations and intellectual imprecision. It is derogatory because of its excessive use by colonial pundits to chastise their subjects and imprecise because of its predication on the equally elusive notion of the primitive. The conflation of tribe with static signifiers of originary identity like "the natural givens" or the "tie of blood" renders it particularly unhelpful as a tool of historical inquiry. It would, for example, be a contradiction in term to posit an 'enemy' of change to explain change. These were the kind of reservations that prompted the post-colonial exodus from tribe to "ethnic group." I noted that post-colonial anthropologists and historians of sub-Saharan Africa identified tribe as a creature of colonial expediency. In contrast, postmodern theorists tended to consider tribe a creature of textuality and tracked its intellectual genealogy back to the

"last rupture" in European epistemology: the Enlightenment. These reservations underpin the current oscillation between its displacement by "ethnic group" and entrapment in inverted comas: tribe. I noted how the flight from tribe to ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa also coincided with its stuffing with the secularized notion of segmentation, and its repatriation to Morocco. I suggested that the repatriation of tribe to Morocco is unwarranted not simply because of its imprecision and checkered career, but also because it was deployed to supplant a term which, by the most conventional anthropological standards, should have been its constitutive other, *qabila*.

I used the similarity between the fetters of tribal identity and primordial attachment to collate my return to the classical notion of *qabila* with subscription to the postmodern emphasis on the discursive and conditional nature of identification. I added that postmodern conceptions of identification are in tone with classical Maghribian theorizations of origin and identity advanced by authors like Ibn Khaldun. For example, Ibn Khaldun's conception of *nasab* (genealogy) as an "illusionary matter" and predication of the survival of the *asabiya* (solidarity) it spawns on its tangible "fruit" (*thamara*) presaged and, indeed, lurk beneath Spivak's demotion of postmodern identities to "commodities." Moroccan sociologists and historians used such interfaces between classical and postmodern visions of identification and, in the process, were also able to produce the kind of "reality-based" paradigms Miller and Bourqia have recently found "refreshingly nonconformist."⁷ Inasmuch as they transcend the ethnographic fixation on the *makhzan-siba* modality, these paradigms also tend to amplify the split between the Takna and Africanist conceptions of the place of the *zawiya* or the dynasty in *qabila* notions of origin and history. In this thesis, I also equated the return to *qabila* with the return to "the sources" that speak to its place in time and space, and its terms of interaction with the motors of Maghribian history: the dynasty, the caravan and the *zawiya*. I posited spatiality and textuality as the main constants that can enable the researcher to deconstruct the Takna and Bayrouk conceptions of origin and history.

Firstly, the return to *qabila* tends to reify the contiguity of translation, as a form of conquest by the pen, with conquest by the sword or "the maxim gun." I noted that the conflation of being Berber with being tribal was conceived in the bosom of the process leading to and following on the European "scramble for Africa." In a similar manner, the mapping out of the Berbers as *qabail* was sanctioned by the Arab conquest of the Maghrib. Here, even if we ignore the conquest by the pen the Arab conquest of the Maghrib had set in motion, the fact remains that the Berber origins and *qabila* formations incarcerated in classical texts were conceived in the wake of forms of displacement that do not auger well for notions of originary identity and cultural atavism. It is difficult, for example, to think of origin or identities in Tuwat without also thinking of the frequent allusion to the *Kharijite* dispositions of its Zanata occupants, the frequency of their conflicts with and flights from dynasties or their treks to *Bilad al-Sudan*. I also noted that notwithstanding their attempts to credit the Sanhaja with descent from *lost Arabs*, classical authors were unable to locate the Lamta and Jazula of al-Sus in time without also thinking of the utility of their *qabila* ensembles to the caravan or their encounters with foreign invaders—namely, the Idrisids, Fatimids,

⁷Miller and Bourqia, "Introduction to the Discussion," In the Shadow of the Sultan, 1-14, 5.

Almoravids and Almohads. Almost at the same time that it brings "the Getules of antiquity" back to life, the translation of *qabila* to tribe blurs the rather 'recent' historical contingencies that made the Zanata or Sanhaja identities glitter. It also licenses the simultaneous silence on the role of textuality in the authorship of esoteric notions of origin like exile from *holy land* and descent from cursed or blessed ancestors: *Philistines*, *lost Arabs*, *Sahaba* (companions) etc. Yet, the same textual tradition that hatched these esoteric origins tells us that neither the existence of the Takna nor their domicile in Wadi Nun can be traced back to the era of the Arab conquest let alone "antiquity." Rather, this textual tradition indicates that the historical chasm that separates the mutation of the Sanhaja, Lamta and Jazula, from the emergence of the Takna *qabila* ensemble is too long to warrant an investiture of the latter with direct descent from the former. The Takna narratives do not dispute this conclusion.

The inclination to posit encounter with the dynasty and, hence, the text, as a frame of reference to locate *qabila* in time and space became a salient fixture in Maghribian discourses on identity and history. For example, extant chronicles of the period from the Arab conquest to the rise of the Almohad dynasty, routinely posit encounter with and recruitment by *kharijite* rebels, *Shiite* refugees or *Sunni* reformers as the intelligible points of reference for the location of the "conquest Arabs" and the "first generation Berbers" in time and space. In contrast, service to the *sufi* savant and his royal patron became the tool box for the identification of the "second generation" Berbers and "fourth generation" Arabs of the Marinid and Shurafa periods. In chapter one, I noted that the *zawaya* savants and Shurafa dynasts incarcerated in the Takna subaltern narratives earned their status as the co-fathers of their *qabila* ensemble precisely because they controlled space and trade arteries, and, as such, were in a position to fleece its occupants. From this vantage point, it would be an exercise in futility to situate the Takna in al-Sus or its Sahara and yet credit them, as segmented tribes, with the ability to elude omnipotent dynasts much less the omniscient "figure" Hammoudi dubbed "the prince as saint and executioner."⁸ I concluded that the Takna *qabila* ensemble was born courtesy of the frequent collusion rather than intermittent collision between the *zawaya* and Shurafa dynasties that controlled the space that gave meaning to their *qabila* identity. Takna identity was, first and foremost, spatial identity.

Secondly, in the same way that the return to *qabila* and the classical sources subverts its distancing from the dynasty, emphasis on the spatial nature of its identity amplifies the discursive import of the narrator's imagination of the Bayrouk relation to the Takna. From the discussion in chapter one and two it becomes obvious that the spatial distance that separates Tuwat from al-Sus also translated into differences in the identity designations assigned to their respective occupants. Given his tendency to 'raid' classical texts, one cannot help but feel that the narrator was aware of the centrality of textuality-spatiality to the construction of *qabila* origin and identity. To historicize the Bayrouk affiliation with the Takna, he traced their respective origins back to the same space, Tuwat. In that sense, the Susian Takna and Bayrouk belong together because their ancestors were, once upon a time, Tuwatians. But equity in descent from Tuwat does not mean the Takna and Bayrouk were kinsmen. Here, the investiture of the Bayrouk with *Ja'farite* descent puts them "in the company" of the upper crust of the

⁸Hammoudi, "The Reinvention of Dar al-Mulk," *In the Shadow of the Sultan*, 139-40—see Introduction

Moroccan social order, right behind Shurafa like the Alawite sultans. In contrast, descent from Hilal puts the common Takna behind the Bayrouk but above sedentary *Brabir* (wayward Berbers) and pastoral *a'rab* (wayward Arabians) of al-Sus and its Sahara. Through it all origin comes across both as an aftereffect and guarantor of the tangible disparities in access to levers of power and material means of social existence *qabila*, as segmented tribe, is supposed to lack. While collusion with sultans, peerage with *zawaya* grandees and access to the caravan perpetuated the material bases of the Bayrouk positional superiority, "literature" enabled them to construct the origins that seemed to ordain such achievement. In that sense, the translation of *qabila* to tribe not only blurs the role of textuality in the articulation of its notion of origin, but also the complicity of the dynasty and the *zawiya* in the ordering of its social existence.

Finally, the return to the textual tradition informing the narrator's vision of *qabila* and the dynasty, can also help one to bypass the stylized images of the third pillar in the Bayrouk conception of history and identity, the caravan. In the introduction, I noted that the historiography of the Trans-Saharan Trade tends to oscillate between the classical and modern, abolitionist, presentations of the caravan as a metaphor for *the golden trade of the Moors* or "Negro" captivity in the Maghrib. In chapter three, I noted how the conflation of the caravan with the importation of, to borrow from Hopkins, "state necessities" or "concubines" also renders it amenable to comparison with the trans-Atlantic caravel. Given the congruity of being black in the Americas with being of servile descent, I added, this kind of comparison also blurs the historicity of African, as *sudan*, domicile in the Maghrib and mutes the variability in the modes and reasons behind the journey to North Africa or the Middle East for that matter. In their attempt to bridge the split between the absence of an 'African' Diaspora in the Mediterranean basin and, to borrow from Hopkins, the "large Negro communities" the caravans had ostensibly transported, Africanists often posit the caravan as a generic origin for black Maghribians. In contrast, entrapment in the "liberal hegemony" abolitionism has spawned tended to ordain slaves as 'inevitable' object of Susian traders like the Bayrouk.

The return to the classical textual tradition and sources also led me to distinguish between the caravan as lore and the caravan as mundane reality. These are not the same thing. As lore, the caravan becomes a "cure" for poverty and, as such, is too majestic to be conflated with catering to the needs of the improvident. It is the metaphor for the exotic par excellence: gold, maidens and ivory. This was the caravan the classical author frequently used to regale his audience and, as such, was invoked by the narrator to chase underachieving ancestors from the Bayrouk saga, especially, those identified as *fallahin* (farmers) and *kassabin* (peddlers) per se. When we take gold out of the equation, this classical caravan also becomes the modern caravan the abolitionist, as *Nazarene*, used to chastise his *Moorish* other. To recover the realistic, mundane, caravan, I invoked Ibn Khaldun's conflation of the "proficient" trader with catering to the needs of both "the rich and poor, sultan and subjects."⁹ I deployed this "common sense approach" to bypass the split between the authorial fixation on gold and maidens and the repletion of the Bayrouk registers with caravans that tended to consume (European) cloth and 'lay' gum and ostrich feathers. As "proficient" traders, the

⁹ Ibn Khaldun, *Mokaddimat Ibn Khaldun*, ed. Al-Juwadi, 367—See chapter three.


Bayrouk seemed to associate financial solvency with catering to European appetite for raw materials and distribution of the affordable textiles their factories were spewing out with alarming rapidity.

In chapter four, I posited this conclusion as a frame of reference to chronicle the Bayrouk quest for a direct "passage" to European markets and to explain its ramifications for their relations with Saharan customers, Susian peers and the Alawite court. The Bayrouk expectations from the caravan and choice of Saharan customers, I added, were extensions of their equation of solvency with access to European markets. In that sense, the caravan survived precisely because of the ability of traders like the Bayrouk to transform themselves to beneficiaries from "legitimate commerce."


Inasmuch as it became a catalyst for the rift amongst Bayrouk's heirs and Mawlai al-Hasan's trek to Gulimeme (1886), the quest for access to European markets tends to demonstrate the pitfalls of the translation of *qabila* to tribe and its conception as the binary opposite of the dynastic realm. I noted how a much weaker Alawite state was still able to outwit *awlad* Bayrouk (sons of Bayrouk). I noted that the Alawite court was able to persuade Bayrouk himself to give up his dream of a local port and to redeem his "religion and honor" without the help of a punitive expedition. I added that the court used the same strategy to bring his son al-Habib back to the fold and later to foil the more ambitious plans entertained by Bayrouk's direct heir, Muhammad. On both occasions, Wadi Nun's location at the crossroad of the Trans-Saharan network of trade was the main reason the embattled Alawite court could not entertain the possibility of its regression to a den of "free" tribes. And on both occasions, tribal autonomy failed to materialize courtesy of collusion between the dynasty and the *zawaya*, namely, the Bayrouk Simlali in-law, al-Husayn Ibn Hashim. Here, the Simlali defection to the side of the dynast tends to demystify the ethnographic inclination to merge the *zawiya* into the tribe and to downplay the political role of the "saints." And inasmuch as it sustained the *Makhzan-Siba* dichotomy, the translation of *qabila* to tribe also seems to have enabled ethnographers and historians to construct and conserve what Pennell dubbed an "unfortunate" and, seemingly, never ending "controversy." It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the ending of such grand, albeit unnecessary, controversies.

Map I

Wadi Nun and it's Surroundings




Map II
The Takna & Their Neighbors




Map III

Tuwat and the Trans-Saharan Trade Network



MAP IV

Gulimeme and the Trans-Saharan Network



GLOSSARY

<i>ahl</i>	Arabic: family (of), people (of).
<i>Amir</i>	Arabic: 'commander', also 'prince'.
<i>a'rab</i>	Arabic: derogatory variant of Arab, 'wayward' ('uncivilised') Arabs—singular <i>a'rabi</i> .
<i>ait</i>	Shilha (Berber): like <i>Id</i> , progeny of, people of. The terms are usually used as the equivalent of the Arabic <i>banu</i> (<i>bani</i>), <i>Awlad</i> and <i>dhawi</i> —sons of, people of.
<i>Awlad dulaym</i>	Arabic: <i>awlad</i> (literally, sons of). A western Saharan group scattered in the area between southern Morocco and northern Mauritania (the Western Sahara).
<i>asabiya</i>	Arabic: v. <i>asaba</i> -- to tie together. Literally, group-feeling, sense of being part of a collectivity: cohesion, spirit de corp.
<i>a'yan</i>	Arabic: elite, notables.
<i>badiya</i>	Arabic: country-side, rural areas, hinterland and their human occupants, the <i>bedou</i> (Bedouins). The term is also a referent to people who make a living by tending to livestock per se, the nomads.
<i>Bambari</i>	Manding: Bambara, a Mending-speaking group in the Niger Bend—namely the kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta.
<i>banu</i>	Arabic: literally, sons of. Figuratively it conveys the same meaning as <i>awlad</i> and <i>dhaw</i> -- Banu Jarar, Awlad Dulaym, Dhawi Hassan etc.
<i>Brabir</i>	Arabic: derogatory variant of Berber, 'wayward' (uncivilized) Berber-- the equivalent of <i>a'rab</i> .
<i>bled (balad)</i>	Arabic: land, country, domain.
<i>bled es Siba</i>	Arabic: land of lawlessness, anarchy and, hence, the den of the <i>a'rab</i> and <i>Brabir</i> .
<i>Bukhari</i>	Arabic: Lit., from Bukhara. Bukhara is a city in central Asia, Uzbekistan. It was the site of domicile of the famous (Sunnite) Muslim jurist, al-Bukhari. He was the 'editor' of one of the two authentic collections of Prophet Muhammad's sayings-- <i>Sahih al-Bukhari</i> . In Morocco the term was used to refer to Mawlai Ismael's 'slave' army. They, reportedly, expressed their support to him by swearing on <i>Sahih al-Bukhari</i> .
<i>dar</i>	Arabic: house, quarters, land or domain—figuratively, family.
<i>fallah</i>	Arabic: v. <i>falah</i> , to plough: 'farmer', 'peasant'.
<i>Fellatah</i>	Arabic (from Kanuri): distortion of <i>Fulbe</i> (singular; <i>Pullo</i>). Name of a linguistic group widely dispersed in an area extending from the basin of the Senegal River in the west to the Nile valley in the east. In Arabic, French and English texts they are also referred as Filan (Arabic) Fula, Peul (French) and Fulani (English).

<i>hadar</i>	Arabic: Literally, 'to come', 'to be present'. Figuratively, <i>hadar</i> signifies urban center (city) and, hence, those who live in it—the opposite of <i>badiya</i> and <i>bedou</i> .
<i>hamada</i>	Arabic (Morocco): 'arid plateau', 'desert'.
<i>hajj</i>	Arabic: 'pilgrim'
<i>haraka</i>	Arabic: 'movement'. In Morocco: military expedition.
<i>Hijaz</i>	Arabic: classical name for that (south-western) part of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the Red Sea: from Mecca in the south to Medina in the north.
<i>hijra</i>	Arabic: v. <i>hajar</i> : 'to desert', 'to flee from', 'to migrate'. <i>Hijra</i> is usually used to refer to Prophet Muhammad's flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E, the first year in the Islamic calendar.
<i>Iqzulin</i>	Shilha (Berber): a political alignment linking a plethora of <i>qabila</i> ensembles occupying the area extending from the Anti-Atlas in the north to the Western Sahara in the south. In the Nineteenth century, its most 'active' members were the Majjat, the Ait Umran, the Takna and the Rgaybat. It is usually defined in terms of opposition to their archrivals, the <i>Tahukat</i> Ba'qila, Awlad Jarar etc.
<i>Ja'farite</i>	Arabic: derived from Ja'far (d.629). It indicates descent from Ja'far Ibn Abi Talib, the paternal cousin of Prophet Muhammad and one of the early converts to Islam, the <i>sahaba</i> (companions).
<i>jama'a</i>	Arabic: 'group (of people)'. In Morocco, it signifies the notables, the a'yan, 'in council'. Collectively, the <i>jama'a</i> represents and make decisions on behalf of a bounded community—village, town or <i>qabia</i> hence, the <i>jama'</i> of so and so.
<i>kafilah</i>	Arabic: caravan
<i>kanun</i>	Arabic: literally, hearth, oven, fireplace. In Morocco, it signifies household. In Shurafa (tax) records <i>Kamun</i> is used as a signifier of the individual family unit—the basic constituent of a <i>qabila</i> .
<i>kassab</i>	Arabic: v. <i>kasab</i> , to earn. In Morocco: peddler (of livestock or grain).
<i>Kharijite</i>	Arabic: v. <i>kharaj</i> , 'to exit', 'to leave'. A term used to refer to those who started their political career as partisans (<i>shiia</i>) of Muhammad cousin, Ali Ibn Abi Talib during the first Muslim civil war, <i>hurub al-ftina</i> (657-661). They later broke up with him, hence, the name <i>Kharijite</i> , and 'produced' his assassin. The most salient feature of <i>Kharijism</i> , as a politico-religious ideology, is the belief in the absolute equality of all believers.
<i>khidma</i>	Arabic: literally, 'service'. In Morocco, it signifies service to the sultan or <i>sufi</i> savant.
<i>laqab</i>	Arabic: 'nickname'.
<i>Leff</i>	(Possibly) Arabic: v. <i>lafa</i> : 'to wind up'. In Morocco, the term refers to an alignment linking individuated <i>qabila</i> groupings—the Ait Jamal <i>Leff</i> , the Iqzulin <i>leff</i> .

<i>luh</i>	Arabic: 'slate (for writing)'— p. <i>alwah</i> . In Morocco, a written contract specifying the terms of interaction governing members of a single <i>qabila</i> or <i>leff</i> .
<i>Maghrib</i>	Arabic: 'place of sunset', 'west/occident'. It is the opposite of <i>Mashriq</i> , 'place of sunrise' (east/orient). <i>Maghrib</i> is also a signifier of the Muslim prayer performed immediately after sunset. In a geographical sense, it signifies Northwest Africa in general and what is today Algeria (<i>al-Maghrib al-Adna</i>) and Morocco (<i>al-Maghrib al-Aqsa</i>) in particular.
<i>Malikism</i>	Derived from the Arabic ' <i>Malikiyya</i> '. It is a signifier of the juridical school named after Malik Ibn Anas— the author of <i>al-Muatta</i> .
<i>Makhzan</i>	Arabic: Literally, 'store'. In Morocco, it signifies the dynastic realm or the central government particularly during the <i>Shurafa</i> period—1500s onwards.
<i>marabout</i>	French: corruption of the Arabic term <i>Murabit</i> . In the classical period, <i>Murabit</i> was used to refer to those deputized to protect the 'frontiers' of a unified Islamic realm. Later on the term was used to refer to pious (<i>sufi</i>) figures. In French sources it often signifies Muslim figures of 'dubious' political motives and, by implication, 'academic' credentials.
<i>mausem</i>	Arabic: Literally, season, time of harvest. In al-Sus, the term signifies a market-day and place established by or held in memory of a Sufi savant—ex. <i>mausem</i> Sidi Ahmad Ibn Musa (Illigh) or Sidi al-Ghazi (Gulimeme)
<i>mawali</i>	Arabic: (singular, <i>Mawla</i>) literally, 'clients, allies'. In classical texts, the term is a referent to non-Arab converts to Islam.
<i>mawlai</i>	Arabic: Literally, 'my lord': a term of endearment used to address claimants of <i>Shurafa</i> descent.
<i>Mudar</i>	Arabic: an alternative appellation for Arab claimants of descent from <i>Adnan</i> (Ibn Ismael). It acquires its full import only in juxtaposition to the deployment of <i>Yemen</i> as a signifier of claimants of descent from his 'sibling', <i>Qahtan</i> .
<i>nakhas</i>	Arabic: 'slave-dealer' (trader). <i>Nikhasa</i> : slave-trading.
<i>nisba</i>	Arabic: 'pedigree or genealogy'— <i>nasaba</i> (genealogist)
<i>nizala</i>	Arabic: (v.) <i>nasal</i> . Literally it means to disembark, dismount, to descend. In Morocco, <i>nizala</i> is a rest house licensed by the government. The proprietor was obliged to pay for any losses incurred within the area under his jurisdiction.
<i>qabail</i>	Arabic: plural of <i>qabila</i> — also <i>qabil</i> : group of (people). <i>Qabila</i> is the Arabic term usually translated as <i>tribe</i> (English) or <i>tribu</i> (French).
<i>Qafr</i>	Arabic: literally, 'arid', 'empty' terrain or 'wasteland'. Classical authors used the term <i>qafr</i> to posit the arid Sahara as the ecological other of the 'verdant' Maghrib.

<i>Qaid</i>	Arabic: literally, 'leader', 'commander'. In Morocco, <i>qaid</i> signifies an official military or administrative rank.
<i>Qusur</i>	Arabic: (singular, <i>qasr</i>) literally 'palaces'-- In northwest Africa, <i>qasr</i> denotes an agrarian settlement centered in a reliable source of water, <i>waha</i> (oasis).
<i>Sahaba</i>	Arabic: (sing. <i>Sahabi</i>), literally, companions. The term signifies the companions of Prophet Muhammad.
<i>sahel (sahil)</i>	Arabic: 'shore', 'coast'.
<i>Siba</i>	Arabic: (<i>saib</i>), 'fallow', 'ownerless'-- figuratively, 'lawless'.
<i>Sidi</i>	Arabic: (<i>sayyid</i>) 'master'. In Moroccan parlance, <i>Sidi</i> is a term of endearment used to address pious figures-- <i>Sufi</i> savants, their descendents and guardians of their <i>zawaya</i>
<i>Sharia'</i>	Arabic: Islamic legal codes espoused by the four schools of interpretation and embodied in jurisprudence
<i>Shilha</i>	Berber: the Berber language spoken in southern Morocco-- especially in the Atlas Mountains, al-Sus and to a lesser extent, the Western Sahara. In southern Morocco, speakers of this language are collectively identified as <i>Shiluh</i>
<i>Shurafa,</i>	Arabic: (singular, <i>shareef</i>), honorific title accorded to those claiming descent from Prophet Muhammad via his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali Ibn Abi Talib.
<i>Trarza:</i>	Arabic: a name for one of the branches of the Hassan (Ma'qil). They settled the area between the southern 'shore' of the Sahara and the river Senegal, southwestern Mauritania. They formed a principality which, in the 18 th . and 19 th centuries also came to be known by the same name.
<i>talib</i>	Arabic: literally, 'seeker' (of knowledge), 'student'. Like <i>Murabit</i> , the term is also used as a signifier of literacy and piety.
<i>tijarat al-sudan</i>	Arabic: Literally 'the Sudan trade', figuratively, the Moroccan name for the Trans-Saharan Trade.
<i>tajir</i>	Arabic: (plural, <i>tujjar</i>), 'trader', 'marchant'
<i>tariq</i>	Arabic: 'road', 'trail'.
<i>trab</i>	Arabic (<i>turab</i>): 'earth', 'soil', 'land'. When followed by of so and so, it signifies, homeland-- <i>trab</i> Takna (Talnaland)
<i>Tuareg</i>	Berber: Saharan Berber-speaking groups living in an area extending from southern Algeria to Lake Chad.
<i>tawqir</i>	Arabic: 'respect', 'deference'.
<i>zabiha</i>	Arabic: verb, <i>zabih</i> : literally, to slaughter (an animal). <i>Zabiha</i> is also the carcass of an slaughtered animal. (In Morocco) the animal to be sacrificed is donated by the seeker of protection but is to be slaughtered at the 'door-steps' of the would-be protector.
<i>zaheer,</i>	Arabic: 'decree', 'warrant'. In Morocco, usually a royal decree either absolving its carrier from certain duties or delegating certain responsibilities to him.

zawiya

Arabic: (plural, *zawayya*), literally, 'corner', angle. It signifies a site devoted to (religious) learning and meditation. But (in practice) it is also a center of economic and political power.

Zlata:

Arabic and Berber: dues collected in return for provision of protection to caravans and traders. *Tazlit* is the act of escorting (*yazlit*) caravans or traders for a certain distance or time.

wahat

Arabic: Plural of *waha*, 'oases'.

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